Ein „now moment“ unter der Lupe

This paper is based on the publications of Daniel Stern’s Process of Change Study Group, which contain new hypotheses concerning the analytical process and how it works. The various stages in the system proposed by this group (“moving along”—”now moment”—”moment of meeting”) are illustrated by a case history with regard to relevant aspects of the transference and with special emphasis on the observed countertransference. The hypothesis used to explain the detailed “now moment” and “moment of meeting” is based on psychoanalytical considerations. This process is analyzed with reference to the concepts of “reparative regression” or “regression for the sake of recognition”, progression and regression, fulguration, and creativity, autonomy, and intimacy.     

Empirically validated treatments—What now?

Progress in the identification of empirically supported psychological interventions is described, along with possible mechanisms for training in such treatments. Obstacles to training established clinicians, including time, cost, and geographic barriers are also discussed.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

Preventing drug abuse: where are we now?

Counselors in many settings are involved in the development and implementation of drug abuse prevention programs. It is therefore essential that counselors be as informed as possible about the characteristics of drug abusers and about the drug abuse prevention programs that seem to hold some promise of being effective. This article provides some of this information by examining the research literature and extracting from it the common themes that have meaning for counselors in almost any population.     

Structures and strategies: Where are we now?

Summary Psychological opinion tends to sway between a view that people are almost infinitely flexible and a view that there are definite and unchangeable fundamental mechanisms that always work in the same way and set limits of flexibility. A popular compromise has been to suppose that lower mechanisms are as determinate as typewriters, while higher ones are unanalysable, autonomous, and perhaps even beyond scientific enquiry. The point of view in this paper favours a different compromise; very early and elementary operations are thought to be done in different ways, depending on the goals and experience of the person. There is, however, a good deal of constraint, which allows laws and principles to be laid down. Yet, there is also a degree of strategic flexibility in the operations actually performed that goes further than would be allowed by theorists of a different persuasion. The selective operations of attention are not due to unalterable mechanisms, nor does there seem to be convincing evidence of universal and invariant computation of all aspects of the input. What is computed, briefly, is the minimum necessary to perform the task before the person.     

So truth is safe from paradox: now what?

The article is part of a symposium on Hartry Field’s “Saving truth from paradox”. The book is one of the most significant intellectual achievements of the past decades, but it is not clear what, exactly, it accomplishes. I explore some alternatives, relating the developed view to the intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of truth.     

Must most psychotherapists remain as incompetent as they now are?

Although psychotherapy often is effective or helpful for groups of people, it is frequently inefficient and therefore is wasteful for many clients and actually contributes to harming a sizable minority of them. Some of the main aspects of therapeutic inefficiency are discussed in this paper, including: overemphasis on past experience; encouraging dependency and the dire need for love; overemphasis on modeling; the stressing of insight; the use of catharsis and abreaction; the use of cognitive distraction; self-efficacy suggestions; operant conditioning; gradual desensitization; and unselective eclecticism. Specific suggestions for increasing the efficiency of psychotherapy are given.     

How long is “now”? Phenomenology and the specious present

The duration of now is shown to be important not only for an understanding of how conscious beings sense duration, but also for the validity of the phenomenological enterprise as Husserl conceived it. If now is too short, experiences can not be described before they become memories, which can be considered to be transcendent rather than immanent phenomena and therefore inadmissible as phenomenological data. Evidence concerning (a) the objective duration of sensations in various sensory modalities, (b) the time necessary for sensations to enter consciousness and (c) the variability in the subjective sense of time's passing under different conditions is used to conclude that the duration of now can actually vary under normal conditions from about 10 ms to several seconds and in extreme cases up to several hours. Thus the immanent moment can be long enough to encompass a report of the contents of consciousness, making phenomenology a viable project. A further speculation from the evidence described is that consciousness takes discrete samples of the external world, at a rate inversely proportional to the duration of the now moment.     

Consuming now or later? The interactive effect of timing and attribute alignability

Decisions are often temporally separated from their outcomes. Using theories of structural alignment and temporal construal, we examined how temporal distance and the associated shift in decision processes moderate susceptibility to context effects. Specifically, in two experiments (one hypothetical, one with real outcomes), we demonstrated that people attend more to nonalignable differences when the outcome of the decision is in the distant future than when it is in the near future. This shift in decision processes was found in preference and choice data, as well as coded written protocols. We further show that this temporal shift cannot be explained by differential involvement with the decision or by the feasibility and desirability of the attributes. Our findings establish temporal distance as an important moderator of structural alignment effects and also extend the implications of temporal construal theory beyond the nature of the attributes to the structural relationships among attributes.     

What do we want? Critical psychotherapy and counselling! When do we want it? Now,now, now! A critical review of a critical issue

This review offers a critical commentary on the contributions to this issue. It outlines four aspects to a critical approach and uses them to read horizontally across all five papers.     

Sharing the ‘now’: Heidegger and the temporal co-constitution of world

In this paper I respond to the view that Heidegger is unable to account for the possibility of immediately experiencing others in their concrete particularity. Critics have argued that since Mitsein characterizes Dasein’s mode of being regardless of the presence or absence of others, Heidegger has essentially granted it the status of an a priori category. In doing so, they argue, Heidegger reduces the other to a mere interchangeable token whose uniqueness is subsumed under the generality of the established category. In contrast, I argue that the Heideggerian ‘a priori’ must be understood as a living responsiveness to particularity, not a top-down imposition of abstract categoriality. The argument further shows that this responsiveness must be understood in terms of temporal particularity. The bulk of the paper then demonstrates the nature of such responsiveness when it is the temporal particularity of the other Dasein that is being encountered. I show that such encounters are a necessary condition for the possibility of world time and the worldly space of shared significance. Because my encounter with the other Dasein is a direct experience of her originary temporality—the fundamental expression of her concrete care-defined way of being—such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an a priori category. They are, rather, a temporal responsiveness to the unique mode of intuitive givenness characterizing other Dasein.

Decision-making in state lotteries: Half now or all of it later?

Many state lotteries offer players a choice between receiving roughly half of the jackpot immediately and receiving the entire jackpot over 25 annual payments. This requires players to make a decision that involves uncertainty, delay, and large amounts of real money. Archival data on lottery players' jackpot payment decisions were collected from seven state and three multistate lotteries. Players' jackpot payment preferences were assessed at the time of ticket purchase and after winning a jackpot. Preference for the annuity payment option significantly decreased as jackpot size increased, both at the time of ticket purchase and after winning. Furthermore, a significant proportion of winners who selected the annuity payment option at ticket purchase switched to the cash payment option after winning, whereas no winners switched from the cash to the annuity option after winning. These findings suggest that real-world choices involving large sums of money may be subject to diminishing marginal utility and probability and delay discounting.