真的概念

弗雷格的语义学蕴涵了两个不可调和的推论:其一认为语句的意义先于命题,命题先于真,这种观点发展成为最少量论;其二认为真先于命题,因而也先于语句的意义,这种观点发展成为成真条件论.结合维特根斯坦的意义即用法的观点,得出的结论是:意义理论的核心概念并不是真,而是一个陈述得到证明的观念,意义理论并不必须采取成真条件论的形式.作为最少量论和成真条件论共同基础的奎因式语义转换原则是包含矛盾的.结合了语义转换原则和塔斯基真的定义的最少量论者必定排除戴维森式成真条件论.     

The Concept of Truth in a Finite Universe

The prospects and limitations of defining truth in a finite model in the same language whose truth one is considering are thoroughly examined. It is shown that in contradistinction to Tarskirs undefinability theorem for arithmetic, it is in a definite sense possible in this case to define truth in the very language whose truth is in question.     

Reinflating Truth as an Explanatory Concept

Abstract: Despite his protests, there have been numerous efforts to enroll Davidson in the deflationist program. Michael Williams has recently continued this enterprise, arguing that a truth-theoretic Davidsonian approach to meaning can be harnessed to a deflationary approach to truth. It is our contention that Williams' attempt is unsuccessful.     

《逻辑哲学论》中的真理概念

维特根斯坦在其《逻辑哲学论》中集中讨论了真理概念,他处理这个概念的方式表明了如何理解语言与实在的关系,以及在何种意义上没有否定记号所代表的实在之物。本文从维特根斯坦关于真理符合论的表述是否会遭到弗雷格的批评这个问题入手,对照戴尔蒙德关于维特根斯坦真理概念的解释,给出了自己的解读,按照这种解读,真内在于使用命题的活动。     

On Tugendhat's Analysis of Heidegger's Concept of Truth

This paper responds to Tugendhat's well‐known and influential critique of Heidegger's concept of truth with the resources of Heidegger's texts, in particular §44 of Being and Time. To start with, Tugendhat's primary critical argument is reconstructed. It is held to consist firstly in the charge of ambiguity against Heidegger's formulations of his concept of truth and secondly in the claim that Heidegger's concept of truth is incompatible with an adequate concept of falsehood. It is shown that the supposedly ambiguous meanings are, on the one hand, in fact clearly distinguished by Heidegger and, on the other, that they merely amount to different extensions of the same meaning of truth. It is then shown how this concept of truth is indeed compatible with an adequate, albeit post‐metaphysical, concept of falsehood. Finally, the grounds of falsehood in the untruth of the existential of Verfallen are pursued and further objections are dismissed.     

The Face of Truth

I attempt to explain Plato's choice of dialogue through an analysis of what he regarded as the conditions of knowledge acquisition. I see the main contribution of the paper in exposing the way in which time and pain are, for Plato, conditions of knowledge acquisition. Plato endorsed the "learning through suffering," or pathei mathos , convention, central to Greek drama, and did so not through theory but through the praxis some of the dialogues employ. This addition of experiential components to the more cognitively oriented definitions of knowledge that Socrates uses complicates what these works may say about human knowledge. I analyze these tensions and the bearing they may have on the question of Plato's choice of dialogue, that is, on his rhetoric in practice. The requirements for actual persuasion, as Plato specifies them in the Seventh Letter, , are only partially met by the fictional scenes of argumentation and knowledge conveying that Plato presents. However, such scenes permit transcending some of the limitations of written, systematic, nonpersonal discourse. The presentation of such interactions to a real reader through dialogue turns into a mode of writing that is closer to meeting the demands of actual communication of knowledge – at least knowledge regarding what Plato envisaged as being the highest sort of epistemic communication     

真之本性

本文是兰姆赛的一篇经典论文,在文中,兰姆赛提出了他的“真之冗余论”的基本观点：只有具有命题指称并且有断定特性的信念才能成为真之载体,一个信念P是真的,当且仅当P。     

The Spirit of Truth

This article reflects on the theme of the “spirit of truth” in a post-truth era – a time in which objective truth seems to no longer exist, any given claim can be substantiated, and it is no longer possible to tell falsehood and truth apart. Focusing on the objectivity of science, the humanity of truth, and the spirit of truth revealed by divinity, the article argues for the adoption of a humane and ecological wisdom, seeing it as a way to deal with humanity’s immense knowledge in a way that is conducive to life, to avoid optimizing humans in a “trans-human” way and making the earth uninhabitable.     

Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem1

With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term ‘truth’ to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long‐standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather than truth itself, what does it mean to say – as Heidegger does – that disclosedness is the “primordial phenomenon of truth” and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re‐evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's ‘existential’ analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth.     

The Truth About Deception

The prohibition on lying is often thought to be very stringent. Some have even been tempted to think that it is absolute. In contrast, the prohibition on other forms of deception seems to be looser. This paper explores the relationship between the duty not to deceive and the duty not to lie. This discussion is situated in the context of a broadly Kantian account of morality. Kant himself infamously claimed that one ought not lie to a murderer at the door about the location of his intended victim. This paper aims to explain how a broadly Kantian view can endorse a distinctive duty not to lie without thereby being committed to this kind of conclusion.