What we remember and what we tell: the effects of culture and self-priming on memory representations and narratives

Two experiments were conducted to explore culture and self-priming effects on memories of Caucasian and Asian American adults (N=526). In the experimental conditions, either the collective or private self was primed prior to retrieval. Participants then described their earliest childhood memories (Study 1) or recalled a fictional story (Study 2). Systematic cultural differences in memory content were obtained across both memory tasks, independent of priming conditions. Caucasians tended to recall specific, one-moment-in-time events that focused on the individual as the central character. Asians tended to provide memories of general, routine events centering on collective activities and social interactions. Priming effects also emerged: memory content reflected the particular aspect of the self being primed. Findings are discussed in light of the interactive relation between memory representations and memory narratives and the role culture plays in remembering.     

What we remember and what we tell: The effects of culture and self-priming on memory representations and narratives

Two experiments were conducted to explore culture and self-priming effects on memories of Caucasian and Asian American adults (N = 526). In the experimental conditions, either the collective or private self was primed prior to retrieval. Participants then described their earliest childhood memories (Study 1) or recalled a fictional story (Study 2). Systematic cultural differences in memory content were obtained across both memory tasks, independent of priming conditions. Caucasians tended to recall specific, one-moment-in-time events that focused on the individual as the central character. Asians tended to provide memories of general, routine events centring on collective activities and social interactions. Priming effects also emerged: memory content reflected the particular aspect of the self being primed. Findings are discussed in light of the interactive relation between memory representations and memory narratives and the role culture plays in remembering.     

Keeping track of where we are: Spatial working memory in navigation

Spatial working memory (WM) seems to include two types of spatial information: locations and relations. However, this distinction has been based on small-scale tasks. Here, we used a virtual navigation paradigm to examine whether WM for locations and relations applies to the large-scale spatial world. We found that navigators who successfully learned two routes and also integrated them were superior at maintaining multiple locations and multiple relations in WM. However, over the entire spectrum of navigators, WM for spatial relations, but not locations, was specifically predictive of route integration performance. These results lend further support to the distinction between these two forms of spatial WM and point to their critical role in individual differences in navigation proficiency.     

Spatial working memory load affects counting but not subitizing in enumeration

The present study investigated whether subitizing reflects capacity limitations associated with two types of working memory tasks. Under a dual-task situation, participants performed an enumeration task in conjunction with either a spatial (Experiment 1) or a nonspatial visual (Experiment 2) working memory task. Experiment 1 showed that spatial working memory load affected the slope of a counting function but did not affect subitizing performance or subitizing range. Experiment 2 showed that nonspatial visual working memory load affected neither enumeration efficiency nor subitizing range. Furthermore, in both spatial and nonspatial memory tasks, neither subitizing efficiency nor subitizing range was affected by amount of imposed memory load. In all the experiments, working memory load failed to influence slope, subitizing range, or overall reaction time. These findings suggest that subitizing is performed without either spatial or nonspatial working memory. A possible mechanism of subitizing with independent capacity of working memory is discussed.     

The face‐mind link: Why we see minds behind faces,and how others' minds change how we see their face

Understanding others' minds has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Psychologists, too, have recently begun asking questions about what causes us to see another person as having complex or simple mental faculties. Here, we review recent evidence linking how we perceive others' faces with how we perceive others' minds—the face‐mind link. We first discuss research demonstrating a face‐to‐mind effect, showing that both certain facial features (e.g., eyes) and face perception processes (e.g., configural processing) can trigger the perception that a face has a mind. We then discuss recent evidence demonstrating a mind‐to‐face effect, showing that believing a person is inhumane (i.e., their mind) leads their face to be processed less like a face and more like an object. Finally, we consider both the consequences of this bidirectional face‐mind link, and what the next steps may be in understanding how and why we infer minds from faces, and how and why beliefs about others' minds affects how we see their face.     

Reflecting on how we remember the personal past: missing components in the study of memory appraisal and theoretical implications

The current paper offers a selective review of the study of memory appraisal, focusing on recollections of the personal past, with the goal to bring attention to a missing component in this study. To date, memory appraisal studies have concentrated on participants’ assessments of the content of their personal recollections (e.g., their perceptual detail and story-like feel), including beliefs about the accuracy of that content. Participants’ assessments of reflection processes accompanying their recollections (e.g., a sense of piecing-together recollection fragments) have yet to be extensively examined. The lack of information on process-based appraisals is related to prior studies’ procedural constraints (e.g., kinds of cue prompts and their timing, minimal opportunities for reflection). Reasons for addressing this missing component provide the central themes of the paper. The reasons emerge from the analysis of autobiographical cueing studies, including integration of narrative research studies and autobiographical works. The analysis leads to suggestions for future research involving the use of personal narratives that are intended to address critiques of reconstruction accounts and unresolved questions in the study of memory appraisal.     

Item strength affects working memory capacity

Do the processing and online manipulation of stimuli that are less familiar require more working memory (WM) resources? Is it more difficult to solve demanding problems when the symbols involved are less rather than more familiar? We explored these questions with a dual-task paradigm in which subjects had to solve algebra problems of different complexities while simultaneously holding novel symbol–digit associations in WM. The symbols were previously unknown Chinese characters, whose familiarity was manipulated by differential training frequency with a visual search task for nine hour-long sessions over 3 weeks. Subsequently, subjects solved equations that required one or two transformations. Before each trial, two different integers were assigned to two different Chinese characters of the same training frequency. Half of the time, those characters were present as variables in the equation and had to be substituted for the corresponding digits. After attempting to solve the equation, subjects had to recognize which two characters were shown immediately before that trial and to recall the integer associated with each. Solution accuracy and response times were better when the problems required one transformation only; variable substitution was not required; or the Chinese characters were high frequency. The effects of stimulus familiarity increased as the WM demands of the equation increased. Character–digit associations were also recalled less well with low-frequency characters. These results provide strong support that WM capacity depends not only on the number of chunks of information one is attempting to process but also on their strength or familiarity.     

Emotional impact feedback affects how people remember an analogue trauma event

Do external motivational processes—in the form of social influences—shape people's memories for trauma? In this experiment, we examined the effects of social influence on memory and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomology for an analogue traumatic event. Seventy-two participants watched a distressing film; some received feedback about others' reactions to the film that either emphasised or downplayed the distressing nature of the film; control participants received no feedback. A week later, participants reported their symptoms, rated their memory on a number of characteristics and we tested their memory for the film's content. Participants who received feedback downplaying the film reported fewer PTSD-related analogue symptoms and weaker memory characteristics than their counterparts. The results suggest that people's memory phenomenology and analogue symptoms are influenced by others' feedback, but only when others' reactions downplayed the distressing nature of the film.     

Multisensory integration affects visuo-spatial working memory

In the present study, we investigate how spatial attention, driven by unisensory and multisensory cues, can bias the access of information into visuo-spatial working memory (VSWM). In a series of four experiments, we compared the effectiveness of spatially-nonpredictive visual, auditory, or audiovisual cues in capturing participants' spatial attention towards a location where to-be-remembered visual stimuli were or were not presented (cued/uncued trials, respectively). The results suggest that the effect of peripheral visual cues in biasing the access of information into VSWM depend on the size of the attentional focus, while auditory cues did not have direct effects in biasing VSWM. Finally, spatially congruent multisensory cues showed an enlarged attentional effect in VSWM as compared to unimodal visual cues, as a likely consequence of multisensory integration. This latter result sheds new light on the interplay between spatial attention and VSWM, pointing to the special role exerted by multisensory (audiovisual) cues.     

What we see: inattention and the capture of attention by meaning

Attention is necessary for the conscious perception of any object. Objects not attended to are not seen. What is it that captures attention when we are engaged in some attention-absorbing task? Earlier research has shown that there are only a very few stimuli which have this power and therefore are reliably detected under these conditions (for example, Mack & Rock, 1998; Moray, 1959). The two most reliable are the observer's own name and a happy face icon which seem to capture attention by virtue of their meaning. Three experiments are described which explore whether these stimuli are detected under conditions, heretofore unexamined, which either cause inattentional blindness or are associated with a perceptual failure associated with the limits of attention. The evidence obtained indicates that these stimuli have a unique capacity to capture and extend the limits of attention under conditions in which this has been deemed highly unlikely.     

When children forget to remember: Effects of reduced working memory availability on prospective memory performance

The preparatory attentional and memory processes theory (PAM) of prospective memory (PM) proposes that prospective remembering is influenced by the variation in the availability of WM resources. Consequently, PM should be impaired when WM resources are reduced either by direct WM manipulation or by individual differences associated with restricted WM performance. Our study tested this prediction in school-age children by examining the independent and interactive effects of three factors known to deplete availability of WM resources: increased processing demands of a concurrent arithmetic task, additional WM span requirements, and high trait anxiety. A sample of 10-year-old children (N = 128) performed a PM task, embedded in an ongoing arithmetic task, which progressively imposed greater WM processing demands. Half of these participants also concurrently carried out an embedded WM span task. The results supported the PAM hypothesis, showing that children’s PM was compromised by the restriction of WM resources, whether this resulted from increasing the processing demands on the ongoing task, from imposing additional WM span requirements, or from high trait anxiety. However, these WM-depleting factors exerted additive effects rather than an interactive impact, suggesting that they might each deplete different aspects of WM resource availability necessary for prospective remembering. Overall findings imply that children’s PM success is not only associated to their WM capacity but it mostly depends upon how many of those WM resources are available to be devoted to the PM requirement.     

Spatial memory: how egocentric and allocentric combine

Recent experiments indicate the need for revision of a model of spatial memory consisting of viewpoint-specific representations, egocentric spatial updating and a geometric module for reorientation. Instead, it appears that both egocentric and allocentric representations exist in parallel, and combine to support behavior according to the task. Current research indicates complementary roles for these representations, with increasing dependence on allocentric representations with the amount of movement between presentation and retrieval, the number of objects remembered, and the size, familiarity and intrinsic structure of the environment. Identifying the neuronal mechanisms and functional roles of each type of representation, and of their interactions, promises to provide a framework for investigation of the organization of human memory more generally.     

How I see me depends on how I see we: the role of attachment style in social comparison

The self-concept is a social, flexible construct that shifts in response to the salience of a relationship partner. Three related experiments found that the tendency to pursue closeness in relationships (as measured by attachment style) served as a moderator of the shift. Specifically, individuals who avoid closeness in relationships became less similar to salient friends via contrast effects, whereas those who pursued closeness in relationships became more similar to salient friends via assimilation effects. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the nature of the self-concept and the importance of friendships.     

Spatial working memory and inhibition of return

Recently we showed that maintaining a location in spatial working memory affects saccadic eye movement trajectories, in that the eyes deviate away from the remembered location (Theeuwes, Olivers, & Chizk, 2005). Such saccade deviations are assumed to be the result of inhibitory processes within the oculomotor system. The present study investigated whether this inhibition is related to the phenomenon of inhibition of return (IOR), the relatively slow selection of previously attended locations as compared with new locations. The results show that the size of IOR to a location was not affected by whether or not the location was kept in working memory, but the size of the saccade trajectory deviation was affected. We conclude that inhibiting working memory-related eye movement activity is not the same as inhibiting a previously attended location in space.     

Spatial memory in rats: electroconvulsive shock selectively disrupts working memory but spares reference memory

In two experiments rats were trained until they displayed highly accurate spatial memories when a 4-h delay was imposed between the to-be-remembered event (TBRE) and the retention test in a 12-arm radial maze. If the procedure tested only working memory (WM) electronvulsive shock (ECS) 2 h after the TBRE produced amnesia but ECS immediately after the TBRE was ineffective. If the testing procedure also involved a reference memory (RM) component, ECS degraded WM regardless of whether it was given 0 or 2 h after the TBRE. RM was not affected. With either training procedure administering ECS 2 h before the TBRE was ineffective. Thus, in the radial maze truly old spatial RM was immune to disruption by ECS while more recent WM was vulnerable. Possible explanations of the data are presented.     

How the physicality of space affects how we think about time

Time is an abstract concept that may be better understood when mapped onto space. For English speakers, typically a timeline is used that runs horizontally from left (past) to right (future) (Boroditsky, Fuhrman, & McCormick, 2011) and can be separated into regions, past and future. However, it is unclear from prior research how these regions along the timeline are differentiated. In addition, although for English speakers time is typically thought of in terms of a left–right axis, gestures and metaphors that conceptualize the past as behind and the future as ahead are prevalent, implicating the use of a front–back axis. In three experiments, participants made temporal judgments of pictures while holding their hands in various positions around their bodies, to assess whether the body or hands or both are used as anchors to differentiate regions and whether the front–back axis can be used as a timeline. In Experiment 1 we found independent influences of the body and the hands in anchoring the left–right axis. In Experiment 2 we found support for the use of the front–back axis to map time, with independent influences of the body and the hands in anchoring this axis as well. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated that the timeline must be configured in a way that is consistent with underlying conceptualizations of time, by showing that the above–below axis is not used for English speakers. Together, these results indicate that time is mapped onto space, with this mapping being constrained by underlying conceptualizations of time.     

To see and remember: visually specific information is retained in memory from previously attended objects in natural scenes

What is the nature of the representation formed during the viewing of natural scenes? We tested two competing hypotheses regarding the accumulation of visual information during scene viewing. The first holds that coherent visual representations disintegrate as soon as attention is withdrawn from an object and thus that the visual representation of a scene is exceedingly impoverished. The second holds that visual representations do not necessarily decay upon the withdrawal of attention, but instead can be accumulated in memory from previously attended regions. Target objects in line drawings of natural scenes were changed during a saccadic eye movement away from those objects. Three findings support the second hypothesis. First, changes to the visual form of target objects (token substitution) were successfully detected, as indicated by both explicit and implicit measures, even though the target object was not attended when the change occurred. Second, these detections were often delayed until well after the change. Third, changes to semantically inconsistent target objects were detected better than changes to semantically consistent objects.