Uncertainty as a Fundamental Scientific Value

The author argues that, though social scientists generally value tolerance for ambiguity, and some even assert a fundamental indeterminacy in human systems, there is still a discipline-wide discomfort with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is argued that this distaste for uncertainty derives from a distorted view of the classical physical sciences, a view that ignores the essentially critical and radical foundations of scientific practice. The drive for certainty, it is argued, is essentially unscientific, in that certain, or adequate, forms of knowledge can only recapitulate the already known and in their dogmatic and institutionalized forms prevent the development of genuinely new knowledge. In contrast, uncertainty is defended as a positive condition, generative of new knowledge because it is open to discovery and to the mystery of the other. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the social sciences can only progress if uncertainty, or mystery, is protected and cultivated through a scientific discourse constituted in local and concrete terms (rather than in general and universal ones) and through a self-reflective and self-critical research praxis.     

Children's Understanding of Scientific Inquiry: Their Conceptualization of Uncertainty in Investigations of Their Own Design

The study examined children's understanding of scientific inquiry, through the lens of their conceptualization of uncertainty in investigations they had designed and implemented with a partner. These largely student-regulated investigations followed a unit about animal behavior that emphasized the scaffolding of independent inquiry. Participants were children in a 2nd grade class (n = 21) and a combined 4th-5th grade class (n = 31). The primary database consisted of videotaped structured interviews with each pair following completion of their investigation. These interviews were used to analyze whether the child had conceptualized an uncertainty in their study and, if so, the sphere of the uncertainty. This top-level analysis resulted in a taxonomy of 5 spheres of uncertainty: (a) how to produce the desired outcome as uncertain; (b) data as uncertain; (c) trend identified in the data as uncertain; (d) generalizability of this trend as uncertain; and (e) the theory that best accounts for the trend as uncertain. Seventy-one percent of the 2nd graders and 87% of the 4th-5th graders conceptualized 1 or more spheres of uncertainty in their respective research study. Among those who had conceptualized 1 or more spheres of uncertainty, 80% of the 2nd graders and 97% of the 4th-5th graders posited a strategy for how to modify their study to address the uncertainty. Finer grained analysis revealed that in almost every instance the grounds reflected some valid concern and the strategy the child proposed would at least begin to address the identified problem. These analyses indicate that most children developed a rich understanding of how uncertainty enters into scientific inquiry. In this context of reflection on their own scientific inquiry, these children manifested at least a rudimentary understanding of the complex relation between the natural world and knowledge thereof that transcended a naive realism, and manifested aspects of a "knowledge problematic" epistemological perspective.     

Nanomedicine: Building a Bridge Between Science and Law

This article aims to address challenges of translating emerging scientific technologies into legal terms and incorporate them into the existing North American regulatory regimes. A lack of full scientific knowledge about nanomedicine technologies results in the lack of development in legal discourse to describe products and to clearly set legal standards on their safety and efficacy. The increasing complexity and hybrid nature of technologies negatively impact the functionality of “law in action” leading to a legal uncertainty and ultimately to a public distrust. Nanomedicine is an illustrative example of how law lags behind increasingly fast-paced scientific technologies making it difficult to find a balance between innovation and safety. This article argues that the boundary crossing nature of nanomedicine through different domains of science triggers a methodological and epistemological debate within science and law, suggesting that a critical revision is required in our traditional methods to learn, create, and categorize knowledge from breakthrough scientific advances. The highly disruptive nature of nanomedicine places stress on traditional conceptual frameworks, classifications of knowledge, and existing regulations. The legal challenge to identify definitions or to classify nanoapplications brings to light a conceptual vacuum surrounding nanomedicine. Moving away from confusing policies and obsolete classificatory models, this article suggests to undertake changes that are only the first steps of a more in-depth “epistemological transformation” that addresses knowledge as the process of not only gathering data, but also, as the process of elaborating new conceptual bases to better fulfill the legal language and facilitate the legal task of finding definitions and formulating criteria more adherent with scientific advances. This should compel regulators to explore new paradigms and develop new methodologies to evaluate data on nanomedicine applications in order to provide sustainable bases for a responsible development of nanomedicine.     

Scientists' Uncertainty and Disagreement about Global Climate Change: A Psychological Perspective

Since there are major gaps in scientific knowledge about the greenhouse effect, policy makers are forced to rely on scientists' judgments about the rate of climate change and its effects. It now appears that significant policy decisions will have to be made despite continuing uncertainty and disagreement among scientists. The best that policy makers can do is look for guidance in the best available expert judgment. But when the best experts express great uncertainty and disagree, as seems to be the case with the greenhouse effect, policy makers are unsure about how to proceed. Despite its importance, scientific judgment about the greenhouse effect has not been systematically studied. Psychological research on expert judgment and decision making provides theory, methods, and empirical results that can be used to study judgments based on uncertain and incomplete data and can help to explain the sources of expert uncertainty and disagreement regarding the greenhouse effect. Possible explanations are discussed.     

Nanotechnology, uncertainty and regulation. A guest editorial

Nanotechnology has been established as a priority research and policy focus, cutting across several R&D fields from pharmaceutics, food and electronics. The raise of nanotechnologies has been accompanied by an enduring uncertainty characterising the developments of the scientific knowledge related to this field, as well as the social trajectories of technological applications. Such a condition inevitably affects regulatory responses to such technologies, their development and their uses. This special issue addresses this junction between uncertainty and regulation. With no ambition of providing a comprehensive assessment of such a complex issue, this collection of articles examines three relevant dimensions for understanding uncertainty in nanotechnology regulation, which can be useful entry points for further reflection and discussion: scientific uncertainty, regulatory fragmentation, social actors’ opinions about and attitudes to nanotechnology and regulation.     

The (Mis)understanding of Scientific Uncertainty? How Experts View Policy-Makers,the Media and Publics

Abstract

Frequent claims that publics ‘misunderstand’ science ignore the contested definition of scientific uncertainty itself. Scientific uncertainty means different things in the natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities, while public controversies show that interpretations of scientific uncertainty have different implications for policy and decision-making. This prompts analysis of the ways that experts view scientific uncertainty and how they characterise the (mis)understandings of this uncertainty by policy-makers, media and publics. Experts from diverse academic fields define scientific uncertainty differently depending on their disciplinary background. For example, mathematics provides experts from the natural sciences with a practice language that facilitates communication with those sharing this cultural competence, but it does not suffice for engaging with wider audiences. Further, experts’ views of diverse publics come across as folk theories, in Arie Rip's terms, which, compiled from disparate pieces of information, can be used to fill a gap in the knowledge about publics.     

Analogical reasoning as a tool of epidemiological investigation

Few, if any, scientific inquiries are conducted against a background of complete knowledge, a background in which inquirers are in possession of the full facts that relate to a particular question or issue. More often than not, scientists are compelled to conduct their deliberations in contexts of epistemic uncertainty, in which partial knowledge or even a total absence of knowledge characterise inquiry. Nowhere is this epistemic uncertainty more evident, or indeed more successfully controlled, than in the branch of scientific inquiry called epidemiology. In this paper, I examine how epidemiologists overcome the unique challenges to inquiry that are posed by epistemic uncertainty. In specific terms, I contend that epidemiologists employ analogical reasoning strategies in an attempt to advance their inquiries in situations that are epistemically uncertain. The context for my claims will be the early inquiries that were conducted into the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the United States. I argue that early scientific work in relation to HIV/AIDS was directly premised upon epidemiological investigations in which analogical reasoning with hepatitis B had featured significantly. I conclude that epidemiological investigations of AIDS exemplify the capacity of analogical reasoning to advance inquiry under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. To this extent, analogical reasoning should be a concern both to those who address practical problems of uncertainty management and to those who pursue theoretical debates within argumentation studies and epistemology.     

COR V2: teaching observational research with multimedia courseware.

Courseware for Observational Research (COR Version 2) is an interactive multimedia program designed to teach the foundation of the scientific method: systematic observation. COR uses digital video with interactive coding to teach basic concepts, such as creating precise operational definitions; using frequency, interval, and duration coding; developing sampling strategies; and analyzing and interpreting data. Through lessons, a case study, and laboratory exercises, it gradually scaffolds students from teacher-directed learning into self-directed learning. The newest addition to COR is a case study in which students work collaboratively, using their own observations to make recommendations about a child's disruptive behavior in an after-school program. Evaluations of the lessons showed that classes using COR received better grades on their field observations than did those using methods that are more traditional. Students' confidence and knowledge increased as they moved through each section of the program.     

Embedding philosophers in the practices of science: bringing humanities to the sciences

The National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States, like many other funding agencies all over the globe, has made large investments in interdisciplinary research in the sciences and engineering, arguing that interdisciplinary research is an essential resource for addressing emerging problems, resulting in important social benefits. Using NSF as a case study for problem that might be relevant in other contexts as well, I argue that the NSF itself poses a significant barrier to such research in not sufficiently appreciating the value of the humanities as significant interdisciplinary partners. This essay focuses on the practices of philosophy as a highly valuable but currently under-appreciated partner in achieving the goals of interdisciplinary research. This essay advances a proposal for developing deeper and wider interdisciplinary research in the sciences through coupled ethical-epistemological research. I argue that this more robust model of interdisciplinary practice will lead to better science by providing resources for understanding the types of value decisions that are entrenched in research models and methods, offering resources for identifying the ethical implications of research decisions, and providing a lens for identifying the questions that are ignored, under-examined, and rendered invisible through scientific habit or lack of interest. In this way, we will have better science both in the traditional sense of advancing knowledge by building on and adding to our current knowledge as well as in the broader sense of science for the good of, namely, scientific research that better benefits society.     

The Problems with Forbidding Science

Scientific research is subject to a number of regulations which impose incidental (time, place), rather than substantive (type of research), restrictions on scientific research and the knowledge created through such research. In recent years, however, the premise that scientific research and knowledge should be free from substantive regulation has increasingly been called into question. Some have suggested that the law should be used as a tool to substantively restrict research which is dual-use in nature or which raises moral objections. There are, however, some problems with using law to restrict or prohibit certain types of scientific research, including (i) the inherent imprecision of law for regulating complex and rapidly evolving scientific research; (ii) the difficulties of enforcing legal restrictions on an activity that is international in scope; (iii) the limited predictability of the consequences of restricting specific branches of scientific research; (iv) inertia in the legislative process; and (v) the susceptibility of legislators and regulators to inappropriate factors and influence. Rather than using law to restrict scientific research, it may be more appropriate and effective to use a combination of non-traditional legal tools including norms, codes of conduct, restrictions on publication, and scientist-developed voluntary standards to regulate problematic scientific research.     

Instituting Science: Discovery or Construction of Scientific Knowledge?

Is knowledge in the natural sciences discovered or constructed? For objectivists, scientific knowledge is discovered through investigations into a mind‐independent, natural world. For constructivists, such knowledge is produced through negotiations among members of a professional guild. I examine the clash between the two positions and propose that scientific knowledge is the concurrent outcome from investigations into a natural world and from consensus reached through negotiations of a professional guild. Specifically, I introduce the general methodological notion, instituting science, which incorporates both the discovery and the construction processes in the generation of scientific knowledge. To that end, I use a case study from the biomedical sciences to illustrate the notion. I conclude with a discussion of how this methodological notion helps to address the debate between objectivists and constructivists over the generation of scientific knowledge, and of how it compares with others who have also attempted to address the debate.     

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Deficit Model,the Diffusion Model and Publics in STS

The start of the twenty-first century witnessed the flourishing of both the biosciences (particularly genomics) and initiatives around public engagement in science, particularly in the UK and USA. STS researchers have both followed and fuelled this latter trend. Hence, it may be helpful to review the genealogy of these recent developments and of STS concern for the publics of science. This provides a way of assessing whether STS activities have been contributing to making the sciences more open and accountable to their publics. One trail returns to the institutionalisation of Public Understanding of Science (PUS) in the mid-1980s. The critique of this movement by STS scholars through reference to the deficit model (of public understanding of science) also figures here. However, less attention has been given to other modes of conceptualising science and publics, including what Cooter and Pumfrey label as the ‘diffusionist’ or ‘diffusion’ model (of scientific knowledge), which they contend entrenched traditional views of scientific knowledge and of publics as receivers of such knowledge. More recently, investigations of the making of science in diverse locations, attention to multiplicity and co-production have taken STS in new directions. Nevertheless, the legacies of both the deficit and diffusion models of science and publics continue to influence STS and its ‘regimes of truth’. Questions remain around STS researchers' persistent failure to acknowledge the diffusion model, in particular, and the consequent retrenchment of traditional views of how science works, limiting prospects for substantial public engagement and more open, democratic modes of science.     

Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs

There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first‐order and second‐order beliefs. This makes it possible for a subject to use probabilistic decision theory to manage in a rational way cases of potential failure of this self‐knowledge, as we find in implicit bias. Through such cases I argue that it is possible for uncertainty about what our beliefs are to be not only rationally permissible but advantageous.     

COR V2: Teaching observational research with multimedia courseware

Courseware for Observational Research (COR Version 2) is an interactive multimedia program designed to teach the foundation of the scientific method: systematic observation. COR uses digital video with interactive coding to teach basic concepts, such as creating precise operational definitions; using frequency, interval, and duration coding; developing sampling strategies; and analyzing and interpreting data. Through lessons, a case study, and laboratory exercises, it gradually scaffolds students from teacher-directed learning into self-directed learning. The newest addition to COR is a case study in which students work collaboratively, using their own observations to make recommendations about a child’s disruptive behavior in an after-school program. Evaluations of the lessons showed that classes using COR received better grades on their field observations than did those using methods that are more traditional. Students’ confidence and knowledge increased as they moved through each section of the program.     

Uncertainty in ethical consumer choice: a conceptual model

The market place has seen significant growth in the demand for ‘ethical’ products and services. Yet, consumers often experience knowledge, evaluation and choice uncertainties in decision‐making processes, particularly in relation to products such as ethical clothing. The authors explore this pertinent form of consumer uncertainty through three qualitative studies of ethical consumers that examine their approaches to clothing consumption. In‐depth interviews and focus groups confirm uncertainty arises; the results also identify the causes and consequences of consumer uncertainty in this context. The causes of uncertainty pertain to issues surrounding complexity, ambiguity, conflict and credibility that give rise to uncertainties that result in delaying purchase decisions, compromising beliefs and negative emotions. This study contributes to literature by offering a holistic understanding of the challenges facing consumers when making ethical choices. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs

Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific knowledge can lead toward representations that are more truth-approximating or more efficient at solving science-related problems under a broad range of circumstances, even under conditions where human cognitive faculties would be further off the mark than they actually are.     

Folk biology and the anthropology of science: cognitive universals and cultural particulars

This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based, species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, nor as variable across cultures, as the assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials, or social groups. These structures are routine products of our "habits of mind," which may in part be naturally selected to grasp relevant and recurrent "habits of the world." An experiment illustrates that the same taxonomic rank is preferred for making biological inferences in two diverse populations: Lowland Maya and Midwest Americans. These findings cannot be explained by domain-general models of similarity because such models cannot account for why both cultures prefer species-like groups, although Americans have relatively little actual knowledge or experience at this level. This supports a modular view of folk biology as a core domain of human knowledge and as a special player, or "core meme," in the selection processes by which cultures evolve. Structural aspects of folk taxonomy provide people in different cultures with the built-in constraints and flexibility that allow them to understand and respond appropriately to different cultural and ecological settings. Another set of reasoning experiments shows that Maya, American folk, and scientists use similarly structured taxonomies in somewhat different ways to extend their understanding of the world in the face of uncertainty. Although folk and scientific taxonomies diverge historically, they continue to interact. The theory of evolution may ultimately dispense with the core concepts of folk biology, including species, taxonomy, and teleology; in practice, however, these may remain indispensable to doing scientific work. Moreover, theory-driven scientific knowledge cannot simply replace folk knowledge in everyday life. Folk-biological knowledge is not driven by implicit or inchoate theories of the sort science aims to make more accurate and perfect.     

Autistic Heterogeneity: Linking Uncertainties and Indeterminacies

Autism is a highly uncertain entity and little is said about it with any degree of certainty. Scientists must, and do, work through these uncertainties in the course of their work. Scientists explain uncertainty in autism research through discussion of epistemological uncertainties which suggest that diverse methods and techniques make results hard to reconcile, ontological uncertainties which suggest doubt over taxonomic coherence, but also through reference to autism’s indeterminacy which suggests that the condition is inherently heterogeneous. Indeed, indeterminacy takes two forms—an inter-personal form which suggests that there are fundamental differences between individuals with autism and an intra-personal form which suggests that no one factor is able to explain all features of autism within a given individual. What is apparent in the case of autism is that scientists put uncertainty and indeterminacy into discussion with one another and, rather than a well-policed epistemic-ontic boundary, there is a movement between, and an entwinement of, the two. Understanding scientists’ dialogue concerning uncertainty and indeterminacy is of importance for understanding autism and autistic heterogeneity but also for understanding uncertainty and ‘uncertainty work’ within science more generally.     

Grounded Theory in Genetic Counseling Research: An Interpretive Perspective

As qualitative inquiry has gained wider acceptance in genetic counseling research, it has become increasingly important for researchers and those who evaluate their work to recognize the diversity of methods that fall under this broad umbrella. Some of these methods adhere to the traditional conventions of scientific research (e.g., objectivity, reliability, validity, replicability, causality and generalizability). When such studies are evaluated by reviewers who are well versed in scientific methods, the rigor of the study may be readily apparent. However, when researchers are using methods that do not conform to traditional scientific conventions, the distinction between well conducted and poorly conducted studies may become more difficult to discern. This article focuses on grounded theory because it is a widely used qualitative method. We highlight key components of this method in order to contrast conventions that fall within a scientific paradigm to those that fall within an interpretivist paradigm. The intent is to illustrate how the conventions within these two different paradigms yield different types of knowledge claims—both of which can advance genetic counseling theory and practice.