Memory and time

The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having.

Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis

In this article, I argue that the relationship between place and self can be accounted for by recent theoretical work on autobiographical memory. The link between place and self is conceptualized as a transitory mental representation that emerges as a “place of mine” (personal autobiographical experience) from a “place” (declarative knowledge). The function of “place of mine” is to guide personal memory and self-knowing consciousness of periods of our lives. I combine inquiries of memory, self, and place in a triadic relationship, a synthesis, suggesting a conceptual model for the phenomenon of place-related self as a sub-system of the self. This is formed by a causal progression from a physical place across time via emotional and cognitive bonds, components of the autobiographical information grounding the self, apportioned across declarative memory. Finally, using the methods of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, I show that the proposed model accounts for previous and new data on place-related identity.     

Internalism,externalism, and transcendental idealism

The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation.     

The effects of a concurrent task on human optimization and self control

Memory deficits have been shown to hamper decision making in a number of populations. In two experiments, participants were required to select one of three alternatives that varied in reinforcer amount and delay, and the effect of a concurrent task on a behavioral choice task that involved making either an impulsive, self-controlled, or optimal response was studied. The studies aimed to see whether or not individuals were capable of optimizing when confronted with a three-alternative choice paradigm, and if a concurrent task could induce over-selectivity toward a self-controlled, or impulsive, choice, rather than an optimal choice. Various factors which could possibly influence optimization were also explored. The results suggest that some, but not all, individuals are capable of optimizing in a three-alternative choice paradigm, especially when there is a great differential between reinforcement rates of optimal versus non-optimal behaviors. Participants with a concurrent task (continuously subtracting seven from a large number) displayed over-selectivity, evidenced by the high proportion of self-controlled responses.     

Memory for details with self-referencing

Self-referencing benefits item memory, but little is known about the ways in which referencing the self affects memory for details. Experiment 1 assessed whether the effects of self-referencing operate only at the item, or general, level or whether they also enhance memory for specific visual details of objects. Participants incidentally encoded objects by making judgements in reference to the self, a close other (one's mother), or a familiar other (Bill Clinton). Results indicate that referencing the self or a close other enhances both specific and general memory. Experiments 2 and 3 assessed verbal memory for source in a task that relied on distinguishing between different mental operations (internal sources). The results indicate that self-referencing disproportionately enhances source memory, relative to conditions referencing other people, semantic, or perceptual information. We conclude that self-referencing not only enhances specific memory for both visual and verbal information, but can also disproportionately improve memory for specific internal source details.     

The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion

My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.

Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett

In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first by talking in a general way about Dennett's phenomenology, and second by examining his treatment of the concept of the self. In both cases I argue that Dennett should have read his Husserl and Merleau-Ponty more carefully, since in the end his (hetero-) phenomenology is methodologically incoherent and suffers from something like a weakness of will. This emerges especially in his use of the notion of fiction.     

Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire

The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) is a theoretically driven and empirically validated 63-item self-report scale designed to measure 10 phenomenological qualities of autobiographical memories: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. To develop a short form of the MEQ to use when time is limited, participants from two samples (N = 719; N = 352) retrieved autobiographical memories, rated the phenomenological experience of each memory and completed several scales measuring psychological distress. For each MEQ dimension, the number of items was reduced by one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and, similar to the long-form version of the scales, the new short scales correlated with psychological distress in theoretically meaningful ways. The new short form of the MEQ has similar psychometric proprieties as the original long form and can be used when time is limited.     

When the "I" looks at the "Me": autobiographical memory, visual perspective, and the self

This article presents a theoretical model of the self processes involved in autobiographical memories and proposes competing hypotheses for the role of visual perspective in autobiographical memory retrieval. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved from either the 1st person perspective, in which individuals see the event through their own eyes, or from the 3rd person perspective, in which individuals see themselves and the event from the perspective of an external observer. A growing body of research suggests that the visual perspective from which a memory is retrieved has important implications for a person’s thoughts, feelings, and goals, and is integrally related to a host of self-evaluative processes. We review the relevant research literature, present our theoretical model, and outline directions for future research.     

Time-Based Prospective Memory Performance and Time-Monitoring in Children with ADHD

The current study investigated prospective memory (PM) performance in children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and controls and aimed at exploring possible underlying factors of PM performance. Twenty-two children with ADHD and 39 age- and ability-matched typically developing children performed a computerized time-based PM task. As predicted, children with ADHD had fewer correct PM responses than controls. Neither differences in overall ongoing task performance nor, remarkably, differences in overall frequency and accuracy of time monitoring were found. Exploratory analyses suggest that individual differences in time monitoring in the final interval before target times may be related to PM performance in ADHD.     

Memory, autonoetic consciousness, and the self

Memory is a general attribute of living species, whose diversification reflects both evolutionary and developmental processes. Episodic-autobiographical memory (EAM) is regarded as the highest human ontogenetic achievement and as probably being uniquely human. EAM, autonoetic consciousness and the self are intimately linked, grounding, supporting and enriching each other's development and cohesiveness. Their development is influenced by the socio-cultural-linguistic environment in which an individual grows up or lives. On the other hand, through language, textualization and social exchange, all three elements leak into the world and participate to the dynamic shaping and re-shaping of the cultural scaffolding of the self, mental time traveling and EAM formation. Deficits in self-related processing, autonetic consciousness, emotional processing and mental time traveling can all lead to or co-occur with EAM disturbances, as we illustrate by findings from EAM impairments associated with neurological or psychiatric disorders.     

Voters, Emotions, and Memory

In this paper we argue that emotional response to information encountered in campaigns has implications for the likelihood of remembering that information at the time of the vote. Most voting models are built on what voters remember—whether it is the placement of candidates on issues, or opened ended responses to prompts. That recall of memory is biased is well-known, but the extent to which those biases are driven by affective response to candidate information has not been studied. Using dynamic process tracing, we examine voters' emotional responses, information search, and candidate evaluations during a simulated presidential primary campaign. By manipulating anxiety and the amount of incongruent information that voters encounter, we can detect the direct influence of affect in information processing. We find evidence that voters are more likely to remember information that generates any affective reaction as opposed to information for which the subjects report no emotional response. However, we find little evidence that anxiety has a special role, compared to enthusiasm or anger, in increasing the likelihood that an individual item is remembered. This challenges a primary contention of the theory of Affective Intelligence that anxiety leads to more memories for campaign information.     

Perceived self in infancy

Research is presented suggesting that an implicit sense of self is developing from birth, long before children begin to manifest explicit (conceptual) self-knowledge by the second year. Implicit self-knowledge in infancy is rooted in intermodal perception and action. Studies are reported showing that at least from 2 months of age, infants become increasingly systematic and deliberate in the exploration of their own body and the perceptual consequences of self-produced action. From such exploration, infants develop a sense of their own body as a differentiated entity, situated and agent in the environment. Based on recent empirical findings, the perceptual determinants of such implicit sense of self are discussed.     

Traumatic stress,neural self and the spiritual mind

According to recent findings stressful experiences may influence various physiological disturbances and also neuroanatomical changes and some studies also show that psychotherapy and meditation may influence brain functions. Traumatic stress is frequently related to a dissociative response that disintegrates conscious experience. In this context, self-reflection is an essential principle in the process of posttraumatic growth related to spiritual experiences and meditation states that enable mental integration and create the novel integrated self. According to recent findings there is no widely accepted evidence about specific neural mechanisms of processes related to mental integration linked to the spiritual experiences and meditation. Nevertheless there is growing evidence that these integrative experiences are related to various alterations in the brain’s physiology and morphology. These findings provide a new paradigm for understanding of mental disorders and emphasize the fundamental role of mental integration and integrated self in the therapy of psychiatric disorders.     

Affective ontologies: Post-humanist perspectives on the self,feeling and intersubjectivity

At this particular historical juncture of the Anthropocene it is becoming increasingly clear that, as Val Plumwood puts it, the survival of our species depends upon how our relationships with earth others are reconfigured . Yet as the human is once again placed at the centre of our planetary life, this time as a geological agent, a growing body of scholarship has taken up the challenge of rethinking the human and its limits (see for example the special issue of the journal Angelaki 16(4), 2011). This special issue seeks to contribute to this body of work from the perspective of posthumanist explorations of affect, and thereby to open possibilities for articulating non-solipsistic and non-anthropocentric notions of the subject.     

Distancing the present self from the past and the future: Psychological distance in anxiety and depression

Humans show a systematic tendency to perceive the future as psychologically closer than the past. Based on the clinical hypothesis that anxiety would be associated more with future threat life events, whereas depression with past loss events, here we explored whether people with anxiety- and depression-related personality traits perceive differently the psychological distance of temporal events. Results showed that the common tendency to perceive the future as psychologically closer than the past is exaggerated in individuals with anxiety-related personality traits, whereas this asymmetry drastically shrinks in individuals with depression-related personality traits. Beyond substantiating the hypothesis that the past and the future are differently faced by people with depression- and anxiety-related personality traits, the present findings suggest that temporal orientation of one’s self may be greatly altered in anxiety and depression.     

Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality

This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “phenomenology” serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by “moral phenomenology.”

The essential moral self

It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits—more than any other mental faculty—are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits.     

Perception of Time and Causation Through the Kinesthesia of Intentional Action

Perception is an intentional action through space in time by which the finite brain explores the infinite world. By acting, the brain thrusts its body into the future space–time of the world while predicting the sensory consequences. Through perceiving its actions and their results, it remembers its predictions, its actions, and their consequences. To perform these operations the brain, through chaotic dynamics, constructs and uses finite perceptual matrices of space–time and infers causation. Perceived time differs from world time in ways that are determined by the neural mechanisms of intentionality. In particular, perception of the self in action, through the mechanism of preafference, gives structure and content to the concepts of continuity, contiguity, duration, temporal order, cause, and effect. We expand our perceptual scales beyond kinesthesia by converting time into space by use of clocks and calendars. Remembered time differs from perceived time in being dependent on awareness, which makes it episodic, fragmentary, and subject to large variations in rates of time lapse in the flow of meanings. The attribution of causal agency to objects and events in the world results from the experience of temporal sequencing in the action–perception cycle: “I act” [cause] “I feel” [effect] during Piaget’s somatomotor phase in early human development.