The very idea of a social science

In The Idea of a Social Science Winch, argues that, sociology is more properly conceived as a branch of philosophy than of empirical science. Winch falls victim here to the Humean assimilation of the empirical to the generalizable. He notes that much of our talk about social practice is in terms of conventions, so that explanations of social action can be given without recourse to statistical or experimental findings. But such talk depends nonetheless on the accuracy and detail with which the situations in which actions occur are‐ recorded, and this is surely an empirical enterprise. It is the misleading conception of sociology as a discipline, characterized by common procedures, that leads Winch to espouse the assimilation of sociology to conceptual inquiry. We need to see instead that sociology embraces a group of questions and subjects so loosely connected that it would be mistaken to speak of, and idle to project, a procedure common to all of them.     

The very idea of a folk Psychology.

Three arguments are proposed against the idea that ordinary talk about the mind constitutes a folk psychology, a sort of prescientific theory which explains human behaviour and which is ripe for replacement by a neurological or computational theory with better scientific credentials. First, not all talk of the mind is introduced to explain in the way assumed by those who think that mental talk hypothesizes inner processes to explain behaviour. Second, the individuation of the behaviour which is explained by the inner processes itself requires reference to ‘mental’ states such as intentions or desires. Consequently the project is circular. Finally, scientific theory is a practice with a history which may be matched in the case of ordinary talk of the mind. Certainly ordinary talk of motives, intentions, and thoughts may be infected by the theorizing of economists and sociologists et al., but it is impossible that all talk of the mind should be theoretical in this way.     

The Fechnerian idea

From the principle that subjective dissimilarity between 2 stimuli is determined by their ratio, Fechner derives his logarithmic law in 2 ways. In one derivation, ignored and forgotten in modern accounts of Fechner's theory, he formulates the principle in question as a functional equation and reduces it to one with a known solution. In the other derivation, well known and often criticized, he solves the same functional equation by differentiation. Both derivations are mathematically valid (the much-derided "expedient principle" mentioned by Fechner can be viewed as merely an inept way of pointing at a certain property of the differentiation he uses). Neither derivation uses the notion of just-noticeable differences. But if Weber's law is accepted in addition to the principle in question, then the dissimilarity between 2 stimuli is approximately proportional to the number of just-noticeable differences that fit between these stimuli: The smaller Weber's fraction the better the approximation, and Weber's fraction can always be made arbitrarily small by an appropriate convention. We argue, however, that neither the 2 derivations of Fechner's law nor the relation of this law to thresholds constitutes the essence of Fechner's approach. We see this essence in the idea of additive cumulation of sensitivity values. Fechner's work contains a surprisingly modern definition of sensitivity at a given stimulus: the rate of growth of the probability-of-greater function, with this stimulus serving as a standard. The idea of additive cumulation of sensitivity values lends itself to sweeping generalizations of Fechnerian scaling.     

The idea of emancipation from a cosmopolitan point of view

R. Rorty uncouples cosmopolitanism from emancipation and rejects the latter on both phylogenetic and ontogenetic grounds. Thus: 1. There is no human nature to be emancipated, and 2. The notion of a rational, transcendental and conditioning subject (presupposed by traditional theories of emancipation) is obsolete. He preserves the idea of cosmopolitanism, which, in an effort to avoid foundationalisrn, he associates only with the development and progress of liberal societies. His cosmopolitanism relies on the distinction between persuasion and force and his preference for conversation over rational discourse. In this paper, I discuss Rorty's claims and trace residues of biologism, positivism, and behaviourism in them. By putting forward an immanent critique of Rorty's account of cosmopolitanism and emancipation, I defend a non-foundationalist notion of redemption as self-realization and propose a new justification of Rorty's distinction between force and persuasion.     

The idea of human science

Abstract

Difficulties in the attempt to apply the natural science approach to human beings are exemplified through the history of psychology. Then, the genuine scientific problems that gave rise to the research setting of the laboratory, the concept of causality, and the procedure of measurement are addressed freshly in light of the characteristics of human subject matter. The logical grounds of a uniquely “human” science are thereby elaborated.     

潜在思想论略

本文厘定了潜在思想,深入分析了其产生的原因,并做了类型划分,指出了把握潜在思想的重要意义。     

潜在思想再论

思想是行为的先导,行为反映思想。然而实然思想与外显行为不匹配、不一致的现象却时有发生,究其缘由乃潜在思想使然。因此,从潜在的层面把握思想,进而分析思想与行为的辨证统一关系不失为一个好的路径选择。