On Becoming What We Might Have Been: Counterfactual Thinking and Self-efficacy

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that, in the aftermath of a performance event, upward counterfactuals reinforce feelings of self-efficacy toward similar future events, whereas downward counterfactuals decrease feelings of self-efficacy. Using a scenario methodology, the first two experiments confirmed this hypothesis: upward counterfactual thinking enhanced feelings of self-efficacy relative to downward counterfactual thinking. In a third experiment, conducted in a more real-world context, upward counterfactuals again led to greater feelings of self-efficacy than downward counterfactuals. However, there were important limiting conditions: the effect of counterfactual thinking on self-efficacy was more or less pronounced depending on both situational and dispositional factors. Whereas the pattern of results provided little support for a self-protection explanation for these limiting conditions, the results were consistent with a depth of processing explanation.     

Counterfactual thinking, persistence, and performance: A test of the Reflection and Evaluation Model

The present research extends previous functional accounts of counterfactual thinking by incorporating the notion of reflective and evaluative processing. Participants generated counterfactuals about their anagram performance, after which their persistence and performance on a second set of anagrams was measured. Evaluative processing of upward counterfactuals elicited a larger increase in persistence and better performance than did reflective processing of upward counterfactuals, whereas reflective processing of downward counterfactuals elicited a larger increase in persistence and better performance than did evaluative processing of downward counterfactuals. Moreover, path analyses indicated that whereas the relationship between counterfactual thinking and persistence was accounted for by emotional responses following upward and downward counterfactual generation, the relationship between counterfactual thinking and performance was accounted for by enhanced persistence following reflective processing of downward counterfactuals, but was accounted for by both enhanced persistence and strategic thinking following evaluative processing of upward counterfactuals.     

Upward and Downward Counterfactual Thought After Loss: A Multiwave Controlled Longitudinal Study

Counterfactual thoughts, mental simulations about how a situation may have turned out differently (i.e., “if only …, then …”), can reduce mental health after stressful life-events. However, how specific counterfactual thought types relate to post-loss mental health problems is unclear. We hypothesized that self-referenced upward counterfactuals (i.e., “If only I had done …, then the current situation would be better”) may serve as cognitive avoidance, thereby perpetuating loss-related distress. Conversely, downward counterfactuals (i.e., “If … had happened, then the current situation could have been [even] worse”) may facilitate benefit finding, thereby reducing distress. In a longitudinal survey, self-referent, other-referent, and nonreferent upward counterfactuals, and nonreferent downward counterfactuals were assessed at baseline. Prolonged grief and depression symptoms were assessed at baseline, and 6- and 12-month follow-ups. Multiple regression analyses assessed associations between counterfactual thoughts and symptom levels in 65 recently bereaved people who generated counterfactual thoughts about the loss-event. Moderator analyses assessed the unicity of significant effects in the previous step, by comparing these effects in 59 people generating loss-related counterfactuals with those in 59 propensity-score matched participants generating counterfactuals about other negative life-events. Multivariate analyses showed that nonreferent upward counterfactuals were uniquely strongly positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms concurrently. Self-referent upward counterfactuals were uniquely positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms longitudinally. Moderator analyses confirmed that thinking about how one’s (in)actions could prevent a death uniquely exacerbated prolonged grief and depression severity. Prolonged grief treatment may be improved by targeting self-blame and guilt.     

Decisions about a crime: downward and upward counterfactuals

Deciding about people’s responsibility, intentions and need for punishment is particularly hard and it may be often associated with counterfactual thinking, which refers to the creation of mental alternatives to actual events. Ninety-three participants were asked to generate downward or upward counterfactuals regarding a given criminal event and, then, to give judgments about defendant’s predictability, responsibility, intentionality and punishment. Results showed that downward counterfactuals had led people to judge the event less intentional, the defendant less responsible and, therefore, to give him a less severe punishment (vice versa for upward). The relationship between counterfactuals and intentionality judgments was partially mediated by the perceived defendant’s predictability of the negative outcomes. Finally, downward counterfactuals were linked to a greater focus on the context (external factors), whereas upward counterfactuals on the defendant/victim’s behaviours (internal factors). Findings were discussed considering both theoretical decision-making models and applications on the judicial field.     

Effect of Motivational Goals on the Causal Realism of Counterfactual Thoughts

Counterfactual thinking refers to mental comparisons of reality with imagined alternatives of it. The “functional view” of counterfactual thinking suggests that upward counterfactuals (which improve on reality) serve a preparative function and downward counterfactuals (which worsen reality) serve an affective function. This view presumes that people generate counterfactuals that focus on cause(s) that have actually produced the negative outcomes. The two experiments reported here demonstrate that people spontaneously manipulate the causal content of their counterfactuals, depending on their motivational goals. Specifically, it was found that when people aim to feel better about a poor decision they generate less realistic (upward) counterfactuals, experience less negative affect and tend to attribute the outcome to less controllable causes than when they aim to learn from their experience. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

General attainability beliefs moderate the motivational effects of counterfactual thinking

Previous research has demonstrated that upward counterfactuals generated in response to less than optimal outcomes on repeatable tasks are more motivating than are downward counterfactuals. In the present work, however, it was hypothesized that upward counterfactuals should only be motivating to the extent that one believes that improvement is generally attainable. By contrast, it was hypothesized that upward counterfactuals should actually diminish motivation and downward counterfactuals should enhance motivation to the extent that one believes that improvement is generally unattainable. In support of these hypotheses, the results of two studies indicated that incremental theorists (who believe that intelligence-related abilities are malleable) displayed greater motivation and enhanced performance in response to upward as compared to downward counterfactuals, whereas entity theorists (who believe that intelligence-related abilities are fixed) displayed greater motivation and enhanced performance in response to downward as compared to upward counterfactuals.     

3～5岁幼儿反事实思维的发展研究

该研究采用结果和前提反事实推理任务,选取58名3-5岁幼儿为被试,考察了其反事实思维能力的发展。结果表明:1.3岁儿童在结果反事实推理中的得分显著低于4岁和5岁儿童,而4岁和5岁儿童的得分并不存在显著差异;2.幼儿的前提反事实推理因结构和方向不同而表现出不同的年龄变化趋势;3.幼儿产生的上行和下行反事实论断之间不存在显著差异。如成人一样,幼儿较少产生减法反事实。     

Optimism and Traumatic Stress: The Importance of Social Support and Coping1

This study examined the effects of optimism following traumatic stress and pathways through which optimism may act. Rescue and recovery workers at the crash site of US Air Flight 427 (n= 159) were studied 2, 6, 9, and 12 months after the crash to examine optimistic outlook, social support, coping, and stress. As predicted, a more optimistic disposition was associated with less self‐reported distress, less use of avoidant and wishful‐thinking coping strategies, greater use of problem‐focused and seeking‐social‐support coping, and greater availability of social support. Contrary to expectations, coping did not account for the relationships observed between optimism and stress responding. Social support explained some of the effects of optimism on coping and stress, but these mediational effects varied over time. Findings suggest that optimism affects stress and coping directly and indirectly by affecting how much social support is available.     

“No More” leads to “Want More,” but “No Less” leads to “Want Less”: Consumers' counterfactual thinking when faced with quantity restriction discounts

The current research examines the impact of point‐of‐purchase (POP) discounts on consumers' counterfactual thinking (CFT). Study 1 reveals that consumers tend to engage in upward CFT (what might have been better) rather than downward CFT (what might have been worse) in response to POP discounts. Study 2 shows that upward CFT depends on how the discount information is framed. A discount with a lower‐quantity restriction (e.g., “X % off if you buy at least Y items”) leads consumers to counterfactually wish to buy more, but a discount with an upper‐quantity restriction (“X % off – limit Y items per customer”) leads consumers to wish to buy less. Study participants in both conditions report they would buy the same POP‐suggested amount, but for completely opposite reasons. In Study 3, this convergence effect in purchase quantity disappears when the maximum and minimum restrictions are lifted, suggesting that quantity restrictions in POP discounts guide quantity decisions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Looking on the bright side: downward counterfactual thinking in response to negative life events

Past research has found that downward counterfactual thoughts are rarely generated in response to negative life events. However, the authors suggest that under conditions in which self-enhancement motives are prominent, downward counterfactuals will be more frequent than upward counterfactuals. When motives were explicitly manipulated (Study 1), people generated more downward counterfactuals in the self-enhancement than in the self-improvement and control conditions. In Study 2, among those chronically more motivated to self-enhance (i.e., European Canadians), a manipulation of event severity led to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals. This finding was mediated by the desire for self-enhancement. In Study 3, cultural background and the opportunity for self-affirmation were related to the generation of downward counterfactuals in expected ways. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Consumer affects when making undesirable purchases to meet the minimum purchase requirement: Decision‐related variables as moderators

One common type of sales promotion involves a minimum purchase requirement (MinPR), where customers must purchase at least a minimum number of products to enjoy a discount. In the process of making purchases to qualify for the discount, consumers may find their first‐choice product options or have to settle for products that they did not originally prefer. Three between‐subjects experiments examines whether, in various decision situations, counterfactual thinking (CFT) might bias individuals' emotions in response to desirable versus undesirable purchases. Study 1 demonstrates that participants who made undesirable purchases to meet the MinPR felt less satisfied with the purchase outcome precipitated by upward CFT, whereas downward CFT led to feelings of pleasure in participants who could find their first‐choice product options. Studies 2 and 3 find that counterfactual emotions of undesirable purchases were more pronounced when participants experienced a difficult decision process because of a narrow promotion scope or when time pressure, manipulated in terms of explicit deadlines, is heavy rather than light, respectively. On the contrary, participants' responses to desirable purchases did not vary as a function of decision difficulty or time pressure.     

Mood, self-esteem, and simulated alternatives: thought-provoking affective influences on counterfactual direction

Four studies indicated that moods and self-esteem can influence counterfactual thoughts. This was shown for counterfactuals generated for hypothetical situations (Study 1), for recalled life events (Study 2), and for agreement with counterfactual statements after laboratory tasks (Studies 3 and 4). High self-esteem (HSE) and low self-esteem (LSE) persons generated (Studies 1 and 2) or agreed to (Studies 3 and 4) more downward (worse than actuality) than upward (better than actuality) counterfactuals when in good moods, but they diverged in reactions to bad moods: HSE persons thought more about downward counterfactuals, whereas LSE persons thought more about upward counterfactuals. HSE persons felt better after generating downward counterfactuals (Study 2) and took longer to agree to analogous statements (Studies 3 and 4) in bad moods, suggesting attempts at mood repair.     

It could have been better: The effects of counterfactual communication on impression formation

While research on counterfactuals has closely examined the psychological antecedents and consequences of thinking counterfactually (imagining alternatives to past events), little is known about the effects of counterfactual communication, and in particular, how such thoughts are interpreted by others. In this paper, I argue that counterfactual communication differentially affects impressions formed of speakers by receivers depending on the general content of the counterfactual. Findings from an archival study and a scenario study demonstrated convergent results: Individuals who communicated upward counterfactuals (thoughts of how things could have been better) were more positively perceived by receivers than were individuals who communicated downward counterfactuals (thoughts of how things could have been worse). This difference stemmed from an enhancement effect of upward counterfactuals. Further analysis revealed that the relationship between counterfactual communication and impression formation was mediated by receivers' perceptions of the extent to which speakers took responsibility for their actions. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: The Bitter-Sweet Influence of Mood on Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking

Three studies demonstrated that manipulated moods influence the prefactual (alternative preoutcome predictions) and counterfactual (alternative postoutcome “what might have beens”) mental simulations of defensive pessimists and optimists. In Study 1, negative moods induced more upward (better than expected) prefactuals, and defensive pessimists performed best under such conditions; optimists performed best under induced positive moods, after which they used little prefactual thinking. In Studies 2 and 3, manipulated moods again influenced the strategies of defensive pessimists and optimists. In Study 2, optimists responded with more downward (worse than actuality) counterfactuals, suggesting attempts at mood repair. In Study 3, defensive pessimists and optimists each coped effectively by using preferred mental simulation strategies; both groups rebounded on a second task from poor performances on a first task.     

Hopelessness as a Risk Factor for Post‐traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms Among Interpersonal Violence Survivors

Post‐traumatic stress disorder often co‐occurs with depression, and they may share common risk factors. One possible common cognitive risk factor is hopelessness. Thus, we examined whether hopelessness was related to symptoms of post‐traumatic stress disorder. Participants were 202 female survivors of interpersonal violence. Relationships between self‐reported and interviewer‐rated measures of hopelessness gathered at 2 weeks post‐trauma and self‐reported and interviewer‐rated symptoms of post‐traumatic stress disorder gathered at 2 weeks and 3 months post‐trauma were examined. Hierarchical, simultaneous regression analyses that co‐varied trauma type revealed that hopelessness was related to self‐reported symptoms of post‐traumatic stress disorder, both concurrently and prospectively. Follow‐up analyses revealed that relationships between hopelessness and symptoms of post‐traumatic stress disorder were due almost entirely to shared variance with depression. No relationships were found between hopelessness and interviewer‐rated symptoms of post‐traumatic stress disorder.     

The Political Consequences of Combat: Post‐Traumatic Stress and Political Alienation Among Vietnam Veterans

On average, veterans are more civically and politically engaged than civilians. Previous research on the effects of military service, however, did not account for differences in veterans’ combat experiences. Using survey data from a representative sample of Vietnam veterans, this study presents evidence that veterans who were exposed to severe combat trauma and veterans who exhibited attitudes and fears associated with post‐traumatic stress had significantly lower levels of political efficacy and trust. The negative consequences of combat exposure and post‐traumatic stress are not mitigated when veterans have quality social support or when they seek professional counseling. These findings inform political psychology and hold implications for claims regarding the empowering influence of service in the U.S. military, increased political engagement, in particular. Among Vietnam veterans, exposure to severe combat trauma and post‐traumatic stress were both associated with reduced political efficacy and trust.     

Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Episodic counterfactual thoughts—imagined alternative ways in which personal past events might have occurred—are frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here, participants recollected positive and negative autobiographical memories and then generated better and worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories. Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event is significantly higher than but typically positively related to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual events heightened the emotional intensity felt while simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the emotional intensity accompanying the experience of remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are discussed in relation to clinical work and functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual Thinking as a Cue to Causality

People often engage in counterfactual thinking, that is, imagining alternatives to the real world and mentally playing out the consequences. Yet the counterfactuals people tend to imagine are a small subset of those that could possibly be imagined. There is some debate as to the relation between counterfactual thinking and causal beliefs. Some researchers argue that counterfactual thinking is the key to causal judgments; current research suggests, however, that the relation is rather complex. When people think about counterfactuals, they focus on ways to prevent bad or uncommon outcomes; when people think about causes, they focus on things that covary with outcomes. Counterfactual thinking may affect causality judgments by changing beliefs about the probabilities of possible alternatives to what actually happened, thereby changing beliefs as to whether a cause and effect actually covary. The way in which counterfactual thinking affects causal attributions may have practical consequences for mental health and the legal system.     

Counterfactuals, coping strategies and psychological distress among breast cancer patients

The aim of this primary study was to predict the effect of counterfactuals, coping strategies, personal resources (age and education) and stage of the illness on psychological distress in a sample of 64 breast cancer patients. The main findings indicated that upward counterfactuals played an important role in the patients' psychological distress and coping process with the illness. Patients who used a high level of upward counterfactual thinking were found to have a high level of psychological distress. Downward counterfactual thinking, however, was not found to be related to less psychological distress.