Education for democracy

Abstract

This article takes it cue from John Dewey and his views on the interrelationship between democracy and education. The basic premise is that education and democracy are inextricably linked and that in a free society the link is severed only at our peril. Education must be both public and democratic if we wish to preserve our democracy’s public spaces. We should resist calls for ‘excellence’ if this means educating only ‘the best’ and excluding those most likely to fail. On the other hand, we should likewise resist the tendency to jettison excellence (or just plain competence) in the name of educational equality.     

Populism and democracy: The challenge for deliberative democracy

Theorists of democracy have long grappled with the question of how to uphold the promise of popular government while restraining populist excesses. The deliberative conception of democracy proposes to do so by subjecting power to collective decision making through procedures of free and equal public deliberation. Critics of this idea often target its realizability. Though valid in theory, they claim, deliberative democracy is hopelessly utopian. The paper argues that, given a proper understanding of the deliberative approach and its underlying ideal of collective self‐government, this line of criticism is not very potent. However, another line of criticism, less pronounced in the contemporary debate, is more effective, questioning the very cogency of public discussion, even by a competent public, as a means of collective self‐government. Open public discussion is prone to various forms of manipulation and deception, which subvert rather than facilitate self‐government. Deliberative democracy's egalitarianism and populism therefore run counter to its deliberative aspiration, which underpins its ideal of democratic legitimacy.     

Defending the bad against the worse: Education and democracy

Recent writings in philosophy of education have expressed pessimism about the possibility of educating students to think for themselves. Similarly, recent writings in political philosophy have expressed pessimism about the possibility of attaining democracy. In this paper, I suggest that such pessimism is premature and may be alleviated, if not removed, by interpreting both educational enlightenment and the democratic ideal as processes, rather than end states. They are, moreover, processes which exist in symbiotic relationship with one another. Thus educational practices may improve the prospects of attaining democracy, and political practices may strengthen education.     

Normative systems theory for sustaining democracy

Democracy is the most widely admired type of political system but also perhaps the most difficult to maintain. If democracy does not operate by the principles of justice, the people may prefer to be governed through their own consent. Legitimacy requires effective performance. But effectiveness may be sacrificed to consent. Democracy is sustainable when its institutional framework promotes normatively desirable and politically desired objectives. It can be said that the viability of a democratic system depends on the principle of justice, which leads to the functioning of autopoietic system in the complex environment of civil society.     

Remembering democracy

A proper sense of history and the past is often held to be essential to democracy. Current attitudes to history and the past in the United Kingdom, particularly but not only in the context of formal education, show signs of strain, just as many other aspects of democracy do. Conceptions of history as heritage or as a site for the exercise of skills deserve critical examination. We need to look for a fresh basis for the relationship of democracies with their past. Perhaps this can be found in the essentially oppositional or ironical structure that both democracy and remembering require for their full flourishing.     

Develocracy vs democracy

In a sequence of contributions in Developmental Review,(Moshman, 1990a, Moshman 1990b; Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), researchers have recently applied a developmental approach to constitutional policy. In particular, they discussed whether student religious groups in public schools should be permitted in light of the potentially conflicting constitutional principles of religious freedom on the one hand and of the ban against the establishment of a religion by the government on the other hand. Although they differed in important respects, Moshman as well as Commons and Rodriguez made the permissibility of student religious groups fully or partly contingent on the students' developmental stage. Because newer developmental theories differentiate several stages of adult development, such linkage of constitutional rights with developmental stages raises the specter of “develocracy.” Develocracy is a term I suggest to characterize a constitutional system in which a substantial number of rights and duties of adults depends on their developmental stage.     

Privacy and democracy

The meaning of privacy has been frequently disputed in the philosophical and legal literature since Warren and Brandeis first argued for it as a distinct and important personal and social value. Nevertheless, while the meaning of privacy is held to be vague, there is general agreement that Warren and Brandeis were correct in their assessment of its value. Theorists of democracy, on the other hand, have been ambivalent towards the realm of the private. This paper interrogates the intersection between privacy and democracy, questioning the place of privacy as a distinctly democratic value.     

Complexity and deliberative democracy

Communism may be dead, but a quasi‐Marxist critique of liberal democracy survives in the writings of a number of thinkers ‐ most notably, David Miller and John Dryzek ‐ who deplore the self‐centered apathy of their fellow citizens and defend the radical ideal of deliberative democracy. Inspired mainly by Rousseau and Habermas, this emergent school of thought argues for a more participatory system where the public interest takes precedence over private interest, and where rational argument replaces cynical manipulation. The paper questions whether the deliberative model can cope with the incalculable complexity of modern society. Deliberative democracy, it is contended, rests on doubtful metaphysical assumptions, a blinkered approach to empirical evidence, and a common misapprehension about the nature of political argument.     

民主的概念

The core elements of modern democracy are citizens who share equally in mutually-compatible basic rights, serve as the final decision-makers on the community’s constitution, and choose whom to be entrusted with legislative and executive powers, while at the same time wielding final veto power over the present government. The rule of the majority in modern democracy is no longer a fundamental principle, but rather a derivative principle the validity of which is based on the above-mentioned core elements. Translated by Hu Jinglei from Tianjin Shehui Kexue 天津社会科学 (Tianjin Social Sciences), 2007, (5): 7–12     

Marxism and radical democracy 1

Whether or not Marxism leads straight to authoritarianism and the destruction of individual liberty is a question which has long exercised both theorists and politicians. This paper deals with a narrower, though related issue: Is Marxism actually reconcilable with radical democracy, the type of democracy advocated by those, including Marxists, who berate the iniquities and hypocrisy of parliamentary liberalism? The answer, according to my paper, is no. The Marxist tradition contains four characteristic features which tend to contradict the participatory procedures most Marxists profess to desire. These features are: (1) the view of Marxism as a science, yielding objective solutions to social and political dilemmas; (2) the messianic aspiration for a society of perfect unity; (3) the belief that human rights are not independent moral norms but so much bourgeois ’ideological nonsense’ (Marx), expressing the antagonistic relationships of the capitalist regime; and (4) hostility to the market mechanism, which results in a preference for a totally planned economy. Marxism, unless revised beyond recognition, would seem, paradoxically, to be more congruous with the élitist, constricted type of democracy we have in the West than with the more egalitarian mode of decision‐making defended in the writings of Marx himself.