Incentives, Inequality and Self-Respect

Rawls argues that ‘Parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’. But what are these social conditions that we should so urgently avoid? One evident candidate might be conditions of material inequality. Yet Rawls seems confident that his account of justice can endorse such inequalities without jeopardising citizens’ self-respect. In this article I argue that this confidence is misplaced. Unequalising incentives, I claim, jeopardise the self-respect of those least advantaged—at least under a Rawlsian schema—by undermining the very processes by which Rawls hopes to make distributional inequalities and self-respect compatible. I begin by setting out Rawls’s distinct account of self-respect before moving to describe how Rawls expects the difference principle to support citizens’ in this regard. I then draw upon GA Cohen’s distinction between ‘strict’ and ‘lax’ interpretations of the difference principle to argue that the presence of unequalising incentives undermines both the direct and indirect support that the difference principle can offer to citizens’ self-respect. As such, I claim that Rawls must either weaken his endorsement of unequalising incentives, or risk violating his ‘prior commitment’ to avoiding social conditions harmful to citizens’ self-respect.     

Hate Speech,Dignity and Self-Respect

This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness.     

Self-Respect or Self-Delusion? Tomasi and Rawls on the Basic Liberties

A central feature of John Tomasi’s ‘Free Market Fairness’ is the emphasis it places upon the good of self-respect. Like Rawls, Tomasi believes that accounts of justice ought to offer support for the self-respect of citizens. Indeed, this is a key way in which Tomasi aspires to engage with the ‘high-liberal’ tradition. Unlike Rawls however, Tomasi argues that this support is best provided by our treating a broader set of economic liberties as basic liberties. In this paper I raise two concerns about this latter claim. Firstly, I trace a number of significant ways in which Tomasi’s discussion of self-respect differs from that of Rawls. Whilst such divergences are not necessarily problematic, I argue that they serve to limit the purchase his account has on left-liberals. Further, I argue that the ideal of self-respect is more deeply ‘hard-wired’ into Rawls’s account of justice than Tomasi recognises. As such, Tomasi fails to address the full range of additional (and important) ways in which Rawls expects his principles of justice to support citizens’ self-respect. I argue that this also limits the force of Tomasi’s claims. Secondly, and more seriously, I argue that there are significant tensions between Tomasi’s discussion of self-respect and his most forceful argument (the ‘greater wealth thesis’) in favour of the market democratic model he proposes. I argue firstly that Tomasi’s account of when (and why) citizens’ self-respect is jeopardised does not allow us to readily distinguish between economic security born of systems of welfare and redistribution, and economic security born of market forces and historical contingency. And more troubling still, is Tomasi’s belief that self-respecting citizens must view themselves as a ‘central cause’ of their situation. Such self-conceptions, I argue, can only coexist alongside the greater wealth thesis if citizens engage in quite naked self-delusions about their causal power. I argue that theorists of justice have good reason to be suspicious of promulgating such delusions and, as such, that this poses a serious problem for a justification of market democracy which aspires to rest upon an appeal to self-respect.     

Believing in one’s equal rights: Self-respect as a predictor of assertiveness

In the present research self-respect is defined as a person’s ability to see the self as someone who has the same basic rights and dignity as others. Self-respect fills a gap in previous theorizing on the self because unlike other self-concepts it can be linked to assertiveness and claim making. Self-respect was empirically distinguished from self-competence and self-confidence (Study 1) as well as from psychological entitlement, self-esteem and self-acceptance (Study 2). Self-respect predicted assertive responses above and beyond these other self-scales in two correlational studies (Studies 1 and 3) and one experiment (Study 2). As predicted, self-respect was not related to aggressive responses, but psychological entitlement was (Studies 2 and 3). Implications for future research are discussed.     

Real self-respect and its social bases

Abstract

Many theories of social justice maintain that concern for the social bases of self-respect grounds demanding requirements of political and economic equality, as self-respect is supposed to be dependent on continuous just recognition by others. This paper argues that such views miss an important feature of self-respect, which accounts for much of its value: self-respect is a capacity for self-orientation that is robust under adversity. This does not mean that there are no social bases of self-respect that such theories ought to incorporate. It means that they are different: they consist of the motivational and epistemic resources needed to develop and maintain such robustness.     

Beyond Establishment and Separation: Political Liberalism, Religion and Democracy

Does John Rawls??s political liberalism require the institutional separation between state and religion or does it allow space for moderate forms of religious establishment? In this paper I address this question by presenting and critically evaluating Cécile Laborde??s recent claim that political liberalism is ??inconclusive about the public place of religion?? and ??indeterminate about the symbolic dimensions of the public place of religion??. In response to Cécile Laborde, I argue that neither moderate separation nor moderate establishment, intended as regimes of religious governance that fix specific interpretations of principles of social and economic justice, are compatible with Rawls??s political liberalism. Furthermore, I claim that a state can ensure that both its religious and non-religious citizens enjoy a sense of self-respect and identification with their polity by leaving issues of symbolic establishment and separation open to democratic debate. I conclude that Rawls??s political liberalism transcends the standard distinction between moderate establishment and moderate separation and leaves the public place of religion open to the democratic contestation of ordinary legislative politics.     

Three Types of Self-Respect

According to John Rawls, self-respect is the most important of the primary goods and is essential for the construction of the just society. Self-respect, however, remains a concept which is inadequately theorised, being closely linked to other concepts such as dignity, shame, pride, autonomy and security. Most usually self-respect is considered to be just the self-reflection of the respect we receive from others. In this paper I argue that self-respect consists of both a self-evaluative and a social reflexive element. Using Darwall’s distinction between two types of respect as a building block, I argue that it is worth considering self-respect as having three dimensions. Broadly these are human recognition, status recognition and appraisal.     

The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective

Recent liberal moral and political philosophy has placed great emphasis on the good of self-respect. But it is not always evident what is involved in self-respect, nor is it evident how societies can promote it. Assuming that self-respect is highly desirable, I begin by considering how people can live in a self-respecting fashion, and I argue that autonomous envisaging and fulfillment of one's own life plans is necessary for self-respect. I next turn to the question of how societal implementation of rights may affect self-respect, and I urge that discretionary rights, which allow people to decline the benefits they confer, support self-respect more effectively than mandatory rights, which forbid people to refuse the benefits they confer. I conclude by examining the import of these contentions for feminist theory. I believe that my arguments are of particular concern to women because women have traditionally been victimized by a mandatory right to play a distinctively “feminine” role which has undermined their self-respect.     

Intergenerational transmission of violence: Is violence a pathology of intersubjective contact?

In this article, I look at violence as a pathology of the intersubjective contact. In particular, I claim that one possible explanation of violence is lack of recognition on a societal, intersubjective level. I propose an explanation based on Honneth’s concept of struggle for recognition and Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity. The article takes the following course: I first give a short outline of the concept of intergenerational transmission of violence, as understood by psychology at the level of an individual, followed by a brief presentation a summary of sociological research on the concept. Then, I proceed with a discussion of Honneth’s three modes of recognition, viz. love, rights, and solidarity, as modes of intersubjective contact, leading to the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. I claim that the lack of these kinds of recognition leads to the decrease in confidence and trust and consequently to abusive behaviour, that it affects social integrity and brings about the destruction of social functions, and that it results in an individual and a society which have lost their “honour” and dignity. Finding his account of intersubjectivity lacking in its philosophical aspect, I complement Honneth’s account of intersubjectivity with that of Merleau-Ponty, based in his understanding of the intertwining of the subject and the world and the reversible contact between and among subjects within the world. Considering the negative effects of misrecognition as described by Honneth, in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of intersubjective contacts among subjects, I conclude that a country where all three modes of recognition have been disturbed houses a society lacking self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, and consequently shows all the signs of Honneth’s forms of disrespect, i.e. abuse and rape, denial of rights and exclusion, as well as denigration and insult, all of which are forms of intergenerationally transmitted violence.     

Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect

The concept of self-respect is often invoked in feminist theorizing. But both women's too-common experiences of struggling to have self-respect and the results of feminist critiques of related moral concepts suggest the need for feminist critique and reconceptualization of self-respect. I argue that a familiar conception of self-respect is masculinist, thus less accessible to women and less than conducive to liberation. Emancipatory theory and practice require a suitably feminist conception of self-respect; I propose one such conception.     

Public reason as a social basis of self-respect

The idea of public reason was traditionally explained in terms of the need to justify the exercise of coercive power to reasonable people who do not agree on the truth of any particular conception of the good. In this paper, I show why this traditional, coercion-based, view is problematic, and offer a different account of public reason: the “self-respect account.” In addition, I argue that this account is capable of informing recent, nontraditional, accounts of public reason. The conclusion is that public reason can be conceptualized as a social basis of self-respect.     

Internalized equality and protest against injustice: The role of disadvantaged group members’ self-respect in collective action tendencies

Recent research shows that self-respect (defined as seeing yourself as a person with equal rights) predicts assertive but not aggressive responses to injustice in interpersonal contexts. The present research focuses on the antecedents of self-respect and its consequences for collective action tendencies among members of disadvantaged groups. Across three studies (N = 227, N = 454, N = 131) using different contexts and samples (discrimination of Muslims in Germany; women regarding gender inequality), experiences with equality-based respect (defined as being treated as someone of equal worth) predicted self-respect. Moreover, across all three studies, self-respect predicted intentions for cooperative or normative but not support for hostile or non-normative protest. The results demonstrate the potential of self-respect for facilitating collective action in the face of injustice while still enabling positive intergroup relations.     

Self-respect and pro-relationship behavior in marital relationships

This work advances an interdependence theoretic analysis of the role of self-respect in ongoing close relationships. Self-respect is defined as the tendency to perceive the self as a principled person who is worthy of honor and high regard and is argued to rest on moral integrity. Consistent with predictions, results from a study of marital relationships revealed that individual self-respect is positively associated with both the individual's and the partner's pro-relationship behavior (accommodation, forgiveness, conciliation). Mediation analyses revealed that self-respect not only exhibits direct associations with each person's behavior, but also exhibits indirect associations with each person's behavior, via the impact of each person's actions on reciprocal pro-relationship behavior from the partner. Mediation was more reliably observed for the association of self-respect with partner behavior than for the association with individual behavior. Both individual pro-relationship behavior and partner pro-relationship behavior are positively associated with couple well-being, which in turn is positively associated with personal well-being (life satisfaction, physical health, psychological adjustment). These associations were evident in both within-participant and across-partner analyses and for both self-report and interaction-based measures of behavior. Self-respect reliably accounts for unique variance beyond variance attributable to self-esteem.     

On Political Morality and the Conditions for Warranted Self-Respect

In my recent book Liberalism with Excellence (2017: chapter 7), I have expounded at length a conception of warranted self-respect. That conception, which draws heavily though far from uncritically on the scattered passages about self-respect in the writings of John Rawls, is central to my defense of a variety of liberalism that combines and transfigures certain aspects of Rawlsianism and perfectionism. However, it is also central to the positions taken in some earlier books of mine on capital punishment and torture. (Kramer, The ethics of capital punishment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Torture and moral integrity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) Although my understanding of warranted self-respect was presented far more briefly or obliquely in each of those earlier books than in Liberalism with Excellence, it in fact underlies both my limited defense of the death penalty and my absolutist insistence that the use of interrogational torture is never morally permissible. The present paper will recount the gist of my conception of warranted self-respect and will then explain how that conception figures pivotally in my ruminations on the diverse matters of political morality that have been mentioned here.     

Work and the Human Essence

ABSTRACT Jenkins and Sherman hold that belief in the value of work is artificially inculcated and that a 'leisure society' is desirable and possible, as well as being necessitated by the introduction of microprocessors. After distinguishing between meaningful work and labour (first section), I reply obliquely to their case by contending that meaningful work affords most people their best chance of the necessary good of self-respect (second section), and that it constitutes the exercise of an essential human capacity, the development of which is necessary to human wellbeing (third section). Because of the contingent connections between employment on the one hand and meaningful work and self-respect on the other, we should recognise the value of work and plan for full employment (fourth section).     

Morality is necessary for happiness

An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, the most basic of which is as follows: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore, morality is necessary for happiness. Some of the most obvious objections are entertained and rejected.     

Ground zero for a post-moral ethics in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and Julia Kristeva’s melancholic

Perhaps no other novel has received as much attention from moral philosophers as South African writer J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. The novel is ethically compelling and yet no moral theory explains its force. Despite clear Kantian moments, neither rationalism nor self-respect can account for the strange ethical task that the protagonist sets for himself. Calling himself the dog man, like the ancient Cynics, this shamelessly cynical protagonist takes his cues for ethics not from humans but from animals. He does not however claim much in the way of empathy or understanding of animals, and his own odd motives remain a puzzle throughout the stages of his ethical transformation. Many scholars approach Coetzee’s text through an ethics of alterity, and even argue that Disgrace is exemplary in this regard. Kristeva’s rendition of alterity ethics brings us close to the novel’s vision, and yet the novel points towards a more primordial basis for ethics in the search for meaning through the human encounter with other animal species.     

The role of culture in appraisals,emotions and helplessness in response to threats

In honour cultures, such as Turkey, reputation management is emphasised, whereas in dignity cultures such as northern US, self-respect and personal achievements are central. Turkey is also a collectivistic culture, where relationship harmony is as important as reputation management. When Turkish people's reputation is threatened, they may experience an internal conflict between these two motives and display helplessness. The purpose of the present study was to examine how people from Turkey (an honour culture; n = 52) and northern US (a dignity culture; n = 48) would perceive and respond to reputation threats as opposed to self-respect threats. As predicted, Turkish participants anticipated stronger anger, shame, and helplessness in response to reputation threats than self-respect threats, whereas differences were smaller or non-existent in northern US. Moreover, shame was a mediator between appraisal and helplessness for reputation threats in Turkey (shame positively predicted helplessness); anger was a mediator between appraisal and helplessness for self-respect threats in northern US (anger negatively predicted helplessness). These results are novel in their inclusion of helplessness and appraisal theory of emotions when examining responses to threats in honour and dignity cultures.     

Capitalism versus Marx's Communism

Conclusion In this paper, I have assessed Marx's criticism of capitalism, and the practice of divided labor, from the standpoint of two important senses of worth which persons can have, namely self-respect and self-esteem. I have tried to show that in either case, Communism, as Marx envisioned it, is not the superior to capitalism he might have supposed. Along the way, I hope to have also shown the importance of distinguishing between two concepts, namely self-respect and self-esteem.This paper has benefited from the criticisms of several individuals: Elizabeth Rapaport, who commented upon the version which was read at the Western Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in 1977; Allen Buchanan, who sent me a number of comments, as well as a quite helpful paper of his entitled Exploitation, Alienation, and Injustice; and a referee forStudies in Soviet Thought. My concern to meet their criticisms have made this paper immeasurably better.     

尊严:自尊、受尊重与尊重

尊严是个体的一种权利。尊严包括自尊、受尊重、尊重三个成分。早在上个世纪初,斯金纳就对尊严与个体的自由、自主,与社会的控制和公正的关系进行过认真的思考。后来的研究发现,尊严也与人们在社会互动中的能力、力量、权势、地位有关联。