Death, Asymmetry and the Psychological Self

Lucretius thought that we should be as indifferent to the time of our death as we are toward the time of our birth. This paper will critique the ways in which Thomas Nagel, Frederik Kaufman and Christopher Belshaw have appealed to a psychological notion of the self in an attempt to defend our asymmetric intuitions against Lucretius' claim. Four objections are marshalled against the psychological–self strategy: (1) the psychological notion of the self fails to capture all of our intuitions about selfhood; (2) some of the intuitions to which proponents of a psychological notion of the self appeal are drawn from irrelevant or misleading ethical and epistemological aspects of certain examples they consider; (3) the arguments developed on the basis of a psychological notion of the self do not answer Lucretius in the right way; and (4) the psychological–self explanation overlooks an important distinction between awareness–dependent and awareness–independent explanations. While the psychological–self explanation of the asymmetry in our attitudes toward the time of our birth and the time of our death may explain why Nagel, Kaufman and Belshaw have asymmetric attitudes, it fails to explain why most people have such attitudes.     

A Critical Theory of the Self: Wittgenstein,Nietzsche, Foucault

Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on the self is developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.     

Beyond the Tools of the Trade: Heidegger and the Intelligibility of Everyday Things

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self‐understandings (such as being a gardener, shoemaker, teacher, mother, musician, or philosopher). In this paper, I argue that while such practical self‐understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self‐understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self‐understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility‐constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self‐understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity.     

Experiential self‐understanding

The notion of insight is at one and the same time central to psychoanalysis and to the self‐understanding that is part of everyday life. Through clinical material and critical engagement with contemporary philosophical work on self‐knowledge, this paper clarifies one crucial aspect of this key notion. Self‐understanding of the sort we have in mind, while of course involving cognitive elements, is not sufficiently accounted for by cognition about one's affects, motivations, or other aspects of the psyche, nor by the simple conjunction of such cognition with felt affect, motivational urges, etc. Nor is it best modelled in terms of internal self‐observation. Rather, it is the product of an ongoing process of the unfolding articulation of one's psychic life. The notion of experience is important here in three ways. First, lived experience is that out of which the self‐understanding arises. Second, this self‐understanding is a development and articulation of these aspects of our inner lives; it is a part of that same lived perspective. And third, this understanding in turn shapes one's experience of one's inner world: as it is attained, one's experience of oneself thereby changes. Central here is the emphasis upon a developing process involving the ability to speak from one's subjective perspective while experiencing one's subjective perspective as the perspective that it is.     

The Spiritual,the Earthly and the Decadent

Under this somewhat grandiose title I want to consider a basic picture that dominates our thinking and feeling in many areas; to show why this picture is inadequate; and to suggest an alternative. I will consider how the embodied self, as both earthly and spiritual, conceptualises and gives meaning to all experience. It is not objects as such but our use of them that determines their 'purity'. Purity consists in being true to, and not corrupting, a desirable form of life. We need to distinguish between what is undesirable because it is corrupt and what is undesirable because it falls into the category of the partial, displaying only one aspect of a desirable form of life. I then consider the notion of decadence and how its cycle can be broken. The human self is not simply a mixture of instincts and regulations for control, but a blend, a state of consciousness in which rules and norms may be pleasurably followed. Good teachers will initiate their pupils into those forms of life that do justice to both these elements.     

The Pre-reflective Situational Self

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to  this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world.

     

A Third Method of Ethics?

In recent decades, the idea has become common that so‐called virtue ethics constitutes a third option in ethics in addition to consequentialism and deontology. This paper argues that, if we understand ethical theories as accounts of right and wrong action, this is not so. Virtue ethics turns out to be a form of deontology (that is, non‐consequentialism). The paper then moves to consider the Aristotelian distinction between right or virtuous action on the one hand, and acting rightly or virtuously on the other. It is claimed that virtue might play an important role in an explanation of acting virtuously (as it does in Aristotle’s ethics), but that such explanations can be charged with ‘double‐counting’ the moral value of the virtues. The paper concludes that, if we focus on the question of the value of virtue, rather than on the notion of right action, there is room for a self‐standing and important view which could be described as virtue ethics.     

‘Wholeness,Dignity and the Ageing Self’: A Conversation Between Philosophy and Theology

SUMMARY

Winifred Wing Han Lamb: My philosophical interest straddles the areas of education, religion and theology. As a teacher involved in school philosophy programs, I have also been interested in the philosophy of childhood and particularly in the recurring notion of the ‘whole child’ in education. In considering what ‘wholeness’ could mean for children's education, I have also been led to consider what meaning it holds for the self through the ‘changing scenes’ of life, especially in the face of the challenges of ageing.

The notion of ‘wholeness’ holds an intuitive appeal and invites articulation of the deep truths of our faith with respect to persons in all ‘sorts and conditions.’ In section one of this chapter, I attempt that articulation. But this conversation needs to be complementary. Our chapter is the beginning of a dialogue between philosophy and theology in which both affirm the ageing self in the light of the human search for wholeness and dignity.

Heather Thomson: My theological research into humanity as an image of God led me to inquire about the way in which we could speak meaningfully of ageing and dying in terms of imaging God. This challenged how God-likeness was to be understood in relation to glory, honour and power, terms associated with imaging God and exerting dominion. In searching for a theological view of the self that would confer dignity on the ageing, I was led into conversation with various philosophies of the self, some very helpful for my task.

It seems to me that, if ageing people are to be counted as having dignity and worth, and not discounted, then one's theory of the human person was significant. In pondering the issue, it appeared that a conversation between philosophy and theology would be fruitful. Hence, this joint paper. We each speak from our own discipline but find resonance with each other's work. We see this as a first step in a constructive conversation.     

UNSELF‐CONSCIOUS CONTROL: BROADENING THE NOTION OF CONTROL THROUGH EXPERIENCES OF FLOW AND WU‐WEI

Abstract. This paper both clarifies and broadens the notion of control and its relation to the self. By discussing instances of skillful absorption from different cultural backgrounds, I argue that the notion of control is not as closely related to self‐consciousness as is often suggested. Experiences of flow and wu‐wei exemplify a nonself‐conscious though personal type of control. The intercultural occurrence of this type of behavioral control demonstrates its robustness, and questions two long‐held intuitions about the relation between self‐consciousness and the experience of control. The first intuition holds that the conscious self initiates and controls actions, thoughts, and feelings. The second is the view that losing this self‐conscious type of control is a negative and upsetting experience. By focusing on “the paradox of control” in these experiences of skillful absorption, I argue that a feeling of control can occur without a self that narratively claims control. Furthermore, this type of control can be a very positive and pleasurable experience. Therefore, the common views of the notion of control are in need of broader conceptualization and further refinement.     

‘With healing in her wings…’: Integration and repair in a self-destructive adolescent

This paper describes certain Jungian concepts related to integration and repair. Fundamental to this is Jung's concept of the self, which Fordham has made the basis of his model of development. To Jung's notion of the self as an integrator and organizer of experience, Fordham has added the idea that the self divides up, or deintegrates. Three corollaries of Fordham's model, pertaining to whole and part objects and the depressive position, are amplified through infant studies.

Clinical material from the treatment of a pigeon-phobic adolescent is presented, which attempts to demonstrate that a significant part of what the phobia represented was an infantile state of projective and introjective identification with an anxious mother. Treatment facilitated actions of the self that contributed to the integration of the experiences represented by the pigeons, so that what had been split off became a deintegrate capable of being reintegrated.

The focus of this paper is on the developmental as well as the pathological. Both are conceived in relation to the treatment.     

The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness

In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing.     

Counting subjects

Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism.     

Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self

This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions [THN 2.2.1.2, 2.1.2.3]. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion of self should be characterized as a bundle of dispositions to our perceptions, such that these dispositions are durable and counterfactual-supporting. I argue that Hume confused his ‘philosophical’ notion of dispositions, as nothing above and beyond their effects, with the thicker notion of dispositions to which the passions respond—which explains his mistaken commitment to the durability constraint.     

Mature Ego Development: A Gateway to Ego Transcendence?

This paper explores whether the highest stage in ego development is indicative of ego-transcendence as I initially surmised. Overall, I will explore some of the similarities and differences between rational awareness of the limits of representational thought and genuine postsymbolic knowing. I will present the research territory with a linear and a non-linear model of human development. Both models can accommodate both Eastern and Western self theories including ego development theory and Alexander's levels of mind. Next, I will outline an alternative developmental trajectory based on Alexander's notion of the shifts in the dominant mode of processing from personal–verbal–discursive to transpersonal–postsymbolic. Then, I will present ego development theory as I conceive of it now and outline the important characteristics of the highest stage (Cook-Greuter, 1999). Finally, I will consider the question of whether and in what way the Unitive ego stage is related to higher consciousness and introduce two testable propositions to clarify the issue.     

Does cardiovascular reactivity during speech reflect self-construction processes?

Abstract

Substantial empirical research has been undertaken on cardiovascular reactivity (CVR). however interpretation of this research is hampered by a lack of theoretical frameworks. This paper develops a framework initially stimulated by evidence demonstrating that the cardiovascular system increases in activity during communication, and that the extent of this activation depends upon numerous and diverse psychosocial factors. We attempt to account for this phenomenon using merit post-structuralist ideas concerning the constructive nature of language and its centrality to an individual's sense of self. Our theoretical framework proposes that the CVR exhibited during language use is explicable in terms of self-construction - From this analysis we hypothesised that CVR would differ across conversations about private self. public self and non-self topics, and that these differences would depend upon people's speaking histories. We found that the blood pressure and heart rate of 102 women was most reactive when they talked in a laboratory with a stranger about aspects of their private self, and least reactive during non-self talk, whilst their heart rate was most reactive during talk about their public self. Overall the results highlight the inextricable link between our inherent socialness and our cardiovascular systems.

SUMMARY

The explanatory scheme outlined here is an attempt to provide a social reconceptualisation of a phenomenon that is typically interpreted in individualistic psychophysiological terms, and which is consistent with the notion that repeated exposure to situations which provoke large haemodynamic changes may lead to CHD disease progression. The explanation draws heavily on post-structuralist ideas regarding language, and the social constructionist notion that engaging in language use is central to constructing and maintaining a sense of self. This sense of self is a central theoretical entity in our everyday lives, produced and maintained in our interactions with others. We argue that it is this centrality of self-construction that helps to explain the extraordinary consistency of elevated CVR in conversation. Further, we have noted the striking parallels between those features of conversations that make the self salient, and those that have been associated with elevated CVR. To examine it more explicitly, it needs to be tested empirically with new data, using explicitly derived operationalisations and hypotheses.     

Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank's Augustine

John Milbank's case against secular reason draws much of its authority and force from Augustine's critique of pagan virtue. Theology and Social Theory could be characterized, without too much insult to either Augustine or Milbank, as a postmodern City of God. Modern preoccupations with secular virtues, marketplace values, and sociological bottom‐lines are likened there to classically pagan preoccupations with the virtues of self‐conquest and conquest over others. Against both modern and antique “ontological violence” (where ‘to be’ is ‘to be antagonistic’), Milbank advances an Augustinian hope for the peace that is both beyond and prior to the peace of (temporarily) repressed antagonism. One aim of this essay is to consider whether virtues conceived out of such a hope are really all that different from the virtues they are taken to replace. I take a critical look at Augustine's critique of pagan virtue, Milbank's appropriation of that critique, the applicability of that critique to Plato, and the polemical value of Augustine's notion of original sin. I end up being skeptical of the notion of a peculiarly Christian way to turn antagonistically conceived virtues into love, but I am not unsympathetic to Milbank's concerns about a loveless and self‐complacent secularity.     

Dressing Religious Bodies in Public Spaces: Gender, Clothing and Negotiations of Stigma Among Jews in Paris and Muslims in London

In recent years religious clothing has become prevalent across many European cities, making religious bodies more visible in public spaces. This paper brings together our separate research on Jews in Paris and Muslims in London. While recognising the clear differences between these two socio-political contexts and distinct religious groups, we suggest that a focus on clothing allows us to consider some points of similarity and difference in the presentation of gendered religious bodies, particularly in situations of heightened stigmatisation. We draw upon Goffman’s notion of impression management, in contexts of risks and threats, to explore how individuals experience and negotiate self presentation as members of stigmatised religious groups. We use rich qualitative data based on indepth interviews to consider how, when faced with collective stigmatisation, actors make deliberate and measured choices to present themselves and attempt to impression manage.     

Connectionism and Self: James,Mead, and the Stream of Enculturated Consciousness

William James conceptualized I, the self as subject as a stream of consciousness. When this conception is augmented with George Herbert Mead's view of self as a radically socialized and enculturated process, a result is the James-Mead model of dynamic self as a stream of enculturated consciousness. In this paper, we argue that connectionism is best suited to theorize this challenging notion. Based on the view that a connectionist model should describe psychological processes that carry out psychological functions grounded in a biological living system, we propose the I-SELF (Imitative and Sequence Learning Functional) model, which is designed to capture the temporal dynamics of a stream of consciousness whose content can be acquired via symbolically mediated social interaction with others in society. We identify four implications of the James-Mead model of dynamic self (embodiment, narrative and self, individual and collective self, and culture and self), and report computer simulations to show the utility of I-SELF in conceptualizing the dynamic self-processes in the contemporary social psychological literature. Theoretical and metatheoretical implications of the connectionist approach to self are discussed.     

SELF‐FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVENESS

If the notion of a victim's forgiveness encounters scepticism in today's world, more so the notion of self‐forgiveness by the offender. However, a failure to forgive oneself, when self‐forgiveness is appropriate, may be detrimental to one's moral and psychological well‐being. Self‐forgiveness is called for when guilt, self‐hatred and shame reach high levels. Further, a third party's assurance that the offence is forgivable may contribute considerably to the completion of the self‐forgiveness process. This article explores the notion of forgiveness of self and compares it with the notion of forgiveness of others. In addition, guilt and shame, right and wrong, repentance and dealing with the consequences of harmful actions are examined in the context of self‐forgiveness.