共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Sven Bernecker 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(1):81-104
This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in
a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective”
or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism
and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning
externalism and internalism to different levels. 相似文献
2.
Thomas M. Crisp 《Synthese》2010,174(3):355-366
Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for
S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g.,
evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael
Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong
construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; given the weak construal, internalism is unmotivated;
either way, internalism is in serious trouble. I argue for two claims in this article. First, Bergmann’s dilemma argument
is unmotivated: he’s given no good reason for accepting one of its crucial premises. And second, Bergmann’s dilemma argument
is unsound: the crucial premise in question is false. 相似文献
3.
Tim Willenken 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(1):1-25
Few philosophers believe that G. E. Moore’s notorious proof of an external world can give us justification to believe that
skepticism about perceptual beliefs is false. The most prominent explanation of what is wrong with Moore’s proof—as well as
some structurally similar anti-skeptical arguments—centers on conservatism: roughly, the view that someone can acquire a justified
belief that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses
that undermine the support lent by E to p are false. In this paper I argue that conservatism does not make trouble for Moore’s
proof. I do this by setting up a dilemma concerning the notion of “justification to believe” that figures in conservatism.
On one understanding of justification to believe, conservatism is subject to obvious counterexamples. On another understanding
of justification to believe, conservatism is consistent with Moore’s “proof” conferring justification upon its conclusion.
Since these two understandings exhaust the logical space, the conservative indictment of Mooreanism fails. 相似文献
4.
While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in
contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers
of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory
practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist–externalist debate—from the perspective
of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence
because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend
that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist
characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists
and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts. 相似文献
5.
Dias P 《Science and engineering ethics》2011,17(2):233-243
Polanyi insisted that scientific knowledge was intensely personal in nature, though held with universal intent. His insights
regarding the personal values of beauty and morality in science are first enunciated. These are then explored for their relevance
to engineering. It is shown that the practice of engineering is also governed by aesthetics and ethics. For example, Polanyi’s
three spheres of morality in science—that of the individual scientist, the scientific community and the wider society—has
parallel entities in engineering. The existence of shared values in engineering is also demonstrated, in aesthetics through
an example that shows convergence of practitioner opinion to solutions that represent accepted models of aesthetics; and in
ethics through the recognition that many professional engineering institutions hold that the safety of the public supersedes
the interests of the client. Such professional consensus can be seen as justification for studying engineering aesthetics
and ethics as inter-subjective disciplines. 相似文献
6.
Gilead Bar-Elli 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):165-184
That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which
analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification,
respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists.
Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which
is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction
for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched. 相似文献
7.
We argue that considering only a few ‘big’ ethical decisions in any engineering design process — both in education and practice
— only reinforces the mistaken idea of engineering design as a series of independent sub-problems. Using data collected in
engineering design organisations over a seven year period, we show how an ethical component to engineering decisions is much
more pervasive. We distinguish three types of ethical justification for engineering decisions: (1) consequential, (2) deontological
or non-consequential, and (3) virtue-based. We find that although there is some evidence for engineering designers as ‘classic’
consequentialists, a more egocentric consequentialism would appear more fitting. We also explain how the idea of a ‘folk ethics’
— a justification in the second category that consciously weighs one thing with another — fits with the idea of the engineering
design process as social negotiation rather than as technological progress. 相似文献
8.
Walker RL 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2006,27(4):305-331
Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference. 相似文献
9.
E. J. Coffman 《Synthese》2011,181(3):471-488
This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz.,
the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic
propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having
justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments
against both claims. 相似文献
10.
Daniel M. Johnson 《Synthese》2011,182(3):433-447
Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain
epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus
specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent
proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of
warrant. The epistemic features I’m concerned about are experiences that should generate a believed defeater but don’t. I’ll
argue that proper functionalism as it stands cannot account for the epistemic effects of these defeating experiences—or, at
least, that it can only do so by embracing a deeply implausible view of our cognitive faculties. I’ll conclude by arguing
that the only plausible option Bergmann has for modifying his theory undercuts the consideration that motivates proper functionalism
in the first place. 相似文献
11.
Barbara S. Stengel 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(6):523-540
Here I shine light on the concept of and call for safe space and on the implicit argument that seems to undergird both the
concept and the call, complicating and problematizing the taken for granted view of this issue with the goal of revealing
a more complex dynamic worthy of interpretive attention when determining educational response. I maintain that the usual justification
for safe space covers rather than clarifies the logic of safe space and makes it difficult for an educator to respond to harassment
in a constructive and fitting way. I also claim that calls for safe space can only be properly interpreted—and responded to—when
the link between fear and safety is uncovered and deconstructed. In the process, I note that the assumption of “safety” as
a “positive condition” for education is problematic and warrants careful consideration. 相似文献
12.
Robert Lockie 《Ratio》1998,11(1):14-36
Moral Internalism is the claim that it is a priori that moral beliefs are reasons for action. At least three conceptions of 'reason' may be disambiguated: psychological, epistemological, and purely ethical. The first two conceptions of Internalism are false on conceptual, and indeed empirical, grounds. On a purely ethical conception of 'reasons', the claim is true but is an Externalist claim. Positive arguments for Internalism — from phenomenology, connection and oddness — are found wanting. Three possible responses to the stock Externalist objections are uncovered and overturned. In so doing a close relation between Internalism and Behaviourism is revealed, and some stock anti-behaviouristic arguments are co-opted for Externalism. The likely dependence of Internalism on an Atomistic Associationism is uncovered and criticised. Internalism is seen as being ultimately a type of Ethical Determinism. Finally, a sketch of an Anti-Associative Externalism is given whereby the notion of self determination of action is put forward as an account of moral motivation fit to resist both the internalist and the belief-desire psychology premises of the stock non-cognitivist argument. 相似文献
13.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(1):1-17
Here I present and defend an etiological theory of objective, doxastic justification, and related theories of defeat and evidence.
The theory is intended to solve a problem for reliabilist epistemologies—the problem of identifying relevant environments
for assessing a process’s reliability. It is also intended to go some way to accommodating, neutralizing, or explaining away
many internalist-friendly elements in our epistemic thinking. 相似文献
14.
Gereon Wolters 《Axiomathes》2009,19(4):481-508
In theoretical matters, ecclesiastical claims to knowledge have lead to various conflicts with science. Claims in orientational matters, sometimes connected to attempts to establish them as a rule for legislation, have often been in conflict with the
justified claims of non-believers. In addition they violate the Principle of Autonomy of the individual, which is at the very
heart of European identity so decisively shaped by the Enlightenment. The Principle of Autonomy implies that state legislation
should not interfere in the life of individual citizens, as long as his or her actions do not violate the rights of others.
This paper—using the example of the theory of evolution—rejects ecclesiastical claims to theoretical knowledge as completely
unfounded and preposterous. In the case of orientational knowledge—using the example of euthanasia—ecclesiastical claims to
(universalizable) knowledge are shown to be unfounded as well. The Church’s position with respect to euthanasia and a range
of other bio-ethical topics, such as pre-marital sex, contraception, abortion, indissolubility of marriage, and homosexuality,
rests on a very peculiar ethical position. This ethical position is the natural right theory, which—far from being universalizable—is
shared by very few people. Among other things, this position presupposes the belief in God as the creator of nature, and the
assumption that ethical norms can be derived from this premise. Thus ecclesiastical knowledge claims, cannot be justified
in a way which could be reasonably supposed to be universally acceptable. Kant (see the quote) was the first to require this
sort of justification. Claims that fail to implement Kant’s stipulations should be eliminated by what I would like to call
“Kant’s razor”. 相似文献
15.
Wang-Yen Lee 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(2):299-313
Pragmatic Scientific Realism (PSR) urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reason to
think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smith thinks that pursuing what we know we cannot
achieve is clearly irrational, Rescher disagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic
grounds—if in pursuing the unreachable goal one can get indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmatic
justification for the realist aim of PSR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds—since there is a competing alternative to
PSR, and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PSR can offer while being less risky than it is, prudential
reasoning favours the alternative to PSR. This undermines the pragmatic case for the realist aim of science since the instrumentalist
alternative does not aim at the truth. 相似文献
16.
We describe a patient (J.M.) who showed “refractory” behavior in picture—word matching tasks—that is, his performance became
poorer when items were repeated. This contrasts with the facilitatory effects of repetition usually observed in normal participants.
We show for the first time that there can be facilitatory effects of repetition on some tasks, even though refractory behavior
is shown on the same items in other tasks. In particular, in Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrate that J.M. showed contrasting
effects of repetition across different components of the language system: There were facilitatory effects of repetition priming
on lexical decision but refractory behavior on picture—word matching. In Experiments 3 and 4, we demonstrate that J.M. showed
contrasting effects of repetition within the same system (semantic memory). His performance became refractory when items were
repeated in picture—word matching (Experiment 3), but it was facilitated when items were repeated in superordinate categorization
(Experiment 4). These contrasting patterns of facilitation and interference from repetition priming have implications for
understanding the nature of refractory behavior and for constraining theoretical accounts of semantic memory. 相似文献
17.
Elijah Chudnoff 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):313-333
In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic
because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification
for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents
in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational
phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical,
and philosophical intuitions. 相似文献
18.
Nathan Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):325-349
I argue that contemporary liberal theory cannot give a general justification for the institution or practice of punishment,
i.e., a justification that would hold across a broad range of reasonably realistic conditions. I examine the general justifications
offered by three prominent contemporary liberal theorists and show how their justifications fail in light of the possibility
of an alternative to punishment. I argue that, because of their common commitments regarding the nature of justification,
these theorists have decisive reasons to reject punishment in favor of a non-punitive alternative. I demonstrate the possibility
of this alternative by means of a careful examination of the nature of punishment, isolating one essential characteristic—the
aim to impose suffering—and showing how this characteristic need not guide enforcement. There is logical space for a forceful
and coercive, yet non-punitive method of enforcement. This fact poses difficulties for many classical and contemporary justifications
of punishment, but it poses particularly crippling problems for general liberal justifications.
相似文献
Nathan HannaEmail: |
19.
Robert Audi 《Synthese》2008,161(3):403-418
Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue
of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light
of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less
philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part,
my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take
to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the
criteria for appraising intellectual virtue. 相似文献
20.
It is generally accepted that the institutionalization of new knowledge is the final stage in the process of knowledge diffusion
and utilization, suggesting the need for conceptual models of institution building strategy. We describe four strategic types
of institution building, which involve a transfer of knowledge and programs from a home setting to a host setting: consulting,
management, adaptation, and entrepreneurial. The strategic types are conceptually derived in terms of the fit between the
institutional components—content, context, and environment—in both home and host settings.
Daniel S. Fogel received his B.S. and M.A. from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin.
He is currently Associate Dean and Director, Center for International Enterprise Development, and professor of business administration
at the University of Pittsburgh. His two recent books areManaging in Emerging Market Economies: Volumes I and II.
His current research focuses on strategic flexibility and innovation in interorganizational networks. 相似文献