《无神论：反对上帝的案例》

在这本书中，作者拒绝超自然概念，并考察、分析、驳斥了有神论者提出的无数证据。他说：“这本书的目的不是要人们改宗无神论……而是要证明对上帝的信仰是非理性的、虚妄的。如果一个人愿意继续信仰上帝，那是他的权利；但是他不能再以理性和道德的名义为自己的信仰辩护。”     

"我不知道怎样发现'适度'"——霍布斯对亚里士多德道德理论的批判和改造

霍布斯批判中道学说的要点包括:(1)在指导实践方面,中道学说——更一般地,是指亚里士多德的道德理论——是空洞的;(2)这种空洞性源于,尽管亚里士多德确立了道德哲学的正确基础,即欲望服从理性的人类灵魂自然秩序观念,然而他未能以规则的形式揭露理性本身的规定性.据此,在霍布斯这里,道德辩护的问题转化为通过理性的自我批判,为诸道德规则寻找理性基础的问题.     

评阿多诺否定性的道德哲学

受尼采的影响,阿多诺认为,不存在道德的可靠性。不能简单地认为,被所有人一致接受的规范就是道德的,在矛盾着的社会中,任何一种道德规范的实施都可能走向自己的反面。因此,我们要赎罪。这也是与人自身的矛盾联系在一起的。在阿多诺看来,人是理性的存在物,但是这个理性是自我矛盾的。人既是他自己又不是他自己。人的这种矛盾实际上是人自身和社会矛盾的缩影。由于这种矛盾,人总是在矛盾状态中生活,他要做好人就必须做坏人。由此,阿多诺指出,在错误的生活之中不存在正确的生活。由于人和社会的这种矛盾,人们无法为牺牲自我以维系社会的伦理行为提供合理性的辩护。由于不存在可靠的道德,在社会和个人的矛盾中,个人只能用责任来为自己的道德行为辩护。这也表明,在当代社会,我们必须从规范伦理学走向责任伦理学。     

何为情感理性

西方道德情感主义者主张人类天生的情感或情感反应能力是理解、解释和辩护道德的最终根据。但如果情感自身的合理性得不到说明,或者需要情感以外的理性概念来加以辩护,那么,以情感来理解、解释和辩护道德的道德情感主义路径从根本上来说就是难以成立的。我们需要一种有别于西方传统理性概念的情感理性概念来为道德情感主义做根本的辩护。情感理性既可以界定为一种推理能力,即通过情感反应从某些事实前提推出规范性判断或价值判断的能力,也可以界定为规范性或应当性的来源之一。情感理性的思想为近期认知神经科学的实验研究所证实。历史经验也表明,恻隐之心所产生的道德情感往往是我们判断道德是非更为可靠的标准。自然选择的理论也为情感理性的思想提供了进一步的支持。     

再论康德伦理学的形式主义——兼论康德的道德目的论的意义

黑格尔对康德伦理学的形式主义所作的批评是富有影响力的,他指责康德的纯粹实践理性概念无力在内容上阐明道德的本质。而当代康德主义者在回应这一批评时,却未能在道德现象中揭示纯粹实践理性与客观价值的实质关联,也因此不能彻底反驳黑格尔的批评。通过对康德道德哲学的分析,本文将表明：一方面,形式主义进路服务于论证纯粹实践理性的可能性,并构成了对道德现象的哲学诠释的一部分;另一方面,该诠释成功地揭示了道德意识的意向结构及其事实性要素,并导向了“目的自身”的概念。因此,康德的形式主义伦理学所导向的道德目的论可以构成一种实质价值学说。在与道德目的论的关联中,康德伦理学的形式主义及其纯粹实践理性概念能够得到恰当理解和有效辩护。     

意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评

无论是在柏拉图那里还是在亚里士多德那里,在他们颇具代表性的灵魂二分或三分学说中均没有意志概念的位置。我们可以说,在古典希腊道德心理学中并不存在着一个意志概念。而当我们进一步考察与意志概念相关的行为道德责任问题,特别是考察亚里士多德的自愿与不自愿概念时,我们可以发现欲望和理性二元结构是古典希腊道德心理学解释行为道德责任的主要思想资源,在这样的一个结构中意志概念是缺席的。赖尔与威廉斯等人所代表的极端观点认为,没有意志概念的古希腊道德心理学比有意志概念的现代道德心理学在解释与说明人的行为上可能更为成功。这种观点值得商榷,意志概念不是一个心理官能和心理活动的概念,而是同行为的主体性相关。古典希腊道德心理学在根本上是一种自然主义行为心理学,它所根本缺失的恰恰是行为的道德责任概念。     

论罗尔斯对Rational和Reasonable的区分

在《政治自由主义》中,罗尔斯明确区分了rational和reasonable这两个概念。rational和reasonable的区分主要体现为理性之人(rationalpersons)和明理之人(reasonablepersons)的区分。理性之人会运用理性去选择合适的目的,择取达成目的的有效手段,并努力抗拒各种干扰和诱惑,坚定执行理性反思确立的目的和手段。理性之人包含工具理性、目的理性以及意志力这三个维度。前两个维度主要关涉认知的事情。明理之人体现在认知和道德这两个维度。明理之人能够认识到人们在思考问题时面临的各种认知上的挑战,能进行合理的推论,且只认同合理的学说;明理之人具备起码的公平感,不是利己主义者,关心自己的行为是否能面向他人得到证成,希望以人们无法合理拒斥的公共理由来证成和规范自己的行为。明理之人与理性之人在认知的维度上具有相同的含义,可以互换,但在道德的维度上则有所不同。明理之人必然具有道德感,必定不是利己主义者,可理性之人在这点上却具有不确定性。     

道德感染的特性与功能

道德感染,是道德传播的一种特殊形式。道德感染,是一方由于敬慕于另一方的道德形象而产生高度的道德情感认同,并导致相应的道德行为的过程。道德感染之所以不同于一般的道德传播,主要在于它具有下述独特性质: (1)非逻辑 道德感染的进行,不是依靠严密的逻辑结构,而是诉诸直观、表象和内在的情感。道德感染是一种无概念或无明确的概念形式的道德传播。 在许多类型的道德传播中,往往借助概念推演、理性论证,以道德的逻辑力量折服人。逻辑的道德传播,为社会个体从理性高度来规范自己的行为奠定了基础。它是一种观念层次上的道德认同。但是,由于它诉诸     

义务论与道德运气——一种康德式的视角

一般认为,以康德伦理学为代表的义务论并不考虑"道德运气"。然而,按照威廉斯等人的观点,人的道德行为很大程度上受到运气等偶然性因素的影响,而这些运气实际上深刻影响着关于一个行为的"道德判断"。本文认为,康德伦理学并非不考虑"道德运气",恰恰相反,现实层面的复杂性正是义务论所思考的出发点,主体的道德动机与道德行为始终不可能脱离开各种运气的影响。正是基于此,康德的义务论才必须提出一种脱离各种运气的法则与原理,它们能在"最小意义"上作为道德行为的衡量标准,从而产生一种基本的"行动指南"。也就是说,康德伦理学不仅不反对或者排斥运气,反而以其自身的原则建构给各种意外情况留下充分的解释空间。     

罗尔斯理性契约论中的错误

在《正义论》(1971)出版20年之后,罗尔斯公开声明,在理论中将正义理论描述为理性选择理论是部分错误的.这里包含两个主要的问题,它们关系到构建原初状态和两个正义原则的最大最小值的推论.由于在霍布斯的模型中,道德与理性是不相关的,所以罗尔斯试图构建一个公平的原初状态.因此罗尔斯的理性契约论证明是理性而公平的模型.但是这个模型犯了道德假设先于理性的循环错误,而这一点或许是理性上任意的.而且,由于它具有非常保守的规避风险的心理态度,罗尔斯就无法表明,在两个正义原则的最大最小值的策略推论中,较高级的理性会凌驾于其他策略中的理性.这些就是罗尔斯不得不承认错误的原因.出于他的正义理论的辩护策略,罗尔斯转向了康德的自由概念和平等的道德人的概念,而围绕康德的概念是存在一些争议的.     

A reason to be rational

This essay argues that in spite of the powerful arguments by Kolodny and Broome there is a reason to be rational. The suggested reason to be rational is that if an agent complies with rational requirements the people around him, as well as he himself, will be able to explain and predict his attitudes. Rationality allows us to make sense of an agent’s attitudes in terms of his other attitudes. This form of explainability is valuable, because it provides us with greater comprehension as regards an agent’s attitudes. Thus, I argue that there is an instrumental reason to be rational.     

Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723?C1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith??s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn??t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel??s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel??s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their ??concrete other?? and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by ??rational feeling??. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate ??family-feelings?? to rational feelings which integrate citizen into ??sittliche community?? through reciprocal process of recognition. In this article I want to consider Hegelians Honneth??s and Williams??s relevance to the theory of moral development.     

Luck,Mystery and Supremacy: D. Z. Phillips Reads Nagel and Williams on Morality

This paper critically examines D. Z. Phillips’ critical examination of Nagel's and Williams's famous exchange about moral luck. It argues that Phillips fails properly to identify the fundamental issues at stake in the exchange – particularly with respect to the role of scepticism, of the picture of the will as an extensionless point, and of the putative supremacy of morality – and so fails to recognise a certain commonality of interest between himself and those he criticises.     

“善良意志”与道德权限

“善良意志”是康德伦理学的核心概念,他将善良意志提升到道德领域的至善地位,从而确定了道德的纯粹性。他还借助善良意志划分了善与恶的界限,指明了责任作为检验善恶的标准,将传统德性论的品质和功用主义的幸福都排除在道德领域之外。由此,康德还将伦理与道德的界限做了区分,他强调伦理与道德各自明确自身的权责,从而充分发挥各自的作用。     

Moral Luck,Responsibility, and Systems of Tort Liability

Bernard Williams drew our attention to what might be wrong with denying the role of luck in our understanding of agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf and David Enoch, in separate works, have asked us to focus instead on what might be virtuous and valuable in embracing that role, and on how our institutions might assist us in that regard. They claim that the agent who ‘takes’ a responsibility that law or morality do not already assign to them may be displaying a special moral virtue or exercising a distinctive moral power. I raise some objections to Wolf’s and Enoch’s case for that claim, and query some of its purported institutional implications for tort law systems.

     

Telling Others to Do What You Believe Is Morally Wrong: The Case of Confucius and Zai Wo

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor.     

Divine Nature and Divine Will

This paper examines the relationship between God and those universals that characterize his nature. It is argued that God has sovereignty over his nature, even though he is not self-creating, and does not give rise to the universals that characterize his nature by any act of intellection. Rather, God is himself an act of rational willing in which all that is has its existence. Because the act that is God is one of free will, he has sovereignty over the features it displays, which include all that characterizes his nature.     

III. Professor Frankena's rendezvous with the absolute

In his presidential address (American Philosophical Association, Western Division), William Frankena sets himself against the relativist and irrationalist drift of our time in asserting that ‘It is of the essence of a normative judgment to claim that it is justified, rational or valid’, and that fully informed men of reason will ultimately agree about value questions. Applauding the return to reason, this note finds a need for further clarification on the definition of normative terms, the justification of normative judgments, the basis of obligation to be rational, and on the promise of agreement among men of reason in axiology.     

Tennessee Williams: the uses of declarative memory in The Glass Menagerie

Tennessee Williams called his first great work, The Glass Menagerie, his "memory play." The situation in which Williams found himself when he began writing the play is explored, as are the ways in which he used the declarative memory of his protagonist, Tom Wingfield, to express and deal with his own painful conflicts. Williams's use of stage directions, lighting, and music to evoke memory and render it three-dimensional is described. Through a close study of The Glass Menagerie, the many uses of memory for the purposes of wish fulfillment, conflict resolution, and resilience are examined.     

Emotional crises of those facing the draft

Summary While emotional responses will vary among young men, for many of them the draft constitutes some kind of crisis. Although it may be very difficult, most young men will be able to cope with the complicating factors of the draft and will take it in stride along with other disturbing events in the normal course of life. A young man may be able to cope with his feelings resulting from the draft in ways akin to his coping with similar situations. However, if the threat is too intense, and if there is not sufficient time to mobilize his usual coping mechanisms, the young man will be thrown into a state of crisis. In view of the nature of the developmental process, a young man between the ages of 18 and 22 has rarely developed an adequate sense of identity. Hence, he may be especially vulnerable to the emotional threat of the draft because of the very nature of the process of personality development.In such a crisis he will need someone to help him cope with the new situation. There are some guidelines which should help the counselee to mobilize his own emotional resources to cope constructively with the crisis. A pastoral counselor may help such a person to honestly face his fears and conflicts, and to face them gradually. Increasing his knowledge about the available possibilities in a particular situation will help him to increase his power to cope with the crisis. Being enabled to face his negative feelings with a sense of responsibility, he will be enabled to accept himself in terms of the situation in which he finds himself. Discovering significant other persons as supportive may give him the necessary time and support to enable him to develop a means of coping with the situation which he faces.