Neo‐pragmatism,Representationalism and the Emotions

This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, but this need not be thought of in terms of a metaphysically heavyweight relation. In applying neo‐pragmatist techniques to the domain of the emotions, the result will be an alternative to currently popular accounts that individuate emotions partly in terms of what they represent. This alternative continues to allow us to use representational language in connection with some emotions. And it also helps to explain the awkwardness of representational talk in connection with other emotions: an awkwardness that was always a liability of monolithic representationalist views.     

El Greco's Eyesight: Interpreting Pictures and the Psychology of Vision

There is a common assumption about pictures, that seeing them produces in us something like the same effects as seeing the things they depict. This assumption lies behind much empirical research into vision, where experiments often expose subjects to pictures of things in order to investigate the processes involved in cognizing those things themselves. Can philosophy provide any justification for this assumption? I examine this issue in the context of Flint Schier's account of pictorial representation. Schier attempts to infer the assumption from what he takes to be the fundamental facts about picturing. I argue that there is no plausible form of Schier's basic claims from which the assumption can be inferred. I then reject a second argument, that by appealing to the assumption Schier could explain why it is impossible to depict a particular without depicting it as having certain properties. I conclude that those sympathetic to the assumption need to articulate and defend some version of it suited to their needs.     

The Intention–Behavior Gap

Bitter personal experience and meta‐analysis converge on the conclusion that people do not always do the things that they intend to do. This paper synthesizes research on intention–behavior relations to address questions such as: How big is the intention–behavior gap? When are intentions more or less likely to get translated into action? What kinds of problems prevent people from realizing their intentions? And what strategies show promise in closing the intention–behavior gap and helping people do the things that they intend to do?     

Notes on Time and Aspect

Abstract

What is time? Neither the numbering of the motion of things nor their schema, but their way of being. In language, time shows itself as tense. But every verb has both tense and aspect. So what is aspect? Irreducible to tense, it is the way in which anything is at any time whatsoever. Thus the way things are, their being, is not merely temporal – for it is just as aspectual.     

Differences between experts and non-experts in photographic perception and assessment

How professional skills and schemata do affect cognition, evaluative dimensions and aesthetic perception of pictures? And what about the effect of social elements like a smiling or serious subject pictured? The present study investigates the differences between Experts (photo professionals) and inexperienced individuals in perception and evaluation of photographs. Furthermore, it approaches the influence of different facial expressions (Reis et al. in Euro J Soc Psychol 20(3):259-267, 1990). People with well-developed schemes in photography should evaluate pictures through assessment, while inexperienced people should evaluate pictures through appraisal? N = 118, 60 Experts and 58 inexperienced people were asked to evaluate a set of stimulus pictures throughout: (a) 'The Circumplex Model of Affect' (PAQs) to measure 4 affective dimensions; and (b) a Semantic Differential made of 9 couples of bipolar adjectives to measure 2 evaluative dimensions (Aesthetics and Distinctive Features). Results partially confirmed the hypotheses: Experts differ significantly from Non-experts in picture evaluations. Smile arouses more positive evaluations, but only in the inexperienced group. No subject position effects were found. These results are in concordance with previous research about Expert and Non-expert evaluation, and they open new questions about facial expressions studies.     

Examining differences in minority versus majority preschoolers on social categorization and perceived intergroup distance

We examined the differences between majority and minority children (i.e., group membership) on racial categorization and perceived cultural distance, among 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children, in low diversified schools. We used a spontaneous social categorization task using pictures of children from three different racial groups broadly represented in France (Europeans, Black‐, and North‐Africans), and an evaluation of the perceived cultural distance between participants' in‐group and the racial group represented in the picture, adapted to children and based on three factors (language, eating habits, and music). Results revealed an effect of age on racial categorization: the older the children, the more successful they are in this task. They showed a significant effect of the racial group represented in the photos on perceived cultural distance: members of minority groups (i.e., Black‐ and North‐Africans) were evaluated as more different compared to those of the majority group on each of the factors. Finally, we got an interaction between participants' in‐group and the racial group represented in the pictures, for the language factor: members of the majority group perceived as more different photographs representing minorities peers than those representing majority peers, while participants belonging to minority groups perceived no differences between photographs, according to the racial criteria.     

Vigilance and control

Philosophical Studies - We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of...     

Learning More About and With the Face–Name Mnemonic Strategy

With the face–name mnemonic strategy, choosing and using ‘prominent’ facial features in interactive images can be difficult. The temptation is to stray from less‐than‐distinctive facial features and instead to associate an individual's name clue with an additional concrete detail (e.g., a headband). To examine this issue, undergraduates viewed face photographs with or without additional details under one of three conditions: own best method, fully imposed mnemonic, and partially imposed mnemonic. Experiment 2 examined a somewhat parallel situation that occurs when applying the strategy to abstract artwork (paintings with less familiar, less concrete elements) versus applying it to representational artwork (paintings with more familiar concrete elements). Our findings suggest that some pictorial stimuli (e.g., facial photos with details; representational paintings) are easier to work with mnemonically than are others (e.g., facial photos by themselves; abstract art). Moreover, in both experiments, mnemonic students displayed performance advantages on both immediate and delayed tests. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure

Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.     

Methodological uncertainties in political science∗

ne important class of actions concerns tasks. Questions may be raised about whether we have succeeded or failed to do what we were trying to do. Not all the things we call actions are open to considerations of such success or failure. And questions of succeeding or failing are not raised solely about what we may have been trying to do. The paper attempts to classify various ways in which one may fail in an action; the array that results is explored in terms of evaluations rendered, responsibility, character, deliberate decision, and the like. The analysis of failing in what one has tried to do is made central. To be said to be trying to do something, one must have done the requisite things that constitute trying to do something and not to have succeeded yet in doing what one may have tried to do. “Trying to succeed”; in doing something is a redundant expression except for special cases; and though one may decide to try to do something, one cannot decide to succeed in this. One may actually succeed in doing what one has tried to do but one cannot deliberately succeed. Further distinctions are made between trying to do something and wishing to do something and believing that one is trying to do something; also, between failing in what one has tried to do, failing to try, failing to do something without failing in what one has tried to do, and failing to do something in respects in which one could never be said to have tried to do it.     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

With the future behind them: convergent evidence from aymara language and gesture in the crosslinguistic comparison of spatial construals of time

Cognitive research on metaphoric concepts of time has focused on differences between moving Ego and moving time models, but even more basic is the contrast between Ego‐ and temporal‐reference‐point models. Dynamic models appear to be quasi‐universal cross‐culturally, as does the generalization that in Ego‐reference‐point models, FUTURE IS IN FRONT OF EGO and PAST IS IN BACK OF EGO. The Aymara language instead has a major static model of time wherein FUTURE IS BEHIND EGO and PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO; linguistic and gestural data give strong confirmation of this unusual culture‐specific cognitive pattern. Gestural data provide crucial information unavailable to purely linguistic analysis, suggesting that when investigating conceptual systems both forms of expression should be analyzed complementarily. Important issues in embodied cognition are raised: how fully shared are bodily grounded motivations for universal cognitive patterns, what makes a rare pattern emerge, and what are the cultural entailments of such patterns?     

The Metaphysics of Degrees

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.     

I didn't think of that

Consider cases in which an agent simply doesn.t think to do a certain thing, or doesn't think of a crucial consideration favoring doing a certain thing, or intends to do a certain thing but forgets to do it. In such a case, is the agent able to do the thing that she fails to do? Assume that commonly we all-in can do things that we do not do. Here I argue that, given this assumption, in the cases under consideration, too, commonly agents all-in can do the things they fail to do.     

Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood

What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts—four‐dimensionalism—unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures in orthodox four‐dimensionalism: temporal parts must be timeless parts. This enables us to state four‐dimensionalism more clearly.     

Some Ontological Consequences of Atomism

Is there a fundamental layer of objects in nature? And if so what sorts of things populate it? Among those who answer ‘yes’ to the first question, a common answer to the second is ‘atoms,’ where an atom is understood in the original sense of an object that is spatially unextended, indivisible, and wholly lacking in proper parts (whether actual or potential). Here I explore some of the ontological consequences of atomism. First, if atoms are real, then whatever motion they appear to undergo must be discrete (discontinuous). The link between atomism and discrete motion goes back at least to Aristotle and is admitted by some atomists, but the full significance of that admission has been neglected. I argue that a commitment to discrete motion in turn entails significant and sometimes counter‐intuitive results. I also examine the implications of these results for the philosophy of mind and for discussions of metaphysical naturalism.     

Motor Intentionality and its Primordiality

Is intentionality possible without representation? This paper considers the conditions under which intentionality without representation could occur and what sort of perceptual content such intentionality would have. In addition, it considers the constraints on non‐representational intentional content in organisms that have representation. The paper is divided into three parts. The first section compares and contrasts two opposed positions on non‐representational intentionality, those of Herbert Dreyfus and John Searle. The second section reviews a neurobiological model that accommodates the possibility of non‐representational perceptual content. The final section provides a puzzle for theories of non‐representational perceptual content, specifically in connection with the perception of representations. The puzzle of representation and perception illustrates a further need for all theories of perception, both philosophical and scientific: to provide a more finely developed definition of the notion of representation.     

Taking Pictures of Jesus: Producing the Material Presence of a Divine Other

A new form of visual representation of divine others is emerging: photography. I examine here a set of photos of deities related to an apparition claim. The goal I pursue is to analyze the self-constitutive features of these pictures – how they produce what they claim to be. I argue that the “presence' of the deities in the photos is achieved through “incarnation practices.' But these pictures are not just a factual representation of alleged mystical events. They constitute an update and a variation on the “Grand Christian Narrative' wherein the factual poses the moral problem of belief. In that sense, divine photography does not modify the epistemology of religious belief.     

A Cross-Cultural and Developmental Analysis of Self-Esteem in Chinese and Western Children

In this review, we examine the construct of self-esteem from a cross-cultural perspective in Chinese and Western children and adolescents. We also explore the role of childrearing practices in the development of self-esteem in these different cultures. In doing so, we first review the concepts of emic (i.e., variations in patterns of behavior within a given culture) and etic research (i.e., variations in common patterns of behavior or activities across cultures). Then, we invoke Berry's notions of “imposed-etic” and “derived-etic” approaches (J. Berry, 1989) in understanding crucial cross-cultural differences that are evident in the literature. We pose basic questions such as: (1) What does self-esteem “look” like in Chinese children? (2) How do childrearing practices in China influence the development of self-esteem in children? And, (3) what are the limitations of cross-cultural research in understanding a phenomenon such as self-esteem? We suggest that self-esteem does not “mean” the same things across these collectivist and individualistic cultures. We conclude our discourse with specific recommendations for clinical theory, research, and practice.