Les caracteres perceptifs des objets et la theorie mathematique des groupes

Objects present some perceptive qualities that might be called “objectual” and others that might be called “relational”. Sometimes the same sensorial process generates both, and the psychological process which works the discrimination between these two kinds of perceptive qualities, allows us to single out of reality elements that are constant, notwithstanding the variation of physical conditions, and which we called the “objectual qualities” of objects.     

You're getting warmer: Level of construal affects the impact of central traits on impression formation

Construal Level Theory argues that psychologically distant information will be processed conceptually, while psychologically near information will be processed concretely. Such theorizing implies that in the classic Asch (1946) paradigm in which participants make trait judgments of targets after viewing lists of trait words describing the targets, the words “warm” and “cold” should have more impact on impressions when targets are psychologically distant than when they are psychologically near. Results from two studies, indeed, found that the “warm–cold” effect reported by Asch was moderated by psychological distance. We interpret these findings as providing support both for the idea that the processes used to form impression of others can vary across situations and they do so in accord with the tenets of Construal Level Theory.     

The importance of differentiation in young children’s acquisition of expertise

In a short-term longitudinal study, stories told about novel creatures conveyed information varying in its capability for differentiating. Depending on the context, a bodily feature could be functionally undifferentiated (FUF), meaning that its subtypes (e.g., eyes of two forms) shared a generic function (“seeing”), or functionally differentiated (FDF), meaning that each subtype’s function was unique to it (e.g., only a “hooded eye” could “see in a sandstorm”). 5- to 6-year-olds who heard 8 stories, but not those who heard only 4, cited FDFs more than FUFs in a pair-justification test of judged similarity; and their delayed recall of specific story events was greater when FDFs rather than FUFs were involved. In the absence of direct instruction, young children show sensitivity to the degree of differentiation afforded by feature-function relations.     

灵感的概念、结构与功能

灵感既是一种人格特质, 也是一种状态体验。无论是作为心理结构的特质灵感, 还会作为欲求体验的状态灵感, 都具有动力性、唤起性和超越性三个核心特征。状态灵感是由诱发刺激所唤起的, 并使个体趋向于目标, 包括by成分和to成分两个独立的过程成分。灵感与积极情绪相比, 具有相当的动力性、更多的超越性和更少的责任性。灵感有利于创造力的发挥, 有益于心理健康, 能够增进个体的幸福感。未来的研究应对领域特异性的灵感、灵感结构的普遍性、灵感的诱发方法以及灵感影响心理健康和幸福感的机制做更深入的探讨。     

Tracing the threads: How five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes

Commentators have noted that the issue stands taken by each side of the American “culture war” lack conceptual consistency and can even seem contradictory. We sought to understand the psychological underpinnings of culture war attitudes using Moral Foundations Theory. In two studies involving 24,739 participants and 20 such issues (e.g. abortion, immigration, same-sex marriage), we found that endorsement of five moral foundations predicted judgments about these issues over and above ideology, age, gender, religious attendance, and interest in politics. Our results suggest that dispositional tendencies, particularly a person’s moral intuitions, may underlie, motivate, and unite ideological positions across a variety of issues and offer new insights into the multiple “moral threads” connecting disparate political positions.     

Sick? Or slow? On the origins of intelligence as a psychological object

This paper examines the first moments of the emergence of “psychometrics” as a discipline, using a history of the Binet–Simon test (precursor to the Stanford–Binet) to engage the question of how intelligence became a “psychological object.” To begin to answer this, we used a previously-unexamined set of French texts to highlight the negotiations and collaborations that led Alfred Binet (1857–1911) to identify “mental testing” as a research area worth pursuing. This included a long-standing rivalry with Désiré-Magloire Bourneville (1840–1909), who argued for decades that psychiatrists ought to be the professional arbiters of which children would be removed from the standard curriculum and referred to special education classes in asylums. In contrast, Binet sought to keep children in schools and conceived of a way for psychologists to do this. Supported by the Société libre de l'étude psychologique de l'enfant [Free society for the psychological study of the child], and by a number of collaborators and friends, he thus undertook to create a “metric” scale of intelligence—and the associated testing apparatus—to legitimize the role of psychologists in a to-that-point psychiatric domain: identifying and treating “the abnormal”. The result was a change in the earlier law requiring all healthy French children to attend school, between the ages of 6 and 13, to recognize instead that otherwise normal children sometimes need special help: they are “slow” (arriéré), but not “sick.” This conceptualization of intelligence was then carried forward, through the test's influence on Lewis Terman (1877–1956) and Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), to shape virtually all subsequent thinking about intelligence testing and its role in society.     

What makes a hypothetical construct “hypothetical”? Tracing the origins and uses of the ‘hypothetical construct’ concept in psychological science

The “hypothetical construct” has been an important concept in philosophy of science for the past half century. References to the concept date as far back as 1943 (Loomba, 1943). Inconsistencies in the use of the term and the related ‘intervening variable’ concept prompted MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) to distinguish the two concepts and propose conventions for their employment in psychological discourse. They recommended that ‘hypothetical construct’ designates theoretical concepts that “refer to processes or entities that are not directly observed” and, thus, fail to meet the requirements of intervening variables (p. 104). It is interesting to speculate what makes a hypothetical construct “hypothetical.” The motivation for attaching “hypothetical” to constructs is not always immediately apparent. The aim of this paper is to trace the origins of the expression ‘hypothetical construct’, delineate its employment in psychology, and explore the ontological and epistemological presuppositions that underlie conceptions of hypothetical constructs.     

Subtyping eating disordered patients along drive for thinness and depression

Subtyping individuals who binge eat by “diet-DT” and “depression” has yielded two valid and clinically useful subtypes that predict eating severity, comorbid psychopathology and outcome. The present study aimed to find four subtypes based on these dimensions and test their validity. Besides, it explored the distribution of eating disorder (ED) diagnoses across subtypes given their known heterogeneity, crossover and binge-eating fluctuation.Cluster analysis grouped 1005 consecutively admitted ED adult women into four subtypes, those previously described “DT” (22%), “DT-depressive” (29%), and “mild DT” (25%) and “depressive-moderate DT” (24%). Overall “mild DT” presented lower and “DT-depressive” greater eating and comorbid psychopathology than the rest, whereas “pure DT” and “depressive-moderate DT” presented no differences on bulimic symptoms but in psychopathology (p < .01). Finally, while BN-P patients were mostly and similarly distributed in the “DT” and “DT-depressive” subtypes than in the other, AN were in the new “mild DT” and “depressive-moderate DT” (p < .01). However, BN-NP, BED and EDNOS were similarly represented across subtypes.Results are discussed with regard to 1) the newly emerged subtypes that may explain cases in which DT prevents or does not predict binge eating; 2) the confluence of DT-depression that signaled greater eating and comorbid pathology, particularly self-control problems; 3) ED-DSM-diagnostic criteria.     

Response-repetition effects in task switching - dissociating effects of anatomical and spatial response discriminability

In task switching, response repetitions typically lead to performance benefits for task repetitions but costs for task switches. We examined whether this cost–benefit pattern is affected by response discriminability (RD), varying (a) the anatomical response separation (within-hand vs. between-hand responses) and (b) the spatial separation (close vs. far response keys). We assumed that anatomical RD increases response competition generally, whereas spatial RD increases the salience of left–right coding and thus facilitates response selection. In two experiments, we found that spatial RD increased the response-repetition costs in task switches but similarly decreased the response-repetition benefit in task repetitions. The effect of spatial RD was response-specific but did not interact with task switching. This data pattern is consistent with a recent account that proposed that facilitated response selection increases response “self-inhibition” after response execution. In contrast, the influence of anatomical RD primarily consisted of an overall increase of reaction-time level in all conditions, whereas error rates decreased, suggesting a general shift in response criterion. Taken together, the data suggest that a self-inhibition mechanism on the level of motor response codes contributes to response-repetition effects in task switching, which is possibly independent of task-specific mechanisms of strengthening of associations.     

The embodied cognition theory and the motor component of “yes” and “no” verbal responses

Most of the experiments which give theories of embodied cognition their empirical anchorage only take into consideration the motor responses induced by the task or the motor component of the visual stimulus. And yet, these motor responses are often associated with a linguistic answer. Our hypothesis is that “YES” and “NO” verbal responses have a motor component. In a first experiment we showed that producing a verbal response (YES vs. NO) involves motor planning (pushing vs. pulling): participants push a lever more quickly when they have to answer “yes” than “no”, and conversely, they pull a lever more quickly when they have to answer “no” than “yes”. Moreover, in a second experiment, we showed that perceiving the words “YES” and “NO”, on its own, leads to the same motor planning than when “yes” and “no” answers actually have to be produced. Participants detect the word “YES” faster when they have to push a lever than when they have to pull it and conversely they detect the word “NO” faster when they have to pull the lever than when they have to push it down. These results are discussed in reference to “online” and “offline embodiment” concepts and to the cognitive linguistic theories.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

The "Iowa Way" revisited

This paper attempts to bridge the gap between past and present stuttering therapy approaches. Specifically, the ideas and methods of Wendell Johnson and Dean Williams are compared to current approaches used in treating mental illness and communication disorders in which there is an emphasis on focusing on what is “right” with the individual and spending less time focusing on the “disorder”. There is particular emphasis on tying Johnson's and Williams’ overall philosophy to modern psychological approaches rooted in “Positive Psychology”, to highlight how these early ideas in stuttering therapy may help us to discover the common factors that underlie the success of several different stuttering therapy approaches, independent of the specific techniques employed. It is proposed that future research on clinical efficacy in stuttering should use focused hypotheses techniques to investigate common factors that make therapy effective across individuals and therapy approaches.Educational objectives: The reader will be able to: (1) summarize the basic philosophy of the “Iowa” approach to stuttering as laid out by Wendell Johnson and Dean Williams; (2) describe current therapeutic techniques that incorporate “positive psychology”; (3) discuss possible common factors that influence therapy outcome that are independent of the therapeutic technique employed.     

Structural alignment in similarity and difference judgments

Similarity is a central construct in models of cognitive processing, and as such has been the focus of psychological inquiry. This work has revealed that similarity and difference judgments are not always inverses. One explanation for this effect is that similarity judgments focus on matching relations between the items, while difference judgments focus on the mismatching attributes. A second explanation is that both similarity and difference judgments involve a process of structural alignment, and that they use the output of this process differently. These views are contrasted by using the one-shot mapping technique that places attribute similarity and relational similarity in competition. The results suggest that similarity and difference judgments both involve structural alignment.     

Styles of pulling in trichotillomania: exploring differences in symptom severity, phenomenology, and functional impact

Previous research has examined possible phenomenological differences between “focused” (i.e., with a compulsive quality) and “automatic” (i.e., with decreased awareness) pulling associated with trichotillomania (TTM), but these constructs have not been assessed using psychometrically sound measures. In the current study, differences in TTM severity, phenomenology, comorbid psychiatric symptoms, and functional impact were examined across individuals with varying combinations of “focused” and “automatic” pulling styles. Participants aged 18 and older were recruited via an internet-based survey. Those meeting inclusion criteria and completing the Milwaukee Inventory for Subtypes of Trichotillomania-Adult Version (MIST-A; n=1545) were classified as either high- or low-focused and either high- or low-automatic based on scores obtained from the focused and automatic scales of the MIST-A using a median split procedure. Results showed some significant differences between pulling styles. For example, “high-automatic” pullers reported more severe TTM and greater stress than “low-automatic” pullers, and “high-focused” pullers reported more severe TTM, greater stress and depression, and greater functional impact than “low-focused” pullers. Subsequent analyses suggest that, in comparison to individuals experiencing low levels of both automatic and focused pulling, those experiencing high levels of each pulling style reported greater severity, psychological impact, and functional impact. Clinical and research implications, study limitations, and future areas of research are discussed.     

Self-construal level and voice procedures: The individual self as psychological basis for procedural fairness effects

In the current article, we investigate the influence of self-construal level on procedural fairness effects, that is, the finding that fair versus unfair procedures influence people’s evaluations of their relation with decision-making authorities. In two experiments, we manipulated self-construal level by activating the individual self (“I”) or the social self (“We”), and we induced a control condition. Furthermore, we manipulated procedural fairness by granting versus denying participants an opportunity to voice their opinion in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed stronger procedural fairness effects if the individual self is activated than if the social self is activated. It is concluded that sometimes the individual self, rather than the social self, constitutes the psychological basis for procedural fairness effects.     

Informational length and order of presentation as determinants of persuasion

The present paper explores the notion that an important difference between prior operational definitions of “cue” or “heuristic” information versus “message argument” information has to do with differential processing difficulty, and relative ordinal position of these two information types. In previous work, “cue/heuristic” information typically differed from “message argument” information not only in its contents, but also in it being (1) briefer, and (2) presented prior to the message information. We find that it is relative brevity and ordinal position rather than contents that ultimately explain the differences in persuasive impact between “cue/heuristic” versus “message argument” information. In so far as both “cues” and “message arguments” can vary in brevity and order with which they are presented, these findings are consistent with the view that these two information types do not necessarily differ in their persuasive impact.     

How are Bayesian models really used? Reply to

In response to the proposal that cognitive phenomena might be best understood in terms of cognitive theories (Endress, 2013), Frank (2013) outlined an important research program, suggesting that Bayesian models should be used as rigorous, mathematically attractive implementations of psychological theories. This research program is important and promising. However, I show that it is not followed in practice. I then turn to Frank’s defense of the assumption that learners prefer more specific rules (the “size principle”), and show that the results allegedly supporting this assumption do not provide any support for it. Further, I demonstrate that, in contrast to Frank’s criticisms, there is no circularity in an account of rule-learning based on “common-sense psychology”, and that Frank’s other criticisms of this account are unsupported. I conclude that the research program outlined by Frank is important and promising, but needs to be followed in practice. Be that as it might, the rule-learning experiments discussed by Frank are still better explained by simple psychological mechanisms.     

Information elaboration and team performance: Examining the psychological origins and environmental contingencies

Information elaboration enables functionally diverse teams to transform their breadth of knowledge resources into actionable solutions to complex problems. The current study advances information elaboration theory and research in two ways. First, we identify how team ability and social motivation composition characteristics provide the psychological origins of complex information processing efforts. Second, we identify environmental turbulence as an important boundary condition, clarifying when information elaboration benefits team performance and when it does not. These ideas were tested in a sample of 4-person self-managed teams (N = 68) which were functionally diverse and performed a cooperative strategic decision-making task. Results indicate that cognitive ability equips teams with the “can do” ability for complex elaboration efforts through emergent team mental models, whereas low preferences for self-reliance provide the “will do” motivation for in-depth information exchange through collective leadership. In turn, teams benefited from information elaboration in turbulent but not stable environments.     

Psychology and personalism by William Stern

In 1916, shortly after his move from Breslau to Hamburg, William Stern wrote in a letter dated October 10 and addressed to his colleague and friend, the Freiburg philosopher Jonas Cohn, that the second volume of a planned three-volume series setting forth that comprehensive system of thought called ‘critical personalism’ was “essentially finished.” He wrote further that that work, in combination with a “little booklet” (Broschüre) titled Psychology and Personalism (Die Psychologie und der Personalismus) should “fashion a bridge” between his philosophical and psychological teachings. Due to a paper shortage in Germany during World War I, the larger of the two works mentioned by Stern in this letter would not actually appear until 2 years later. The “little booklet,” however, could be published sooner, and in fact appeared in 1917. What follows is a translation of that work. It sets forth the principle tenets of critical personalism in a relatively concise and accessible way, and is thus not only worthy of attention in its own right but also offers readers of this Special Issue helpful background for the papers that follow.I am very grateful to Lothar Laux and Karl-Heinz Renner for their careful reading of an earlier draft of my translation against the original publication. As native speakers of German, Laux and Renner made numerous suggestions that I gladly implemented in the interest of improving the quality of the translation. For such infelicities as remain I take full responsibility.