Constraints on Analogical Inference

The ability to reason by analogy is particularly important because it permits the extension of knowledge of a target domain by virtue of its similarity to a base domain via a process of analogical inference. The general procedure for analogical inference involves copying structure from the base to the target in which missing information is generated, and substitutions are made for items for which analogical correspondences have already been found. A pure copying with substitution and generation process is too profligate to be useful, and so constraints must be placed on what information is to be carried over. In this paper, the importance of systematicity as a constraint on inference is explored in four studies in which subjects find correspondences between domains and also make inferences. This work suggests that people prefer to make inferences of information connected to systematic correspondences between domains. A second important theme of this paper is that violations of one-to-one mapping can lead to inconsistent object substitutions in inference. The data reveal no such inconsistent substitutions in people's inferences, suggesting that they do respect one-to-one mapping in analogical inference. These findings are discussed relative to four prominent computational models of analogical mapping and inference.     

Categorization processes in mental comparisons

Five experiments explore categorization and category-based congruity effects in mental comparisons. The first 4 experiments concentrate on categorization of infinite-set small items. The experiments vary the additional items presented and whether those items appear once (Experiments 1-2) or repeatedly (Experiments 3-4). Additional items include other small items (Experiment 1), relatively large items (Experiments 2-4), and items involving nonsize dimensions (Experiment 4). The critical small items show a complete congruity effect only in Experiments 1 and 3. Results suggest that categorization of infinite-set items may be based on range information alone (Experiment 1) but that multiple categorizations based on multiple ranges (Experiment 2) may require attentional effort. Results implicate categorization as a central process in mental comparison, despite differences in ease of categorization across paradigm.     

Systematicity as a selection constraint in analogical mapping

Analogy is often viewed as a partial similarity match between domains. But not all partial similarities qualify as analogy: There must be some selection of which commonalities count. Three experiments tested a particular selection constraint in analogical mapping, namely, systematicity. That is, we tested whether a given predicate is more likely to figure in the interpretation of and prediction from an analogy if the predicate participates in a common system of relations. In Experiment 1, subjects judged two matches to be included in an analogy: on isolated match, and a match embedded in a larger matching system. Subjects preferred the embedded match. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects made analogical predictions about a target domain. Subjects predicted information that followed from a causal system that matched the base domain, rather than information that was equally plausible, but that created an isolated match with the base. Results support Gentner's (1983, 1989) structure-mapping theory in that analogical mapping concerns systems and not individual predicates, and that attention to shared systematic structure constrains the selection of information to include in an analogy.     

Integration of Category Induction and Hierarchical Classification: One Paradigm at Two Levels of Complexity

Hierarchical classification (HC) and category induction (CI) were tested by a common property inference procedure to facilitate comparison and enable relative complexities to be assessed. Relational complexity theory predicts that HC is more complex because it entails a ternary relation between categories B, A, and A' such that A and A' are included in B, whereas CI entails a simpler binary relation between a category and its complement. Experiment 1 tested inferences about familiar categories with plausible but unfamiliar attributes, and Experiment 2 assessed inferences about fictitious categories with familiar attributes. As predicted, HC was more difficult than CI. Children over 5 years succeeded on both, but 3-year-olds succeeded on CI only. Tasks of the same level of complexity predicted 68% (Experiment 1) and 80% (Experiment 2) of age-related variance. The results suggest that HC and CI may be regarded as 1 paradigm with 2 levels of structural complexity.     

Effect of feature similarity on illusory conjunctions

In four experiments, we examined whether the phenomenon of illusory conjunctions is constrained by feature similarity. Specifically, are illusory conjunctions more likely to occur between items with similar features than between items with dissimilar features? Feature similarity was manipulated in two dimensions: color and shape. Experiment 1 demonstrated that more illusory conjunctions occur between items with similar colors than between items with dissimilar colors. A similar effect was found for letter similarity in Experiment 2. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that the similarity effect is still obtained for illusory conjunctions even when identification of the relevant features is near perfect. These findings introduce a new constraint in the process of feature integration. Additional implications of the similarity constraint for theories of feature integration are discussed.     

Recognition and frequency judgments in young and elderly adults

Three experiments examined frequency judgments and recognition memory in young and elderly adults. Subjects were presented a long list of words at either a 5-s rate (Experiments 1 & 3) or a 1-s rate (Experiment 2), after which frequency-judgment and recognition memory tasks were administered. Either an absolute (Experiments 1 & 2) or a relative (Experiment 3) frequency-judgment task was used. The recognition test, which involved repeated tests of some items, involved either one incorrect item paired with each correct item (Experiments 1 & 2), or four incorrect items (Experiment 3). Age-related differences in frequency judgments, for the more frequently presented items, were found in all three experiments. For the recognition scores, the predicted interaction between age and successive tests was found only in Experiment 3. The results were interpreted within the framework of age-related differences in elaborative encoding and in distractibility to irrelevant stimuli.     

Associative storage and retrieval processes in person memory

In this article, a general associative storage and retrieval theory of person memory is proposed, and seven experiments that test various aspects of the theory are reported. Experiment 1 investigated memory for behavioral information that is congruent with, incongruent with, or irrelevant to a prior impression. The results indicated that incongruent events are best recalled and irrelevant events are most poorly recalled. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and demonstrated that there are systematic individual differences that are consistent with the general nomothetic model proposed. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that, relative to a baseline condition, adding incongruent items to the list increases the probability of recalling congruent items but has no effect on the recall of irrelevant items. Both effects are predicted by the model. Experiment 4 provided support for the retrieval assumptions of the theory by demonstrating that there is a systematic order in which various types of items are recalled, as well as consistent differences in interresponse times. Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that the model is relevant to situations in which data driven, as well as conceptually driven, processes are involved. Finally, Experiment 7 examined a special case in which the theory predicts greater recall of congruent than incongruent behavioral events. The results of all seven experiments provide converging evidence for a general theory of person memory, and they have implications for a number of issues related to the study of person memory and social judgment.     

Chimpanzee responding during matching to sample: control by exclusion

Three chimpanzees performed a computerized matching-to-sample task in which samples were photographs of items and comparison stimuli were geometric symbols called lexigrams. In Experiment 1, samples were either defined (i.e., they represented items that were associated already with a specific lexigram label by the chimpanzees) or undefined (i.e., they did not have an already learned association with a specific lexigram). On each trial, the foil (incorrect) comparison could be either a defined or an undefined lexigram. All 3 chimpanzees selected the correct comparison for undefined samples at a level significantly better than chance only when the foil comparison was defined. In Experiment 2, three comparisons were presented on each trial, and in Experiment 3, four comparisons were presented on each trial. For Experiments 2 and 3, the foil comparisons consisted of either defined or undefined comparisons or a mixture of both. For these two experiments, when the chimpanzees were presented with an undefined sample, they typically made selections of only undefined comparisons. These data indicate that the chimpanzees responded through use of exclusion. A final experiment, however, indicated that, despite the use of exclusion to complete trials with undefined samples correctly, the chimpanzees did not learn new associations between undefined samples and comparisons.     

Some functional properties of iconic storage in retarded and nonretarded subjects

Four experiments, which examine some functional properties of iconic storage in mildly retarded subjects, are reported. Experiments I and III demonstrated that retardates report about three items, or one item less than normal subjects, after a single brief tachistoscopic exposure and that this span of attention was independent of size of array. Both normal and retarded groups reported more items correctly when arrays were arranged on two lines. Experiment II determined that exposure durations up to 250 msec did not influence the number of items reported by either group. Experiment IV compared the form of decay for both groups by cuing report of each of seven positions at five poststimulus delays. The presence of the typical W-shaped curve for both groups at all delays permitted the inference that items in iconic storage decay together rather than individually. Although quantitative differences existed between groups, in no case did intelligence interact with the manipulated variables. The results were discussed in relation to control processes and structural features within an information processing model of memory.     

Semantic congruity and lexical marking in symbolic comparisons: An expectancy hypothesis

Lexical marking and semantic congruity effects were investigated in four symbolic size comparison experiments. Predictions followed from an expectancy hypothesis suggested by results of recent comparative judgment studies. According to the present position, lexical marking and semantic congruity should be mutually exclusive effects in such tasks, and the demonstration of either dependent upon the order in which the stimuli and the comparative term are evaluated. When the comparative precedes the stimuli, an expectancy is created whereby the subject is more likely to be prepared for, say, large items following the comparative “larger” and small items following the comparative “smaller.” In addition, the usual advantage of unmarked as compared to marked comparisons should be offset by the initial processing of the comparative. As predicted, the comparative-stimulus presentation order produced a significant semantic congruity effect and no effect of lexical marking in Experiment 1. Conversely, when stimuli precede the comparative, or are presented simultaneously with it, no expectancy should be created, as the items are immediately available to the subject, and the semantic congruity effect should not be obtained. Upon presentation of the comparative, however, unmarked comparisons should be easier than marked comparisons. Experiments 2 and 4 confirmed these expectations, as significant lexical marking effects were obtained and significant congruity effects were not. These findings are contrary to predictions derived from a semantic coding interpretation of the symbolic comparison process.     

Object-based correspondence effects for action-relevant and surface-property judgments with keypress responses: evidence for a basis in spatial coding

It has been proposed that grasping affordances produce a Simon-type correspondence effect for left–right keypress responses and the location of the graspable part of an object for judgments based on action-relevant properties such as shape, but not on surface properties. We tested the implications of this grasping affordance account and contrasted them with the ones derived from a spatial coding account that distinguishes holistic processing of integral dimensions and analytic processing of separable dimensions. In Experiments 1–3, judgments about the color of a door handle showed a Simon effect relative to the handle’s base, whereas judgments about the handle’s shape showed no Simon effect. In Experiment 4, when the middle of the handle was colored, the Simon effect was obtained relative to the base, but when the color was at the tip of the handle or near the base, Simon effects were obtained relative to the color location. For Experiment 5, only the base was colored, and the Simon effect was larger for a passive rather than active handle state, as in the color-judgment conditions of Experiments 2–4 in which the colored region overlapped with the base. In Experiment 6, orientation judgments showed no Simon effect, as the shape judgments did in Experiments 1 and 2. The findings of (a) an absence of Simon effects for shape and orientation judgments, (b) no larger Simon effects for active than passive handle states, and (c) isolation of the changing component for color judgments are consistent with the spatial coding account, according to which the distinction between object shape/orientation and color is one of integral versus separable dimensions.     

Visual field asymmetries and allocation of attention in visual scenes

Single items such as objects, letters or words are often presented in the right or left visual field to examine hemispheric differences in cognitive processing. However, in everyday life, such items appear within a visual context or scene that affects how they are represented and selected for attention. Here we examine processing asymmetries for a visual target within a frame of other elements (scene). We are especially interested in whether the allocation of visual attention affects the asymmetries, and in whether attention-related asymmetries occur in scenes oriented out of alignment with the viewer. In Experiment 1, visual field asymmetries were affected by the validity of a spatial precue in an upright frame. In Experiment 2, the same pattern of asymmetries occurred within frames rotated 90 degrees on the screen. In Experiment 3, additional sources of the spatial asymmetries were explored. We conclude that several left/right processing asymmetries, including some associated with the deployment of spatial attention, can be organized within scenes, in the absence of differential direct access to the two hemispheres.     

Overinformative Speakers Are Cooperative: Revisiting the Gricean Maxim of Quantity

A pragmatic account of referential communication is developed which presents an alternative to traditional Gricean accounts by focusing on cooperativeness and efficiency, rather than informativity. The results of four language‐production experiments support the view that speakers can be cooperative when producing redundant adjectives, doing so more often when color modification could facilitate the listener's search for the referent in the visual display (Experiment 1a). By contrast, when the listener knew which shape was the target, speakers did not produce redundant color adjectives (Experiment 1b). English speakers used redundant color adjectives more often than Spanish speakers, suggesting that speakers are sensitive to the differential efficiency of prenominal and postnominal modification (Experiment 2). Speakers were also cooperative when using redundant size adjectives (Experiment 3). Overall, these results show how discriminability affects a speaker's choice of referential expression above and beyond considerations of informativity, supporting the view that redundant speakers can be cooperative.     

Part-set cueing and the generation effect: An evaluation of a two-mechanism account of part-set cueing

The part-set cueing effect refers to paradoxical memory impairment often observed when elements from a set of items appear as ostensibly helpful retrieval cues during testing of memory for the set. We tested predictions of a two-mechanism account of part-set cueing—that, without enhanced relational processing, standard encoding leaves items susceptible to cueing-induced inhibition that persists after cues are removed; and that increasing item-specific encoding increases this persisting inhibition. Experiment 1 used antonym generation during study to increase item-specific encoding relative to standard encoding. Tests using item-specific probes revealed greater cueing-induced impairment for the generation condition, as predicted. However, when part-set cues were later removed, this impairment abated significantly in the generation condition and even disappeared in the standard-encoding condition—effects not predicted by the two-mechanism account, challenging its completeness. In Experiment 2, we ruled out an artifactual explanation of these results by replicating previously reported persisting impairment on free recall tests.     

Knowledge, expectations, and inductive reasoning within conceptual hierarchies

Previous research (e.g. Cognition 64 (1997) 73) suggests that the privileged level for inductive inference in a folk biological conceptual hierarchy does not correspond to the “basic” level (i.e. the level at which concepts are both informative and distinct). To further explore inductive inference within conceptual hierarchies, we examine relations between knowledge of concepts at different hierarchical levels, expectations about conceptual coherence, and inductive inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 8-year-olds and adults listed features of living kind (Experiments 1 and 2) and artifact (Experiment 2) concepts at different hierarchical levels (e.g. plant, tree, oak, desert oak), and also rated the strength of generalizations to the same concepts. For living kinds, the level that showed a relative advantage on these two tasks differed; the greatest increase in features listed tended to occur at the life-form level (e.g. tree), whereas the greatest increase in inductive strength tended to occur at the folk-generic level (e.g. oak). Knowledge and induction also showed different developmental trajectories. For artifact concepts, the levels at which the greatest gains in knowledge and induction occurred were more varied, and corresponded more closely across tasks. In Experiment 3, adults reported beliefs about within-category similarity for concepts at different levels of animal, plant and artifact hierarchies, and rated inductive strength as before. For living kind concepts, expectations about category coherence predicted patterns of inductions; knowledge did not. For artifact concepts, both knowledge and expectations predicted patterns of induction. Results suggest that beliefs about conceptual coherence play an important role in guiding inductive inference, that this role may be largely independent of specific knowledge of concepts, and that such beliefs are especially important in reasoning about living kinds.     

Causal status as a determinant of feature centrality

One of the major problems in categorization research is the lack of systematic ways of constraining feature weights. We propose one method of operationalizing feature centrality, a causal status hypothesis which states that a cause feature is judged to be more central than its effect feature in categorization. In Experiment 1, participants learned a novel category with three characteristic features that were causally related into a single causal chain and judged the likelihood that new objects belong to the category. Likelihood ratings for items missing the most fundamental cause were lower than those for items missing the intermediate cause, which in turn were lower than those for items missing the terminal effect. The causal status effect was also obtained in goodness-of-exemplar judgments (Experiment 2) and in free-sorting tasks (Experiment 3), but it was weaker in similarity judgments than in categorization judgments (Experiment 4). Experiment 5 shows that the size of the causal status effect is moderated by plausibility of causal relations, and Experiment 6 shows that effect features can be useful in retrieving information about unknown causes. We discuss the scope of the causal status effect and its implications for categorization research.     

Testing four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect: Single- and multi-item entities as comparison targets and referents

In six experiments, we tested four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect (B/WTA) by manipulating the number of items comprising the target or referent of direct comparison. A single-item target tended to be rated more extremely than a single-item or a multi-item referent (Experiments 1–3). No B/WTA was obtained, however, when a multi-item target was compared with either a single- or multi-item referent (Experiments 4 and 5). A bias favoring a multi-item target was found only if cohesiveness among the items was increased through instructions (Experiment 6). The Unique-Attributes Hypothesis generally provided the best explanation the findings; the focalism explanation also demonstrated some empirical viability. The results suggest that important preferential decision-making outcomes can be affected by both the number of items and whether items are strategically manipulated to serve as targets or referents of comparison.     

Causal-based property generalization

A central question in cognitive research concerns how new properties are generalized to categories. This article introduces a model of how generalizations involve a process of causal inference in which people estimate the likely presence of the new property in individual category exemplars and then the prevalence of the property among all category members. Evidence in favor of this causal-based generalization (CBG) view included effects of an existing feature's base rate (Experiment 1), the direction of the causal relations (Experiments 2 and 4), the number of those relations (Experiment 3), and the distribution of features among category members (Experiments 4 and 5). The results provided no support for an alternative view that generalizations are promoted by the centrality of the to-be-generalized feature. However, there was evidence that a minority of participants based their judgments on simpler associative reasoning processes.     

Perceived duration of expected and unexpected stimuli

Three experiments assessed whether perceived stimulus duration depends on whether participants process an expected or an unexpected visual stimulus. Participants compared the duration of a constant standard stimulus with a variable comparison stimulus. Changes in expectancy were induced by presenting one type of comparison more frequently than another type. Experiment 1 used standard durations of 100 and 400 ms, and Experiments 2 and 3 durations of 400 and 800 ms. Stimulus frequency did not affect perceived duration in Experiment 1. In Experiments 2 and 3, however, frequent comparisons were perceived as shorter than infrequent ones, and discrimination performance was better for infrequent comparisons. Overall, this study supports the notion that infrequent stimuli increase the speed of an internal pacemaker.     

Short-term memory in autism spectrum disorder

Three experiments examined verbal short-term memory in comparison and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) participants. Experiment 1 involved forward and backward digit recall. Experiment 2 used a standard immediate serial recall task where, contrary to the digit-span task, items (words) were not repeated from list to list. Hence, this task called more heavily on item memory. Experiment 3 tested short-term order memory with an order recognition test: Each word list was repeated with or without the position of 2 adjacent items swapped. The ASD group showed poorer performance in all 3 experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that group differences were due to memory for the order of the items, not to memory for the items themselves. Confirming these findings, the results of Experiment 3 showed that the ASD group had more difficulty detecting a change in the temporal sequence of the items.