John Venn's Hypothetical Infinite Frequentism and Logic

The goal of this paper is to provide a detailed reading of John Venn's Logic of Chance (1866) as a work of logic or, more specifically, as a specific portion of the general system of so-called ‘material’ logic developed in his Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic (1889) and to discuss it against the background of his Boolean-inspired views on the connection between logic and mathematics. It is by means of this situating of Venn 1866 Venn, J. 1866. The Logic of Chance. An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability. With Especial Reference to Its Application to Moral and Social Science, London: Macmillan. [Google Scholar] [The Logic of Chance. An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability. With Especial Reference to Its Application to Moral and Social Science, London: Macmillan] within the entirety of his oeuvre that it becomes both possible to revisit and necessary to re-articulate its place in the history of the frequency interpretation of probability. For it is clear that if Venn's approach to logic not only allowed him to establish its foundations on the basis of a process of idealization and define it as consisting of so-called hypothetical infinite series, but also brought him to do so in strictly non-mathematical terms, he was able to anticipate much of the content (and problems) of his twentieth-century fellow frequentists.     

Against Hypothetical Syllogism

The debate over Hypothetical Syllogism is locked in stalemate. Although putative natural language counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism abound, many philosophers defend Hypothetical Syllogism, arguing that the alleged counterexamples involve an illicit shift in context. The proper lesson to draw from the putative counterexamples, they argue, is that natural language conditionals are context-sensitive conditionals which obey Hypothetical Syllogism. In order to make progress on the issue, I consider and improve upon Morreau’s proof of the invalidity of Hypothetical Syllogism. The improved proof relies upon the semantic claim that conditionals with antecedents irrelevant to the obtaining of an already true consequent are themselves true. Moreover, this semantic insight allows us to provide compelling counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism that are resistant to the usual contextualist response.     

Against Arguments from Reference*

It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such ‘arguments from reference.’ Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross‐cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture ( Machery et al. 2004 ). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.     

Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism

In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function , Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N . The hypothesis E says that "human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention" (p. 220). With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says "it isn't easy to say precisely what naturalism is," but then adds that "crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is no such person as the God of traditional theism." Plantinga tries to cast doubt on the conjunction E&N in two ways. His "preliminary argument" aims to show that the conjunction is probably false, given the fact ( R ) that our psychological mechanisms for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable. His "main argument" aims to show that the conjunction E&N is self-defeating – if you believe E&N , then you should stop believing that conjunction. Plantinga further develops the main argument in his unpublished paper "Naturalism Defeated" (Plantinga 1994). We will try to show that both arguments contain serious errors.     

Double Defence Against Multiple Case Manipulation Arguments

Philosophia - The article aims to show that compatibilism can be defended against Pereboom’s ‘Four Case’ Manipulation Argument (Pereboom 2001), hereinafter referred to as 4-Case...     

Against Disjunctive Properties: Four Armstrongian Arguments

Philosophia - This paper defends the case against (sparse) disjunctive properties by means of four Armstrongian arguments. The first of these is a logical atomist argument from truthmaking, which...     

Some Arguments Against Analyzing Client Change Graphically

Although single-subject research techniques are relevant and valuable to counselors, analyzing change by graphs alone is open to major sources of error. The author discusses these sources and explores the issues of serial dependency, unreliability of graphs, interjudge disagreement on graphed data, and the use of a more reliable statistical procedure (the time-series statistic) with relevance to the counselor in the field.     

Philosophical Arguments Against the A‐Theory

According to the A‐theory of time some instant of time is absolutely present. Many reject the A‐theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with current spacetime physics, which appears to leave no room for absolute presentness. However, some reject the A‐theory on purely philosophical grounds. In this article I describe three purely philosophical arguments against the A‐theory and show that there are plausible A‐theoretic responses to each of them. I conclude that, whatever else is wrong with the A‐theory, it is not obviously a philosophically suspect theory.     

A Millennial Mistake: Three Arguments Against Radical Social Constructivism

Recent scholars have argued that counseling has begun to embrace social constructivism as a paradigm for counseling. However, this commitment to social constructivist tenets may be both premature and undesirable. This article provides a critique of a dominant branch of social constructivism: radical social constructivism. Three arguments are presented establishing that radical social constructivism leads to logically impossible conclusions, violates counseling's moral convictions, and denies secure scholarship in related fields.     

Contemporary Arguments Against Nonsexist Language: Blaubergs (1980) Revisited

Two studies investigated whether undergraduatesenrolled in sport management classes at a midwesternuniversity supported or resisted nonsexist language.Resistive statements were classified using arguments identified by Blaubergs (1980). In Study 1, 82primarily Caucasian students reacted to a videotapeabout language. Half (48%) supported nonsexist language;32% were ambivalent; 21% were opposed to nonsexist language. The negative comments fit 7 ofBlaubergs' 8 categories after 2 were modified; 2additional categories (Sexism is Acceptable andHostility toward Proponents of Change) emerged. In Study2, 164 primarily Caucasian undergraduates speculatedon why others resisted nonsexist language. Theircomments led to the addition of 2 more new categories:Tradition and Lack of Understanding. The finalmodification of Blaubergs' classic arguments contains 12categories that should be useful in studying resistanceto nonsexist language.     

Hypothetical Retrospection

Moral theory has mostly focused on idealized situations in which the morally relevant properties of human actions can be known beforehand. Here, a framework is proposed that is intended to sharpen moral intuitions and improve moral argumentation in problems involving risk and uncertainty. Guidelines are proposed for a systematic search of suitable future viewpoints for hypothetical retrospection. In hypothetical retrospection, a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of the branches of possible future developments has materialized. This evaluation is based on the deliberator’s present values, and each decision is judged in relation to the information available when it was taken. The basic decision rule is to choose an alternative that comes out as morally acceptable (permissible) from all hypothetical retrospections.

The Effects of Moral and Pragmatic Arguments Against Torture on Demands for Judicial Reform

Torture can be opposed on the basis of pragmatic (e.g., torture does not work) or moral arguments (e.g., torture violates human rights). Three studies investigated how these arguments affect U.S. citizens' attitudes toward U.S.‐committed torture. In Study 1, participants expressed stronger demands for redressing the injustice of torture when presented with moral rather than pragmatic or no arguments against torture. Study 2 replicated this finding with an extended justice measure and also showed the moderating role of ingroup glorification and attachment. Moral arguments increased justice demands among those who typically react most defensively to ingroup‐committed wrongdoings: the highly attached and glorifying. Study 3 showed that the effect of moral arguments against torture on justice demands and support for torture among high glorifiers is mediated by moral outrage and empathy but not guilt.     

Empirical,Logical and Philosophical Arguments Against Cigarette Smoking as a Pharmacologically Compelled Act

The fundamental hypothesis of the disease model of nicotine addiction states that, following a regime of chronic smoking, further smoking becomes a pharmacologically compelled rather than a chosen act. Despite it’s public and professional popularity as an explanation for why people continue to smoke in spite of a deteriorating quality of life, the validity of this hypothesis has been critically undermined by the state of evidence in four domains: inconclusive empirical evidence of withdrawal severity as a potent predictor of quit outcome; methodological problems concerning the measurement of factors which maintain smoking; logical problems with the interpretation of factors which maintain smoking, in particular, failures to discriminate reflexive and mediated actions in explanations of why people smoke; and philosophical problems with conceptualisations of human action as determined rather than willed. In light of these problems, it is argued that evidence on the nature of nicotine addiction is not well explained by the disease model, but rather, posits smoking primarily as a decision-making process influenced peripherally by the pharmacologic effects of nicotine on the brain and body.

The Hypothetical Syllogism

The hypothetical syllogism is invalid in standard interpretations of conditional sentences. Many arguments of this sort are quite compelling, though, and you can wonder what makes them so. I shall argue that it is our parsimony in regard to connections among events and states of affairs. All manner of things just might, for all we know, be bound up with one another in all sorts of ways. But ordinarily it is better, being simpler, to assume they are unconnected. In so doing, we jump to the conclusions of some compelling but invalid arguments.     

A Plantingian Pickle for a Darwinian Dilemma: Evolutionary Arguments Against Atheism and Normative Realism

Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that ultimately support Plantinga's structurally similar argument. If Street succeeds in debunking normative realism, I argue, then she also succeeds in debunking atheism. But atheism is a suppressed premise of the Darwinian Dilemma as well as a commitment of almost all normative anti‐realists. If Street's argument entails theism, then the Darwinian Dilemma is internally incoherent and should be abandoned by almost everyone. 1