Easy on the mind, easy on the wallet: The roles of familiarity and processing fluency in valuation judgments

Although people routinely estimate the value of items in their environment, from goods and services to natural resources and lost earnings following an accident, the processes that underlie human valuation estimates are not well understood. We show that people use familiarity and fluency-the ease with which they process information-to determine an item's value. In three experiments, participants believed that familiar forms of currency (e.g., a familiar $1 bill) had greater purchasing power than their unfamiliar counterparts (e.g., a rare and unfamiliar coin). Mechanistic analyses showed a positive correlation between participants' familiarity with the unfamiliar currency and their estimates of its value. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of our findings for researchers, marketing experts, and policymakers alike.     

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

The higher they are,the harder they fall: The effects of wrongdoer status on observer punishment recommendations and intentionality attributions

In two studies, we explore whether the status of a wrongdoer affects observers’ attributions for the wrongdoer’s actions and opinions about the wrongdoer’s deserved punishment. We find that observers attribute greater intentionality to the actions of high status wrongdoers than the identical actions of low status wrongdoers, and consequently recommend more severe punishments for the former than the latter. Additionally, we find that the relationship between a wrongdoer’s status and observers’ attributions is driven by observers’ perceptions of the wrongdoer’s underlying social motives: high status wrongdoers are presumed to be more interested in their own welfare (self-concerned), and less interested in the welfare of others (other-concerned), than low status individuals. These findings have implications for the psychology of retributive justice, and suggest that punitive reactions may be influenced as much by characteristics of the criminal as they are by characteristics of the crime.     

Why the unskilled are unaware: Further explorations of (absent) self-insight among the incompetent

People are typically overly optimistic when evaluating the quality of their performance on social and intellectual tasks. In particular, poor performers grossly overestimate their performances because their incompetence deprives them of the skills needed to recognize their deficits. Five studies demonstrated that poor performers lack insight into their shortcomings even in real world settings and when given incentives to be accurate. An additional meta-analysis showed that it was lack of insight into their own errors (and not mistaken assessments of their peers) that led to overly optimistic estimates among poor performers. Along the way, these studies ruled out recent alternative accounts that have been proposed to explain why poor performers hold such positive impressions of their performance.     

Stability of the Positive Mood Effect on Creativity When Task Switching,Practice Effect,and Test Item Differences are Taken into Consideration

Although experimentally induced positive mood can generally last for 20 min and the induced mood is conducive to creative performance, it is still unclear whether the facilitation effect is stable during these 20 min. Two studies were conducted to examine this issue while controlling for the impacts of task switching, practice effect, and test item differences. In Study 1, participants (N = 42) were randomly assigned to positive, negative, and neutral mood conditions. After watching a short video clip, participants answered four items of the Alternate Uses Test (AUT) in 20 min, with 5 min allotted for each item. Creative performance during each 5‐min period was scored in terms of fluency and flexibility. Separate repeated‐measures analyses of variances on these creativity scores showed that positive mood consistently enhanced performance over 20 min. Study 2 further eliminated the effects of test item differences and test order. Participants (N = 131) underwent the same mood induction procedure and answered the same four items of the AUT, except that these items were presented in four different sequences in accordance with the Latin square design. Consistent with the findings in Study 1, Study 2 showed that the facilitation effect of positive mood lasted for 20 min when the interference of task switching, practice effect, and test item differences were minimized. This finding not only sheds light on the debate regarding the stability of experimentally induced positive mood effect, but also contributes to the body of empirical evidence that future studies may use to examine the positive mood effect over a relatively long period of time.     

Metacognitive beliefs across the continuum of psychosis: comparisons between patients with psychotic disorders, patients at ultra-high risk and non-patients

BACKGROUND: Recent models of emotional disorders and psychosis implicate metacognitive beliefs in the development and maintenance of psychological distress. We predicted that patients with established psychotic disorders and those meeting at risk mental state (ARMS) criteria (and, thus, at increased risk of developing psychosis) would show higher levels of metacognitive beliefs than non-patient controls. Furthermore, we predicted that patients with psychosis would show higher levels of such beliefs than the at risk group. METHOD: The Metacognitions Questionnaire was administered to 73 patients with psychotic disorders, 43 ARMS patients and 188 non-patients. RESULTS: As predicted, patients with psychotic diagnoses and those at risk scored higher on metacognitive belief dimensions than non-patients. Patients with psychosis showed higher positive metacognitive beliefs than the at risk patients, indicating a greater range of unhelpful metacognitions overall, when compared to non-patients. CONCLUSIONS: These findings are consistent with metacognitive conceptualisations of psychological disorders. The implications of these findings for clinical practice are discussed.     

Glimpses of a one-speed mind: Focus-switching and search for verbal and visual, and easy and difficult items in working memory

We investigated focus-switching and search rates in an N-Back task for stimuli presumably encoded either in a phonological/semantic or an abstract-visual format. Experiment 1 used Chinese characters and tested Chinese speakers and non-Chinese speakers; character frequency and visual complexity were also manipulated. Experiment 2 presented Chinese characters and English words to non-Chinese English speakers. Effects of focus-switching on accuracy were larger for abstract-visual stimuli and for more difficult stimuli; effects on RT were larger for abstract-visual stimuli, but there was no effect of difficulty, with the exception of the most difficult stimulus set in Experiment 1. Search slopes outside the focus of attention did not covary with either type of code or item difficulty. The decline in accuracy over set-size was stronger for the items coded in abstract-visual format. This suggests that item availability is sensitive to robustness of the memory representations, but item accessibility is not. The data fit well with a model of STM in which a fixed number of ‘slots’ are searched at a constant rate, regardless of the slot’s contents.     

Risky driving and lapses on the road: An exploration on self-regulatory dysfunction in Australian drivers

Self-regulatory ability has been linked to a) the tendency to engage in risky behaviours, and b) the ability to focus attention. This study investigated the relationships between metacognitions, emotion regulation difficulties, risky driving behaviours, and attentional lapses on the road, among an online sample of Australian drivers (N = 255). Firstly, group comparisons showed that although females reported greater self-regulatory dysfunction, males reported a higher frequency of risky driving behaviours. Alternatively, older drivers reported being better self-regulators, and less-frequent risky driving behaviours and attentional lapses on the road. Secondly, correlations demonstrated that metacognitions were associated with difficulties in regulating emotions, the engagement of risky driving behaviours, and the quantity of attentional lapses experienced on the road. Emotion regulation difficulties and risky driving behaviours were also shown to be positively related to the frequency of attentional lapses. Structural equation modelling confirmed a hierarchical model in predicting attentional lapses, with self-regulatory components representing higher-order factors over risky behavioural components. Finally, metacognitions demonstrated mediative effects toward the relationship between prior speeding experiences and future intentions to speed. This study has provided preliminary evidence for the application of metacognitions in the engagement of risky driving behaviours, and therefore the potential for informing future interventions.     

Differences in the justification of choices in moral dilemmas: effects of gender, time pressure and dilemma seriousness

The effects on moral reasoning of gender, time pressure and seriousness of the issue at hand were investigated. In Experiment 1, 72 university students were presented with moral dilemmas and asked what actions the actors involved should take and to justify this. Women were found to be more care-oriented in their reasoning than men, supporting Gilligan's moral judgment model. Both time pressure and consideration of non-serious as opposed to serious moral dilemmas led to an increase in a justice orientation compared with a care orientation in moral judgments. In Experiment 2, a similar task was given to 80 persons of mixed age and profession, and the participants' moral reasoning was coded in terms of its being either duty-orientated (duty, obligations, rights) or consequence-oriented (effects on others). Men were found to be more duty-oriented than women, and time pressure to lead to a greater incidence of duty orientation.     

When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of Fluency on Truth Judgments

Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so‐called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency‐based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Implicit theories in driving: Scale development,validation, and predictive role on violations and driving self-efficacy

Implicit theories focus on how ability may be perceived by individuals. There are two main beliefs: entity beliefs (i.e., driving ability is a gift) and incremental beliefs (i.e., driving ability is improvable through effort). Implicit theories have been studied in various domains (e.g., education, sport), but never in driving, even though they could improve the knowledge of drivers’ psychological characteristics. The first objective of the present study was to develop and validate a questionnaire measuring implicit theories in driving. The second objective was to assess the predictive role of implicit theories on violations and driving self-efficacy, and the moderating role of gender. In study 1, confirmatory factor analysis, analyses of gender invariance, and concurrent validity were assessed to validate the questionnaire named Implicit Theories in Driving Questionnaire (ITDQ). In study 2, the predictive role of implicit theories on violations and driving self-efficacy was evaluated using multiple regression analyses. Moderation analyses evaluated the moderating role of gender on the relationships between implicit theories and violations, along with driving self-efficacy. The ITDQ showed acceptable psychometric properties. The results highlighted that entity beliefs positively predicted aggressive violations and negatively predicted driving self-efficacy. Conversely, incremental beliefs negatively predicted ordinary violations and positively predicted driving self-efficacy. The ITDQ is a valid scale now available for assessing implicit theories in driving, that have been shown to influence self-reported driving behavior. Future research on implicit theories in driving may help to better understand the psychological characteristics of at-risk drivers and improve driver’s training, to reduce the number of road accidents.     

Monitoring memory errors: The influence of the veracity of retrieved information on the accuracy of judgements of learning

The current study examined the degree to which predictions of memory performance made immediately or at a delay are sensitive to confidently held memory illusions. Participants studied unrelated pairs of words and made judgements of learning (JOLs) for each item, either immediately or after a delay. Half of the unrelated pairs (deceptive items; e.g., nurse–dollar) had a semantically related competitor (e.g., doctor) that was easily accessible when given a test cue (e.g., nurse–do_ _ _r) and half had no semantically related competitor (control items; e.g., subject–dollar). Following the study phase, participants were administered a cued recall test. Results from Experiment 1 showed that memory performance was less accurate for deceptive compared with control items. In addition, delaying judgement improved the relative accuracy of JOLs for control items but not for deceptive items. Subsequent experiments explored the degree to which the relative accuracy of delayed JOLs for deceptive items improved as a result of a warning to ensure that retrieved memories were accurate (Experiment 2) and corrective feedback regarding the veracity of information retrieved prior to making a JOL (Experiment 3). In all, these data suggest that delayed JOLs may be largely insensitive to memory errors unless participants are provided with feedback regarding memory accuracy.     

Tracking the mind during reading: the influence of past, present, and future words on fixation durations

Reading requires the orchestration of visual, attentional, language-related, and oculomotor processing constraints. This study replicates previous effects of frequency, predictability, and length of fixated words on fixation durations in natural reading and demonstrates new effects of these variables related to 144 sentences. Such evidence for distributed processing of words across fixation durations challenges psycholinguistic immediacy-of-processing and eye-mind assumptions. Most of the time the mind processes several words in parallel at different perceptual and cognitive levels. Eye movements can help to unravel these processes.     

Searching for the Right Word: Performance on Four Word-Retrieval Tasks Across Childhood

Word retrieval was assessed in 207 normally developing Hebrew-speaking children aged 8–17 through four tasks: picture naming, phonemic fluency, semantic fluency, and homophone meaning generation (HMGT). Scores on all tests correlated positively and significantly with participant age. Yet, age effects and the correlation between age and test scores were weakest for the naming test and strongest for the HMGT. We discuss the nature of the word search involved in each task and suggest that the more executive demands required by a test the steeper the slope of performance increase on this test.     

No pain no gain: The positive impact of punishment on the strategic regulation of accuracy

Previous studies have shown that punishing people through a large penalty for volunteering incorrect information typically leads them to withhold more information (metacognitive response bias), but it does not appear to influence their ability to distinguish between their own correct and incorrect answers (metacognitive accuracy discrimination). The goal of the current study was to demonstrate that punishing people for volunteering incorrect information—versus rewarding volunteering correct information—produces more effective metacognitive accuracy discrimination. All participants completed three different general-knowledge tests: a reward test (high points for correct volunteered answers), a baseline test (equal points/penalties for volunteered correct/incorrect answers) and a punishment test (high penalty for incorrect volunteered answers). Participants were significantly better at distinguishing between their own correct and incorrect answers on the punishment than reward test, which has implications for situations requiring effective accuracy monitoring.