Individual Differences in the Predictions of Behavioral Intentions

Abstract

We examined individual differences in the formation of behavioral intentions by American female students. Within the frameworks of the Fishbein-Ajzen and Triandis models of behavioral intentions, we measured the relative emphasis given to intention predictors for 40 behavioral intentions and examined how this emphasis was related to authoritarianism. In addition, empirical evidence was sought for the conceptual distinction between a personal norm (internalized norm) and a subjective norm (perceptions of significant other' opinions concerning a given action). Relative to low authoritarians, high authoritarians took subjective norms less into account, placed greater emphasis on personal norms, and emphasized less the consequences of action in forming behavioral intentions. The results suggest that subjective and personal norms can be distinguished empirically.     

Is An Agreement An Exchange of Intentions?

Abstract: Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions – in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what they have said – plays all these roles, and so conclude that an agreement is in fact an exchange of intentions.     

Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account

After having identified several shortcomings of the so‐called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended with particular reference to the work of Charles Taylor on expression, as well as recent work on embodied cognition.     

Intentions are mental states

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.     

Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent

It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it.     

Intentions in the Light of Goals

This paper presents a systematic analysis of the various steps of goal-processing and intention creation, as the final outcome of goal-driven action generation. Intention theory has to be founded on goal theory: intentions require means-end reasoning and planning, conflict resolution, coherence. The process of intention formation and intentional action execution is strictly based on specific sets of beliefs (predictions, evaluations, calculation of costs, responsibility beliefs, competence, etc.). The origin of an intention is not necessarily a “desire” (which is just a kind of goal). Intention is a two-layered goal-structure: the intended action(s) to be executed, and the intended outcome motivating that action—with two distinct kinds of “failure”. This belief-goal perspective also allows to examine two stages/types of intention, and the relations and differences between intention “in agenda” (future directed) and intention under execution (intention in action). I will argue that the will is much more than the intention driving an intentional action. I will also claim that intentions are not there just for motivating and regulating intentional actions (from the motor level to more complex behaviors), but that they play also several other important roles.     

What do infants understand of others’ action? A theoretical account of early social cognition

Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants. However, the notions of intention attribution and action understanding, as well as their relation to each other, are surrounded by much confusion, making it difficult to assess the meaning and value of such findings. In this paper we set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’. We will show that what is commonly referred to as ‘action understanding’ in fact encompasses various heterogeneous association and prediction mechanisms. In general, these forms of action understanding will not result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By detaching intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, we provide a theoretical framework on early social cognition that allows for better comparison of findings from different experimental paradigms, and better assessment of infant action understanding abilities. Taking into account the plurality of forms that action understanding can adopt will help cognitive neuroscience to gain a full understanding of the early roots of social cognition.     

II. Intentions and conditions of satisfaction 1

This paper discusses a problem arising from the way in which John Searle marks the distinction between intentional and unintentional action (Inquiry, Vol. 22, pp. 253–80), namely, that of adequately distinguishing those events which we regard as unintentional actions on the part of an agent from those other events occasioned by or brought about as a result of his action which we (correctly) do not countenance as actions of any sort ‐ unintentional or otherwise. Searle's attempt to distinguish them in terms of the ‘proximity of the contents of intentions’ is examined and rejected, and an alternative account which exploits the anthropocentric character of our action vocabulary is proposed and defended. The discussion ends with a brief indication of some other difficulties engendered by Searle's analysis.     

First–Person Plural Legislature: Political Reflexivity and Representation*

Abstract

In the Social Contract Rousseau gives what could be called a philosophical rule of recognition for law in Modernity: a law is law if and only if ‘the whole people rules over the whole people’. Thus, he defines self-legislation as, at bottom, collective intentional action. I will first map out the speech act structure [LEX] underlying self-legislation on this account. In particular, I argue for a first person plural counterpart of the reflexive structure inherent to intentions generally: the notion of a collective self. Then I take issue with Bratman's analysis of shared intentional activity in terms of mutuality, submitting that it misses out on the specifically political presupposition involved in ‘doing something together’. I will show why ‘mutuality’ requires representation of the unity of a polity, and how this representation can take form without either external authority or mutual responsiveness.     

Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite

Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions.     

Everybody needs to know?

I propose an amendment to Sosa’s virtue reliabilism. Sosa’s framework assigns a central role to sophisticated, conceptual, motivational states: ‘intentions to affirm aptly’. I argue that the suggestion that ordinary knowers in fact are motivated by such intentions in everyday belief-forming situations is at best problematic, and explore the possibility of an alternative virtue reliabilist framework. In this alternative framework, the role Sosa assigns to ‘intentions to affirm aptly’ is played instead by non-conceptual motivational states, which I call ‘needs’. The first part of the paper sketches Sosa’s framework. The second develops the need-based alternative. I close by comparing the two proposals, concluding that the onus is at least on Sosa to say why his intention-based framework should be preferred.     

Choice Sets and Choice Intentions

Abstract

Researchers have widely accepted the argument that the Fishbein model generally predicts better if the intention measure corresponds to the predicted behavior with respect to target, action, context, and time frame. Although the model is routinely applied in situations involving choice among multiple alternatives, researchers frequently overlook the need to measure intentions so that they correspond to the multiple target behaviors that constitute the subject'S salient choice set. The present study was designed to demonstrate the effect of choice set on the measurement of behavioral intentions of American students. The data support the argument that Fishbein'S intention measure is quite sensitive to the choice set involved, perhaps one reason why intention measures sometimes fail to predict behavior accurately.     

Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency

Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.     

Intentions,Permissibility, and Choice

T. M. Scanlon has argued that the intentions with which one acts, or more specifically, one’s reasons for acting, are non-derivatively irrelevant to the moral permissibility of one’s actions. According to one of his arguments in favor of that thesis, it can be permissible to act for one reason rather than another only if one can choose to act for a reason but, since that choice is impossible since believing as will is impossible, one can be permitted to act but one cannot be permitted to act for a reason. This paper aims to show that that argument is unsound. It first argues that the assumption that choosing an action is necessary for it being an object of a moral duty or permission cannot be made consistent with Scanlon’s idea that the same does not hold for an action being an object of blame. It then argues that even if direct control over forming beliefs is impossible, it is not impossible to choose one’s reason for action and, therefore, to be permitted or forbidden to act for it.     

The Holistic Phase Model of Early Adult Crisis

The objective of the current study was to explore the structural, temporal and experiential manifestations of crisis episodes in early adulthood, using a holistic-systemic theoretical framework. Based on an analysis of 50 interviews with individuals about a crisis episode between the ages of 25 and 35, a holistic model was developed. The model comprises four phases: (1) Locked-in, (2) Separation/Time-out, (3) Exploration and (4) Rebuilding, which in turn have characteristic features at four levels—person-in-environment, identity, motivation and affect-cognition. A crisis starts out with a commitment at work or home that has been made but is no longer desired, and this is followed by an emotionally volatile period of change as that commitment is terminated. The positive trajectory of crisis involves movement through an exploratory period towards active rebuilding of a new commitment, but ‘fast-forward’ and ‘relapse’ loops can interrupt Phases 3 and 4 and make a positive resolution of the episode less likely. The model shows conceptual links with life stage theories of emerging adulthood and early adulthood, and it extends current understandings of the transitional developmental challenges that young adults encounter.     

Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments,Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality

Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long‐term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – or at least for retaining one's intention until the time to act has come? Or is the rationality of ‘doing as you decide’ governed by diachronic wide‐scope norms, as Michael Bratman and John Broome suggest? All of these approaches are shown to raise severe problems, which suggests a more modest view: diachronic pressures on intending are at each point in time confined to the very next instant.     

Does habit weaken the relationship between intention and behaviour? Revisiting the habit‐intention interaction hypothesis

Habitual behaviours are elicited when a familiar context activates cue‐behaviour associations that have been learned through previous performance. A core hypothesis within habit theory is that, by virtue of its automaticity, habit weakens the impact of intention on action, such that in facilitating conditions, action will be guided more by habit than momentary intentions. This has led to recommendations that habit formation be harnessed as a mechanism for sustaining desirable behaviour over time, when people would otherwise relapse due to loss of motivation. This article reviews theory and evidence around the hypothesized interaction between habit and intention as determinants of behaviour. We first qualify the hypothesis by clarifying that it pertains only to determinants of the instigation of action, rather than execution. Next, drawing on a systematic review of 52 behaviour‐prediction studies, we highlight mixed empirical support for the interaction. We argue that ostensibly inconsistent findings can be reconciled by recognizing the distinction between the direction and strength of intention, and identifying the “facilitating conditions” that may determine the relative influence of habit and intention on behaviour. Evidence demonstrates that when self‐control is diminished, people act habitually regardless of intention direction or strength. When people possess self‐control, habits can help people to act on favourable but weakened intentions, but intentions that oppose habitual tendencies can override habitual influence. This has important implications for behaviour change: even if habit has formed, a minimal level of favourable conscious motivation may be required to sustain behaviours over time. Social psychology might fruitfully move beyond asking whether habit moderates the intention‐behaviour relationship, and instead probe how and in which conditions habits and intentions interact.     

What It Is to Pretend

Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – and without circular recourse to an ‘intention to pretend’ or to a sui generis mental state of ‘imagining.’     

If You Are Going to Pay Within the Next 24 Hours,Press 1: Automatic Planning Prompt Reduces Credit Card Delinquency

People often form intentions but fail to follow through on them. Mounting evidence suggests that such intention‐action gaps can be narrowed with prompts to make concrete plans about when, where, and how to act to achieve the intention. In this paper, we pushed the notion of plan‐concreteness to test the efficacy of a prompt under a minimalist automated calling setting, where respondents were only prompted to indicate a narrower duration within which they intent to act. In a field experiment, this planning prompt significantly helped people to pay their past dues and get out of debt delinquency. These results suggest that minimalist automatic planning prompts are a scalable, cost‐effective intervention.