The complex and elusive nature of religious prosociality: Reply to Myers (2012) and Saroglou (2012)

This reply explores issues raised in comments by Myers (2012) and Saroglou (2012) on Galen (2012) regarding whether religiosity has any influence on prosociality. Areas of contention include (a) the distinction between religious belief and other influences, mainly the socialization effects of group behavior; (b) whether behavior largely restricted to the ingroup is genuine prosociality; (c) methodological issues such as the validity of self-report and peer-reported data and effects of social desirability; (d) the often paradoxical relationships with different forms of religiosity; and (e) potential curvilinear effects. Recent work regarding these issues is highlighted, and future directions that may productively resolve these debates are suggested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Principles of contour information: Reply to Lim and Leek (2012)

Lim and Leek (2012) presented a formalization of information along object contours, which they argued was an alternative to the approach taken in our article (Feldman & Singh, 2005). Here, we summarize the 2 approaches, showing that--notwithstanding Lim and Leek's (2012) critical rhetoric--their approach is substantially identical to ours, except for the technical details of the formalism. Following the logic of our article point by point, Lim and Leek (a) defined probabilistic expectations about the geometry of smooth contours (which they based on differential contour geometry, while we used a discrete approximation--the only essential difference in their approach), (b) assumed that information along the contour was proportional to the negative logarithm of probability, following standard information theory, and then (c) extended this formulation to closed contours. We analyze what they described as errors in our approach, all of which rest on mathematical misunderstandings or bizarre misreadings of our article. We also show that their extension to 3-dimensional surfaces and their "modified minima rule" contain fatal deficiencies.     

Reply to Commentary by Daniel N. Stern

I respond to Stern's largely affirming discussion by fleshing out a few points, for example, improvisation is more than just being spontaneous, it is ensemble work that plays off and with patterns emergent in the personalities of both parties. These patterns illuminate something about the unconscious of each from which blossom things heretofore unimagined or unarticulated. Several principles are then emphasized: First, improvisational moments arise when the “characters” in the moment draw from something real within themselves along with who they are inducing one another to become. Second, the cultivation of play in improvisation lends itself to putting to rest the myth of the perfectly analyzed analyst as not only impossible but as being both unnecessary and undesirable—a seminal point to the entire relational canon. Third, improvisation is a means for putting live flesh on the sterile bones of a host of theories now informing the contemporary psychoanalytic perspective such as chaos and complexity theory, along with dynamic systems theory. I also note that improvisational moments exhibit an emerging sense of vitality and a deepened sense of connection between the partners. Their work obtains a greater sense of focus, though not a deliberate focus as that their relational unconsciouses are “directing” them. Improvisational work feels liberating, playful, as well as affirming and recognizing what what each is bringing to their coauthorship. By contrast, when the improvisation fails, it devolves into negative thirdness or one-upsmanship, the qualities of which reflect deadness, avoidance, confusion, constriction of play, and a misrecognition of one another that devolves into a mutual sense of defeat. Responding to Stern's question about posi-traums, I affirm there is a phenomenon in which an entrenched emotional conviction of a patient's can be dramatically altered. This happens when something positive occurs that cannot be assimilated within the patient's intransigently negative belief system such that she must accommodate a new organizing principle, that is, a new emotional conviction to make sense of it. I concede, however, that it may be too soon to tell how much such phenomena penetrate the more physiologically encoded elements of trauma.     

Reply to Reviews by Slavin,Stein, and Stern

Major points of three reviews—by Malcolm Owen Slavin, Ruth Stein, and Donnel Stern—are highlighted and further elaborated, particularly the broad existential foundations of dialectical constructivism, the importance of dialectical thinking, and the centrality of the struggle with epistemological and moral uncertainty in this perspective. Several counterpoints are formulated—for example, the seemingly paradoxical commitment to a definitive theory of the process, the place of objective facts and universal principles in experience that is fundamentally ambiguous, and the pragmatic necessity for commitment to particular understandings and courses of action in the light of the passage of time and of mortality. Some clinical examples are presented to illustrate the dialectic of ritual and spontaneity as reflected in the tailoring of the frame to suit particular analytic relationships. Precursors of dialectical constructivism in the author's early work are identified.     

Further clarification on the Hom, Mitchell, Lee, and Griffeth (2012) model: Reply to Bergman, Payne, and Boswell (2012) and Maertz (2012)

In this article, we reply to Bergman, Payne, and Boswell (2012) and Maertz (2012), who commented on our reconceptualization of the employee turnover criterion and proximal withdrawal states (Hom, Mitchell, Lee, & Griffeth, 2012). We agree with some points (e.g., anticipated destinations) but take issue with others (e.g., turnover intentions as the criterion). Nonetheless, our aim is to clarify our integrative formulation about mindsets for organizational participation and withdrawal. In our view, the current process of "article-commentaries-reply" advances our collective understanding of staying and leaving, which is of longstanding interest to scholars in industrial and organizational psychology, organizational behavior, and human resource management. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Bayesian eggs and Bayesian omelettes: reply to Stern (2005)

In this response to Stern's (2005) discussion of Klugkist, Laudy, and Hoijtink (2005), model inference based on posterior probabilities on the parameter space is discussed. Furthermore, the authors respond to Stern's example in which all possible orderings are included via a short discussion of exploratory versus theory-based modeling. Finally, the authors show that the Bayesian approach is flexible and can deal with many types of constraints. This is illustrated using a model with constraints on the differences between means.     

Clinical Reflection and Ritual as Forms of Participation and Interaction: Reply to Bass and Stern

We agree with the commentaries that Relational psychoanalysis has stood firmly against dichotomizing clinical reflection, on one hand, and interactional processes, on the other. Still, we wonder whether the relational literature has skewed toward interaction at the expense of concentrated attention to patients’ internal worlds. Predispositions toward interaction may diminish reflective space and quiet inwardness, which are themselves forms of analytic relating. We raise the possibility that the Relational model’s inclusive breadth, valuable as it is, might sometimes impede and even devalue discussions of specific technical matters. We consider clinical conceptualizations of ritual, “relating,” and “being in contact.”     

Reply to Furedy (1991)

Furedy (1991) suggests that Goddard's (1991) US-US associative theory of habituation cites supporting studies that may not involve emotionally arousing stimuli or may not be associative in nature. The difficulty in characterizing a stimulus as emotionally arousing and the issues involved in what constitutes a US-US association are discussed. It is hoped that the Goddard-Furedy interchange might stimulate further empirical research on this issue and some constructive suggestions are offered.     

Correction to gonzalez (2012)

Reports an error in "Association of solitary binge drinking and suicidal behavior among emerging adult college students" by Vivian M. Gonzalez (Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, Advanced Online Publication, Jan 30, 2012, np). In the article, there is an error in the introductory paragraph. The number of students who had seriously considered attempting suicide in the Barrios, Everett, Simon, & Brener (2000) study should have been reported as 11.4%, not 1.4%. Additionally, in the Participants section, data for the study were collected from March 2009 to September 2010, not March 2009 to January 2010 as reported. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2012-02608-001.) Emerging adult college students who binge drink in solitary contexts (i.e., while alone) experience greater depression and suicidal ideation than do students who only binge drink in social contexts, suggesting that they may be at greater risk for suicidal behavior. This study examined the association of a previous suicide attempt, one of the best predictors of future suicide attempts and suicide, and severity of recent suicidal ideation with drinking in solitary and social contexts. Participants were binge drinking, emerging adult (18- to 25-year-old) college students (N = 182) drawn from two studies of college drinkers. A logistic regression analysis revealed that both suicide attempt history and severity of suicidal ideation were significantly associated with a greater likelihood of being a solitary binge drinker as opposed to only a social binge drinker. Students with a previous suicide attempt were nearly four times more likely to be solitary binge drinkers. Multiple regression analyses revealed that suicide attempt history was significantly associated with greater frequency and quantity of drinking in solitary, but not social contexts. Suicidal ideation was significantly associated with drinks per solitary drinking day, but not frequency of solitary drinking once suicide attempt history was accounted for. Given the associations found between solitary binge drinking and a history of suicide attempts, as well as greater severity of recent suicidal ideation, it appears that these students are in need of suicide prevention efforts, including treatment efforts aimed at reducing binge drinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Rejoinder to MacCallum, Edwards, and Cai (2012) and Rindskopf (2012): Mastering a new method

This rejoinder discusses the general comments on how to use Bayesian structural equation modeling (BSEM) wisely and how to get more people better trained in using Bayesian methods. Responses to specific comments cover how to handle sign switching, nonconvergence and nonidentification, and prior choices in latent variable models. Two new applications are included. The first one revisits the Kaplan (2009) science model by considering priors on primary parameters. The second one applies BSEM to the bifactor model that was hypothesized in the original Holzinger and Swineford (1939) study. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Gender differences in presentation and conceptualization of adolescent self-injurious behaviour: Implications for therapeutic practice

The UK is reported to have the highest rate of self-injurious behaviour (SIB) in Europe. It is no longer underrepresented in adolescent male populations, and further appears to correlate significantly with the increase in young male completed suicides. Early research suggested mental health professionals view males as being psychologically healthier than females. Gender differences in behavioural presentation and conceptual understanding of SIB may account for such disparity. The fields of counselling psychology and psychotherapy are in the advantageous position of embracing broader perspectives in which to challenge methodological and conceptual biases within existing medical frameworks. Differential gender biases in the nosology of comorbid conditions, psychodiagnosis, and treatment decisions are identified. Mental health workers across disciplines continue to find the management of SIB a challenge despite the wealth of theoretical models available to inform practice. Some techniques and promising therapies (dialectical behaviour therapy and problem-solving therapy) are highlighted as practicable approaches for counselling psychologists. Conclusions reveal future research may benefit from incorporating broader definitions of SIB expressed across the sexes. Further investigation into treatment efficacy with particular emphasis on the impact of gender role socialization is also indicated.     

Explanation versus accommodation: Reply to Bowers (2010)

Bowers (2010) presented a critique of the account of masked priming presented by Norris and Kinoshita (2008) based on the Bayesian Reader model of visual word recognition (Norris, 2006). In this reply, we point out that: (1) Bowers' criticisms are based on his misunderstanding of both the Bayesian or ideal-observer approach, and the theoretical claims made in Norris and Kinoshita, and (2) Bowers' alternative account of the key data presented in Norris and Kinoshita relies on a series of ad hoc assumptions that are combined in different proportions to postdict any pattern of data.     

Questions of criteria: Reply to Peterzell (1997)

In a reply to our report on hemispheric differences in processing band-pass filtered letters (Christman, Kitterle, & Niebauer, 1997), Peterzell (1997) argues that our results are not attributable to hemispheric asymmetries in spatial frequency processing. Rather, Peterzell argues that factors such as response criteria and stimulus visibility can account for our results. We argue that our results are attributable (at least in part) to hemispheric asymmetries in spatial frequency processing, while at the same time we acknowledge the potential influence of other factors in the determination of hemispheric differences.     

The relationship between mean square differences and standard error of measurement: comment on Barchard (2012)

In the discussion of mean square difference (MSD) and standard error of measurement (SEM), Barchard (2012) concluded that the MSD between 2 sets of test scores is greater than 2(SEM)2 and SEM underestimates the score difference between 2 tests when the 2 tests are not parallel. This conclusion has limitations for 2 reasons. First, strictly speaking, MSD should not be compared to SEM because they measure different things, have different assumptions, and capture different sources of errors. Second, the related proof and conclusions in Barchard hold only under the assumptions of equal reliabilities, homogeneous variances, and independent measurement errors. To address the limitations, we propose that MSD should be compared to the standard error of measurement of difference scores (SEMx-y) so that the comparison can be extended to the conditions when 2 tests have unequal reliabilities and score variances.     

Facing up to the issues: Reply to Hellige (1983)

In a recent article in this journal, Hellige (Brain and Cognition, 2, 199-203, 1983) presented a critique of the chimeric-face technique that was used by us to validate a hand preference questionnaire. Data were presented by Hellige to show that the left visual field (LVF) bias that occurs on this task is due primarily to differences in detail in the features of the two faces and not because of right hemisphere dominance for face perception. In our rebuttal, we acknowledge that the two faces are not mirror-image duplicates of each other, but contend that this fact does not explain why differences between left-handers and right-handers have been observed on this task. Further data on the role of handedness as well as other variables impacting on this task are presented. A possible explanation is also offered for the rather small extent of LVF bias that Hellige obtained when he used corrected (i.e., true mirror-image) versions of Jaynes' chimeric faces.     

Understanding developmental reversals in false memory: Reply to Ghetti (2008) and Howe (2008)

Replies to comments on the current authors' original article. S. Ghetti (2008) and M. L. Howe (2008) presented probative ideas for future research that will deepen scientific understanding of developmental reversals on false memory and establish boundary conditions for these counterintuitive patterns. Ghetti extended the purview of current theoretical principles by formulating hypotheses about how developmental reversals are controlled by the growth of phantom recollection and by the growth of false-memory editing. Some data are available on her hypotheses about phantom recollection, which distinguish phenomenology (vague or vivid) from memory representation (verbatim or gist). Howe introduced alternative theoretical principles that can be traced to the early work of Deese and Underwood. He argued that fuzzy-trace theory is subject to 3 limitations and that his alternative conception makes 3 predictions that contrast with fuzzy-trace theory's predictions. In the current reply, it is shown that the stated limitations do not apply to fuzzy-trace theory, that previously published research runs counter to the 3 predictions, and that the core difference between the 2 approaches is that fuzzy-trace theory is an opponent-processes model whereas the alternative conception is a 1-process model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).