Intuitive physics: the straight-down belief and its origin

This study examines the nature and origin of a common misconception about moving objects. We first show through the use of pencil-and-paper problems that many people erroneously believe that an object that is carried by another moving object (e.g., a ball carried by a walking person) will, if dropped, fall to the ground in a straight vertical line. (In fact, such an object will fall forward in a parabolic arc.) We then demonstrate that this "straight-down belief" turns up not only on pencil-and-paper problems but also on a problem presented in a concrete, dynamic fashion (Experiment 1) and in a situation in which a subject drops a ball while walking (Experiment 2). We next consider the origin of the straight-down belief and propose that the belief may stem from a perceptual illusion. Specifically, we suggest that objects dropped from a moving carrier may be perceived as falling straight down or even backward, when in fact they move forward as they fall. Experiment 3, in which subjects view computer-generated displays simulating situations in which a carried object is dropped, and Experiment 4, in which subjects view a videotape of a walking person dropping an object, provide data consistent with this "seeing is believing" hypothesis.     

From simple desires to ordinary beliefs: the early development of everyday psychology

We provide evidence for the claim that before young children construe human action in terms of beliefs and desires they understand action only in terms of simple desires. This type of naive psychology--a simple desire psychology--constitutes a coherent understanding of human action, but it differs from the belief--desire psychology of slightly older children and adults. In this paper we characterize what we mean by a simple desire psychology and report two experiments. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate that 2-year-old can predict actions and reactions related to simple desires. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that many 2-year-old pass desire reasoning tasks while at the same time failing belief reasoning tasks that are passed by slightly older children, and that are as comparable as possible to the desire tasks they pass with ease.     

Development of the Correspondence Between Real and Imagined Fine and Gross Motor Actions

The development of the correspondence between real and imagined motor actions was investigated in 2 experiments. Experiment 1 evaluated whether children imagine body position judgments of fine motor actions in the same way as they perform them. Thirty-two 8-year-old children completed a task in which an object was presented in different orientations, and children were asked to indicate the position of their hand as they grasped and imagined grasping the object. Children’s hand position was almost identical for the imagined- and real-grasping trials. Experiment 2 replicated this result with 8-year-olds as well as 6-year-olds and also assessed the development of the correspondence of the chronometry of real and imagined gross motor actions. Sixteen 6-year-old children and seventeen 8-year-old children participated in the fine motor grasping task from Experiment 1 and a gross motor task that measured the time it took for children to walk and imagine walking different distances. Six-year-olds showed more of a difference between real and imagined walking than did 8-year-olds. However, there were strong correlations between real and imagined grasping and walking for both 6- and 8-year-old children, suggesting that by at least 6 years of age, motor imagery and real action may involve common internal representations and that motor imagery is important for motor control and planning.     

Development of inhibition as a function of the presence of a supernatural agent

In this study the author examined the developmental differences in inhibition and cognition of 4-8-year-old children as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. Previous evolutionarily-relevant research has suggested that humans are naturally primed to think in terms of supernatural agents and that, given the correct context, individuals readily accept novel supernatural entities and alter their behavior accordingly. All children in this study played 4 games designed to assess their present level of inhibitory and cognitive development. Children in the experimental condition were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task. Results revealed that cognitively advanced children were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were less cognitively advanced children. This research provides support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents.     

Does eye gaze indicate implicit knowledge of false belief? Charting transitions in knowledge

Three-year-olds sometimes look to the correct location but give an incorrect verbal answer in a false belief task. We examined whether correct eye gaze among 3- to 5-year-old children indexed unconscious knowledge or low confidence conscious knowledge. Children "bet" counters on where they thought a story character would go. If children were conscious of the knowledge conveyed by their eye gaze then they should have bet modestly on their explicit answer (i.e., been unsure whether this answer or the answer conveyed through eye direction was correct). We found that children bet very highly on the location consistent with their explicit answer, suggesting that they were not aware of the knowledge conveyed through their eye gaze. This result was supported by a number of conditions that showed that betting was a sensitive measure of even small degrees of uncertainty. The results shed light on false-belief understanding, the implicit-explicit distinction, and transitional knowledge. We argue that the transition to a full understanding of false belief is marked by periods of implicit knowledge and explicit understanding with low confidence.     

Learning from others' mistakes? limits on understanding a trap-tube task by young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens)

A trap-tube task was used to determine whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens) who observed a model's errors and successes could master the task in fewer trials than those who saw only successes. Two- to 7-year-old chimpanzees and 3- to 4-year-old children did not benefit from observing errors and found the task difficult. Two of the 6 chimpanzees developed a successful anticipatory strategy but showed no evidence of representing the core causal relations involved in trapping. Three- to 4-year-old children showed a similar limitation and tended to copy the actions of the demonstrator, irrespective of their causal relevance. Five- to 6-year-old children were able to master the task but did not appear to be influenced by social learning or benefit from observing errors.     

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00–9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice—a hallmark of moral agency—is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.     

Acting and planning on the basis of a false belief: its effects on 3-year-old children's reasoning about their own false beliefs

This study examined 3-year-olds' explanations for actions of theirs that were premised on a false belief. In Experiment 1, children stated what they thought was inside a crayon box. After stating "crayons," they went to retrieve some paper to draw on. Children were then shown that the box contained candles and were asked to (a) state their initial belief and (b) explain their action of getting paper. Children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out several alternative interpretations for these findings. In Experiment 4, children planned and acted on their false belief. Again, children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action.     

Development of Inhibition as a Function of the Presence of a Supernatural Agent

In this study the author examined the developmental differences in inhibition and cognition of 4–8-year-old children as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. Previous evolutionarily-relevant research has suggested that humans are naturally primed to think in terms of supernatural agents and that, given the correct context, individuals readily accept novel supernatural entities and alter their behavior accordingly. All children in this study played 4 games designed to assess their present level of inhibitory and cognitive development. Children in the experimental condition were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task. Results revealed that cognitively advanced children were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were less cognitively advanced children. This research provides support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents.     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

Gravity does rule for falling events

Hood (1995) reported a vertical invisible displacement task where the goal was to find a ball that was dropped down one of three chimneys connected to three hiding boxes below by opaque tubes. Preschool children exhibited perseverative search at the box directly below the chimney where the ball was dropped even though the tubes were always visible and the children were given numerous trials and feedback. This behavior was interpreted as a naive theory of gravity. The current study set out to test the naive gravity theory hypothesis by reversing the motion of the event on a television. On half of the trials the object appeared to fall up the tube into one of the boxes which were now on the top of the apparatus. There were significantly more errors for ‘down’ trials as compared to ‘up’ trials which supports the hypothesis that children are biased to infer that falling objects travel in a straight line whereas anti-gravity events do not conform to this naive theory.     

Vitalism in naive biological thinking

Vitalism is the belief that internal bodily organs have agency and that they transmit or exchange a vital force or energy. Three experiments investigated the use of vitalistic explanations for biological phenomena by 5- and 10-year-old English-speaking children and adults, focusing on 2 components: the notion that bodily organs have intentions and the notion that some life force or energy is transmitted. The original Japanese finding of vitalistic thinking was replicated in Experiment 1 with English-speaking 5-year-olds. Experiment 2 indicated that the more active component of vitalism for these children is a belief in the transfer of energy during biological processes, and Experiment 3 suggested an additional, albeit lesser, role for organ intentionality. A belief in vital energy may serve a causal placeholder function within a naive theory of biology until a more precisely formulated mechanism is known.     

Ratings of speech naturalness of children ages 8-16 years

The focus of this cross-sectional study was the investigation of Speech Naturalness (speech that sounds normal or natural to the listener) of 60 normal speaking children and adolescents between the ages of 8 and 16 years. 26 naive adult listeners rated the naturalness of videotaped and computer-presented speech samples, using a 9-point-Likert rating scale (1: highly natural sounding speech and 9: highly unnatural sounding speech). The children and adolescents who participated as speakers were distributed among 5 age groups (8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 yr.) with 6 boys and 6 girls in each group. Each child demonstrated normal articulation, language, voice, and speech fluency skills. Age and sex comparisons indicated boys' and girls' speech was rated comparably; however, 8-yr.-olds' speech was rated as significantly less natural than those of 12-, 14-, and 16-yr.-olds. Preliminary ratings of Speech Naturalness for normal speaking children were presented. Suggestions for the clinical application of the findings as a target criterion in treatment programs with communicatively impaired children were suggested. Replication with a larger and more representative sample is in order.     

Children are cursed: an asymmetric bias in mental-state attribution

Abstract - Young children have problems reasoning about false beliefs. We suggest that this is at least partially the result of the same curse of knowledge that has been observed in adults—a tendency to be biased by one's own knowledge when assessing the knowledge of a more naive person. We tested 3- to 5-year-old children in a knowledge-attribution task and found that young children exhibited a curse-of-knowledge bias to a greater extent than older children, a finding that is consistent with their greater difficulty with false-belief tasks. We also found that children's misattributions were asymmetric. They were limited to cases in which the children were more knowledgeable than the other person; misattributions did not occur when the children were more ignorant than the other person. This suggests that their difficulty is better characterized by the curse of knowledge than by more general egocentrism or rationality accounts.     

3～6岁儿童对11种基本颜色命名和分类研究

对3~6岁儿童11种基本颜色的命名和分类进行了研究。结果表明:⑴汉语儿童对11种基本颜色的正确命名率随年龄增长而提高,顺序是白、黑、红、黄、绿、蓝、粉红、紫、橙、灰和棕。(2)汉语儿童对基本颜色分类能力随年龄增长而提高。3~4岁儿童对基本颜色没有明确的分类标准。5岁儿童有了一定标准,并出现按“彩色/非彩色”和“冷色/暖色”分类的倾向。6岁儿童颜色分类标准更明确,开始由主观标准向客观标准转变。     

Aspects of the validity of the Movement Assessment Battery for Children

Does the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC) measures what it claims to measure? The concurrent validity of the total impairment score and some of the item scores of the second and third age band of the M-ABC test were investigated. One hundred thirty three children, between 7- and 9-year-old, were assessed with the M-ABC test, a ball catching test and two tasks measuring dynamic balance. Ninety of these children were identified as children with a poor ball catching skill and 43 children were typically developing children. One hundred and seven children were assessed with the second age band of the M-ABC (the 7- and 8-year-old children) and 26 with the third age band (the 9-year-old children). The results of the correlation analysis between the ball catching test, the two dynamic balance tasks and the corresponding items of the M-ABC, varied from non-significant to a highly significant correlation coefficient of -0.74. For some items concurrent validity was established but other items seemed less valid, probably due to a lack of discriminative power. The concurrent validity of the total impairment score of the M-ABC was confirmed for the second age band. Correlation coefficients between the ball catching test, the dynamic balance skills and the M-ABC varied between -0.72 and -0.76. The results for the third age band have to be interpreted with prudence because they were based on only 26 children.     

The role of accuracy motivation on children's and adults' event recall

To examine the role of accuracy motivation in event recall, 6-, 7-, and 8-year-old children and adults were shown a short video about a conflict between two groups of children. Three weeks later, participants were asked a set of unbiased specific questions about the video. Following A. Koriat and M. Goldsmith's (1994) distinction of quantity- and quality-oriented memory assessments, and based on their model of strategic regulation of memory accuracy (1996), accuracy motivation was manipulated across three conditions. Participants were (a) forced to provide an answer to each question (low accuracy motivation), (b) initially instructed to withhold uncertain answers by saying "I don't know" (medium accuracy motivation), or (c) rewarded for every single correct answer (high accuracy motivation). When motivation for accuracy was high, children as young as 6 were to withhold uncertain answers to the benefit of accuracy. The expected quality-quantity trade-off emerged only for peripheral items but not for the central items. Participants who were forced to provide an answer gave more correct answers but also high numbers of incorrect answers than participants who had the option to answer "I don't know." The results are discussed in terms of the underlying model as well as in terms of forensic interviewing.     

Talking about others facilitates theory of mind in Chinese preschoolers

A longitudinal study and a training study were conducted to show that simply referring to others facilitated theory of mind (ToM) development in Chinese children. In Study 1, 3- to 4-year-old Chinese children (N = 52) were tested on ToM and autobiographical memory (AM). One year later, in the group of children who initially failed the false belief tasks, only those who increased their references to others in AM recall passed the tasks. In Study 2, Chinese preschoolers who were trained to talk about others through storytelling showed improvement in their ToM performance. These findings suggest alternative pathways for ToM development in non-Euro-American context.     

幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展

采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用