A model for production, perception, and acquisition of actions in face-to-face communication

The concept of action as basic motor control unit for goal-directed movement behavior has been used primarily for private or non-communicative actions like walking, reaching, or grasping. In this paper, literature is reviewed indicating that this concept can also be used in all domains of face-to-face communication like speech, co-verbal facial expression, and co-verbal gesturing. Three domain-specific types of actions, i.e. speech actions, facial actions, and hand-arm actions, are defined in this paper and a model is proposed that elucidates the underlying biological mechanisms of action production, action perception, and action acquisition in all domains of face-to-face communication. This model can be used as theoretical framework for empirical analysis or simulation with embodied conversational agents, and thus for advanced human–computer interaction technologies.     

Does Philosophy of Action Rest on a Mistake?

Philosophers of action tend to take for granted the concept of basic actions – actions that are done at will, or directly – as opposed to others that are performed in other ways. This concept does foundational work in action theory; many theorists, especially causalists, take part of their task to be showing that normal, complex actions necessarily stem from basic ones somehow. The case for the concept of basic actions is driven by a family of observations and a cluster of closely related anti-infinite regress arguments. I review this case in the work of Arthur Danto, Donald Davidson, and Jennifer Hornsby – three of the most important developers of the concept – and find it lacking. I conclude by sketching the possibility of non-foundationalist action theory.     

Differential reliance of chimpanzees and humans on automatic and deliberate control of motor actions

Humans are often unaware of how they control their limb motor movements. People pay attention to their own motor movements only when their usual motor routines encounter errors. Yet little is known about the extent to which voluntary actions rely on automatic control and when automatic control shifts to deliberate control in nonhuman primates. In this study, we demonstrate that chimpanzees and humans showed similar limb motor adjustment in response to feedback error during reaching actions, whereas attentional allocation inferred from gaze behavior differed. We found that humans shifted attention to their own motor kinematics as errors were induced in motor trajectory feedback regardless of whether the errors actually disrupted their reaching their action goals. In contrast, chimpanzees shifted attention to motor execution only when errors actually interfered with their achieving a planned action goal. These results indicate that the species differed in their criteria for shifting from automatic to deliberate control of motor actions. It is widely accepted that sophisticated motor repertoires have evolved in humans. Our results suggest that the deliberate monitoring of one’s own motor kinematics may have evolved in the human lineage.     

The intentionality of intention and action

Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of human behavior until we have a clear account of what a human action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce a distinction between prior intentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally selfreferential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they enable me to suggest solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordian effect, basic actions, etc.), to show how the logical structure of intentional action is strikingly like the logical structure of perceptions, and to construct an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.     

Limitations of distal effect anticipation when using tools

Modern technologies progressively create workplaces in which the execution of movements and the observation of their consequences are spatially separated. Challenging workplaces in which users act via technical equipment in a distant space include aviation, applied medical engineering and virtual reality. When using a tool, proprioceptive/tactile feedback from the moving hand (proximal action effect) and visual feedback from the moving effect point of the tool, such as the moving cursor on a display (the distal action effect) often do not correspond or are even in conflict. If proximal and distal feedback were equally important for controlling actions with tools, this discrepancy would be a constant source of interference. The human information processing system solves this problem by favoring the intended distal action effects while attenuating or ignoring proximal action effects. The study presents an overview of experiments aiming at the underlying motor and cognitive processes and the limitations of visual predominance in tool actions. The main findings are, that when transformations are in effect the awareness of one's own actions is quite low. This seems to be advantageous when using tools, as it allows for wide range of flexible sensorimotor adaptations and – may be more important – it evokes the feeling of being in control. Thus, the attenuation of perceiving one's own proximal action effects is an important precondition for using tools successfully. However, the ability to integrate discordant perception-action feedback has limits, especially, but not only, with complex transformations. When feature overlap between vision and proprioception is low, and when the existence of a transformation is obvious proximal action effects come to the fore and dominate action control in tool actions. In conclusion action–effect control plays an important role in understanding the constraints of the acquisition and application of tool transformations.     

Temporal perception is enhanced for goal-directed biological actions

ABSTRACT

Research into the visual perception of goal-directed human action indicates that human action perception makes use of specialized processing systems, similar to those that operate in visual expertise. Against this background, the current research investigated whether perception of temporal information in goal-directed human action is enhanced relative to similar motion stimuli. Experiment 1 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in upright human action to a kinematic control (an animation yoked to the motion of the human hand), and also to inverted human action. Experiment 2 compared human action to a non-human motion control (a tool moved the object). In both experiments observers’ sensitivity to detecting the speed changes was higher for the human stimuli relative to the control stimuli, and inversion in Experiment 1 did not alter observers’ sensitivity. Experiment 3 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in goal-directed human and dog actions, in order to determine if enhanced temporal perception is unique to human actions. Results revealed no difference between human and dog stimuli, indicating that enhanced speed perception may exist for any biological motion. Results are discussed with reference to theories of biological motion perception and perception in visual expertise.     

What are self-generated actions?

The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by [Passingham et al., 2010a] and [Passingham et al., 2010b] . There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from operant actions. But defining ‘self-generated’ by the degree of involvement of an endogenous process risks regress. We sketch an alternative account of self-generated action that tries to avoid these problems to make self-generated actions accessible to experimental science.     

When do we simulate non-human agents? Dissociating communicative and non-communicative actions

There is strong evidence that we automatically simulate observed behavior in our motor system. Previous research suggests that this simulation process depends on whether we observe a human or a non-human agent. Measuring a motor priming effect, this study investigated the question of whether agent-sensitivity of motor simulation depends on the specific action observed. Participants saw pictures depicting end positions of different actions on a screen. All postures featured either a human or non-human agent. Participants had to produce the matching action with their left or right hand depending on the hand presented on the screen. Three different actions were displayed: a communicative action (emblem), a transitive (goal-directed) action and an intransitive action. We found motor priming effects of similar size for human and non-human agents for transitive and intransitive actions. However, the motor priming effect for communicative actions was present for the human agent, but absent for the non-human agent. These findings suggest that biological tuning of motor simulation is highly action-selective and depends on whether the observed behavior appears to be driven by a reasonable goal.     

Probing folk-psychology: Do Libet-style experiments reflect folk intuitions about free action?

There is an ongoing debate in philosophy and psychology about when one should consider an action to be free. Several aspects are frequently suggested as relevant: (a) a prior intention, (b) a conscious action-related thought, (c) prior deliberation, (d) a meaningful choice, (e) different consequences of the action, and (f) the duration between intention and action. Here we investigated which criteria laypeople adopt and thus probed their intuitions about free actions in three surveys based on daily life scenarios. First, our results indicate that laypeople consider a conscious intention important for an action to be free. Second, laypeople consider spontaneous actions without consequences to be freer than actions with prior deliberation. Third, laypeople consider proximal rather than distal intentions relevant when it comes to judging actions as free. Taken together, these results suggest that simple laboratory experiments on action choices reflect laypeople’s intuitions of free actions to a considerable degree.     

Human biological and nonbiological point-light movements: Creation and validation of the dataset

Human action perception is so powerful that people can identify movement efficiently in the absence of pictorial information, such as in point-light displays. Interest is growing in this type of stimulus for research in neuroscience. This interest stems from the advantage of separating the component of pure human action kinematics from other pictorial information, such as facial expression and muscle contraction. Although several groups have previously developed datasets of human point-light actions, due to the lack of datasets composed of daily actions with short durations, we developed 20 biological and 40 control (scrambled) point-light movements by using the technique of recording people wearing reflector patches. The videos are about 1 s long. Subsequently, we performed a judgment task in which 100 participants (50 male and 50 female) evaluated each video according to three categories: human action resemblance, performed action, and gender of actor. We present the mean scores of each evaluation for each video, and further propose a selection of the most suitable videos to be used as human point-light action displays and scrambled point-light displays for control. Finally, we discuss our findings on the gender attributions of the point-light displays.     

Psychological determinism and rationality

There are arguments which purport to rebut psychological determinism by appealing to its alleged incompatibility with rationality. I argue that they all fail. Against Davidson, I argue that rationality does not preclude the existence of psychological laws. Against Popper, I argue that rationality is compatible with the possibility of predicting human actions. Against Schlesinger, I claim that Newcomb's problem cannot be invoked to show that human actions are unpredictable. Having vindicated the possibility of a rationally-based theory of action, I consider the form it might take.     

The mirror neuron system: grasping others’ actions from birth?

In the adult human brain, the presence of a system matching the observation and the execution of actions is well established. This mechanism is thought to rely primarily on the contribution of so-called 'mirror neurons', cells that are active when a specific gesture is executed as well as when it is seen or heard. Despite the wealth of evidence detailing the existence of a mirror neuron system (MNS) in the adult brain, little is known about its normal development. Yet, a better understanding of the MNS in infants would be of considerable theoretical and clinical interest, as dysfunctions within the MNS have been demonstrated in neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism spectrum disorder. Arguments in favor of an innate, or very early, mechanism underlying action understanding mainly come from studies of neonatal imitation, the existence of which has been questioned by some. Here, we review evidence suggesting the presence of an MNS in the human child, as well as work that suggests, although indirectly, the existence of a mechanism matching the perception and the execution of actions in the human newborn.     

Human trafficking: factors that influence willingness to combat the issue

Human trafficking involves severe violations of human rights and social action is required to combat it. Past research has identified emotional reactions to victims of trafficking, as well as the perceived cost and efficacy of actions, as significant predictors of willingness to get involved. We surveyed 216 Australians (70% female) to assess their perceptions of sex and labor trafficking and actions to reduce them. Results demonstrated that women reported greater personal distress (but not empathy) for victims than men, which was associated with greater willingness to take action. Women also perceived available actions to be more efficacious than men, which predicted willingness, while perceived cost of actions did not. Implications for promoting social action to reduce human trafficking are discussed.     

职业生涯背景行动理论及其方法的述评

背景行动理论是职业生涯研究中的新理论。此理论以人类职业行动为基本研究单位,认为:(1)人类的职业行动在本质上都是意向性和目标指向的;(2)应在日常生活中了解人们的职业观念、解释和选择;(3)职业是社会建构的。行动-项目质性方法基于此理论产生,从外显行为、内在过程和社会意义三方面收集职业行动的完整信息。背景行动理论对职业行动、发展过程及社会意义的认识为职业生涯研究提供了新的理论视角。     

Verantwortung ohne Verständnis? Wie die Ethikdebatte zur Gentechnik von deren Wissenschaftstheorie abhängt

Responsibility Without Understanding? How the Debate on the Ethics of Genetic Engineering Depends on Its Philosophy of Science. The main thesis in this paper is that bioethics has no own criteria to judge the chances and risks of genetic engineering. But if we distinguish (1) between different types of genetic, (2) between genetic engineering as a set of methods for experimentation and genetic engineering as an industrial technique and (3) reconstruct the metaphors and the terminology in general, which are used by biologists describing their practice, it is possible to formulate such criteria. As the distinction between nature and culture is the result of human actions (not drawn by nature) and the communication about these actions and distinctions in a given cultural context, the criteria are the result of a discourse, in which not only biologists, but all members of a society argue about the reproduction and structuration of their society.     

Goal saliency boosts infants’ action prediction for human manual actions,but not for mechanical claws

Previous research indicates that infants’ prediction of the goals of observed actions is influenced by own experience with the type of agent performing the action (i.e., human hand vs. non-human agent) as well as by action-relevant features of goal objects (e.g., object size). The present study investigated the combined effects of these factors on 12-month-olds’ action prediction. Infants’ (N = 49) goal-directed gaze shifts were recorded as they observed 14 trials in which either a human hand or a mechanical claw reached for a small goal area (low-saliency goal) or a large goal area (high-saliency goal). Only infants who had observed the human hand reaching for a high-saliency goal fixated the goal object ahead of time, and they rapidly learned to predict the action goal across trials. By contrast, infants in all other conditions did not track the observed action in a predictive manner, and their gaze shifts to the action goal did not change systematically across trials. Thus, high-saliency goals seem to boost infants’ predictive gaze shifts during the observation of human manual actions, but not of actions performed by a mechanical device. This supports the assumption that infants’ action predictions are based on interactive effects of action-relevant object features (e.g., size) and own action experience.     

Human action and virtue in Descartes and Spinoza

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good (summum bonum), and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it.