On the relation between justification of solution method and correctness of solution in statistical problem solving

The relation between the justification of a choice of solution method and the correctness of that choice in statistical problem solving was investigated. In the first of two studies 16 subjects were asked to think aloud while solving two statistical problems. The results showed that an incorrect choice of solution method was more common when subjects did not justify their choice of solution as compared to when they justified their choice with domain-specific knowledge. Study 2 employed an experimental design. A group of 20 subjects were instructed to provide a justification for each choice of solution method, while another group of 20 subjects received no such instructions. The results showed no difference between the groups with respect to number of correct choices of solution method. A qualitative analysis of the justifications in the instructed group showed that the justifications for incorrect solution methods were more often incorrect than subjects' justifications for correct solution methods. The results in Study 2 suggested that the association found between incorrect choice of solution method and lack of justification in Study 1 was not in the first place due to a strategical deficiency on the part of the subjects but due to a lack of domain-specific knowledge.     

Error detection processes in statistical problem solving

Problem solvers' error detection processes were studied by instructing 16 subjects to think aloud when solving two statistical problems. The evaluative episodes occurring in subjects' protocols were analyzed into Affirmative evaluation, Direct error-hypotheses, Error suspicion, and Standard check episodes, the last three of which are assumed to cover all main types of error detection processes. Most errors (78%) were found to have contributed to a solution part that triggered some evaluative episode. However, only one-third of the undetected errors had contributed to such a solution part. The Standard check episodes, seen as centrally-invoked, only led to the detection of few errors in proportion to the number of times they were performed. Evidence was found for two types of spontaneous error detections, one occurring abruptly and the other as a result of a more elaborated error detection process, initiated by the solver perceiving the solution as dissatisfying or strange. The perception of a symptom was a fairly reliable source of information about errors. However, subjects often did not manage to detect the error after having noticed a symptom. The closer a relevant Error suspicion episode followed an error, the greater was the probability of detecting the error. Good problem solvers detected a higher proportion of their errors compared to poor problem solvers, probably due to differences in the processes leading up to the triggering of an evaluative episode rather than to differences after the episode had been triggered.     

Flexible strategy use: A characteristic of gifted problem solving

The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between flexible strategic thinking and problem solving performance. In the first experiment, gifted, average, and poor problem solvers performed a number of tasks which were designed to provoke rigidity. The results indicated that the average and poor performance groups did not differ in the number of answers indicating response and perceptual set. On the other hand, creative and intelligent students showed fewer rigid answers than the other two groups. In the second experiment, gifted and average students were asked to think aloud while solving different problems with open and closed solution situations. The thinking aloud protocols were analyzed by classifying the statements into different strategy types. Gifted students used a variety of strategies when solving problems, as well as different strategies for different problem types. No such differences were observed with the average problem solvers. The results of both experiments demonstrated consistent evidence for the role of flexible strategic thinking in gifted problem solving, as well as less direct evidence of the importance of metacognitive knowledge.     

Mood and realism of confidence judgements of one''s own answers to general knowledge questions

This study examines the effect of a depressed mood on the realism of subjects' confidence judgements of the correctness of answers to general knowledge questions. Research conducted on how mood influences cognitive processes gives reason to expect that a depressed mood might increase the realism of individuals' confidence ratings. Sixty subjects were divided into three conditions, two of which were given mood induction, one condition into an elated-happy mood and one condition into a depressed-sad mood. As evidenced by subjects' responses to mood scales only the depressed condition was affected by the mood induction. All subjects answered 93 general knowledge questions and rated their confidence in the correctness of the answer given. Subjects were instructed to think aloud when answering the last 31 questions. The conditions did not differ with respect to the proportion of questions answered correctly, mean level of confidence, nor with respect to three measures of the realism in subjects' confidence ratings (calibration, over/underconfidence and resolution). The results were the same when questions answered with and without think aloud instructions were analysed separately.     

The suppression of exciting thoughts

We examined how the suppression of an exciting thought influences sympathetic arousal as indexed by skin conductance level (SCL). Subjects were asked to think aloud as they followed instructions to think about or not to think about various topics. Experiment 1 showed that trying not to think about sex, like thinking about sex, elevates SCL in comparison to thinking about or not thinking about less exciting topics (e.g., dancing). Experiment 2 revealed that the suppression of the thought of sex yielded SCL elevation whether or not subjects believed their think-aloud reports would be private or public, and it also revealed that the effect dissipated over the course of a few minutes. Experiment 3 found such dissipation again but showed that subsequent intrusions of the suppressed exciting thought are associated with further elevations in SCL over 30 min. Because such an association was not found when subjects were trying to think about the exciting thought, it was suggested that the suppression of exciting thoughts might be involved in the production of chronic emotional responses such as phobias and obsessive preoccupations.     

Mode of presentation and instructions in solutions to practical construction problems

This study examined the effects of mode of presentation and instructions on the solution of five classical practical construction problems by 96 undergraduate men and 96 women. Visual presentation of practical materials was superior to verbal presentation in the solution of practical construction problems. When subjects were instructed to use either imaginative or memory-imagery strategies in solving problems, imaginative imagery produced more solutions. The overall conclusion was that visual presentation of materials and instructions to use imagination favoured development of solutions while the verbal presentation of materials and memory-imagery instructions impeded solution.     

Accommodating Surprise in Taxonomic Tasks: The Role of Expertise

This paper reports a psychological study of human categorization that looked at the procedures used by expert scientists when dealing with puzzling items. Five professional botanists were asked to specify a category from a set of positive and negative instances. The target category in the study was defined by a feature that was unusual, hence situations of uncertainty and puzzlement were generated. Subjects were asked to think aloud while solving the tasks, and their verbal reports were analyzed. A number of problem solving strategies were identified, and subsequently integrated in a model of knowledge‐guided inductive categorization. Our model proposes that expert knowledge influences the subjects' reasoning in more complex ways than suggested by earlier investigations of scientific reasoning. As in previous studies, domain knowledge influenced our subjects' hypothesis generation and testing; but, additionally, it played a central role when subjects revised their hypotheses.     

Following the wrong footsteps: fixation effects of pictorial examples in a design problem-solving task

Two experiments examined possible negative transfer in nonexperts from the use of pictorial examples in a laboratory design problem-solving situation. In Experiment 1, 89 participants were instructed to "think aloud" and were assigned to 1 of 3 conditions: (a) control (standard instructions), (b) fixation (inclusion of a problematic example, describing its problematic elements), or (c) defixation (inclusion of a problematic example, with instructions to avoid using problematic elements). Negative transfer due to examples was measured both quantitatively and qualitatively through verbal protocols. Verbal protocols (N = 176) were analyzed for participants' reasons for reference to the examples. In Experiment 2, fixation to examples was evaluated in nonverbalizing participants (N = 60). Results of both experiments suggest that (a) although participants consulted the problem instructions, they tended to follow the examples even when they included inappropriate elements and (b) the fixation effects can be diminished with the use of defixating instructions.     

Insight versus analysis: Evidence for diverse methods in problem solving

Since the Gestalt psychologists made the distinction approximately 100 years ago, psychologists have differentiated between solving problems through analysis versus insight. The present paper presents evidence to support the idea that, rather than conceptualising insight versus analysis as distinct modes of solving problems, it is more useful to conceive of insight and analysis as two approaches within a set of possible solving methods. In the present research, 60 participants solved insight problems while thinking aloud, which provided evidence concerning the processes underlying problem solution. Comparison with performance of a nonverbalisation control group (n = 35) indicated no negative effects of thinking aloud on insight in problem solving. The results supported the idea that various methods are utilised in solving insight problems. The “classic” impasse–restructuring–insight sequence occurred in only a small minority of solutions. A number of other solution methods were found, ranging from relatively direct applications of knowledge, to various heuristic methods, to restructuring arising from new information gleaned from a failed solution. It is concluded that there is not a sharp distinction between solving a problem through analysis versus insight, and implications of that conclusion are discussed.     

样例的编码方式对问题解决迁移的影响及心理机制

以概率原理为材料,通过两个实验考察了样例的编码方式对问题解决迁移的影响及其心理机制。实验1探讨了样例的变异性与不同的自我解释模式结合对被试解决不同程度迁移问题的影响;实验2运用大声思维技术,进一步探讨不同样例的变异性和不同自我解释模式编码样例的条件下学习者的学习活动和问题解决的特点。结果表明:样例的变异性和诱发自我解释模式结合能有效地促进原理图式的获得和迁移;自我解释对理解原理和获得原理的概化图式有着重要作用。不同的学习者自我解释的特征并不一致,存在着个体差异。     

Individual differences in thinking-aloud performance

A key method in current research on thinking is to have subjects think aloud as they work on some task. Considerable individual differences usually emerge in the quantity and quality of thinking-aloud records. This article reports an experimental sudy of such individual differences. Subjects took Cattell’s 16-PF personality test, a self-relevation scale, and a test of verbal fluency. The 35 subjects then attempted three 8-puzzle tasks under thinking-aloud instructions. The resulting thinking-aloud records (protocols) were scored in terms of length, number of words per puzzle move, number of goal references, and number of goal references per move. The different protocol measures intercorrelated highly in each problem. Furthermore, each of the protocol measures correlated over different puzzles; that is, someone who produced a long protocol on one problem tended to produce a long protocol on other problems. However, none of the protocol measures correlated with any of the personality scores or with the verbal fluency measure. It is concluded that there is consistency within individuals in protocol quantity and completeness, and that this tendency merits further investigation.     

The influence of articulation,self‐monitoring ability,and sensitivity to others on creativity

Although it is often recommended to think aloud to solve problems and to become more creative, cognitive and social psychological research suggests thinking aloud may actually produce less creative ideas than thinking in silence. The results of two experiments indeed showed that thinking aloud hinders creativity—although people produced the same amount of new uses for an object, these were judged to be less original in the thinking aloud condition. Experiment 2 further showed that this effect was particularly pronounced for individuals with high sensitivity to what other's think of them and low ability to adapt to these expectations. From this, we conclude that the felt presence of an actual or implied audience when thinking aloud, reduces creative idea generation especially among those having difficulty adapting to others. Implications for creativity research, and for promoting creativity in applied settings such as organizational teams are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Immediate reproduction of temporal information under four cognitive strategies

The main purpose was to determine the retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under a retention interval of immediate reproduction and various cognitive strategies for time estimation. Four levels of cognitive strategy were used, viz., conscious, mental counting, counting aloud without auditory cues, and counting aloud with auditory cues. The latter three cognitive strategies were experimenter-defined, time-aiding techniques. Subjects were instructed to refrain from employing time-aiding techniques under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation. Visual durations of 1, 2, and 4 sec. were estimated by 12 subjects under the method of reproduction. Two measures of performance were computed, viz., variable and constant errors. The general conclusions were: (a) the effectiveness of mental counting, counting aloud without auditory cues, and counting aloud with auditory cues as cognitive strategies over conscious cognitive strategy in terms of variability depends on the duration used, and (b) in terms of accuracy and variability an increase in the number of cues under time-aiding techniques does not necessarily produce better performance.     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Response selection strategies and realism of confidence judgments

Two studies were conducted to examine how response selection strategy is related to confidence ratings and to performance on general knowledge questions. In both studies subjects were asked to answer 80 general knowledge questions and to rate their confidence in the correctness of the answer selected. A pilot study, in which subjects thought aloud while answering general knowledge questions, was carried out to identify different response selection strategies. In the first study, 40 subjects were asked to indicate which of four strategies (immediate recognition, inference, intuition, or guessing) they used for selecting an answer. In Study 2, think aloud reports from 20 subjects were coded into the same four strategies. The distribution of strategies differed between the studies, but there were very similar relations among strategy, confidence, and correctness of answer in the two studies. Response selection strategy was related to correctness of answer when confidence was partialed out. More specifically, immediate recognition was associated with higher proportion correct than with the other strategies. It was also found that ratings of how difficult the knowledge questions were to fellow students of the subjects were on a much more realistic level than the confidence ratings were. It is concluded that people could improve their confidence judgments by taking into account (a) how difficult a question is to other people, and (b) the response selection strategy used for answering the question.     

The psychology of knights and knaves

Knight-knave brain teasers are about a realm in which some people, knights, tell only truths, whereas all others, knaves, tell only lies. For example, suppose person A says, "I am a knight and B is a knight," and person B says, "A is a knave." Is A a knight or a knave? Is B a knight or a knave? In a pilot study, we asked subjects to think aloud while solving problems like these. Their statements suggested that they were making assumptions about the knight/knave status of the characters and drawing deductive inferences from these assumptions to test their consistency. This encouraged us to model the process by means of a simulation based on an earlier natural-deduction theory of reasoning. The model contains a set of deduction rules in the form of productions and a working memory that holds a proof of the correct answer. The greater the number of steps (assumptions and inferences) in the proof, the greater the predicted difficulty of the puzzle. The experiments reported here confirmed this prediction by showing that subjects were more likely to make mistakes (Experiment 1) and take longer to solve (Experiment 2) puzzles associated with a larger number of proof steps.     

Web usability evaluation with screen reader users: implementation of the partial concurrent thinking aloud technique

A verbal protocol technique, adopted for a web usability evaluation, requires that the users are able to perform a double task: surfing and talking. Nevertheless, when blind users surf by using a screen reader and talk about the way they interact with the computer, the evaluation is influenced by a structural interference: users are forced to think aloud and listen to the screen reader at the same time. The aim of this study is to build up a verbal protocol technique for samples of visual impaired users in order to overcome the limits of concurrent and retrospective protocols. The technique we improved, called partial concurrent thinking aloud (PCTA), integrates a modified set of concurrent verbalization and retrospective analysis. One group of 6 blind users and another group of 6 sighted users evaluated the usability of a website using PCTA. By estimating the number of necessary users by the means of an asymptotic test, it was found out that the two groups had an equivalent ability of identifying usability problems, both over 80%. The result suggests that PCTA, while respecting the properties of classic verbal protocols, also allows to overcome the structural interference and the limits of concurrent and retrospective protocols when used with screen reader users. In this way, PCTA reduces the efficiency difference of usability evaluation between blind and sighted users.     

False memories of having said the unsaid: some new demonstrations

In a series of four studies, subjects who were naive as to the true purpose of the research were asked if they had said aloud things that, at most, they had only intended to say. Often, subjects reported (incorrectly) that they had said them. Specifically, the procedures involved: showing a series of phrases, each being followed by a command to say it aloud or not (Study 1); asking a series of questions, each being followed by a request to answer it aloud or not (Study 2); asking a series of questions in a public polling situation and interrupting the subject before one of the questions was answered (Study 3); and having each subject participate in a debate, during the course of which the participant was induced to plan to use a particular point, but was prevented from doing so (Study 4). Subjects were confident of such erroneous reports; they had a lower tendency to make such errors for material that had not actually been presented, and such errors depended upon certain details of the manner in which such ‘source-monitoring’ searches were initiated. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidence for an abstract lexical representation of word structure

Subjects were required to judge whether a particular visually presented word was a homophone or not. When instructed not to read the word aloud, subjects had difficulty with words whose orthography suggested a morphological structure different from that suggested by their homophones, for example, FINED (homophonic with FIND). There were no major problems encountered when the two members of the homophonic pair had the same morphological structure, for example, KNEAD. When subjects were instructed to read the word aloud before making a decision, however, their performance on the morphologically different items improved markedly. This result suggests, first, that inflected words are represented in the lexicon as stem plus affix and, second, that silent reading involves a more abstract phonological representation than the actual phonetic representation produced by reading aloud.     

Observation can be as effective as action in problem solving

This study discusses findings that replicate and extend the original work of Burns and Vollmeyer (2002) , which showed that performance in problem-solving tasks was more accurate when people were engaged in a non-specific goal than in a specific goal. The main innovation here was to examine the goal specificity effect under both observation-based and conventional action-based learning conditions. The findings show that goal specificity affects the accuracy of problem solving in the same way when the learning stage of the task is observation-based as when it is action-based. In addition, the findings show that, when instructions do not promote goal specificity, observation-based problem solving is as effective as action-based problem solving.