共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
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David LigginsEmail: |
2.
Jussi Haukioja 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):145-151
A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional
analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends
crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker
have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism,
thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy.
This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter’s objections.
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Jussi HaukiojaEmail: |
3.
Scott Hill 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):277-283
Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with
all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents
a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical
and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about
(ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion
of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.
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Scott HillEmail: |
4.
Jens Johansson 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):87-89
Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble.
I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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Jens JohanssonEmail: |
5.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):273-295
6.
Richard Woodward 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):273-288
Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other
than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of
a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen
objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions
that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism
is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing
her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic
contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and
argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.
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Richard WoodwardEmail: |
7.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
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Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
8.
Simon J. Evnine 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):91-110
This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what
one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the
coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The
first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over
time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future
selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and
projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs.
Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection
is both rational and necessary for persons.
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Simon J. EvnineEmail: |
9.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
相似文献
Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
10.
In this paper we analyze the uses and misuses of argumentation schemes from verbal classification, and show how argument from
definition supports argumentation based on argument from verbal classification. The inquiry has inevitably included the broader
study of the concept of definition. The paper presents the schemes for argument from classification and for argument from
definition, and shows how the latter type of argument so typically supports the former. The problem of analyzing arguments
based on classification is framed in a structure that reveals the crucial role it plays in the persuasion process. The survey
of the literature includes the work of Hastings, Perelman, Kienpointner and Schiappa, but still finds much of value in Aristotle.
Lessons drawn from Aristotle’s Topics are shown to be useful for developing new tools for assessing definitions and arguments
from definition.
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Fabrizio MacagnoEmail: |
11.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
12.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
13.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):345-352
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth.
The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition
expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.”
In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition
is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
相似文献
Jay NewhardEmail: |
14.
Mikkel Gerken 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):87-96
There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or
anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However,
Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge
and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility
is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are
promising responses available to the compatibilists.
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Mikkel GerkenEmail: |
15.
Jonathan M. Weinberg 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):455-464
Timothy Williamson devotes significant effort in his The Philosophy of Philosophy to arguing against skepticism about judgment. One might think that the recent “experimental philosophy” challenge to the
philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence is a possible target of those arguments. However, this is not
so. The structure of that challenge is radically dissimilar from that of traditional skeptical arguments, and the aims of
the challenge are entirely congruent with the spirit of methodological improvement that Williamson himself exemplifies in
the Afterword of his book.
相似文献
Jonathan M. WeinbergEmail: |
16.
James D. Marshall 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(2):97-109
In this paper I wish to comment upon the use of polemical argument in philosophy of education and education. Like Foucault,
I believe that a whole morality is at stake because polemical argument obfuscates the search for truth at the expense of truth
and the other’s veracity, integrity and dignity. The use of polemics is illustrated by two arguments. The first general argument
is taken from an attack upon Albert Camus by the British writer Colin Wilson. The second more particular example is taken
from attacks in New Zealand by the State Department of Education upon the educational ideas of the novelist and educator Sylvia
Ashton-Warner. Finally I discuss how polemics might be countered in education.
相似文献
James D. MarshallEmail: |
17.
Tuomas E. Tahko 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):335-340
In this paper I offer a counterexample to the so called vagueness argument against restricted composition. This will be done
in the lines of a recent suggestion by Trenton Merricks, namely by challenging the claim that there cannot be a sharp cut-off
point in a composition sequence. It will be suggested that causal powers which emerge when composition occurs can serve as
an indicator of such sharp cut-off points. The main example will be the case of a heap. It seems that heaps might provide
a very plausible counterexample to the vagueness argument if we accept the idea that four grains of sand is the least number
required to compose a heap—the case has been supported by W. D. Hart. My purpose here is not to put forward a new theory of
composition, I only wish to refute the vagueness argument and point out that we should be wary of arguments of its form.
相似文献
Tuomas E. TahkoEmail: |
18.
Dan Arnold 《Argumentation》2008,22(1):135-147
This paper examines some Indian philosophical arguments that are understandable as transcendental arguments—i.e., arguments
whose conclusions cannot be denied without self-contradiction, insofar as the truth of the claim in question is a condition
of the possibility even of any such denial. This raises the question of what kind of self-contradiction is involved—e.g.,
pragmatic self-contradiction, or the kind that goes with logical necessity. It is suggested that these arguments involve something like practical reason—indeed, that they just are arguments against the primacy of “theoretical reason.” This characterization illuminates a characteristically
Indic appeal to ordinary language.
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Dan ArnoldEmail: |
19.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
20.
Joseph Shieber 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):169-181
In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss
the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion
KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion,
from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the
AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in
fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I
claim that the argument therefore fails.
相似文献
Joseph ShieberEmail: |