Honderich,Davidson, and the question of mental holism

Honderich's defence of aspects of his correlationist theory against many objections actually or likely to be raised today, in particular from the point of view of Davidson's anomalous monism and psychological holism, is accepted as largely successful. But it is suggested that, even if Davidson's theory is wrong‐headed, another kind of holism, more deeply ontological and less linguistic, regarding the mental seems to be true, and presents difficulties for Honderich's correlationism. Finally, it is contended that a panpsychist kind of identity theory escapes his strictures on identity theories and is probably true; however, the identity is, in virtue of certain synthetic necessities about the course of a stream of consciousness, either only between particular mental and physical events (and thus anomalously monist in Davidson's sense), or if it holds also between types of mental and of brain event then certain quite striking consequences follow as to the character of the fullest possible explanation of what goes on in the brain.     

Structural realism and Davidson

Structural realism is an attempt to balance the competing demands of the No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. In this paper I trace the development of the structuralist idea through the work of one of its leading advocates, John Worrall. I suggest that properly thought through what the structuralist is offering or should be offering is not an account of how to divide up a theory into two parts—structure and ontology—but (perhaps surprisingly) a certain kind of theory of meaning—semantic holism. I explain how a version of structural realism can be developed using Davidson’s theory of meaning and some advantages this has over the Ramsey-sentence version of structuralism.     

Quine and Davidson on Language,Thought and Reality

Books reviewed: Hans‐Johann Glock, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge University Press, 2003; xi + 311 pp. £45.00, $60.00 (hardcover).
Reviewed by Dale Jacquette, The Pennsylvania State University
Department of Philosophy
The Pennsylvania State University
246 Sparks Building
University Park, PA 16802 / USA
dlj4@psu.edu
http://www.personal.psu.edu/dlj4/     

On Davidson and interpretation

Davidson's theory of interpretation, I argue, is vulnerable to a number of significant difficulties, difficulties which can be avoided or resolved by the more Quinean approach which I develop. In Section 1 I note difficulties which apply to T-theories but are avoided by translation manuals. In Section 2 I show how to construct what I call T-manuals, which are like T-theories in requiring Tarskian structure, but like translation manuals in avoiding the difficulties discussed in Section 1. In Section 3 I show that the approach using T-manuals does at least as well as Davidson's with respect to a number of other concerns of his. In Section 4 I show that it does better than Davidson's with respect to reporting interpretations, especially where demonstrative utterances are concerned. In Section 5 I argue for (somewhat modified) Quinean empirical constraints, which go with manuals, as superior to the empirical constraints Davidson imposes, which go with T-theories. In Section 6 I show that Davidson is unable to offer an adequate account of what an interpreter knows; and propose a more acceptable theory of language mastery which gives a central role to the requirement that the interpreter's language usage satisfy the refined and amplified Quinean empirical constraints of Section 5.I wish to thank Susan Haack for her help in turning a draft into the present paper.     

Soames on Quine and Davidson

A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II.     

Davidson on Causal Relevance

Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not sufficient to show that mental properties are causally relevant.