Biological knowledge is more tentative than physics knowledge: Taiwan high school adolescents' views about the nature of biology and physics

Many educational psychologists believe that students' beliefs about the nature of knowledge, called epistemological beliefs, play an essential role in their learning process. Educators also stress the importance of helping students develop a better understanding of the nature of knowledge. The tentative and creative nature of science is often highlighted by contemporary science educators. However, few previous studies have investigated students' views of more specific knowledge domains, such as biology and physics. Consequently, this study developed a questionnaire to assess students' views specifically about the tentative and creative nature of biology and physics. From a survey of 428 Taiwanese high school adolescents, this study found that although students showed an understanding of the tentative and creative nature of biology and physics, they expressed stronger agreement as to the tentativeness of biology than that of physics. In addition, male students tended to agree more than did females that physics had tentative and creative features and that biology had tentative features. Also, students with more years of science education tended to show more agreement regarding the creative nature of physics and biology than those with fewer years.     

Metamodeling Knowledge: Developing Students' Understanding of Scientific Modeling

We argue that learning about the nature and utility of scientific models and engaging in the process of creating and testing models should be a central focus of science education. To realize this vision, we created and evaluated the Model-Enhanced ThinkerTools (METT) Curriculum, which is an inquiry-oriented physics curriculum for middle school students in which they learn about the nature of scientific models and engage in the process of modeling. Key components of our approach include enabling students to create computer models that express their own theories of force and motion, evaluate their models using criteria such as accuracy and plausibility, and engage in discussions about models and the process of modeling. Curricular trials in four science classes of an urban middle school indicate that this approach can facilitate a significant improvement in students' understanding of modeling. Further analyses revealed that the approach was particularly successful in clarifying and broadening students' understanding of the nature and purpose of models. The METT Curriculum also led to significant improvements in inquiry skills and physics knowledge. Comparisons of METT students' performance with that of prior ThinkerTools students suggest that the acquisition of metamodeling knowledge contributed to these gains. In particular, METT students wrote significantly better conclusions on the inquiry test and performed better on some of the far-transfer problems on the physics test. Finally, correlational results, including significant correlations of pretest modeling and inquiry scores with posttest physics scores, suggests that developing knowledge of modeling and inquiry transfers to the learning of science content within such a curriculum. Taken together, the findings suggest that an emphasis on model-based inquiry, accompanied by the development of metamodeling knowledge, can facilitate learning science content while also developing students' understanding of the scientific enterprise.     

Knowledge and society

The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to construct an argument to show that in specifying the ‘data’ of social science, we have to introduce an element of ‘interpretive understanding’ which radically alters the meaning of the term ‘empirical base’ in social scientific contexts, thus supplementing Winch's argument in his reply to Louch. At the same time, my argument shows, I believe, that this view of the nature of social science does not lead to any arbitrary restrictions on the methods of research pursued by social scientists, as is sometimes imagined. What the argument leads to is the conclusion that our knowledge of society involves distinctive epistemological features that differentiate this kind of knowledge from the kind of knowledge we have in the natural sciences.     

Cognitive technology to capture deep computational concepts with combinators

Computational activity is now recognized as a natural science, and computational and information processes have been discovered in the deep structures of many areas. Computations in the natural world were present long before the invention of computers, but a remarkable shift in understanding its fundamental nature occurs, in fact, before our eyes. The present moment, in fact, is a transition from the concept of computer science as an artificial science to the understanding that information processes are abundant in nature. Computing is recognized as a natural science that studies natural and artificial information processes.In everyday computing, operations are performed on the individual generators, with little attention paid to their internal structure. However, many common operations consist of more primitive constructions connected by a combination mode. The interaction of information processes and corresponding structures is carried out in an environment of “applicative interaction”, their applications to each other, and the study of the properties of this environment allows us to understand the nature of the computations.In the present work, the main attention is paid to elucidating the technological features of computations with individual generators, or objects. Their interaction is considered in an applicative environment, which allows us to elucidate the internal structure of ordinary operations, the knowledge of which allows us to understand their properties. The choice of initial constant generators, considered as generic ones and expressed by combinators, is discussed. These initial generators are used as the main “building blocks” that occur within the larger blocks of the applicative environment in interaction with each other. As a result of the interaction, constructions arise that give representative sets of ordinary operators and embedded computing systems.     

DIVINE DNA? “SECULAR” AND “RELIGIOUS” REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE IN NONFICTION SCIENCE TELEVISION PROGRAMS

Through analysis of film sequences focusing on DNA in two British Broadcasting Corporation nonfiction science television programs, Wonders of Life and Bang! Goes the Theory, first broadcast in 2013, contrasting “religious” and “secular” representations of science are identified. In the “religious” portrayal, immutable scientific knowledge is revealed to humanity by nature with minimal human intervention. Science provides a creation story, “explanatory omnicompetence,” and makes life existentially meaningful. In the “secular” portrayal, scientific knowledge is changeable; is produced through technical skill in expert communities; and is ambiguous, potentially positive and negative for society. Television representations of science affect audience understandings, and this is particularly the case for nonfiction representations of science, as they are likely to be “taken more seriously” than fictional representations. The consequences of the “religious” representation of science are discussed, and it is argued that a widespread understanding of science as presented in the religious portrayal would negatively impact democracy.     

Self-Knowledge and the ‘Inner Eye’

Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer's iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, but with the finite base which Schiffer proves is capable of generating those iterations. An understanding of this finite base as a primitive, relational property holding between two or more people, allows us to understand the iterations as an implicit and ‘harmless’ intrapersonal feature of what is an interpersonal phenomenon. The paper concludes by relating the account to joint attention in infant interaction.     

Idealizations and scientific understanding

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who think that a certain kind of understanding??objectual understanding??is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive.     

《易经》:早期儒家的形上学与意识进化学

相关资料初步表明,在中国古代,客观地把握人性及人与宇宙交互作用的自觉与努力业已发生。本文试图阐明《易经》的思维理路,借此思维理路,《易经》不仅塑造和影响了早期儒家形上学,而且也塑造和影响了诸如意识研究,尤其是意识学之类的当代研究领域。《易经》的发展及其在西方的传播,正说明了这一点。意识学研究人性,思考存在的其他领域。在这些方面,意识学与《周易》是相通的。将意识学同中国古代思想相比较可以看出,我们现在所研究的意识学在中国古代思想中早已有之。基于这一历史事实,我们有必要在意识学的起始处研究意识学。在意识学研究中,意识进化学是一个不可或缺的、必须进行研究的内容。我们可以通过《易经》来探索意识的进化。     

Science,spirituality and truth: acknowledging difference for spiritual dialogue and human well‐being

This article seeks to explain why spiritual education must be clear about the nature of spiritual knowledge and truth and how it differs from the knowledge and truth generated by science. The author argues this is important in order that spirituality and science are equally valued, and in order that spiritual pedagogy appropriately reflects the nature of spiritual truth in the context of spiritual diversity and commitment. Based on these arguments, and inspired both by the ideas of inter‐faith dialogue and the philosophy of Michael Bakhtin, the author then suggests a dialogical approach to spiritual pedagogy for spiritual development and wellbeing. The article suggests education will best enhance human wellbeing if it is positive about the contributions of both science and spirituality, and if it promotes understanding of spiritual difference and commitment.     

What Does it Mean to Notice my Students’ Ideas in Science Today?: An Investigation of Elementary Teachers’ Practice of Noticing their Students’ Thinking in Science

Abstract

Efforts toward improving K-12 science education emphasize teachers noticing students’ thinking as they engage in disciplinary practices and reasoning. This noticing requires specialized teacher knowledge and skills as it involves attending to students’ ideas, as well as making sense of and responding to those ideas so that the disciplinary substance in them is recognized, made explicit, and supported. This study investigates three elementary teachers’ in-the-moment noticing of students’ ideas while teaching science and their thinking about what it means to engage in this teaching practice. Results indicate that teachers notice many different kinds of student science ideas, and also that teachers have different ways of thinking about which student ideas are substantive during a science lesson. This research contributes to our theoretical understanding of the nature of teacher noticing in science. Noticing students’ science ideas involves not only the presence of ideas and the ability to notice them, but also a teacher’s understanding of this teaching practice in the moment.     

The convergence of Kuhn and cognitive psychology

Although psychology has been criticized for adhering to outmoded conceptions of knowledge (e.g. logical positivism), the assertion is made that at least one branch of psychology, namely cognitive psychology, is in the position to corroborate and extend contemporary philosophy of science. Kuhn's “learned perception of similarity” and the related notion of exemplar, which serve to exemplify more adequate conceptions of knowledge within the philosophy of science, are shown to converge with cognitive psychology's schema theory. In this way, the schema theory's empirical offspring provide a validation mechanism for Kuhn's notions and thus provide a richer understanding of the scientific enterprise. This convergence is seen as instantiating an epistemological trend towards understanding of limitations and validity of scientific evidence through an understanding of the limitations and validity of the scientist.     

Reframing the question of forbidden knowledge for modern science

In this paper I use the concept of forbidden knowledge to explore questions about putting limits on science. Science has generally been understood to seek and produce objective truth, and this understanding of science has grounded its claim to freedom of inquiry. What happens to decision making about science when this claim to objective, disinterested truth is rejected? There are two changes that must be made to update the idea of forbidden knowledge for modern science. The first is to shift from presuming that decisions to constrain or even forbid knowledge can be made from a position of omniscience (perfect knowledge) to recognizing that such decisions made by human beings are made from a position of limited or partial knowledge. The second is to reject the idea that knowledge is objective and disinterested and accept that knowledge (even scientific knowledge) is interested. In particular, choices about what knowledge gets created are normative, value choices. When these two changes are made to the idea of forbidden knowledge, questions about limiting or forbidding lines of inquiry are shown to distract attention from the more important matters of who makes and how decisions are made about what knowledge is produced. Much more attention should be focused on choosing directions in science, and as this is done, the matter of whether constraints should be placed on science will fall into place.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.     

Theology: Reduction or Autonomy?

Issues of the nature and task of theology remain important to the science-theology dialogue. This paper lays out a framework for understanding the nature of theology in relation to the other sciences. In particular, I argue that the primary question remains one of autonomy and reduction. If theology is a genuine academic discipline, then it should be an autonomous field with its own subject matter and norms. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that theology is the science of God, but I suggest that theology be more broadly understood as the science of meaning. If we recognize this, the modes of interaction between theology and the other sciences becomes clearer.     

说明心理学的形态、特征与评析

说明心理学以心理、行为现象背后的本质、规律、发生机制的说明为己任,其发展先后呈现出心理-心物关系的说明、刺激-反应关系的说明、认知心理-神经机制的说明、进化心理机制的说明等形态,在方法论上则带有鲜明的科学主义特征。它致力于人的自然本性的研究,构筑了作为自然科学的心理学样态,与理解心理学一道推动了心理学的独立、成熟。未来心理学还需摒弃蕴含于说明心理学与理解心理学之中的非此即彼的思维方式,确立心理学的整合视野。     

Fichte’s critique of physicalism – towards an idealist alternative

ABSTRACT

Though the perennial problem of consciousness has outlasted the idealists, the reductivist turn in contemporary naturalistic philosophy of mind and the non-reductivist reactions to it provoke us to re-think post-Kantian idealism. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre makes for a classical case of non-reductivist (and probably even non-naturalist) approach to mind and his critique of ‘dogmatism’ is all the more relevant in this context. This article contains four sections. The first section is an introduction that explains why post-Kantian idealism is relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind. The second section pinpoints the placement issue that confronts not only current philosophers but also partially motivated Fichte's own philosophy. The third section is a short but essential remark about the normative and practical valence of ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ in Fichte's traditional understanding of them. In the fourth section, I provide a reconstructive analysis of Fichte's understanding and critique of physicalism. Fichte's argument can be analyzed into two horns with each targeting reductivism and epiphenomenalism respectively. The final section is a brief but positive exposition on a necessary feature, namely reflexivity, of mind and the first-person perspective. Fichte's appropriation of intellectual intuition exemplifies a non-representationalist picture that connects content transparency with the active nature of mind.     

Sixth-Grade Students' Epistemologies of Science: The Impact of School Science Experiences on Epistemological Development

Previous studies have documented that middle school students have a limited "knowledge unproblematic" epistemology of science (i.e., scientists steadily amass more facts about the world by doing experiments) with no appreciation of the role played by scientists' ideas in guiding inquiry. An important question concerns to what extent students this age and younger are ready to restructure their epistemological views to focus on more "constructivist" issues: the conjectural, explanatory, testable, and revisable nature of theories. This study tests the claim that even elementary school students can make significant progress in developing a more sophisticated, constructivist epistemology of science, given a sustained elementary school science curriculum that is designed to support students' thinking about epistemological issues. To assess the impact of elementary science experiences on students' epistemological views, 2 demographically similar groups of 6th-grade students were individually interviewed using the Nature of Science Interview developed by Carey and colleagues (Carey, 1991; Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989). Both groups had experienced sustained elementary science instruction; 1 taught from a constructivist perspective and 1 taught from a more traditional perspective. We found that students in the more traditional science classroom had developed a knowledge unproblematic epistemology of the type previously reported by Carey et al. (1989). In contrast, students in the constructivist classroom had developed an epistemological stance toward science that focused on the central role of ideas in the knowledge acquisition process and on the kinds of mental, social, and experimental work involved in understanding, developing, testing, and revising these ideas. We conclude that elementary schoolchildren are more ready to formulate sophisticated epistemological views than many have thought. We discuss how these findings relate to the broader epistemological literature, and the features of the constructivist classroom environment that may have supported the development of these sophisticated understandings.     

THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PHILIP HEFNER'S “CREATED CO‐CREATOR”

Philip Hefner's understanding of humans as “created co‐creators” has played a key role in the science and religion field, particularly as scholars consider the implications of emerging technologies for the human future. Hefner articulates his “created co‐creator” framework in the form of scientifically testable hypotheses supporting his core understanding of human nature, adopting the structure of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programme. This article provides a brief exposition of Hefner's model, examines his hypotheses in order to assess their scientific character, and evaluates them against the relevant findings of contemporary science. While Hefner's model is largely commensurate with contemporary science, he at times makes claims that cannot be scientifically falsified or corroborated. Hefner's accomplishments in demonstrating the scientific compatibility of many theological notions is admirable; however, his overall position would be strengthened with a more tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of scientific knowledge. His anthropology draws also from extrascientific commitments and is all the richer for it.     

A philosopher's view of values and ethics

Counseling is the practical art of making rational decisions about values; thus it is part science and part philosophy. As a professional activity it falls midway between science and philosophy and partakes of the characteristics of both. Counseling readily recognizes its dependence on professional science for empirical knowledge about fact and theory but tends to ignore the analytic contributions of professional philosophy for understanding the nature of value and value theory. Counseling will be a better art when counselors are as concerned with what philosophy says about values as they are with the contributions of the social sciences.     

Recapturing a Context for Psychology: The Role of History

ABSTRACT— With the ever-increasing fragmentation of psychology into narrower subspecialties, the field devolves further and further into a focus on specialized knowledge, answering smaller questions and avoiding the larger and more meaningful ones. It is argued that specialized knowledge acquires its meaning only from an understanding of its place in a broader intellectual context. Psychology appears to have lost that context and perhaps the opportunity for a more significant role in modern science. An understanding of the history of psychological science offers a way to recapture that context and to prepare future psychologists to address the truly significant behavioral problems that face our world.