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1.
In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge
them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will
call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue
our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we will inevitably
find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory)
or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations
that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals
or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient.
I should like to thank David Frost for brushing up my English and the Austrian Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF) for the financial support. 相似文献
2.
Joseph LaPorte 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):321-336
Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s
interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect
to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual
properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of
designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the
work of grounding a posteriori necessity.
I thank Steve Schwartz and Bernard Linsky for helpful feedback on this
paper 相似文献
3.
Lee McIntyre 《Synthese》2007,155(3):337-343
In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in
the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm
case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological
emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts. 相似文献
4.
Robert Eamon Briscoe 《Synthese》2006,152(1):95-128
Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims
about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning
of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first
claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally
constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to
disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism
(in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted
“indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about
idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s
idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”
相似文献Wittgenstein (1958, 14).
5.
Stéphanie Ruphy 《Synthese》2006,151(3):325-330
Ontology is taken by Moulines as supervenient on science: what kinds of things there are is determined by our well-confirmed theories. But the fact is that today, science provides us with a multiplicity of well-confirmed theories, each having its own ontological commitments. The modest, ontological form of reduction advocated by Moulines (this volume) restores hope of putting some ontological order in the “huge chaotic supermarket of science”. In this paper I show that any claim on the amount of order obtained by reduction does not only always remain “temporally qualified” but, worse for the reductionist with a taste for ontological order, that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers. 相似文献
6.
Dan Mcarthur 《Synthese》2006,151(2):233-255
In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the
laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that
fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply
in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental
physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing
a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account
of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable.
I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such
as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the
EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether
abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses. 相似文献
7.
8.
Tomasz Szkudlarek 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):113-125
In this text I concentrate on semiotic aspects of the theory of political identity in the work of Ernesto Laclau, and especially
on the connection between metaphors, metonymies, catachreses and synecdoches. Those tropes are of ontological status, and
therefore they are of key importance in understanding the discursive “production” of identity in political and educational
practices. I use the conceptions of both Laclau and Eco to elucidate the operation of this structure, and illustrate it with
an example of the emergence of the “Solidarność” movement in Poland, expanding its analysis provided by Laclau. I focus on
the moment when one of particular demands assumes the representation of totality, which, in Laclau, is left to “circumstantial”
determination. This moment inspires several questions and needs to be given special attention if Laclau’s theory is to be
used in theory of education. It is so because theory of education cannot remain on the level of the ontological (which is
the core of Laclau’s achievement), but has to theorize “non-ontological” dimensions as well, that is the ontic (i.e. “content”
of education), the deontic (duty, obligation, and the normative in general), as well as what I call the deontological—the very relation between “what there is” and “what there is not” (including that which should be) as the locus of education. 相似文献
9.
Phenomenology's systematic exploration of how a world comes into existence for knowers – knowers who are often conceptualized as individual and ostensibly isolated – requires that it provide some account of the constitution of alterity. In this paper, I address this issue by arguing that we apperceive alterity in terms of the intentionality of behavior. A corollary of this argument is that the apperception of an alter as specifically human is a secondary attribution, following the primary apperception of intention. I further argue that the intentionality of behavior is understood through the projection of a narrative frame, or a “protonarrative,” onto the alter's behavior. I suggest that protonarrativity is the form that experience takes as its ontological condition. Our living is not simply known to us reflectively as protonarrative; rather, experience is lived as protonarrative.This essay is based on a paper presented at the annual conference of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, Memphis, Tennessee, October 28–30, 2004. 相似文献
10.
Patricia Hanna 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):343-355
In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue,
pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes
an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account
succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving
the “delivery problem”. 相似文献
11.
12.
Billy Dunaway 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(3):351-371
James Dreier (Philos Perspect 18:23–44, 2004) states what he calls the “Problem of Creeping Minimalism”: that metaethical
Expressivists can accept a series of claims about meaning, under which all of the sentences that Realists can accept are consistent
with Expressivism. This would allow Expressivists to accept all of the Realist’s sentences, and as Dreier points out, make
it difficult to say what the difference between the two views is. That Expressivists can accept these claims about meaning
has been suggested by Simon Blackburn on behalf of his “quasi-realist”. I argue against the assumption that there is a way
to interpret the Realist’s sentences in a way that renders them consistent with Expressivism. 相似文献
13.
Understanding the Subjective Point of View: Methodological Implications of the Schutz-Parsons Debate
The bone of contention that divides Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons in their 1940–1941 debate is that Schutz acknowledges
an ontological break between the commonsense and scientific worlds whereas Parsons only considers it “a matter of refinement.”
Schutz’s ontological distancing that disconnects the “world of consociates” where social reality is directly experienced in
face-to-face contacts, and the “world of contemporaries” where the Other is experienced in terms of “types” has been crucial
to social scientists. Implicated in the break is that all intellectual attempts to understand experiences of Others must be
based on the “models” constructed in the “world of contemporaries” (or “predecessors”); hence, epistemologically, to grasp
the subjective point of view with a here-and-now understanding is an outright impossibility. Based on a Schutzian perspective,
the author suggests that the sociologist must objectivize the Thou-orientations involved in his/her analysis in order that
s/he can possibility grasp the subjective point of view in objective terms.
相似文献
Wing-Chung HoEmail: |
14.
Ahmad Ahmadi 《Topoi》2007,26(2):213-219
Regarding the exhaustive discussions of the fundamentality of existence versus the fundamentality of quiddity, it is a necessary
preliminary to examine and analyze the first documented statement of the fundamentality of existence. Following this, we must
inquire how the concept is obtained on the basis of which such a judgment could be formed. Then we must illuminate the meaning
of propositions that state only that an object is or exists (ontological propositions). Finally, by explaining the meaning
of the words “quiddity” and “existence” and comparing them, indications are found of confusion between epistemological and
ontological issues.
相似文献
Ahmad AhmadiEmail: |
15.
Peter Mittelstaedt 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(1):45-53
In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty
Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation
and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first
sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is
based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals.
We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure
of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt,
Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still
an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished
from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time
and matter. 相似文献
16.
张世英 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(1):143-155
Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality”
and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy,
“essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition
and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep
meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can
be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly
lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance
of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality
to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is
the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual
peculiarity and otherness.
Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (11): 23–29 相似文献
17.
Frances Howard-Snyder 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):233-246
I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima
facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have
argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought
to do some alternative action – such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary
enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent
cannot fulfill both. 相似文献
18.
Both thinkings on Dao in Chinese philosophy and metaphysics in Western philosophy investigate things on a spiritual level
that transcends experience, but there are incommensurable differences between them. The objective of “metaphysics” is ontological
knowledge about nature from the perspective of epistemological “truth-pursuing”. Western metaphysics is thus a “metaphysics
of nature”. Dao in Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, more often manifests itself in “good-pursuing” by means of the internal,
experiential pursuit of moral stature and spiritual security. Philosophy of Dao is thus a “metaphysics of ethics”. The cause
of this difference can be traced back to the differences between the rational tradition of the West, characterized by the
dualism of the subject and the object, and the moral tradition of China, characterized by the integration of man and nature.
__________
Translated by Zhang Lin from Lunlixue yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethics), 2007, (4): 62–65 相似文献
19.
Charles B. Cross 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(2):101-120
In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, (2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world
similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, (2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative
world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. In this paper
I show that taking comparative world similarity to be antecedent-relative results in a formal semantics which is a comparative
world similarity semantics in name only. 相似文献
20.
How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jurgen Naets 《Topoi》2010,29(1):77-86
This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and
philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a
close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist
approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number
is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries.
Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical
ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.” 相似文献