SHOULD KANTIANS BE CONSEQUENTIALISTS?

Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism. ¹     

SHOULD SIGNIFICANCE TESTS BE BANNED?

Abstract— Significance testing of null hypotheses is the standard epistemologicat method for advancing scientific knowledge in psychology, even though a has drawbacks and it leads to common inferential mistakes These mistakes include accepting the null hypothesis when it fails to be rejected, automatically interpreting rejected null hypotheses as theoretically meaningful, and failing to consider the likelihood of Type II errors Although these mistakes have been discussed repeatedly for decades, there is no evidence that the academic discussion has had an impact A group of methodologists is proposing a new approach simply ban significance tests in psychology journals The impact of a similar ban in public-health and epidemiology journals is reported     

SHOULD MARITAL RELATIONS BE NON‐HIERARCHICAL?

The paper explores an egalitarian norm widely accepted today, which I call the Marital Non‐Hierarchy Standard. According to this standard, marital relationships should be non‐hierarchical; neither partner may be more dominant than the other. The Marital Non‐Hierarchy Standard is exceptional: in almost all associations, including many financial, professional, educational and recreational ones, in almost all spheres of life, some hierarchies, within certain limits, are widely believed to be morally legitimate. I argue that in marital relations, too, some hierarchies should be accepted as morally legitimate. It might be argued that marital relations should be loving, and love requires that lovers will have the same degree of power. However, contemporary analyses of love show that love is consistent with (some) hierarchies. It might also be argued that justice requires that lovers will have equal power. However, theories of distributive justice such as Rawls's, Sen's, Dworkin's, and almost all others allow some marital hierarchies. Thus, both the love requirement and the justice requirement allow some hierarchical marital relationships and conflict with the Marital Non‐Hierarchy Standard. Until other justifications for this standard are presented, it is unclear why it should be endorsed.     

HOW FAR SHOULD WE GENERALIZE?

Abstract— A conceptual model based on staffing theory was applied to previously collected survey data from a representative sample of American workers The model links organizational size, workload, work experience variables (felt responsibility and involvement, assessments of work associates), and work outcomes (job satisfaction, work self-esteem, stress symptoms) Path analyses indicated that the model fit data from all waged and salaried workers relatively well When the model was applied to subsamples of new and established employees and of employees from two contrasting occupational groups (professional-technical workers and operative workers), somewhat different patterns emerged The study illustrates the benefits of applying psychological theories across subdisciplines, as well as the limitations of generalizing research findings across different categories of workers We suggest that localized theories and fine-grained analyses of workplace events could help to make research more applicable to work settings     

SHOULD WE FEAR QUANTUM TORMENT?

The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1     

SHOULD A CHRISTIAN ADOPT METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM?

It has become standard practice for scientists to avoid the possibility of references to God by adopting methodological naturalism (MN), a method that assumes that the reality of the universe, as it can be accessed by empirical enquiry, is to be explained solely with recourse to natural phenomena. In this essay, I critique the Christian practice of this method, arguing that a Christian's practices should always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God. This leads me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble approach to the sciences (instead of MN), with which she humbly acknowledges that special divine action is not discernible by empirical science. To further my critique, I consider three ways in which the practice of MN can be particularly problematic for Christianity.     

SHOULD INSTITUTIONS PRIORITIZE RECTIFICATION OVER AID?

Should an institutional scheme prioritize the rectification or compensation of harms it has wrongfully caused over provision of aid to persons it has not harmed? Some who think so rely on an analogy with the view that persons should give higher priority to rectification than to aid. Inference from the personal view to the institutional view would be warranted if either (i) the correct moral principles for institutional assessment are nearest possible equivalents of the correct personal moral principles, or (ii) the moral principles which ground the personal view also ground the institutional view. Neither claim can be justified. I briefly assess some alternative ways of defending the view that institutions should prioritize rectification over aid.     

WHY SHOULD IDEAL REASONERS BECOME EVIL COMPUTERS?

In his article on ‘Technophobic themes in pre-1990 computer films’, Anton Karl Kozlovic provides an insightful analysis of the theme of ‘evil computers’ in many popular culture films (Kozlovic, 2003). Kozlovic’s focus is on finding the broad, negative categories such as ‘humanity’s rivals’ and ‘humanity’s dominators’ which reappear throughout computer films (p. 4). Kozlovic urges science educators to become aware of the history of these negative pop culture images and engage in ‘consciousness raising activities’ with the aim of correcting fictional excesses and perhaps influencing future depictions of computers in a more positive, engaging direction. Interestingly enough, Kozlovic points out that despite the very negative and unflattering portrayal of robotics and AI, computer films are nevertheless ‘enthusiastically enjoyed by real world professionals in the computer, robotics, and AI fields...’ and cites several sources to document this point (p. 3). Kozlovic says that for these professionals the film is a form of ‘waking dream fueling the desire for the power of imagination and the act of construction’ (p. 3).     

DOES NATURE NEED TO BE REDEEMED?

Abstract. In the light of evolutionary biology, the biblical idea that nature fell with the coming of human sin is incredible. Biblical writers, classical theologians, and contemporary biologists are ambivalent about nature, finding in natural history both a remarkable genesis of life and also much travail and suffering. Earth is a land of promise, and there is the conservation, or redemption, of life in the midst of its perpetual perishing. Life is perennially a struggling through to something higher. In that sense even natural history is cruciform, though human sinfulness introduces novel tragedy. Humans now threaten creation; nature is at more peril than ever before.