Judging scandal: Standards or bias in politics

As the number of political scandals rises, we examined the circumstances that might influence how a politician would be judged as a result of a scandal. Specifically, we hypothesized that ingroup bias theory and shifting standards theory would produce different patterns of judgements. In two studies, we found support for the ingroup bias theory, such that participants rated the fictitious politician’s public approval and perceived character as higher if the politician was a member of their own political party (i.e. their ingroup) than if the politician was a member of the another political party (i.e. their outgroup). These results may explain, in part, why people may judge politicians involved in scandal more or less harshly depending on whether they are an ingroup member or outgroup member.     

Self-Ratings of Personality: A Naturalistic Comparison of Normative, Ipsative, and Idiothetic Standards

ABSTRACT The purpose of this research is to examine some of the implicit standards that individuals may use when they rate themselves on personality dimensions Specifically, we compared ratings based on instructions that specified normative, ipsative, or idiothetic creteria with ratings obtained when subjects used their own (implicit) standards In a series of three studies, we found that each of the explicit ratings was highly similar to the implicit-standard ratings and that there were substantial individual differences in the relative similarity of each of the explicit ratings to the implicit ratings However, because the normative instructions elicited less extreme responses than any of the other instructions, there was a small but consistent tendency for them to be less similar to the ratings based on implicit standards than the ipsative or idiothetic ratings The implications of this research for personality assessment and self-evaluation are discussed     

Perceived self‐society moral discrepancies predict depression but not anxiety

Discrepancies between one's own beliefs, standards and practices and the standards expected by others are associated with increased vulnerability to depression and anxiety. Perhaps the most important personal standard is morality, one's standard of acceptable behaviour. We therefore reason that perceived discrepancies between one's own moral standards and those of society predict anxious and depressed moods. We tested this hypothesis, for the first time, in a sample of 99 female Turkish students. Moral discrepancies were assessed using an adapted moral foundations scale: participants were asked how much payment they would require to perform a series of potentially immoral acts, and how much payment they thought the average person in society would require. Participants also completed standard questionnaire measures of depression and trait anxiety. Results show that perceived self‐society moral discrepancies were significantly related to depression scores, but not to anxiety scores. Furthermore, only discrepancies related to the moral dimensions of respect for ingroups and avoiding harm were related to depression. We argue that perceiving a discrepancy between one's own standards of behaviour and those of society can increase vulnerability to depression, much as other kinds of self‐other discrepancies can; however, the specific moral standards which predict depression may vary with culture and the characteristics of the sample.     

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.     

Which opinion should a clinical ethicist give: Personal viewpoint or professional consensus?

When clinical ethicists are called upon to give a recommendation regarding patient care, they may be faced with a dilemma of their own. If their own personal opinion is not widely shared, the ethicist will have three options. These include: (1) giving their own opinion; (2) giving the widely shared opinion; and (3) giving both opinions, leaving the physician to select which opinion to accept. The intentions of this article are to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of these three alternatives and to suggest that ethics consultants recognize and deal with this issue. Two cases are presented to explore the limitations of each option. The author suggests that when the views of ethics consultants differ from the consensus view, the consultant should give the consensus view, their own dissenting view and the arguments in support of each position.     

Is Standards-based School Reform Consistent with Schooling for Personal Liberty?

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether standards-based school reform is an acceptable strategy for achieving a politically legitimate school system according to a principle of personal liberty. First, it briefly describes the purpose and implementation of standards-based school reform in the U.S. It then considers the ramifications of the principle of personal liberty for the conduct of public schooling, arguing that it requires children’s access to and appreciation of a variety of liberty-consistent cultures in their society coupled with the development of children’s ability to think critically about those cultures and their meaning as possibilities for their own lives. Third, it considers whether some standards for public education might be consistent with this purpose of education and finds that certain outcome and process standards may be appropriate. Finally, it considers whether these kinds of standards are included in standards-based reform as it is currently practiced or proposed in the U.S. and concludes that they are not. Barry Bull is a professor of philosophy of Education at Indiana. His research focuses on the moral and political justification of education policies.     

Self and social judgments of ability: beyond distributional information

In a given domain, low-skill individuals typically evaluate the ability level of other people more favorably than high-skill individuals. The current study tests whether this tendency continues to occur even when people have unambiguous distributional information available through which to judge others. Students received distributional information detailing their percentile rank in a statistics course and the percentile rank of another student in the course. Then, students were asked to evaluate their own and the other students' statistics ability. Students evaluated the other person's ability more favorably when their own rank in the course was low rather than high. Therefore, people may use themselves as a standard of comparison when they judge others even when more diagnostic sources of information are available.     

On the Nature of Public and Private Self-Consciousness

ABSTRACT Wicklund and Gollwitzer raise a number of questions concerning the explanatory value of self-consciousness as a trait and the validity of the distinction between public and private self-consciousness These questions are based on strawperson arguments, the issues they attack are largely of their own creation and bear little relation to the original authors' own positions My response attempts to point out their false assumptions concerning the nature of self-attentional traits, to examine some of the research, much of which they have ignored or misrepresented, which supports the public-private self-consciousness distinction, and to question Wicklund and Gollwitzer's tendency to regard their own theory as some sort of standard against which others must be judged, apparently unaware of the possibility that their own conceptions may be flawed     

Bridging the “Great Divide” in Undergraduate Religion: An Experiment in Faculty/Student Collaboration

Undergraduate students today often enroll in introductory religious studies or theology classes because they want the time and space to reflect on their personal spiritual questions. Such a motivation can clash with the faculty's desire to introduce students to rigorous academic study of their field. Barbara Walvoord has proposed four “voices” that students may develop that will assist both student and faculty to cross this “great divide.” This essay explores the ways in which a course based in engaged pedagogical theory and practice – in this case, problem‐based learning – can provide an effective space for students to “find their voices,” take control of their own learning, and fulfill both their own and their professor's expectations.     

Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of depressive episodes.

I propose that the ways people respond to their own symptoms of depression influence the duration of these symptoms. People who engage in ruminative responses to depression, focusing on their symptoms and the possible causes and consequences of their symptoms, will show longer depressions than people who take action to distract themselves from their symptoms. Ruminative responses prolong depression because they allow the depressed mood to negatively bias thinking and interfere with instrumental behavior and problem-solving. Laboratory and field studies directly testing this theory have supported its predictions. I discuss how response styles can explain the greater likelihood of depression in women than men. Then I intergrate this response styles theory with studies of coping with discrete events. The response styles theory is compared to other theories of the duration of depression. Finally, I suggest what may help a depressed person to stop engaging in ruminative responses and how response styles for depression may develop.     

Illusory Superiority in Self-Reported Memory of Older Adults

Older adults (N = 117, 46-89 years) compared their memory to that of age peers, 25-year-old young adults, and their own performance at the age of 25. In line with social comparison theory, most participants were very positive about their memory when age peers and young adults were the points of reference. When participants compared their present to their past memory, however, they reported decline. Surprisingly, only about half of the participants expected future memory decline. Contrary to prevailing stereotypes, all types of memory judgments were only weakly related to age. When using self-reports in research and in clinic it is important to remember that subjective judgments are useless unless participants are given a specific standard against which to evaluate their own functioning.     

Women’s anger, epistemic personhood, and self-respect: an application of Lehrer’s work on self-trust

I argue in this paper that the work of Keith Lehrer, especially in his book Self-Trust has applications to feminist ethics; specifically care ethics, which has become the leading form of normative sentimentalist ethics. I extend Lehrer??s ideas concerning reason and justification of belief beyond what he says by applying the notion of evaluation central to his account of acceptance to the need for evaluation of emotions. The inability to evaluate and attain justification of one??s emotions is an epistemic failure that leads one not to act on one??s own aspirations and desires and treat those desires as if they did not exist. I argue that this is a common condition among women in patriarchal societies because patriarchy can cause women to believe that they are not worthy of their trust concerning what they accept, specifically acceptance of their anger over their own mistreatment. As a result, many women are unable to realize the self-protective role of their anger. All of this reflects a lack of what I shall call epistemic personhood, a concept based on Lehrer??s theory concerning the keystone role of self-trust in the epistemic arch of rationality, justification and knowledge. Lastly, I use this concept of epistemic personhood to develop a care ethical account of self-respect that counters the Kantian account.     

Self and Social Judgments of Ability: Beyond Distributional Information

ABSTRACT

In a given domain, low-skill individuals typically evaluate the ability level of other people more favorably than high-skill individuals. The current study tests whether this tendency continues to occur even when people have unambiguous distributional information available through which to judge others. Students received distributional information detailing their percentile rank in a statistics course and the percentile rank of another student in the course. Then, students were asked to evaluate their own and the other students' statistics ability. Students evaluated the other person's ability more favorably when their own rank in the course was low rather than high. Therefore, people may use themselves as a standard of comparison when they judge others even when more diagnostic sources of information are available.     

选择扩散效应研究的回顾与前瞻

由失调导致的态度改变一直受到社会心理学的关注,选择扩散效应是态度改变的结果之一。多个理论模型对此做出各种解释,近年来对失调的脑机制研究为行为模型提供了新的证据。文化心理学也涉足了这方面的研究,并多以自我模型为基础,发现东西方人在对失调的体验及随后的态度变化上存在文化差异。总结了选择扩散效应的研究意义后,文章从该效应的研究范式、心理机制和脑机制、文化影响三方面对相关研究进行回顾,在此基础上提出研究范式的区分、模型的整合、脑机制的进一步研究、减缓失调的积极作用是未来的研究趋势,并指出跨文化研究中应注意的问题     

Perceived collective continuity and ingroup identification as defence against death awareness

Perhaps unique among the animal species, humans are aware that they will ultimately die. Terror management theory (TMT) posits that investing in a social group helps people to manage paralysing anxiety stemming from death awareness. In line with this proposition, research to date has shown that when reminded of their own mortality, people increase their identification with a relevant group and defend its beliefs, values, and practices. In the reported study, we demonstrate that a mortality salience induction enhances people’s perceptions of group temporal endurance—or perceived collective continuity (PCC), as we define it. Enhanced PCC leads, in turn, to enhanced group identification. This is in line with the TMT assumption that death awareness leads people to invest in a social group because this constitutes a temporally enduring meaning-system that imbues life with meaning, order, and permanence, and promises death transcendence to those who meet the prescribed standards of value.     

Gender differences in standards for romantic relationships

Why is it that women often report more problems in their romantic relationships than do men? One explanation apparent in the literature is that women may view different standards as important for relationships than do their male counterparts and, as a consequence, women may be less likely to have their standards met. A second explanation is that while women and men may not differ in terms of the importance they associate with various standards, the experiences they have in their romantic relationships may lead women Lo believe their standards are not fulfilled as often as do men. The current study offers a preliminary test of these two rival explanations and found greater support for the latter. Analyses of two composite measures and more detailed factor-based measures generally indicated that the standards held by women and men involved in heterosexual romantic relationships were rated similar in importance. Women, however, tended to note that their standards were met less fully than did men. Further, compared to men, women reported a greater discrepancy between the importance they associated with various standards and the extent to which the standards were fulfilled in the context of their relationship. The ability of two different theoretical models to predict and explain these findings is discussed, as re the implications of the results for future research.     

Moral in whose eyes? Cross-cultural differences in moral decision making and behaviour

All people want to feel that they are morally adequate. People tend to evaluate their moral adequacy by judging their behaviour through their own eyes (first-person perspective) or the eyes of others (third-person perspective). People in all cultures use both perspectives, but there may be cultural variations in which perspective takes precedence. By conducting two studies, we explore the way people in face cultures are more likely to secure their moral self-regard through the eyes of others (vs. their own eyes), whereas the opposite is true in case of people from dignity cultures. Study 1 found that people from face culture (Korean participants) cheated to a lesser extent when others were invoked (vs. not invoked), but people from dignity culture (American participants) were not affected by this priming. Study 2 found that moral intentions were more strongly influenced by what participants perceived others to do in moral situations in face (vs. dignity) cultures. In contrast, moral intentions were found to be more strongly influenced by what they believed they should do in moral situations in dignity (vs. face) cultures.     

Conflicts Between Ethics and Law in Counseling and Psychotherapy

Codes of ethics are designed to guide and govern the behavior of the professional for whom they are written. In such fields as counseling, psychology, and social work, ethical standards are necessary to protect clients, guide professionals, safeguard the autonomy of professional workers, and enhance the status of the profession. Sometimes, however, the professional worker finds that the ethical standards of the profession seem to be in conflict with the law. These conflicts may arise in such areas as advertising, confidentiality, and clients' rights of access to their own files. The authors discuss the nature, ramifications, and implications of ethical-legal conflicts in the helping professions.     

The relationship between children's drawings and preferences for alternative depictions of a familiar object

Little attention has been paid to children's evaluations of their own drawings and those of others. This study aimed to determine whether young children are satisfied with their own method of portraying a familiar object, or whether they would ideally like to draw in a more advanced way, but are hampered by production deficiencies from achieving this aim. Children aged 4 to 9 years produced drawings of a house and expressed preferences concerning an experimental series of house drawings, in which features typically found in drawings by children of different ages were systematically varied. It was found that children of all ages preferred those drawings which had most features in common with their own productions, suggesting that they are satisfied with their own drawings and may actually choose to draw in the way that they do. The conclusions of other studies using this paradigm are questioned on the grounds that they contain methodological weaknesses, particularly with respect to design of their preference stimuli.     

Shame,Publicity, and Self‐Esteem

Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself; but on the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? I begin by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then present a theory of shame according to which shame is a response to the subject's perception that he is not thought of in the way he intrinsically values himself for being thought of by someone else. Then I go on to suggest some refinements to this basic view. First, the subject of shame is primarily concerned about his audience's attitudes toward him, not what they believe about him. And second, there may be one particular attitude which he values himself for inspiring. There is no very perspicuous term for this attitude, so I call it ‘proto‐respect’ – the attitude a social animal directs toward those it regards as valuable allies or bad enemies.