Studying persons in context: Taking social psychological reality seriously

Herein, I describe and illustrate the materiality and objectivity of sociocultural and psychological reality. I contend that many well-known problems in ensuring that psychological inquiry is obviously and properly connected to its primary subject matter, “persons in context,” may be understood as related to the apparent inability of many psychologists and schools of psychology to take historically-established sociocultural and psychological reality seriously. The example I use is a brief, joint biographical study of the sociocultural and psychological contexts within which Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner were positioned and came to position themselves with respect to issues of freedom and control. This study provides a particular and concrete example of the sociocultural and psychological constitution of personhood, selfhood, and human agency as emergent and lived in particular lives. Throughout the article, the material, objective bases for social-cultural and psychological personhood are emphasized.     

William Stern and discursive psychology

This paper examines some conceptual and methodological affinities between Stern's philosophy of psychology and discursive psychology. Stern's concept of the person as unitas multiplex finds currency in recent attempts to do justice both to the discursive domain of human life as well as its material foundation in the body. The person as embodied conscious actor is captured for instance in discursive analyses of first person pronoun use, a universal practice of both locating oneself spatio-temporally and displaying one's culturally differentiated moral qualities. We consider how contemporary research inspired by Vygotsky's cultural-historical approach and Wittgenstein's works in some ways fulfill Stern's original propositions while also highlighting the cultural specificity of personhood.     

Methodological functionalism and the description of natural systems

The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs (i.e., stimuli from the environment) are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s (1684) explanation of fermentation, Farr’s (mid-1800s) explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s (mid-1800s) explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. This technique has limitations. The implications for cognitive psychology are considered, and one conclusion is that cognitive psychology will eventually cease relying on methodological functionalism.     

Evolutionary psychology is compatible with equity feminism, but not with gender feminism: A reply to Eagly and Wood (2011)

I comment on Eagly and Wood's biosocial constructionist evolutionary theory (2011; DOI: 10.1007/s11199-011-9949-9). Although this gender feminist theory allows for evolved physical differences between men and women and evolved psychological similarities for men and women, it fails to consider evolutionary accounts of psychological sex differences. I hypothesize that gender feminists' reluctance to acknowledge that evolution has left different fingerprints on men's and women's bodies and brains stems from two common misunderstandings of evolutionary psychology: the myth of immutability and the naturalistic fallacy. I conclude that although evolutionary psychology is eminently compatible with equity feminism, evolutionary psychology and feminist psychology will conflict as long as the latter adheres to gender feminism and its unwillingness to acknowledge the evidence for evolved psychological sex differences. Gender feminism's dualistic view of evolution hinders the search for and understanding of the proximate and ultimate causes of inequality. Feminist psychology needs to evolve by embracing equity feminism, which has no a priori stance on the origin or existence of differences between the sexes.     

Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism

The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.     

Personhood: An activist project of historical becoming through collaborative pursuits of social transformation

The goal of this paper is to contribute to recent scholarship that pursues radical revision of prevalent models of personhood mired in outdated notions of human development and its foundational principles. To achieve this goal, I revisit and expand Vygotsky's project of cultural historical psychology to offer a dialectical framework that encompasses but is not limited to relational ontology. Premised on the notion of collaborative transformative practice as the grounding for human Being and Becoming,¹ my proposal is that at the core of human nature and development lies an ineluctably activist stance vis-à-vis the world; it is the realization of this stance through answerable deeds composing one unified life project that forms the path to personhood. The ethical dimension appears as foundational to Being and Becoming because it is integral to actions through which we become who we are while changing the world in collaborative pursuits of social transformation. From an activist transformative stance persons are agents not only for whom “things matter” but who themselves matter in history, culture, and society and, moreover, who come into Being as unique individuals through and to the extent that they matter in these processes and make a contribution to them.     

Emergent persons

Recent psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons makes a number of ontological claims that are not always explicit. A critical consideration of such claims reveals both considerable convergence and some points of disagreement across different psychological theories of emergent personhood. What is clear is that all such theories resist the reduction of persons to biophysical or sociocultural properties, conditions, and processes. In various ways, they each call for a nonreductionistic recognition of the sociocultural constitution of important aspects of personhood, without denying the necessity of biophysical requirements of personhood. Because standard emergentist positions in physical science and the philosophy of physical science mostly ignore the sociocultural level of reality, psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons requires an alternative ontological framework. It is proposed that an ontology of levels of reality that includes the physical, chemical, biological, sociocultural, and personal/psychological is appropriate for understanding how persons are both substantively and relationally emergent within the biophysical, sociocultural world. With such an ontological framework in place, it is possible to understand human activity in the world as the primary vehicle for both the phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of persons.     

Paradigms and Personhood: A Deepening of the Dilemmas in Ethics and Medical Ethics

There are many calls for a definitions personhood, but also many logical and Wittgensteinian reasons to think fulfilling this is unimportant or impossible. I argue that we can consider many contexts as language-games and consider the person as the key player in each. We can then examine the attributes, presuppositions and implications of personhood in those contexts. I use law and therapeutic psychology as two examples of such contexts or language-games. Each correlates with one of the classic “theories” of ethics-deontology and consequentialism. But each is a large enough cluster to consider them as paradigms in a sense related to Thomas Kuhn's notion in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Showing the presuppositions about and “takes” on personhood together with the connections involved in the paradigms deepens the dilemmas we already know to be present. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Stern words on the mind-brain problem: Keeping the whole person in mind

The presentation of recent research in neuroscience in articles, books, and the popular press, has reflected what Bennett and Hacker refer to as the mereological fallacy, in which a variety of psychological aspects of experience such as distorting, telling, directing, controlling, producing, managing, winning, interpreting, being political expecting, sensing, or talking, have been attributed to the brain or parts of the brain. In each and every case, the authors of such locutions are begging the question and creating a new form of Cartesian dualism that their efforts were undertaken to avoid. In this article I present Stern's view of the mind/brain relationship as found in his Critical Personalism, wherein he anticipates and refutes such attributions as are being made presently and instead attributes such experiences and tendencies not to the brain, but to the person. Stern's views and the relationship between brain development and culture are briefly explored.     

Coordinating with others: Outlining a pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood

In contrast to individualistic, cognitive-biological, and reductive psychologies, a pragmatic psychology of personhood takes the worldly activity of persons as its core subject matter. The pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood outlined herein offers theoretical frameworks for understanding the development and evolution of persons through their embodied coordination with objects and others in a world that is simultaneously biophysical and sociocultural. In both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, it is their active participation within coordinated, multi-perspectival sequences of interactive practices that constitutes human beings as psychological selves and communal agents who constantly transform the world and themselves. The constitution, emergence, and transformation of persons are accompanied and enabled by a holistic neurophysiological functioning that interacts constantly with, and owes much to, our history of interactivity within the world, especially our social participation with others and their actions and perspectives. A viable pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood demands the close study of our coordinated interactivity within sociocultural practices central to the life of communities and the communal agents who populate them.     

G. H. Mead's alleged behaviorism

This paper seeks to clarify those conceptual foundations of G.H. Mead's social behaviorism which are assumed, but not made explicit, in that writer's well-known volume Mind, Self and Society. These foundations are shown to be an outgrowth of Mead's early commitment to the organic conception of conduct underlying the psychological functionalism of the Chicago School. Further light is shed upon Mead's position by pointing out the fundamental differences between his model of conduct and that characteristic of the behaviorist tradition in American psychology.     

Functionalism and inverted spectra

Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of philosophical interest is the possibility of an inverted spectrum. Hilary Putnam argues that the physical possibilty of acquired spectrum inversion refutes functionalism. I argue, however, that in the absence of empirical results no a priori arguments against functionalism, such as Putnam's, can be cogent. I sketch an experimental situation which would produce acquired spectrum inversion. The mere existence of qualia inversion would constitute no refutation of functionalism; only its persistence after behavioral accommodation to the inversion would properly count against functionalism. The cumulative empirical evidence from experiments on image inversion suggests that the results of actual spectrum inversion would confirm rather than refute functionalism.     

Realization and Multiple Realization,Chicken and Egg

A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain the proper way to understand the relation between realization and multiple realization.     

Towards an Alternative Approach to Personhood in the End of Life Questions

Within the Western bioethical framework, we make adistinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: thenaturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim topromote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normativeviews on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every daylife. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general thearguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist interpretation of moral personhoodwhile the arguments against euthanasia, for their part, are derived from the idealistand/or humanist understanding of the same concept. This article focuses onexamining the metaphysical assumptions and internal contradiction found behind the opposingarguments presented by two prominent philosophers of these two traditions:Peter Singer and Ludger Honnefelder. The author claims that neither side of thedebate succeeds in defending its normative position without reconsidering how to takethe social aspects of moral personhood into account. The author holds that, despite ourneed to set individual's decision making into social context, the currentcommunitarian narrative concept of personhood fails to offer a convincing alternative.Instead of merely trying to replace psychological and atomistic view of personhood with acollective understanding of an individual's moral identity, we need to discuss thenormative relation between the concept of `moral personhood' and the demand for respect ofindividual autonomy in Western bioethics within a wider philosophical perspective.     

Tension and opportunity in post-world War II American psychology

The rapid growth of post-World War II psychology in the United States led to intradisciplinary tensions and opportunities. In this article, I examine these tensions and opportunities in the context of social change from the 1950s through the present, attending specifically to the broad impact of federal funding on psychology. I argue that as psychology became a resource-rich field, it was forced to move from a narrow, parochial stance to a position as a national-level professional player that had to deal with the challenges of mixing science and practice, as well as meeting the demands of non-White psychologists at the national level. The impetus to create a more inclusive psychology has grown in the last three decades of the 20th century and has helped create possibilities for greater richness in American psychology and movement toward a truly international role vis-a-vis emergent psychologies around the world.     

Wilhelm Wundt and the cognitive shift

This paper compares Wundtian and cognitive psychology with respect to immediate and mediate experience, non-functionalism, and the status of the experiment. It is pointed out that the perspective of immediate experience, which can also be found in early American functionalism, has disappeared in the wake of behaviorism. Next cognitive psychology, which to some extent represents a correction of behaviorism, is compared with Wundt's system. It is concluded that in spite of certain similarities the Wundtian and the cognitive perspective are irreconcilably opposed.     

Wilhelm Wundt's contribution to John Dewey's functional psychology

John Dewey's functionalism and instrumentalism arose from his defense of a teleological understanding of human activity and intelligence. E. B. Titchener's counterdefense of structuralism in the late 1890s placed Wundt's psychological methodology in opposition to functionalism. However, investigations that convincingly re-interpret Wundt instead permit the disclosure of much fundamental agreement. Examination of Dewey's earliest work shows that his commitment to teleology, with its attendant organicist and voluntarist orientation, arose from an early allegiance to G. S. Morris's Aristotelianized neo-Hegelianism and an inspirational debt to Wundt's psychology and philosophy. William James's influence on Dewey's development toward instrumentalism must be accordingly de-emphasized.     

Ideology obscured. Political uses of the self in Daniel Stern's infant

Daniel Stern's (1985) respected theory of infant development is critiqued from a social-constructionist perspective in order to demonstrate how decontextualized psychology theories inadvertantly perpetuate the political status quo. Self-invariants in the core-self phase are discussed as reflections of the current configuration of self rather than a discovery of universal elements of human development. The parental attunement response is reinterpreted as a way by which Western interiority and subjectivity are socially constructed. Language as the fundamental cause of alienation and dividedness is disputed. In Stern's theory, universal qualities of the self and the processes of language acquisition are responsible for several psychological ills characteristic of the 20th century. By exonerating political structures as causal factors, decontextualized theories legitimize, justify, and perpetuate current arrangements of power and privilege.