The native mind: biological categorization and reasoning in development and across cultures

This article describes cross-cultural and developmental research on folk biology: that is, the study of how people conceptualize living kinds. The combination of a conceptual module for biology and cross-cultural comparison brings a new perspective to theories of categorization and reasoning. From the standpoint of cognitive psychology, the authors find that results gathered from standard populations in industrialized societies often fail to generalize to humanity at large. For example, similarity-driven typicality and diversity effects either are not found or pattern differently when one moves beyond undergraduates. From the perspective of folk biology, standard populations may yield misleading results because they represent examples of especially impoverished experience with nature. Certain phenomena are robust across populations, consistent with notions of a core module.     

The subjective experience of object recognition: comparing metacognition for object detection and object categorization

Perceptual decisions seem to be made automatically and almost instantly. Constructing a unitary subjective conscious experience takes more time. For example, when trying to avoid a collision with a car on a foggy road you brake or steer away in a reflex, before realizing you were in a near accident. This subjective aspect of object recognition has been given little attention. We used metacognition (assessed with confidence ratings) to measure subjective experience during object detection and object categorization for degraded and masked objects, while objective performance was matched. Metacognition was equal for degraded and masked objects, but categorization led to higher metacognition than did detection. This effect turned out to be driven by a difference in metacognition for correct rejection trials, which seemed to be caused by an asymmetry of the distractor stimulus: It does not contain object-related information in the detection task, whereas it does contain such information in the categorization task. Strikingly, this asymmetry selectively impacted metacognitive ability when objective performance was matched. This finding reveals a fundamental difference in how humans reflect versus act on information: When matching the amount of information required to perform two tasks at some objective level of accuracy (acting), metacognitive ability (reflecting) is still better in tasks that rely on positive evidence (categorization) than in tasks that rely more strongly on an absence of evidence (detection).     

The benefits and costs of comparisons in a novel object categorization task: Interactions with development

We investigated how children use within- or between-category comparisons to generalize novel names for novel objects on the basis of a nonsalient dimension (texture) rather than a salient one (shape). Previous studies have not experimentally addressed the costs associated with comparisons. We conjectured that increasing the number of stimuli to be compared (and thus, converging evidence in favor of the target texture-based generalization), might not necessarily be beneficial, especially in young children (3- to 4-year-olds vs. 5- to 6-year-olds). Our results showed that more evidence in favor of texture (i.e., more within-category exemplars sharing the same texture) did not linearly increase texture-based choices in the same way for younger and older children. They also revealed that between-category comparisons gave rise to texture-based generalizations in both age groups. Overall, our results show that even though within- and between-category comparisons contribute to generalizations based on texture, they also generate cognitive constraints that interact with age.     

Global influences on the development of spatial and object perceptual categorization abilities: Evidence from preterm infants

Influences on the development of perceptual categorization were examined by comparing the performance of three groups of infants on spatial and object categorization tasks. The groups consisted of 1) fullterm infants tested at 3 to 4 months of age, 2) healthy preterm infants tested 3 to 4 months from birth (postnatals), and 3) healthy preterm infants tested 3 to 4 months from their due date (postterms). Four experiments showed that fullterms and postterms outperformed postnatals on a spatial categorization task (i.e., ‘above’ vs. ‘below’, and that fullterms outperformed both postnatals and postterms on object categorization tasks (i.e., dogs vs. cats, and cats vs. birds). These results suggest that maturation may be the predominant influence on the early development of the ability to form categorical representations of spatial information, while preterm birth may exert a limiting influence on the development of object categorization abilities.     

Situational information contributes to object categorization and inference

Three experiments demonstrated that situational information contributes to the categorization of functional object categories, as well as to inferences about these categories. When an object was presented in the context of setting and event information, categorization was more accurate than when the object was presented in isolation. Inferences about the object similarly became more accurate as the amount of situational information present during categorization increased. The benefits of situational information were higher when both setting and event information were available than when only setting information was available. These findings indicate that situational information about settings and events is stored with functional object categories in memory. Categorization and inference become increasingly accurate as the information available during categorization matches situational information stored with the category.     

Syllogistic reasoning and cognitive ageing

Gilinsky and Judd (1994) demonstrated that age-related impairment in syllogistic reasoning was in part due to reduced working-memory capacity. A total of 30 older (average age 66 years) and 34 younger persons (average age 24 years) were tested on syllogisms of various types as well as on other measures. Syllogistic reasoning was significantly correlated with education, processing speed, word span, and word fluency. Correlations with visuo-spatial processing and random letter generation were just short of significance. Syllogistic reasoning performance declined with age, although the deficit was no longer statistically significant following control for age-related differences in information-processing speed. On the other hand the inclusion of word fluency as an additional covariate boosted the apparent age effect, returning it to statistical significance. Thus it is possible that cognitive processes outside of working memory might underpin at least part of the apparent age deficit. This possibility is evaluated in the light of neuropsychological evidence implicating the prefrontal cortex in both the processing of syllogisms and more generally in cognitive ageing.     

A bird's eye view: biological categorization and reasoning within and across cultures

Many psychological studies of categorization and reasoning use undergraduates to make claims about human conceptualization. Generalizability of findings to other populations is often assumed but rarely tested. Even when comparative studies are conducted, it may be challenging to interpret differences. As a partial remedy, in the present studies we adopt a 'triangulation strategy' to evaluate the ways expertise and culturally different belief systems can lead to different ways of conceptualizing the biological world. We use three groups (US bird experts, US undergraduates, and ordinary Itza' Maya) and two sets of birds (North American and Central American). Categorization tasks show considerable similarity among the three groups' taxonomic sorts, but also systematic differences. Notably, US expert categorization is more similar to Itza' than to US novice categorization. The differences are magnified on inductive reasoning tasks where only undergraduates show patterns of judgment that are largely consistent with current models of category-based taxonomic inference. The Maya commonly employ causal and ecological reasoning rather than taxonomic reasoning. Experts use a mixture of strategies (including causal and ecological reasoning), only some of which current models explain. US and Itza' informants differed markedly when reasoning about passerines (songbirds), reflecting the somewhat different role that songbirds play in the two cultures. The results call into question the importance of similarity-based notions of typicality and central tendency in natural categorization and reasoning. These findings also show that relative expertise leads to a convergence of thought that transcends cultural boundaries and shared experiences.     

Object recognition and object segregation in infancy: historical perspective, theoretical significance, "kinds" of knowledge, and relation to object categorization

Needham (2001, this issue) reports that 4.5-month-old infants can use a short-term familiarization experience with a single object to facilitate the segregation of a visual display consisting of a configurally similar object and a configurally dissimilar adjacent object. We reflect on this finding in the larger context of Needham's systematic research on the development of object perception, a program that has included (1) a series of empirical studies designed to identify the different cues that infants use for object segregation and (2) a theoretical framework in which infants are presumed to integrate these cues to form interpretations of complex visual displays.     

Nash equilibrium, team reasoning and cognitive hierarchy theory

This paper comments on two experiments, carried out by Colman, Pulford and Rose, which investigate the prevalence of team reasoning. I argue that because the first experiment uses 'decomposable' games, it cannot discriminate between team-reasoning and the conceptually distinct 'prosocial' orientation. In the second experiment, Colman et al. find more support for the team reasoning hypothesis than for the rival hypothesis that subjects choose Nash equilibrium strategies. I suggest that the most credible explanation of the data is that some subjects are team reasoners while others act according to cognitive hierarchy theory.     

A cortical framework for invariant object categorization and recognition

In this paper we present a new model for invariant object categorization and recognition. It is based on explicit multi-scale features: lines, edges and keypoints are extracted from responses of simple, complex and end-stopped cells in cortical area V1, and keypoints are used to construct saliency maps for Focus-of-Attention. The model is a functional but dichotomous one, because keypoints are employed to model the “where” data stream, with dynamic routing of features from V1 to higher areas to obtain translation, rotation and size invariance, whereas lines and edges are employed in the “what” stream for object categorization and recognition. Furthermore, both the “where” and “what” pathways are dynamic in that information at coarse scales is employed first, after which information at progressively finer scales is added in order to refine the processes, i.e., both the dynamic feature routing and the categorization level. The construction of group and object templates, which are thought to be available in the prefrontal cortex with “what” and “where” components in PF46d and PF46v, is also illustrated. The model was tested in the framework of an integrated and biologically plausible architecture.

Logical reasoning,world knowledge,and mental imagery: Interconnections in cognitive processes

To better understand the role of problem content in verbal reasoning, the effect of two aspects of problem representation on conditional reasoning was examined. Specifically, this study focused on the effect of availability of knowledge schemata and mental imagery on recognition of indeterminacy. Four groups of 20 adults solved syllogisms that varied in imagery value and in tendency to access knowledge schemata (assessed by ratings of the relatedness of antecedent and consequent clauses of premises). When problems both were high in imagery value and had related clauses, performance was significantly better on indeterminate syllogisms. Access to schemata may permit elaborative processing and the generation of counterexamples to invalid inferences; imagery may support representation of problems and generation of elaborative information in memory.     

Crowded and sparse domains in object recognition: consequences for categorization and naming

Some models of object recognition propose that items from structurally crowded categories (e.g., living things) permit faster access to superordinate semantic information than structurally dissimilar categories (e.g., nonliving things), but slower access to individual object information when naming items. We present four experiments that utilize the same matched stimuli: two examine superordinate categorization and two examine picture naming. Experiments 1 and 2 required participants to sort pictures into their appropriate superordinate categories and both revealed faster categorization for living than nonliving things. Nonetheless, the living thing superiority disappeared when the atypical categories of body parts and musical instruments were excluded. Experiment 3 examined naming latency and found no difference between living and nonliving things. This finding was replicated in Experiment 4 where the same items were presented in different formats (e.g., color and line-drawn versions). Taken as a whole, these experiments show that the ease with which people categorize items maps strongly onto the ease with which they name them.     

The effects of surface detail on object categorization and naming

Three experiments are reported examining the effects of surface colour and brightness/texture gradients (photographic detail) on object classification and naming. Objects were drawn from classes with either structurally similar or structurally dissimilar exemplars. In Experiment 1a, object naming was facilitated by both congruent surface colour and photographic detail, with the effects of these two variables combining under-additively. In addition incongruent colour disrupted naming accuracy. These effects tended to be larger on objects from structurally similar classes than on objects from structurally dissimilar classes. Experiment 1b examined superordinate classification. There were again advantages due to congruent colour and photographic detail on responses to objects from both structurally similar and structurally dissimilar classes. Incongruent colour disrupted classification accuracy on structurally distinct but not structurally similar items. For structurally similar items, the advantages of congruent surface attributes on classification were smaller than on naming, but this was not the case for structurally dissimilar items. Experiment 2 examined subordinate classification of structurally similar objects. Now effects of congruent and incongruent colour, but not of photographic detail, were found. Experiment 3 showed that congruent and incongruent colour effects occur only when the colours occupy the internal surfaces of objects. The results suggest that surface details can affect object recognition and naming, depending upon: (1) the degree to which objects must be differentiated for a correct response to be made, and (2) the nature of the rate-limiting process determining performance.     

Visual discrimination and object categorization in the cichlid Pseudotropheus sp

Object categorization is an important function of the visual system, quickly providing an animal with relevant information about its surrounding and current situation, as for example during predator detection. While the ability to categorize objects has already been observed in several vertebrate and even invertebrate species, no attempt has previously been made to evaluate this function in fish, the most species-rich vertebrate group. This study assessed form discrimination abilities and object categorization skills in the African cichlid Pseudotropheus sp. Fish could discriminate between a variety of two-dimensional geometrical shapes, forms and sizes and learned to distinguish between two categories, "fish" versus "snail". Performance remained undisturbed by extensive modifications to the stimuli, as long as key features were maintained. Results indicate that fish not only memorized the features of the positive stimulus (categorized the positive stimulus), but also categorized the negative stimulus. During transfer trials involving a previously unknown object, fish were able to discriminate between both the negative and the positive stimulus and the unknown stimulus and responded accordingly.     

Domains of deontic reasoning: Resolving the discrepancy between the cognitive and moral reasoning literatures

Deontic reasoning has been studied in two subfields of psychology: the cognitive and moral reasoning literatures. These literatures have drawn different conclusions about the nature of deontic reasoning. The consensus within the cognitive reasoning literature is that deontic reasoning is a unitary phenomenon, whereas the consensus within the moral reasoning literature is that there are different subdomains of deontic reasoning. We present evidence from a series of experiments employing the methods of both literatures suggesting that people make a systematic distinction between two types of deontic rule: social contracts and precautions. The results call into question the prevailing opinion in the cognitive reasoning literature and provide further support for both an evolutionary view of deontic reasoning and the more domain-specific perspective found in the moral reasoning literature.