“Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation

Kant argued that individuals should be punished “proportional to their internal wickedness,” and recent work has demonstrated that essentialism—the notion that observable characteristics reflect internal, biological, unchanging “essences”—influences moral judgment. However, these efforts have yielded conflicting results: essentialism sometimes increases and sometimes decreases moral condemnation. To resolve these discrepancies, we investigated the mechanisms by which essentialism influences moral judgment, focusing on perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior, the target of essentialism (particular behaviors vs. actors’ character), and the component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). Participants punished people described as having a criminal essence more than those with a non-criminal essence or no essence. Probing potential mechanisms underlying this effect, we found a mediating role for perceptions of control and weak influences of essentialism focus (behavior vs. character) and component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). These results extend prior work on essentialism and moral cognition, demonstrating a causal link between perceptions of “internal wickedness” and moral judgment. Our findings also resolve discrepancies in past work on the influence of essentialism on moral judgment, highlighting the role that perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior play in moral condemnation.     

Whose Side Are You On? Exploring the Role of Perspective Taking on Third-Party’s Reactions to Workplace Deviance

We introduce perspective taking as an antecedent of third-party reactions to different forms of workplace deviance. Varying the perspective taken by third-parties, the target and the type of workplace deviance, we show that third-parties who take the perpetrator’s perspective perceive the incident as less of a moral violation, make less internal, and more external attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior, which in turn reduces endorsement of punishment. Findings were consistent across four studies, and the mediating mechanisms supported by the instrumental variable method and the concurrent double randomization design.     

The Importance of Philosophy: Reflections on John Rawls

This paper tackles the question whet her we should punish a remorseful offender. Traditional retributive and consequentialist theories on punishment are struggling with the question of the justification of punishment, but I think a more basic question needs to be solved first; namely, how can we interpret the practice of punishment. I state that a theory of symbolic restoration can help us to understand the meaning of this practice. A theory of symbolic restoration depends on an expressivist account of punishment, like Joel Feinberg's. Expressivism gives us an insight into the importance of the feeling of moral condemnation and it is this feeling that gives rise to the longing for punishment and remorse. Because of moral condemnation after a crime we ask for punishment and expect some kind of remorse. The question is whether punishment can be exchanged for remorse and I argue that in certain cases it cannot. The punishment of a remorseful offender is, I argue, – in certain cases – justified.     

Equality as a benchmark for third-party punishment and reward: The moderating role of uncertainty in social dilemmas

The present paper focuses on third-parties’ decisions to punish and reward in social dilemmas, and on the moderating role of environmental uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the size of the common resource). We argue and demonstrate that in social dilemmas third-parties use the equality rule as a strict benchmark to determine punishments (Study 1) as well as rewards (Study 2), but only under environmental certainty. Under environmental uncertainty, third-parties do not apply such a strict benchmark to distinguish cooperators from defectors. Instead, they appear to use the following rule: the more an individual group member has cooperated the less he/she should be punished (Study 1) and the more he/she should be rewarded (Study 2). As such, these findings are the first to demonstrate that third-party sanctioning decisions are moderated by environmental uncertainty.     

Doing as they would do: How the perceived ethical preferences of third-party beneficiaries impact ethical decision-making

Although unethical behavior often benefits third-parties not directly complicit in the misconduct, not all beneficiaries welcome these ill-gotten benefits. We investigate whether actors consider the ethical preferences of potential beneficiaries or rely solely on their own ethical predispositions when making decisions that affect others. Three studies demonstrate that the perceived ethical preferences of these beneficiaries can substantially influence the likelihood that actors behave unethically on their behalves. These studies show that actors consider the ethical preferences of beneficiaries only when their own ethical disposition is outcome-based.     

坏念头，罪几何？意图信息的强弱变化对大学生道德判断的影响

成人在对他人的行为进行道德判断时,对意图和结果信息的利用存在不稳定的现象。Cushman提出道德判断双加工过程理论,认为当存在重大负性后果时,需要综合考虑意图和结果信息;而当不存在负性后果时,主要关注意图信息。本研究通过句式变化操控意图信息的明显性,分别考察了两组大学生在对道德情景进行判断时意图信息强弱变化所造成的影响,结果发现：（1）对中性行为进行道德判断时,突显负性意图信息后被试会增加道德谴责;（2）对负性行为进行道德判断时,道德谴责程度没有因意图信息明显性的改变而发生显著变化。此研究结果表明,在行为结果为中性时,人们主要利用意图的信息做出道德判断,但此时对负性意图的谴责程度并不稳定,容易受明显性变化的干扰。     

第三方惩罚的神经机制：来自经颅直流电刺激的证据

第三方惩罚既是社会规范在群体得以维系的基石, 也是个体维护社会规范的体现。当前关注社会规范的神经研究大多基于第二方惩罚的独裁者或最后通牒实验框架, 缺乏对第三方维护社会规范过程中相关脑区活动的探索, 对这一过程的内在神经机制也不清楚。本文基于第三方惩罚的独裁者博弈框架, 对右侧背外侧前额叶区域(DLPFC)进行不同极性的经颅直流电刺激(tDCS), 同时依据第三方是否需要为其惩罚付出成本设计了零成本和有成本两个实验任务。结果发现, 第三方在零成本任务的情绪反应和惩罚显著受到tDCS设置的影响, 且阴极刺激显著提升了第三方的惩罚值, 这表明情绪机制对第三方惩罚有着重要影响。另外, 第三方在零成本和有成本任务中的惩罚差异在不同tDCS设置之间也存在显著差异, 这与第三方惩罚还受到自利机制影响的观点相符。本文率先为右侧DLPFC活动影响第三方惩罚提供了神经层面的证据, 且支持了第三方对社会规范的遵从与其负性情绪反应和自利加工密切相关的机制解释。     

Lay Theories of Personality: Cornerstones of Meaning in Social Cognition

Lay theories (or ‘implicit theories’) are cornerstones for social cognition: people use lay theories to help them make sense of complex and ambiguous behavior. In this study, we describe recent research on the entity and incremental theories (the belief that personality is fixed or malleable). In so doing, we demonstrate that each theory does not act alone. Instead, each is associated with a set of allied beliefs, the sum total of which cohere into two distinct meaning systems. We present evidence that these meaning systems produce systematic differences in a range of fundamental social cognition processes, with important implications for the field’s understanding of trait/situation attribution, moral judgment, person memory, and stereotyping. We further argue that because meaning systems serve a central meaning‐making function, people are motivated to believe that the meaning system they are using is effective and accurate. Accordingly, we present evidence that people exhibit processing distortions and compensatory mechanisms to minimize the impact of information that violates their meaning system. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field’s understanding of basic social cognition.     

The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.

第三方惩罚的演化与认知机制

第三方惩罚一般是指当违反社会规范的行为与自身利益无关时,个体牺牲自我利益来惩罚违规者的行为。最近的研究发现,对于个体而言,第三方惩罚是一种具有适应性的信号,包括建立良好的声誉以及威慑违规者。不同情境下第三方惩罚的功能有所差异,它是一种特殊的利他行为。第三方惩罚依赖于多个系统,涉及情绪反应、共情等社会认知能力以及认知控制等中央执行能力。探讨该行为的演化和认知机制也能贡献于个体、群体和人际层面的社会心理服务工作。     

Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

The Moral Foreign-Language Effect

Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect (FLE) is the activation of systematic reasoning processes by thinking in a foreign language. We demonstrate that the FLE extends to moral judgment. This indicates that different types of processes can lead to the formation of differing moral judgments. One implication of the FLE is that it raises the possibility that moral judgments can be made more systematic, and that the type of processing used to form them might be relevant to normative and applied ethics.     

得失情境下第三方惩罚决策差异的神经机制：基于rTMS的研究

本研究应用低频rTMS技术,通过在第三方惩罚（研究1）及第三方惩罚和第三方补偿（恢复性惩罚）并存的情况下（研究2）,对个体双侧vmPFC功能进行抑制,探索vmPFC在得失情境下第三方惩罚决策中的作用。研究1结果表明,rTMS抑制右侧vmPFC功能将降低损失情境下的第三方惩罚,收益情境下未发生改变。研究2得到与研究1一致的结果,且第三方惩罚减少程度更大,第三方补偿并未发生改变。这些结果强调了vmPFC与第三方惩罚紧密相关,在第三方判断得失情境的影响时起关键作用。     

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

ABSTRACT

Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.     

Blame attribution in sexual victimization

The current study explored how victims and third-parties attribute blame and perpetrator motivation for actual sexual victimization experiences. Although we do not assert that victims are responsible for perpetrators’ behavior, we found that some victims do not allocate all blame to their perpetrator. We sought to examine how victims and third-parties allocate blame in instances of actual completed and attempted sexual victimization and how they perceived perpetrator motivations. Victims of completed rape (n = 49) and attempted sexual assault (n = 91), and third-parties who knew a victim of sexual assault (n = 152) allocated blame across multiple targets: perpetrator, self/victim, friends, family, and the situation. Participants also described their perceptions of perpetrator’s motivation for the sexual assault. Victims tended to assign more blame to themselves than third-parties assigned to victims. Furthermore, victims perceived perpetrators as being more sexually-motivated than third-parties did, who viewed perpetrators as more power-motivated. Results suggest that perceptions of rape and sexual assault significantly differ between victims and third-party individuals who have never directly experienced such a trauma.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

Compassion for one reduces punishment for another

The ability of compassion felt toward one person to reduce punishment directed at another was examined. The use of a staged interaction in which one individual cheats to earn higher compensation than others resulted in heightened third-party punishment being directed at the cheater. However, among participants who were induced to feel compassion toward a separate individual, punishment of the cheater disappeared even though the cheater clearly intended to cheat and showed no remorse for doing so. Moreover, additional analyses revealed that the reduction in punishment was directly mediated by the amount of compassion participants experienced toward the separate individual.     

A Loss of Judgment: The Dismissal of the Judicial Conscience in Recent Christian Ethics

Christian ethicists have neglected conscience, understood as an individual's moral self‐awareness before a locus of accountability and judgment, over the last few decades. The aim of this essay is to suggest how this neglect came about. I draw on the work of Paul Lehmann and Oliver O'Donovan to illustrate how ethicists in the twentieth century became suspicious of conscience because of its association with the alleged ahistorical individualism of Immanuel Kant's work. I argue that a social‐historicist conception of conscience, such as H. Richard Niebuhr offered, attempts to save conscience from this suspicion. Ironically, however, Stanley Hauerwas's development of Niebuhr's historicist, communitarian approach to conscience, appears to have led to a dismissal of conscience. I conclude with a brief comment about what this dismissal has cost contemporary Christian ethics, namely the Christian tradition's basic commitment to the singularity of an individual's accountability before God.     

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.