儒家、康德与德行伦理学

<正>近年来英语世界出现了一股藉西方的"德行伦理学"(Virtue Ethics)①诠释儒家伦理学之风潮,例如万百安的《早期中国哲学中的德行伦理学与结果论》(见Van Norden)、余纪元的《孔子与亚里士多德的伦理学》(见Yu;另见余纪元,2009年),以及沈美华的《藉亚里士多德与孔子来重探道德》(见Sim)。最近,"德行伦理学"的提倡者之一斯洛特(M.Slote)也涉入了此项主题。2008年10月他在台湾政治大学"人文价值讲座"针对"德行伦理学"所发表的系列演讲,便属于这类尝试。不过,他所主张的并非亚里士多德式的"德行伦理学",而是所谓的"情感主义的德行伦理学"(sentimentalist virtue ethics),其主要代表是休谟。     

Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is that it issues from the person's constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant's categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution.     

柏拉图与康德伦理学中的自我构成

相对于常见的灵魂的斗争模式而言,柏拉图与康德提出了灵魂的构成模式.构成模式可以解释行动缘何不同于事件.行动是源自于作为整个人格的构成,而不是源自于在个人内部起作用的某种力量,后者正是斗争模式所蕴含的观点.这种构成观反过来又蕴含了好行动的要素,即行动是以把人统一成合构成体系的方式得到审思和选择的.也就是说,审思行动把我们构造成一个统一的行为者.柏拉图式正义与康德的绝对命令就是这种自我构成原则,由此也是行动的规范标准.     

交通伦理学:研究现状与前景展望

目前关于交通伦理的研究尚处于关注具体问题的各论性初级研究阶段,其研究的基本思路是:以"人本原则"引申出的"安全"、"便捷"、"公正"、"舒适"、"生态"原则为价值向度,对交通主体之间、客体之间、交通主客体之间多方面的伦理关系及其矛盾冲突进行理性的审视、质疑、评判,论证,寻求伦理权衡机制与解困的共识,从而为交通从冲突走向和谐提供伦理导向与支持.     

The Priority Principle from Kant to Frege

In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought that Frege's priority principle is close to (or at least derivable from) Kant's. I argue that it is not. Nevertheless, there was a gradual historical development that began with Kant's priority thesis and culminated in Frege's new logic.     

论内在价值论在环境伦理学中的必然性——从康德到罗尔斯顿

内在价值是与外在价值或工具价值相对应的概念.工具价值指事物的功用是其他事物存在的利益性条件,内在价值则指事物的功用是产生其自身的各种需求及存在与发展的根本性或绝对性条件.工具价值的指向是为他的,而内在价值的指向则是为我的.     

道教经济伦理刍议——以财神信仰为中心的考察

道教是古老的宗教,也是常新的宗教.当现代化的进程不断向前的时候,它所需要的文化资源也不断在扩大.然而现实的情况是,经过近百年的社会巨变,中国传统的文化资源大量被破坏,有些则被埋没.     

Kant: The Audacity of Judgement

In the legal judgement reason demands that it extend itself beyond the mere subjective limits of the self in order that it might fashion a judgement that speaks for the other. This is the universal necessity of the judgement. No claim of truth or the moral law can guarantee that others will agree with this judgement: thus disputation is the risk which reason takes in order to judge at all. The author examines this audacity of judgement by reference to Kant's autonomy of reason, which risks itself in the thought that thinks. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

传统伦理向当代转换的可能性

当代伦理道德重构必然涉及传统伦理资源的开发与运用.开发、运用传统伦理资源,所涉及的一个前提性问题是传统伦理资源向当代有效转换如何可能?对这一前提问题的求证,既涉及到重新审查传统伦理的视域范围,也涉及到对传统伦理的实质构成内容、本质规定和价值导向的重新确认,更涉及到传统伦理资源向当代转换的原则确立与方法探讨.此三者,构成本文讨论的基本内容,并企图通过这种讨论,为传统伦理资源的当代转换提供认知视域、价值原则和宏观操作方法.