THE VALUE OF EXTERNAL DIRECTION AND INDIVIDUAL DISCOVERY IN LEARNING SITUATIONS: The learning of a fwen alphabet

W erdelin , I. The value of external direction and individual discovery in learning situations. II. The learning of a foreign alphabet. Scand J. Psychol ., 1968, 9, 248–251.—Three samples (A, B, C), selected at random from seven eighth grade classes and matched with respect to scholastic achievement, line of study, and sex, were taught a foreign alphabet differently. A was told the principles of the alphabet and applied it on examples; B was given most examples first, then told the principles, and given additional examples; C was given the examples only. There was a clear tendency that A learned the principles best as measured by the ability to apply them immediately but C was comparatively better on tests which measured retention and transfer.     

Relational learning with and without awareness: Transitive inference using nonverbal stimuli in humans

Learning complex relationships among items and representing them flexibly have been shown to be highly similar in function and structure to conscious forms of learning. However, it is unclear whether conscious learning is essential for the exhibition of flexibility in learning. Successful performance on the transitive inference task requires representational flexibility. Participants learned four overlapping premise pairs (A > B, B > C, C > D, D > E) that could be encoded separately or as a sequential hierarchy (A > B > C > D > E). Some participants (informed) were told prior to training that the task required an inference made from premise pairs. Other participants (uninformed) were told simply that they were to learn a series of pairs by trial and error. Testing consisted of unreinforced trials that included the non-adjacent pair, B versus D, to assess capacity for transitive inference. Not surprisingly, those in the informed condition outperformed those in the uninformed condition. After completion of training and testing, uninformed participants were given a postexperimental questionnaire to assess awareness of the task structure. In contrast with expectations, successful performance on the transitive inference task for uninformed participants does not depend on or correlate with postexperimental awareness. The present results suggest that relational learning tasks do not necessarily require conscious processes.     

小学生代数运算规则的样例学习

采用完整或不完整样例,对180名六年级小学生用样例学习两种代数运算规则进行了实验研究。结果显示：多数被试难以学会“平方差”运算规则,只有少数被试学会了“完全平方和”运算规则;反馈对不完整样例的学习效果有促进作用;用不完整样例学习难度不同的规则,其效果不同;在无反馈条件下,完整样例的学习效果都好于不完整样例;在有反馈的情况下,只有删除一步运算步骤样例的学习效果比完整样例的学习效果好     

Learning strategy differentially impacts memory connections in children and adults

Even once children can accurately remember their experiences, they nevertheless struggle to use those memories in flexible new ways—as in when drawing inferences. However, it remains an open question as to whether the developmental differences observed during both memory formation and inference itself represent a fundamental limitation on children's learning mechanisms, or rather their deployment of suboptimal strategy. Here, 7–9-year-old children (N = 154) and young adults (N = 130) first formed strong memories for initial (AB) associations and then engaged in one of three learning strategies as they viewed overlapping (BC) pairs. We found that being told to integrate—combine ABC during learning—both significantly improved children's ability to explicitly relate the indirectly associated A and C items during inference and protected the underlying pair memories from forgetting. However, this finding contrasted with implicit evidence for memory-to-memory connections: Adults and children both formed A-C links prior to any knowledge of an inference test—yet for children, such links were most apparent when they were told to simply encode BC, not integrate. Moreover, the accessibility of such implicit links differed between children and adults, with adults using them to make explicit inferences but children only doing so for well-established direct AB pairs. These results suggest that while a lack of integration strategy may explain a large share of the developmental differences in explicit inference, children and adults nevertheless differ in both the circumstances under which they connect interrelated memories and their ability to later leverage those links to inform flexible behaviours.

Research Highlights

• Children and adults view AB and BC pairs related through a shared item, B. This provides an opportunity for learners to connect A–C in memory.
• Being encouraged to integrate ABC during learning boosted performance on an explicit test of A–C connections (children and adults) and protected from forgetting (children).
• Children and adults differed in when implicit A–C connections were formed—occurring primarily when told to separately encode BC (children) versus integrate (adults), respectively.
• Adults used implicit A–C connections to facilitate explicit judgments, while children did not. Our results suggest developmental differences in the learning conditions promoting memory-to-memory connections.

     

Principle of organization: a dynamic-systems view of the archetype-as-such

The personality is a dynamic system. Like all other dynamic systems, it must be self-organized. In this paper I focus upon the archetype-as-such, that is, upon the essential core around which both an archetypical image and a complex are organized. I argue that an archetype-as-such is a pre-existing principle of organization. Within the personality that principle manifests itself as a psychological vortex (a complex) into which we are drawn. The vortex is impersonal. We mediate it through myths and rituals or through consciousness. In this paper I show that Jung's intuition about the archetype-as-such is supported by recent science. I evaluate other concepts of the archetype. My concept is different from that proposed recently by Saunders and Skar. My concept allows each archetype-as-such to be defined precisely in mathematical terms. It suggests a new interpretation of mythology. It also addresses our spiritual experience of an archetype. Because the archetypes-as-such are fundamental to the personality, the better we understand them the better we understand our patients. The paper is grounded with clinical examples.     

The Disappearing “Advantage of Abstract Examples in Learning Math”

When teaching a novel mathematical concept, should we present learners with abstract or concrete examples? In this experiment, we conduct a critical replication and extension of a well-known study that argued for the general advantage of abstract examples (Kaminski, Sloutsky, & Heckler, 2008a). We demonstrate that theoretically motivated yet minor modifications of the learning design put this argument in question. A key finding from this study is that participants who trained with improved concrete examples performed as well as, or better than, participants who trained with abstract examples. We argue that the previously reported “advantage of abstract examples” manifested not because abstract examples are advantageous in general, but because the concrete condition employed suboptimal examples.     

When deception influences memory: the implication of theory of mind

When deceiving, one should remember to whom a falsified story was previously told; otherwise he or she may include inconsistencies, and the deception will probably be discovered. Bearing this in mind, we investigated the potential relationship between deception and the ability to remember to whom a piece of information was previously told (i.e., destination memory). Forty-one adults were given a destination memory task in which they had to decide to whom proverbs had previously been told. They were also given a questionnaire about deception (e.g., “I sometimes tell lies if I have to) and a cognitive theory of mind task in which they had to predict the behaviour of protagonists who hold a mistaken belief about the state of the world. Results showed a positive correlation between deception and destination memory (p <?.001), a relationship that was further mediated by cognitive theory of mind ability (p?<?.01). Deception requires monitoring and inferring what targets know, suspect, and believe. This monitoring ability (i.e., cognitive theory of mind) results in better processing of the target and consequently better destination memory. By showing the involvement of deception and theory of mind in destination memory, our findings emphasize the memory variations in social and interpersonal interactions.     

Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness

If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods.     

Effects of Variation and Prior Knowledge on Abstract Concept Learning

Learning abstract concepts through concrete examples may promote learning at the cost of inhibiting transfer. The present study investigated one approach to solving this problem: systematically varying superficial features of the examples. Participants learned to solve problems involving a mathematical concept by studying either superficially similar or varied examples. In Experiment 1, less knowledgeable participants learned better from similar examples, while more knowledgeable participants learned better from varied examples. In Experiment 2, prior to learning how to solve the problems, some participants received a pretraining aimed at increasing attention to the structural relations underlying the target concept. These participants, like the more knowledgeable participants in Experiment 1, learned better from varied examples. Thus, the utility of varied examples depends on prior knowledge and, in particular, ability to attend to relevant structure. Increasing this ability can prepare learners to learn more effectively from varied examples.     

Habituation of orienting responses as a function of “instructional set”

Electrodermal and plethysmographic recordings were obtained from three groups of alcoholic patients. The groups differed with respect to instructions given for response to a series of words spoken by the experimenter. Group A was told to report verbally their first associations for each word presented. Group B received instructions to think of an association for each word without reporting it. Group C was to respond to each word by repeating it after it was spoken by the experimenter. The instructions did not have the predicted differing effects upon rate of EDR habituation. However, the over-all amplitude of EDR was lower for Group B than for Group A or C. We observed very little habituation of the plethysmographic OR as measured by per cent of subjects responding to each word. As with the EDR data, Group B shows less responsivity, i.e., this group produced significantly fewer plethysmographic responses over all words than did either of the other two groups. The relative importance of association and of verbal responding to a stimulus word for eliciting autonomic responses was considered.     

Resolution of dilemmas: A mathematical theory

A mathematical formulation for a dilemma (i.e. a situation in which a very difficult choice between two alternatives must be made) is given. Multiple-objective programming is assumed as the model for a single decision maker. It is shown that, in principle, any dilemma is resolvable. Furthermore, there is always more than one way in which to resolve a dilemma. Illustrative examples from non-convex optimization are presented.     

The cognitive representation of persons and groups and its effect on recall and recognition memory

A conceptualization of the manner in which trait and behavioral information is organized in memory is proposed and applied in predicting both the recall and recognition of information about persons and groups. Three information presentation conditions were considered: (1) Subjects are told to form an impression of a target (person or group) on the basis of the target's behaviors, and are given a trait-based concept of what the target is like before learning about these behaviors. (2) Subjects are told to form an impression of the target, but a general traitbased concept of the target is not induced until after they learn about the target's behaviors. (3) Subjects receive information about the target's behaviors with instructions to remember the information, and only subsequently are told to form an impression and are given more general information about the target's traits. The proposed model accounted for between-condition differences in both the recall and recognition of behaviors that were consistent and inconsistent with a general trait-based concept of the target, and for contingencies of these differences on whether the target was a single person or a group.     

Evidence that blocking is due to associative deficit: Blocking history affects the degree of subsequent associative competition

Rats were trained on an appetitive discriminated operant procedure according to a blocking design, in which training with a compound stimulus (A + B) was given with or without prior training with A alone. Stimulus B was then presented in compound with a new stimulus (B + C compound). The ability of Stimulus B to block acquisition of control by Stimulus C was decreased by B having itself been blocked by A during the prior training. The results imply that the mechanism of blocking during the initial blocking procedure was a reduced association between Stimulus B and the reinforcer, and not a performance deficit such as that postulated by comparator models of learning.     

Representation-mediated Inhibitory Learning in the Conditioned-suppression Procedure

In three experiments, rats in group I (for intermixed) were given non-reinforced exposure to two compound stimuli, AX and BX, where A and B represent different auditory cues, and X represents a visual cue. AX and BX were presented in alternation. Group B (blocked) received similar exposure except that subjects experienced a block of AX trials and then a block of BX trials. Subsequent shock reinforcement of A was found to endow B with inhibitory strength in group I, as assessed by retardation (Experiments 1 and 2) and summation tests (Experiment 3). This outcome confirms and extends the results reported by Espinet, Iraola, Bennett, and Mackintosh (1995) and constitutes a further example of mediated learning in which the associative strength of a stimulus is found to be modified as a consequence of training given to some other event with which that stimulus is associated.     

The impact of semantic distance and induced stress on analogical reasoning: A neurocomputational account

In a study of reasoning with four-term verbal analogy problems, we explored the relationship between the effects of an acute, mild stressor and the complexity of the reasoning process. Participants judged whether analogy problems in the form A:B :: C:D were valid or invalid, on the basis of whether the relation in the A:B term matched that in the C:D term. Half of the problems contained a C:D pair semantically near the A:B pair (e.g., NOSE:SCENT :: TONGUE:TASTE), and the other half contained ones semantically far from A:B (e.g., NOSE:SCENT :: ANTENNA:SIGNAL). After an initial block without stress, participants were randomly assigned to count backward by 13?s from 1,000 while being told to go faster, or to count forward by 1?s from 0. The stress-induced participants reported a significant increase in state anxiety as compared to controls immediately after the mental arithmetic task. Stressed participants performed less accurately (as measured by d') on both near and far analogy problems, mainly due to an increase in false alarms. We were able to model the influence of semantic distance using the ??learning and inference with schemas and analogies?? (LISA) model. Our findings indicated that even mild increases in stress impair analogical reasoning. However, the decrement does not seem to directly involve the integration of relations, but rather is due to a shift in decision strategy: Under stress, people show an increased tendency to endorse analogies as valid when the terms in the individual pairs are semantically related to each other, even if the overall analogical relationship is not valid.     

Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief

In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences.     

知道与不知道要学多少：类别学习中样例量的预期作用

采用“5/4模型”类别结构探讨了类别学习中样例量的预期作用。设置了两种学习条件(“知道样例量”和“不知道样例量”), 分别探讨两种学习条件下的学习效率、学习策略以及所形成的类别表征。106名大学生参加了实验, 结果表明：在类别学习中, 样例量的预期作用显著, 知道样例量组的学习效率高于不知道样例量组; 样例量的预期作用对类别学习效率的影响是通过影响学习过程中使用的策略来实现的; 样例量的预期作用不影响两种学习条件的学习后形成的类别表征, 且两种学习条件的被试自始至终表现出样例学习的表征模式。     

Evidence,explanation and enhanced indispensability

In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of ‘explanatory indispensability’ and ‘genuine mathematical explanation in science’ on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following ‘question of evidence’: What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.     

物体受力分析正误样例组合的学习效果

分别采用正误样例组合、有无错误标记的正误样例组合和有标记的正误样例配对组合设计方法,以物体受力分析正误样例为实验材料,以初中三年级学生为被试进行3项实验,考察了被试物体受力分析图正误样例组合的学习效果。结果表明,正误样例组合的学习成绩显著优于正确样例组合的学习成绩;有标记的正误样例组合的学习成绩显著优于无标记样例组合的学习成绩;有标记正误样例配对组合的学习成绩明显优于正确样例组合的学习成绩。     

Transfer of specific contextual functions to novel conditional discriminations

Three adolescents and 4 children participated in studies designed to examine contextually controlled conditional discrimination performance. In Study 1, participants selected Comparison B1 in the presence one stimulus (A1) and Comparison B2 in the presence of another stimulus (A2) using a matching-to-sample procedure. Next, contextual stimuli X1 or X2 were presented, such that in the presence of X1, selection of B1 given A1 and selection of B2 given A2 were reinforced; and in the presence of X2, selection of B2 given A1 and selection of B1 given A2 were reinforced. Then, new conditional discriminations were taught with Stimuli E and F. When the contextual Stimuli X1 and X2 were presented, participants selected the same comparisons as previously established in the EF relations in the presence of X1, but the opposite comparison as in the EF relations in the presence of X2. The results then were replicated with new Stimuli G and H. In Study 2, a new conditional discrimination, CD, was taught. Then, four combinations of two-element samples--C1 and D1, C2 and D2, C1 and D2, or C2 and D1--were presented with X1 and X2 as comparisons. Five of 6 participants selected X1 in the presence of C1 and D1 or C2 and D2, and selected X2 in the presence of C1 and D2 or C2 and D1. Finally, in Study 3, two new discriminations IJ and JK were taught. Then, the transitive IK relations were tested with X1 and X2 as contextual stimuli. The 4 participants selected K1 in the presence of I1 and K2 in the presence of I2 when the contextual stimulus was X1--demonstrating class formation--and selected the other comparisons when the contextual stimulus was X2. These results suggest that the contextual control functions of X1 and X2 transferred even to relations that had not been directly taught. These results extend those demonstrating generalized contextual control by showing transfer of functions of the contextual stimuli in transitivity tests and when the former contextual stimuli were presented as comparisons.