Moral philosophy and theology: why is there so little difference for Roman Catholics?

The cardinal question in Christian moral theory and bioethics is whether the knowledge that Christians have (1) by grace and (2) by revelation (e.g., regarding the character of human and cosmic history as reaching from creation through the Incarnation and the Redemption to the Second Coming and the restoration of all things) makes a crucial contribution to understanding morality, as for example issues such as the good death and the morality of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. This article argues that such a contribution is made by grace and revelation. The reduction of Roman Catholic moral theology and bioethics to secular bioethics is explored, as well as the necessity of the unique knowledge possessed by Christians for adequate end-of-life decision-making.     

Laying down one's life for oneself.

Roman Catholicism has long opposed suicide. Although Scripture neither condones nor condemns suicide explicitly, cases in the Bible that are purported to be suicides fall into several different categories, and the Roman Catholic tradition can show why some of these should be considered morally wrong and some should not. While Christian martyrdom is praised, it is not correct to argue that this Christian outlook invites suicide, or that it recommends physician-assisted suicide for altruistic motives. Church Tradition, from its earliest days, has clearly distinguished martyrdom from suicide. The principles of double effect and cooperation, mainstays in Roman Catholic moral theology, enable one to see the moral difference between martyrdom and suicide, and to appreciate why physician-assisted suicide is wrong for both patient and physician.     

Defining forgiveness: christian clergy and general population perspectives

The lack of any consensual definition of forgiveness is a serious weakness in the research literature (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). As forgiveness is at the core of Christianity, this study returns to the Christian source of the concept to explore the meaning of forgiveness for practicing Christian clergy. Comparisons are made with a general population sample and social science definitions of forgiveness to ensure that a shared meaning of forgiveness is articulated. Anglican and Roman Catholic clergy (N = 209) and a general population sample (N = 159) completed a postal questionnaire about forgiveness. There was agreement on the existence of individual differences in forgiveness. Clergy and the general population perceived reconciliation as necessary for forgiveness while there was no consensus within psychology. The clergy suggest that forgiveness is limitless and that repentance is unnecessary, while the general population suggests that there are limits and that repentance is necessary. Psychological definitions do not conceptualize repentance as necessary for forgiveness, and the question of limits has not been addressed, although, within therapy, the implicit assumption is that forgiveness is limitless.     

Suffering, meaning, and bioethics.

Suffering evokes moral and metaphysical reflection, the bioethics of suffering concerns the proper ethos of living with suffering. Because empirical and philosophical explorations of suffering are imprisoned in the world of immanent experience, they cannot reach to a transcendent meaning. Even if religious and other narratives concerning the meaning of suffering have no transcendent import, they can have aesthetic and moral significance. This understanding of narratives of suffering and of their custodians has substantial ecumenical implications: chaplains can function as general custodians of narratives and sustainers of a generic religious meaning. This understanding is contrary to traditional Christianity, which discloses a transcendent significance of human suffering found in a very particular history involving particular persons: Christ as the second Adam through the submission of the second Eve has taken on our nature so that we can be united with God. Human suffering is tied to human sin, not simply as a punishment for sin, much less as an opportunity to discharge a supposed temporal punishment due to sin. Human suffering is the result of our rebellious free choices. It provides an opportunity for humility and submission, so that, united to the cross of Christ, sin can be forgiven and suffering set aside in the Resurrection. Knowledge of this framing context for all human suffering is accessible not through rational argument. It is a knowledge garnered through repentance, purification of the heart, illumination by God's grace, and unification with God. Christian bioethics is embedded in the narrative of suffering, which is part of the history of salvation and which encompasses and places all of medicine in its terms.     

The deChristianization of Christian hospital chaplaincy: some bioethics reflections on professionalization, ecumenization, and secularization.

The traditional roles of Christian chaplains in aiding patients, physicians, nurses, and hospital administrators in repentance, right belief, right worship, and right conduct are challenged by the contemporary professionalization of chaplaincy guided by post-Christian norms located in a public space structured by three defining postulates: the non-divinity of Christ, robust ecumenism, and the irrelevance of God's existence. The norms of this emerging post-Christian profession of chaplaincy make interventions with patients, physicians, nurses, and hospital administrators in defense of specifically Christian bioethical norms and goals unprofessional, because the chaplain is now directed as a professional to support health care services held to standards articulated within a secular morality. These changes are exemplar of the profound recasting of the dominant moral culture with wide-ranging implications for bioethics.     

Christian bioethics, secular bioethics, and the claim to cultural authority.

Though the papers in this volume for the most part address the question, "What is Christian about Christian Bioethics", this paper addresses instead a closely related question, "How would a Christian approach to bioethics differ from the kind of secular academic bioethics that has emerged as such an important field in the contemporary university?" While it is generally assumed that a secular bioethics rooted in moral philosophy will be more culturally authoritative than an approach to bioethics grounded in the contingent particularities of a religious tradition, I will give reasons for rejecting this assumption. By examining the history of the recent revival of academic bioethics as well as the state of the contemporary moral philosophy on which it is based I will suggest that secular bioethics suffers from many of the same liabilities as a carefully articulated Christian bioethics. At the end of the paper I will turn briefly to examine the question of how, in light of this discussion, a Christian bioethics might best be pursued.     

Physician-assisted suicide reconsidered: dying as a Christian in a post-Christian age.

The traditional Christian focus concerning dying is on repentance, not dignity. The goal of a traditional Christian death is not a pleasing, final chapter to life, but union with God: holiness. The pursuit of holiness requires putting on Christ and accepting His cross. In contrast, post-traditional Christian and secular concerns with self-determination, control, dignity, and self-esteem make physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia plausible moral choices. Such is not the case within the context of the traditional Christian experience of God, which throughout its 2000 years has sternly condemned suicide and assisted suicide. The wrongness of such actions cannot adequately be appreciated outside the experience of that Christian life. Traditional Christian appreciations of death involve an epistemology and metaphysics of values in discordance with those of secular morality. This difference in the appreciation of the meaning of dying and death, as well as in the appreciation of the moral significance of suicide, discloses a new battle in the culture wars separating traditional Christian morality from that of the surrounding society.     

The ecumenical and non-ecumenical dialectic of Christian bioethics.

Non-ecumenical Christian bioethics will seem a strange category for many. The category relies on the recognition that bioethics mediates morality and ethics in healthcare. As such bioethics will have particular content. It is the content of a moral vision that both divides and unites. The enterprise of non-ecumenical Christian bioethics explores how Christians are both divided and united on the issue of bioethics. Non-ecumenical Christian bioethics is opposed to a facile ecumenism that reduces the content of Christian morality to the lowest common denominator.     

Towards a Christian bioethics.

Rather than revealing itself as a single, unified, ecumenical faith, Christianity is sundered with Christians united neither in one communion nor in one baptism. Christian Bioethics seeks to examine the traditional content-full moral commitments which the Christian faiths bring to life, sexuality, suffering, illness and death within the contexts of medicine and health care. Seeking to understand the differences which separate the bioethics of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and the Orthodox, Christian Bioethics explores the manners in which the faiths diverge. The failure of the Enlightenment project to disclose a content-full communality that would bind mankind has left much to be reconsidered by Christians who face new ethical dilemmas in the novel guise of advances in health care technologies.     

The seventh century in Byzantine‐Muslim relations: Characteristics and forces

The seventh century Muslim‐Byzantine relations are revealing and paradigmatic of the political, religious and “national” forces (Persian, Greek and Arab), each striving to dominate the land and the heart of the region. Notwithstanding the deeply‐rooted Christian tradition, orthodox or heretical, among the populations of the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) empire, integrally Arab in temperament and Greek in appearance, the Muslim expansion outside the “island” of Arabia proper must be seen as part of a larger phenomenon of rising Arab, rather than Muslim solidarity and self‐consciousness; thence the unique, in many ways, character and content of the interaction of the Christian and Muslim community. The theological divisions alone among the Christian population do not explain the successful expansion of Islam; they underline the dynamics and the characteristics of the seventh century.     

Christian Bioethics in a Western Europe after Christendom

Europe has taken on a new, post-Christian, if not a somewhatanti-Christian character. The tension between Western Europe'sever more secular present and its substantial Christian pastlies at the heart of Western Europe's current struggle to articulatea coherent cultural and moral identity. The result is that WesternEuropean mainline churches are themselves in the midst of anidentity crisis, thus compounding Western Europe's identitycrisis. Christian bioethics in Europe exists against the backdropof these profound cultural cross currents that define the Europeancondition, engender conflicts regarding the meaning of beingWestern European and being Christian, and bring the public significanceand role of Western European bioethics, especially Western EuropeanChristian bioethics, into question. The dominant culture ofthe public forum is post-Christian and post-traditional, althoughtraditional Christianity still asserts its voice. Denis Müllerin his paper has clarified the choice between a traditional-fundamentalistChristian Bioethics and a revisionist, progressive ChristianBioethics.     

Sexual ethics and communal judgments: on the pluralism of virtues, values, and practices.

Different judgments by Christian communities on issues in sexual ethics involve different weightings of various sources of moral authority, different understandings of the normativity of the natural, and different assessments of the scope of freedom to be exercised in relation to the goods of marriage. These fundamental differences of interpretation can be exemplified by the ongoing Roman Catholic discussion of the legitimacy of voluntary sterilization in certain "hard cases." The contributors to this issue of Christian Bioethics, in their spirited exchange on that issue, exemplify the need for careful attention to the ways that differences of theological emphasis and moral method lead to different judgements in particular cases, both within and between particular Christian communities.     

Whose tradition? Which Enlightenment? What content? Engelhardt, Hauerwas, Capaldo, and the future of Christian bioethics.

The development of a content-full Christian bioethics requires an analysis of the particular contents and traditions which different Christians bring to morality. For Hauerwas, the content of Christian ethics is the speech and practices of the community. For Engelhardt, only a content-full tradition, such as the Orthodox tradition, will be able to arrive at closure on the moral issues presented by the contemporary practice of medicine. Capaldi calls, in contrast, for a Kantian society of autonomous self-legislators whose responsible freedom is grounded in a cosmic order that must be explicated and retrieved in particular practices. The manner in which we view our own traditions and the shortcomings of modernity determine the content that Christianity brings to bioethics.     

CONSENT,CONVERSION, AND MORAL FORMATION: Stoic Elements in Jonathan Edwards's Ethics

The contemporary revival of virtue ethics has focused primarily on retrieving central moral commitments of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and the Neoplatonist traditions. Christian virtue ethicists would do well to expand this retrieval further to include the writings of the Roman Stoics. This essay argues that the ethics of Jonathan Edwards exemplifies major Stoic themes and explores three noteworthy points of intersection between Stoic ethics and Edwards's thought: a conception of virtue as consent to a benevolent providence, the identification of virtue as a singular and transformative good, and an account of moral formation as simultaneously self‐directed and received. Common ground between Edwards and the Stoics illustrates the value of recognizing Stoic moral thought as a philosophical framework that can enhance and undergird Christian ethicists' understandings of moral development and the nature of virtue.     

Moral knowledge: some reflections on moral controversies, incompatible moral epistemologies, and the culture wars.

An authentic Christian bioethical account of abortion must take into consideration the conflicting epistemologies that separate Christian moral theology from secular moral philosophy. Moral epistemologies directed to the issue of abortion that fail to appreciate the orientation of morality to God will also fail adequately to appreciate the moral issues at stake. Christian accounts of the bioethics of abortion that reduce moral-theological considerations to moral-philosophical considerations will not only fail to appreciate fully the offense of abortion, but morally mislead. This article locates the bioethics of abortion within the theology of the Church of the first millennium, emphasizing that abortion was prohibited, whether or not one considered the embryo or fetus to be ensouled.     

Between morality and repentance: recapturing "sin" for bioethics.

Distinguishing within "sin" the dimensions of anomia, hamartia, and asthenia makes it possible to analyze in greater detail the contrary manners in which traditional and post-traditional Christianities in this issue of Christian Bioethics endeavor to recapture what was lost when secular bioethics reconstructed the specifically spiritual-context-oriented normative commitments of Christianity in one-dimensionally moral terms. Various post-traditional attempts at securing moral orientation and resources for forgiveness, both of which secular bioethics finds increasingly difficult to provide, are critically reviewed. Their engagement of secular moral concepts and concerns, and even their adoption of an academically philosophical posture and language, is presented as responsible for their failure to adequately preserve what in traditional Christianity would count as prohibited vs. permitted, and advisable vs. non-advisable, or what would allow to resolve "tragic conflicts." The deeper reason for this failure lies in post-traditional Christianity's restricting the Christian life (with its central tension between love and the law) to what can be captured by cognitive categories. As the survey of several traditionally Christian accounts of sin in bioethics makes clear, both moral orientation (along with the resolution of "tragic" conflicts) and the sources of forgiveness are available, once that Christian life is framed in terms of persons' spirit-supported practical involvement in ascesis and liturgy, and once bioethical reflections are situated in the experiential context of such involvement.     

Universalism, particularism and the ethics of dignity.

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense--thus meeting the demands of universalism--but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations--thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance.