The role of verbal labels in the judgment of orientation and location

In an earlier study it was found that judgments of right-left orientations and locations were more difficult than judgments of up-down only when spatial words were used in the tasks. Experiments are reported in which pictures of many objects were presented to eliminate the possibility that subjects in previous studies had used strategies specific to single-stimulus tasks. In experiment 1, right-left orientations were judged more slowly than up-down orientations both when the spatial words were used and when arbitrary letters replaced the spatial words. In experiment 2, judgments of the right-left locations of pictures took longer than judgments of their up-down locations only when spatial words were used in the task; the right-left difficulty was eliminated when arbitrary letters replaced the words. The differential effect of words and letters in location judgments seems to be due to the different coding strategies adopted by subjects under the two conditions. It is concluded that a right-left difficulty does not depend on the use of spatial terms: word and letter conditions yield different results only when the task permits different judgments to be made under the two conditions.     

Essentialism and compassion: Predicting preference for noun labels applied to people with mental disorders

Two studies, one correlational and one experimental, examined preference for noun labels applied to people with mental disorders (e.g., John is a schizophrenic) as a function of differences in essentialist thinking and compassion. Study 1 (N = 360) showed that those high in essentialist thinking were more likely than those low in essentialist thinking to endorse noun labels. Study 2 (N = 86) showed that those led to experience state compassion were less likely to endorse noun labels than those in a control condition. This research is discussed with respect to processes underlying these effects, the positive psychology of language, limitations and future research directions, and implications for reducing stigmatizing attitudes towards those with mental disorders.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

Functional belief and judgmental belief

Synthese - A division between functional (animal) belief, on the one hand, and judgmental (reflective) belief, on the other, is central to Sosa’s two-tier virtue epistemology. For Sosa, mere...     

The need for contextual and technical knowledge in judgmental forecasting

The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which judgmental forecasts are improved by having more contextual and technical knowledge. Contextual information is knowledge gained by practitioners through experience on the job, consisting of general forecasting experience in the industry as well as specific product knowledge. Technical knowledge is knowledge about data analysis and formal forecasting procedures, including information on how to analyze data judgmentally. We directly compared judgmental forecasts of business practitioners with those generated by students, using 22 real-world time series. The practitioners had considerable contextual but no technical knowledge. The students had no contextual but two different levels of technical knowledge. We also generated forecasts with statistical methods to benchmark performance. Results show that contextual knowledge is particularly important in making good judgmental forecasts, while technical knowledge has little value. Practitioner forecasts are better than student forecasts in almost all comparisons. A decisive factor affecting forecast performance appears to be data variability, measured by the coefficient of variation of the time-series data. As the variability of a time series increases, the performance of all forecasts deteriorates, but judgmental forecasts by practitioners become more preferable. Statistical methods have difficulty achieving reasonable forecasts when the data are more variable, whereas judgemental forecasts reinforced by contextual information do relatively well. Data variability is one explanation for the mixed findings of past studies, relative to how well statistical techniques compare with judgment as a forecasting method.     

Interpretation and judgmental biases in social phobia

Previous research demonstrated that social phobia is characterized by content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases. The present study investigated whether this interpretation bias occurs not only in ambiguous, but also in positive and negative social events, and whether social phobic patients (SPs) are more characterized by a judgmental bias in costs than in probability. Besides, we argued that the judgmental bias observed in former studies could also be attributed to accurate estimations of SPs (of, for example, stuttering). Therefore, we assessed judgmental bias by the ratings of probability and costs of a negative evaluation (e.g. ‘people dislike me’) and not, as in previous studies, of negative social events (e.g. ‘stuttering’). SPs (n=228) and normal controls (n=33) were presented social and non-social events ranging from positive to profoundly negative. They ranked four different interpretations on likelihood to assess interpretation bias, and rated the profoundly negative interpretation on probability and cost to assess judgmental bias. SPs demonstrated content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases that also occurred in positive and negative social events. In contrast with expectations, SPs were characterized by a judgmental bias in both costs and probability.     

Beware how you compare: comparison direction dictates stimulus-valence-modulated presentation-order effects in preference judgment

Englund and Hellström (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 25:82–94, 2012a) found a tendency to prefer the left (first-read) of two attractive alternatives but the right (second-read) of two unattractive alternatives—a valence-dependent word-order effect (WOE). They used stimulus pairs spaced horizontally, and preference was indicated by choosing one of several written statements (e.g., “apple I like more than pear”). The results were interpreted as being due to stimulus position, with the magnitude of the left stimulus having a greater impact on the comparison outcome than the magnitude of the right. Here we investigated the effects of the positioning of the stimuli versus the semantics of the response alternatives (i.e., comparison direction) on the relative impacts of the stimuli. Participants rated preferences for stimuli spaced horizontally with the response alternatives not dictating a comparison direction (Exp. 1), and stimuli spaced vertically using Englund and Hellström’s (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 25:82–94, 2012a) response alternatives, which dictate a comparison direction semantically (Exp. 2). The results showed that the valence-dependent WOE found by Englund and Hellström (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 25:82–94, 2012a) was not due to the horizontal stimulus positioning per se, but to the induced comparison direction, with the effect probably being mediated by attention directed at the subject of the comparison. We concluded that a set comparison direction is required for the valence-dependent WOE to appear, and that using Hellström’s sensation-weighting model to determine stimulus weights is a way to verify the comparison direction.     

Interpreting ambiguous stimuli: Separating perceptual and judgmental biases

Interpreting ambiguous situations is not a purely data-driven process but can be biased towards positive interpretations by top-down influences. The present study tries to identify the underlying processes of these top-down influences. There are two separable types of processes that can be influenced by motivational biases: A perceptual bias affects information uptake whereas a judgmental bias affects acceptance criteria for positive and negative outcomes. In the present study, motivated influences on perception and judgment were investigated with a simple color discrimination task in which ambiguous stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. One of two colors indicated a financial gain or a loss, whereas a third color was neutral. To separate perceptual and judgmental biases, Ratcliff’s [Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59–108] diffusion model was employed. Results revealed motivational influences on perception and judgment.     

Languages and designs for probability judgment

Theories of subjective probability are viewed as formal languages for analyzing evidence and expressing degrees of belief. This article focuses on two probability langauges, the Bayesian language and the language of belief functions (Shafer, 1976). We describe and compare the semantics (i.e., the meaning of the scale) and the syntax (i.e., the formal calculus) of these languages. We also investigate some of the designs for probability judgment afforded by the two languages.     

Cognitive parallels between moral judgment and modal judgment

A central question in the study of moral psychology is how immediate intuition interacts with more thoughtful deliberation in the generation of moral judgments. The present study sheds additional light on this question by comparing adults’ judgments of moral permissibility with their judgments of physical possibility—a form of judgment that also involves the coordination of intuition and deliberation (Shtulman, Cognitive Development 24:293–309, 2009). Participants (N = 146) were asked to judge the permissibility of 16 extraordinary actions (e.g., Is it ever morally permissible for an 80-year-old woman to have sex with a 20-year-old man?) and the possibility of 16 extraordinary events (e.g., Will it ever be physically possible for humans to bring an extinct species back to life?). Their tendency to judge the extraordinary events as possible was predictive of their tendency to judge the extraordinary actions as permissible, even when controlling for disgust sensitivity. Moreover, participants’ justification and response latency patterns were correlated across domains. Taken together, these findings suggest that modal judgment and moral judgment may be linked by a common inference strategy, with some individuals focusing on why actions/events that do not occur cannot occur, and others focusing on how those same actions/events could occur.     

Safety behaviors and judgmental biases in social anxiety disorder

Two experiments were conducted to examine the link between safety behaviors and social judgments in social anxiety disorder (SAD). Safety behaviors were manipulated in the context of a controlled laboratory-based social interaction, and subsequent effects of the manipulation on the social judgments of socially anxious participants (N = 50, Study 1) and individuals meeting diagnostic criteria for generalized SAD (N = 80, Study 2) were examined. Participants were randomly assigned to either a safety behavior reduction plus exposure condition (SB + EXP) or a graduated exposure (EXP) control condition, and then took part in a conversation with a trained experimental confederate. Results revealed across both studies that participants in the SB + EXP group were less negative and more accurate in judgments of their performance following safety behavior reduction relative to EXP participants. Study 2 also demonstrated that participants in the SB + EXP group displayed lower judgments about the likelihood of negative outcomes in a subsequent social event compared to controls. Moreover, reduction in safety behaviors mediated change in participant self-judgments and future social predictions. The current findings are consistent with cognitive theories of anxiety, and support the causal role of safety behaviors in the persistence of negative social judgments in SAD.