内在锚与外在锚对锚定效应及其双加工机制的影响

通过2（外在锚类型：高锚VS低锚）×2（内在锚类型：有VS无）被试间设计,考察不同锚定信息来源：由外部世界提供的外在锚与个体自身内部产生的内在锚信息对锚定效应及其加工机制的影响。结果发现：（1）当内在锚不存在时,外在高低锚组的估计值有显著差异,当内在锚存在时此种差异变得不显著;（2）当内在锚存在时,外在高低锚组被试的答题反应时有显著差异,内在锚与外在锚一致时反应时比不一致时更快,当内在锚不存在时,此种差异变得不显著。实验结果表明,当锚定调整机制与选择通达机制同时存在时,前者更占优势;锚定信息一致性会影响不同加工机制的启动,一致的信息会激活选择通达机制,不一致的信息则会激活锚定调整机制。     

不同形式的锚定值对时距估计决策过程的影响

采用基本锚定范式,以时间词和物理时距分别作为数字锚定值和物理锚定值,探讨了不同形式和大小的锚定值如何影响产生法（实验1）和口头估计法（实验2）中的时距估计的决策过程。55名在校大学生参加了本次实验。实验结果表明,数字锚定值被作为时距估计的调整起始点,对决策过程中的数值估计产生同化影响;物理锚定值则被作为时距估计的比较标准,同化产生法中的决策估计值,对口头估计法中的决策估计值却产生对比影响。     

场认知风格条件下罗夏墨迹测验的眼动研究

通过《团体图形镶嵌测验》从201名大学生中筛选出48名具有典型场独立与场依存特征的大学生为被试,采用Eyelink 2000型眼动仪,研究探讨不同认知风格者注视罗夏墨迹图时的眼动规律及其反应特点。结果显示:(1)在自由反应阶段,场依存者眼跳次数少,平均眼跳距离大,而反应时和注视次数都较少;场独立者反之。且图片颜色对被试反应有显著影响。彩色图片眼跳次数多,平均眼跳距离小,而反应时和注视次数都较多;非彩色图片反之。(2)在提问阶段,场认知风格在该阶段主效应显著,且一般眼动指标的规律与自由反应阶段的一致。有色彩反应(C)的反应时、注视次数和眼跳次数均显著大于没有色彩反应(UC)的。(3)反应规律:不同认知风格被试的运动反应次数差异显著,场独立者多于场依存者。     

意识锚定加工对潜在锚定加工的影响

潜在锚定效应是指阈限下的启动锚定数字导致的锚定效应现象。本研究通过2个实验探讨了意识锚定加工对潜在锚定加工的影响。实验一考察了意识层面的外在锚对潜在锚定效应产生的影响,实验二则进一步探讨了意识层面的自发锚对潜在锚定效应的影响。实验一发现,在不存在外在锚时高锚与低锚的估计有显著性差异;实验二发现,在不存在自发锚时高锚与低锚的估计有显著性差异。研究结果表明,外在锚定加工和自发锚定加工的效应都强于潜在锚定加工。     

潜在锚定效应的加工机制初探

潜在锚定效应指的是阈限下的启动锚定数字导致的锚定效应现象.本研究探讨了潜在锚定效应的产生机制.采用2(潜在锚类型:高锚vs低锚)×2(词汇类型:夏天vs冬天)混合设计.结果发现,在潜在高锚情况下,夏天词汇的反应时(M=745.50)显著快于冬天词汇的反应时;在潜在低锚情况下,冬天词汇的反应时(M=697.47)显著快于夏天词汇的反应时.即被试对与启动锚定数字信息一致的词汇判断的反应时比不一致的更快.研究结果表明,潜在锚定效应的产生是由于锚定数字内部命题属性被激活导致的.     

反向眼跳的实验范式、机制及影响因素

反向眼跳任务是研究内源性眼跳的主要方法。1978年,Hallett在研究中首次使用了反向眼跳的实验任务。实验中要求被试抑制对外围目标的注视,并注视它的相反位置。反向眼跳任务是研究行为控制以及注意功能的有效范式。目前认为反向眼跳任务中的朝向眼跳和反向眼跳计划是同时加工并相互竞争的,并且反向眼跳的产生与额顶叶皮层下组织有关。反向眼跳会受到多种因素的影响,例如,空白效应、工作记忆、认知老化、目标离心率等。     

问题性网络游戏使用青少年未来取向的助推研究

摘要：以问题性网络游戏使用青少年为研究对象,基于锚定效应助推国民身心健康的理论前提和态度改变理论视角,通过实验1和实验2分别建立未来取向内部锚和未来取向外部锚,检验未来取向内部锚和外部锚对减少问题性网络游戏使用青少年游戏时间的有效性。结果表明,未来取向内部和外部的助推方式,均能够有效促进问题性网络游戏使用青少年游戏时间的减少,提高了决策效用。     

锚定效应的种类、影响因素及干预措施

锚定效应是指个体在不确定情境下的决策会受到初始无关锚影响致使其随后的数值估计偏向该锚的一种判断偏差现象。不同种类的锚定效应其影响因素和干预措施不同, 如影响传统锚定效应的有锚定信息特征、能力变量、情绪因素及个体差异性等, 基本锚定效应的主要影响因素有知识技能与时间压力, 自发锚定效应则受动机变量、认知因素及内部信念等影响。未来研究可深入挖掘认知加工机制、类比推理过程和开发DDS系统等来帮助减少各种锚定偏差。     

锚定效应的产生前提及作用机制

为了探讨锚定效应的产生前提以及基础锚定效应的理论解释,设计了两个实验。实验一选取高、低、无三种锚值,设置了15ms、45ms、75ms、1000ms四种呈现时间,结果发现只有15ms条件下未出现锚定效应,随着呈现时间增加,锚定效应不断增大,低锚下的锚定效应高于高锚下的锚定效应。实验二设置了语意相同但表述形式不同的两种水平的锚值,结果发现两者引发的锚定效应不同。锚定效应的产生前提是注意,数字启动假说可以更好地解释基础锚定效应。     

眼跳任务中的偏心距效应

采用完全被试内设计,控制了眼跳任务类型(朝向眼跳、反向眼跳)和目标偏心距水平,考察了大学生在两种眼跳任务中的偏心距效应,即目标刺激相对于屏幕中心的距离对于眼跳过程的影响.研究结果发现:(1)反向眼跳任务中的首次眼跳方向错误率显著高于朝向眼跳,眼跳潜伏期也显著较长.(2)在朝向和反向眼跳过程中,都出现了目标的偏心距效应,即随着目标偏心距的增大,眼跳潜伏期缩短,眼跳落点视角增大.     

Anchoring,Activation, and the Construction of Values

Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While anchors have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers to knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the underlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest that anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test this notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the effects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belief as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar features has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mechanism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlying anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena.     

The limits of anchoring

Anchoring and adjustment is a pervasive bias in which decision makers are influenced by random or uninformative numbers or starting points. As a means of understanding this effect, we explore two limits on anchoring. In Experiments 1 and 2, implausibly extreme anchors had a proportionally smaller effect than anchors close to the expected value of the lotteries evaluated. In Experiments 2 and 3, anchoring occurred only if the anchor and preference judgment were expressed on the same scale. Incompatible anchors and response modes resulted in no anchoring bias. A confirmatory search mechanism is proposed to account for these results.     

Can genes modulate anchoring effect?

The anchoring effect is a well-known decision bias, referring that initial irrelevant number (anchor) can impact late estimation. Anchoring effect can be explained as people starting from the anchor and stopping incremental adjustment too early—in other words, jumping into the conclusion impulsively. High impulsivity is associated with AA genotype of rs806379. Therefore, we hypothesized that rs806379 polymorphism can exert an influence on the anchoring effect. The subjects completed an experimental task of anchoring effect and provided saliva for genotyping. As expected, we found that subjects with AA genotype of rs806379 demonstrated stronger anchoring effect. This is the first article that explores the anchoring effect from the gene perspective. Our finding suggests that nature plays a role in anchoring effect.     

Answering yes-no questions about causes: Question acts and question categories

Three experiments examined the cognitive process of answering yes-no questions about causes. Singer’s VAIL model of question answering predicted that readers would take longer to correctly answer “no” than “don’t know” to such questions. In Experiment 1, the antecedent sentences used either the causal conjunction so orbecause. Experiment 2 compared so with an implicit causal link. In all conditions, the main prediction was strongly supported. However, when the questions referred to brief stories in Experiment 3, correct “no” and “don’t know” response latencies did not differ. It was concluded that (1) VAIL identifies the cognitive operations underlying the answering of causal questions; (2) answering yes-no questions about causes resembles answering yes-no questions about case-filling elements; (3) the yes-no versus wh- distinction is orthogonal to the type of relation asked about; and (4) studying question answering about sentences will contribute to the understanding of question answering about text.     

The De‐biasing Effect of Incidental Anger on Other‐provided Anchors

The current research investigates the effect of incidental anger on anchoring bias. We hypothesized that feeling angry will make people less influenced by other‐provided anchors because of the moving against action tendency associated with anger. That is, individuals in an angry state will be likely to perceive a given anchor as a viable target for their desire to attack and actively seek out anchor‐inconsistent information, thereby committing less anchoring bias. To examine our hypothesis, in Study 1, we manipulated emotions using film clips and administered a general knowledge task with other‐provided anchors. As predicted, participants in the anger condition showed less anchoring bias to the other‐provided anchors than those in the sad or neutral condition. Study 2 replicated the finding with a different emotion manipulation technique and different anchoring questions. More important, consistent with the moving against action tendency explanation, we also found that people in an angry state committed more anchoring bias for self‐generated anchors, compared with people in a sad or neutral state. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning.     

Sadness and susceptibility to judgmental bias: the case of anchoring

In a wide range of empirical paradigms, sadness has been associated with more extensive and detail-oriented thinking than happiness, resulting in reductions in judgmental bias that arise from reliance on stereotypes and other simple decision heuristics. It was hypothesized that anchoring would constitute a significant exception to this general pattern. Recent research on anchoring indicates that an active thought process underlies the emergence of this bias. If sad people are likely to think more actively about the judgmental anchor than their neutral-mood counterparts, their subsequent judgments should be more likely to be assimilated toward this reference point. This prediction was confirmed in two experiments demonstrating that sad people are indeed more susceptible to anchoring bias than are people in a neutral mood. Moreover, this effect generalized over judgments in positive, neutral, and negative content domains.     

Are all experiences of fit created equal? Two paths to persuasion

Regulatory fit influences the effectiveness of persuasion through two paths: 1) a “feeling right” as “feeling good about the target” effect where feeling right is a positive feeling that transfers positivity directly to the target, similar to “feelings as information” or fluency effects, and 2) a “feeling right” as “feeling confident about the evaluation” effect where feeling right is feeling confident about one's evaluative judgments of the target that increases reliance on those evaluations. We propose that the involvement with an attitude-related issue in a persuasion message is one key factor that determines when each effect will occur. Five studies demonstrate that under high involvement, fit increased reliance on evaluative reactions to the target, making a target of a positive advocacy message evaluated as more positive and a target of a negative advocacy message evaluated as more negative; and under low involvement, fit increased the positivity of feelings toward the target regardless of the valence of the message advocacy, making the evaluation of the target more positive for either a positive or negative advocacy message.