Prior’s defence of Hintikka’s theorem. A discussion of Prior’s ‘The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician’

In his paper, The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician, A.N. Prior considers Hintikka??s theorem, according to which a statement cannot be both impossible and permissible. This theorem has been seen as problematic for the very idea of a logic of obligation. However, Prior rejects the view that the logic of obligation cannot be formalised. He sees this resistance against such a view as an important part of what could be called the obligation of the logician. Prior argues that Hintikka??s theorem should not be seen as something paradoxical. On the contrary, it should be seen as a fully acceptable consequence of a basic and reasonable assumption in deontic logic, namely Hintikka??s rule.     

Benjamin’s Angel of History and the Work of Mourning in Ethical Remembrance: Understanding the Effect of W.G. Sebald’s Novels in the Classroom

The paper develops a conceptual framework for understanding the work of ethical remembrance in the classroom. Using David Hansen’s recent example of using Sebald’s novels in his classroom to do the work or remembrance, the paper argues that the effect of Sebald’s novels is best understood using Walter Benjamin’s figure of the angel of history. That figure indicates a view of history that goes beyond the progression of everyday time, to one called remembrance. The paper suggests that the work of mourning effects such remembrance, but simultaneously points to hope through the emergence of weak messianic power.     

Rousseau’s Emile, or the Fear of Passions

Notwithstanding the general accepted understanding that Rousseau is the master of modern education reflecting the progress by enlightenment this articles suggests that Rousseau??s Emile is??as most of Rousseau??s other writings are, too??testimony to a brilliant and passionate writer expressing thoughts about his concern how to deal with passions??passion being one of the most disputed concepts in late seventeenth and in eighteenth century. The reading of Emile has therefore take into account polemic as a literary trope in Rousseau??s style of writing.     

N. A. Vasil’ev’s Logic and the Problem of Future Random Events

The solution of the problem of the future random events truth is considered in Vasil’ev’s logic. N. A. Vasil’ev graded the logic according to two levels—the level of facts, i.e. time fixed events, and the level of notions or rules, governing these facts. The mathematical construction previously suggested for imaginary Vasil’ev’s logic, extends to the early variant of his logic—a logic of notions. In the paper, we investigate the meaning of problematic and uncertain assertions introduced by Vasil’ev. As a result, we developed a model of Vasil’ev’s logic of facts that resolves also the truth problem of future random events. The imaginary logic has also been extended to the level of notions, and the law of the excluded eighth is gotten in it. The correspondence between Vasil’ev’s terms “some” and “all” and modern quantifiers is discussed.     

Damasio’s body-map-based view,Panksepp’s affect-centric view,and the evolutionary advantages of consciousness

Although dualism has the advantage of being intuitively plausible, it is not compatible with a 21^st-century (scientific) world view. Jaak Panksepp and Antonio Damasio are contemporary writers who reject dualism, and whose views take the form of “biological naturalism”. I first discuss how their views compare in five specific respects; and then I look more closely at how the different emphases of the views affect their ability to account for the evolutionary advantages of consciousness, specifically. Both authors agree that “consciousness” provides creatures with a survival advantage in terms of their ability to produce novel and/or flexible responses, their ability to plan ahead, and their motivation to promote their own survival – but the exact means by which they think these advantages are conferred, in each of these respects, differ. One might say that, whereas Damasio thinks the main evolutionary advantages of “consciousness” (the “higher reaches” of which are unique to humans) have to do with enabling creatures to work out what to do to promote their well-being, Panksepp thinks the main advantage of “consciousness” is that being “conscious” of affective feelings urgently motivates creatures to take action when their well-being is threatened. Considering that “working out what do” is only possible for a small selection of cognitively sophisticated organisms, I argue that Panksepp’s account is more plausible than Damasio’s account.     

The Perfection of the Teacher Through the Pursuit of Happiness: Cavell’s Reading of J. S. Mill

Drawing upon Nel Noddings’ contention that, if children are to be happy in schools, their teachers should also be happy, this paper tries to explore a way in which the obviously intimate but seemingly conflicting connections between students’ and teachers’ happiness can be understood from the viewpoint of Stanley Cavell’s reading of J. S. Mill. Mill’s conceptions of desire and pleasure are examined as a means of liberating the above connection from existing prioritization: that is, teachers’ or students’ happiness comes first. The pursuit of happiness for both teachers and students is discussed, in the hopes of illuminating alternative images of teacher education.     

Christ’s faith,doubt, and the cry of dereliction

According to accounts of the Passion, Christ cries out from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” The cry, I argue, manifests that Christ lacks a belief that God is with him. Given the standard view of faith—belief that p is required for faith that p—it would follow that Christ lost his faith that God is with him just before he died. In this paper, I challenge the standard view by looking at the cognitive requirement of faith. Although faith that p requires some positive cognitive orientation toward p, that orientation need not be belief. I show that reliance is an alternative stance that fulfills the cognitive requirement of faith. Reliance aims at providing sensible guidance for action that is in accord with one’s values/ends. Thinking of the cognitive component of Christ’s faith in terms of reliance makes sense of the doubt manifested in his cry.     

C. G. Jung’s Influence on Art Therapy and the Making of the Third

Art therapy and the image are active approaches to address the analytic third, an idea that was mentioned by C. G. Jung in the Psychology of the Transference, but was first experienced by him as described in The Red Book (2009). Jung’s art-making was an impressive lifelong affair that relied upon mixed media, making it reasonable for us to consider Jung as the father of art therapy. Prior to the 1913 publication of Symbols of Transformation, Jung visited America for a second time; on this visit, the Jungian analyst Beatrice Hinkle introduced Jung to the Greenwich crowd. Among the noteworthy artists and activists were Margaret Naumburg and Florence Cane, who later established the field of art therapy in the United States. Despite the tension created from the Freud–Jung split, Naumburg and Cane were deeply influenced by Jung’s theoretical ideas, initially via Hinkle, with whom they analyzed for three years. Requiring a safe passage for the birth of art therapy, Naumburg navigated an independent third way, but drew from many of Jung’s already established ideas to formulate her research and educational approach. Because the historical details surrounding the development of art therapy in America are being stitched back into an art therapy education, Jung’s early clinical insights regarding specific theoretical ideas gain visibility and respect. This overview acknowledges that analytical psychology remains a powerful and integral building block in the field of art therapy and offers relevant resources for theoretical and clinical formulations when working as an art therapist.     

Lacan’s subversion of the subject

I explore Lacan’s theory of the subject by responding to two well-known criticisms of it, found in Borch-Jacobsen’s Lacan and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s The Title of the Letter. I argue that the relation of the subject to language is an important part of Lacan’s theory, but his conception of the subject cannot be reduced to language, as the critiques allege. The real must be included in the picture too. I then discuss the situation of Lacan’s subject between language and the real, and conclude with a contrast of Lacan’s subversion of the subject to a Derridean paleonymic approach.     

Russell’s Repsychologising of the Proposition

Bertrand Russell’s 1903 masterpiece The Principles of Mathematics places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 (and until the end of his career) Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as “psychological occurrences”. These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell’s re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood against the background of his struggle with the problem of the unity of the proposition in earlier work. Once this is recognized, and the solution to the problem offered by the 1919 theory is appreciated, new light is also shed on Russell’s naturalism. I go on to compare Russell’s psychological “picture theory” with the vehemently anti-psychological picture theory of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and suggest that, once the background of the dispute is brought into clearer focus, Russell’s position can be seen to have many advantages over its more celebrated rival.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.     

Freud’s dream of the double

While the motif of the double serves a prominent role in Freud’s writings from early on, this essay is an examination of the determinative power of the double in two key texts, texts in which specific, new sets doubles emerge for the first time in Freud’s career. Totem and Taboo features a double that manifests itself primarily in the form of ambivalence. Beyond the Pleasure Principle features a double that manifests itself primarily in the form of a very peculiar conflict that also entails complicity.