A critical look at critical (neo)personalism: Unitas multiplex and the ‘person’ concept

This essay evaluates critically William Stern's (Stern, W. (2010). Psychology and personalism) unitas multiplex and definition of ‘person.’ Discussion of the former is restricted to the lowest psychological levels and evaluation is conducted in light of interpretive options open to the ‘targets’ of Stern's current adherents, termed ‘neopersonalists.’ It is concluded that to avoid the charge of ‘individualism,’ neopersonalist expositions of the unitas multiplex should be geared toward the strong possibility that their targets will read it as a person-ontology. Evaluation then turns to Stern's definition of ‘person,’ which is compared with elements of Hacker's (Hacker, P. (2007). Human nature: The categorial framework. Oxford: Blackwell) analysis of the same concept. Results suggest that while Stern's definition applies to ‘animal’ and ‘human being,’ it does not apply to ‘person’. A more coherent conceptual framework for neopersonalism thus is suggested. A ‘can-do teleontology’ maintains emphasis on the person's potentialities and inherent goal-oriented and goal-striving nature, avoids reduction of the person concept, relates the person to others by necessity, and is amenable to Stern's definition of ‘personality.’     

William Stern and discursive psychology

This paper examines some conceptual and methodological affinities between Stern's philosophy of psychology and discursive psychology. Stern's concept of the person as unitas multiplex finds currency in recent attempts to do justice both to the discursive domain of human life as well as its material foundation in the body. The person as embodied conscious actor is captured for instance in discursive analyses of first person pronoun use, a universal practice of both locating oneself spatio-temporally and displaying one's culturally differentiated moral qualities. We consider how contemporary research inspired by Vygotsky's cultural-historical approach and Wittgenstein's works in some ways fulfill Stern's original propositions while also highlighting the cultural specificity of personhood.     

The tradition of personalism and its relationship to contemporary indeterminate functionalism

Early twentieth century psychology was marked by a variety of perspectives that took seriously the centrality of personhood as the key marker of psychological properties and attributes. William Stern's critical personalism was one such position and its loss, along with related positions, to the scientism that has marked the last hundred years of psychology has meant the impoverishment of both the theoretical and empirical worlds of psychology. In this paper I wish to trace the demise of these positions by focusing on the gradual hegemony of functionalist theories of various kinds that have come to dominate psychological theorizing. This functionalism, quite loose from the various forms of functionalism debated in philosophical circles, is indeterminate in so far as it is neutral with respect to important properties of experience and its relationship to a reductionist form of science. Denying the fundamental sociality and alterity of human attributes however has become a crucial foundation of modern psychology, making possible its inherently neutral stance with respect to the nature of personhood. Stern would have disagreed and I contrast his stance with that of Kurt Lewin who shares a number of important features of Stern's life and position with respect to the importance of individuality and personhood.     

The “New Big Five” from a personalistic point of view

McAdams and Pals (2006) “New Big Five” principles are contrasted with William Stern's conception of the person. It is criticized that the intra-individual organization of the person is not adequately addressed in the “New Big Five” approach: McAdams and Pals are shifting the issue of the idiosyncratic organization of the person to the level of a more or less coherent life narrative. The person tells or constructs a narrative, the person, however, is not the narrative.It is therefore suggested to complement and enrich the “New Big Five” with the three primary characteristics of the person as proposed by William Stern: unitas multiplex, purposefulness and individuality. In addition, Stern's concept of introception is suggested as a more integrated view of how the external world is internalized within the person. In concluding, the significance of Stern's critical personalism for an integrative science of personality in the 21^st century is highlighted.     

Social Support and the Perception of Geographical Slant

The visual perception of geographical slant is influenced by physiological resources, such as physical fitness, age, and being physically refreshed. In two studies we tested whether a psychosocial resource, social support, can also affect the visual perception of slants. Participants accompanied by a friend estimated a hill to be less steep when compared to participants who were alone (Study 1). Similarly, participants who thought of a supportive friend during an imagery task saw a hill as less steep than participants who either thought of a neutral person or a disliked person (Study 2). In both studies, the effects of social relationships on visual perception appear to be mediated by relationship quality (i.e., relationship duration, interpersonal closeness, warmth). Artifacts such as mood, social desirability, and social facilitation did not account for these effects. This research demonstrates that an interpersonal phenomenon, social support, can influence visual perception.     

Art’s False “Ease”: Form,Meaning and a Problematic Pedagogy

This paper argues that in foregoing the questions that emerge from the dialectical relationship between form and meaning, an intrinsic fallacy mistakes the relationship between the arts and education for a simplistic mechanism of signification—a false “ease”—where empty forms are supposedly given meaning by ethical and aesthetic givens as if the pedagogy of art were analogous to an empty room that was (or still needs to be) inhabited. Art’s false “ease” presents a tautology that presumes the relationship between the arts and learning on assumptions that force a false equivalence between (a) the perception of implicit causes that constitute a number of externalised artistic attributes (such as creative, critical, and intuitive forms of thinking and making) by which the arts are instrumentalised, and (b) a number of desired effects that are seen as being equal to the relative value that an arts subject (or discipline) commands in a perceived relationship with the world in terms of its use and therefore function. To counter this distortion this paper makes a case for a pedagogical aesthetics that would unlearn—and thereby exit—the educationalist tautology of art’s false ease. While politically this would mean that the arts are recognized in their ability to think and act outside the traditional notion of schooling as a walled polis, philosophically this represents a challenge to move arts education away from the “spatial” concepts by which dialectical narratives, such as those of form and content, have been hitherto assumed as constructivist signifiers.     

The Dimensionality of Visual Space

The empirical study of visual space (VS) has centered on determining its geometry, whether it is a perspective projection, flat or curved, Euclidean or non-Euclidean, whereas the topology of space consists of those properties that remain invariant under stretching but not tearing. For that reason distance is a property not preserved in topological space whereas the property of spatial order is preserved. Specifically the topological properties of dimensionality, orientability, continuity, and connectivity define “real” space as studied by physics and are the spatial properties that characterize the physical universe as being an integral whole. By contrast the geometrical analysis of VS has taken little cognizance of its topology. Instead such properties have been presupposed a priori rather than being established a posteriori by empirical means, perhaps because these properties are self-evident. Applying the method of coordinative definition expounded by Hans Reichenbach for determining geometrical and topological properties of physical space (PS), it can be shown that VS fulfills the topological criteria of being a “real” space sui generis. Though theorized to be produced by the brain, the topology of VS is not topologically equivalent (homeomorphic) with the structure and activity of the brain because, as will be shown, the topology of VS cannot be formed from the topology of the brain without tearing and/or cutting and pasting.     

On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy

In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. We advocate the approach of “de-essentialization” across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. “De-essentialization” applies to all “levels” of concepts: everyday notions such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, and philosophical categories such as forms of life and dao 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that “the other” is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed. There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and qing 情).     

The You-I event: on the genesis of self-awareness

I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural exchanges between infant and caregiver, such as reciprocal smiles and imitative vocalizations. Lacking self-awareness at first, the infant is unaware of her own agency. By returning her unwitting gesture, the caregiver singles out for her—thanks to neural matching—the gesture's kinesthesis. Moreover, the caregiver's smile, imitative vocalization, or other gesture is the form that focusing takes. The kinesthesis of the infant's gesture, in being singled out, is experienced by the infant as what the caregiver is focusing on. It is experienced as being within the focal center. In this way, the infant becomes aware of herself as a bodily entity acting toward the caregiver. Exchanges that involve matching are at first essential, I argue, in making the infant present to herself in action. Matching will cease to be necessary, but self-awareness continues to depend fundamentally on others until the acquisition of language, when the child becomes capable of talking to herself as if she were the caregiver.     

The notion of the moral: the relation between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology

In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice.     

Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima

The notion of a capacity (dunamis) in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle??s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics ?? Aristotle also extends ??capacity??, and the corresponding concept of ??activity?? (energeia), to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to clarify and confirm a certain view of how Aristotle wishes us to see the relationship between the two uses of ??capacity?? and ??activity??. To that end, I consider also Aristotle??s employment of the terms in the De Anima, which sheds light on the key examples which direct the discussion in Metaph. ??.     

How the brain responds to any: an MEG study

The word any may appear in some sentences, but not in others. For example, any is permitted in sentences that contain the word nobody, as in Nobody ate any fruit. However, in a minimally different context any seems strikingly anomalous: ^*Everybody ate any fruit. The aim of the present study was to investigate how the brain responds to the word any in such minimally different contexts - where it is permitted (licensed) and where it is not permitted (unlicensed). Brain responses were measured from adult readers using magnetoencephalography (MEG). The results showed significantly larger responses to permissible contexts in the left posterior temporal areas between 400-500 ms and 590-660 ms. These results clarify the anatomy and timing of brain processes that contribute to our judgment that a word such as any is or is not permitted in a given context.     

Acoustic memory and the perception of speech

The nature of acoustic memory and its relationship to the categorizing process in speech perception is investigated in three experiments on the serial recall of lists of syllables. The first study confirms previous reports that sequences comprising the syllables, bah, dah, and gah show neither enhanced retention when presented auditorily rather than visually, nor a recency effect—both occurred with sequences in which vowel sounds differed (bee, bih, boo). This was found not to be a simple vowel-consonant difference since acoustic memory effects did occur with consonant sequences that were acoustically more discriminable (sha, ma, ga and ash, am, ag). Further experiments used the stimulus suffix effect to provide evidence of acoustic memory, and showed (1), increasing the acoustic similarity of the set grossly impairs acoustic memory effects for vowels as well as consonants, and (2) such memory effects are no greater for steady-state vowels than for continuously changing diphthongs. It is concluded that the usefulness of the information that can be retrieved from acoustic memory depends on the acoustic similarity of the items in the list rather than on their phonetic class or whether or not they have “encoded” acoustic cues. These results question whether there is any psychological evidence for “encoded” speech sounds being categorized in ways different from other speech sounds.     

A case-controlled field study evaluating ICD-11 proposals for relational problems and intimate partner violence

Background/Objective: Intimate partner relationship problems and intimate partner abuse and neglect — referred to in this paper as “relational problems and maltreatment” — have substantial and well-documented impact on both physical and mental health. However, classification guidelines, such as those found in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), are vague and unlikely to support consistent application. Revised guidelines proposed for ICD-11 are much more operationalized. We used standardized clinical vignette conditions with an international panel of clinicians to test if ICD-11 changes resulted in improved classification accuracy. Method: English-speaking mental health professionals (N = 738) from 65 nations applied ICD-10 or ICD-11 (proposed) guidelines with experimentally manipulated case presentations of presence or absence of (a) individual mental health diagnoses and (b) relational problems or maltreatment. Results: ICD-11, compared with ICD-10, guidelines resulted in significantly better classification accuracy, although only in the presence of co-morbid mental health problems. Clinician factors (e. g., gender, language, world region) largely did not impact classification performance. Conclusions: Despite being considerably more explicated, raters’ performance with ICD-11 guidelines reveals training issues that should be addressed prior to the release of ICD-11 in 2018 (e. g., overriding the guidelines with pre-existing archetypes for relationship problems and physical and psychological abuse).     

Unperceived dating violence among Mexican students

The aim of this ex post facto study was to determine the level of self-perceived abuse and the feelings of fear and entrapment that exist among Mexican students in a dating relationship. We intended to explore possible differences in the prevalence of the various types of violence or victimization between individuals who perceive themselves as being abused and those who do not, combining such perceptions with the feelings of fear and entrapment. The sample was composed of 3,495 Mexican students, of which 1,927 were pre-university students (M = 20.16; SD = 2.13) and 1,568 were university students (M = 15.99; SD = 1.64). We applied a questionnaire on socio-demographic data and the Cuestionario de Violencia entre Novios (CUVINO, Dating Violence Questionnaire). Results showed that 88% of participants did not feel abused by their boyfriend or girlfriend; yet, 15.2% reported having been afraid and 27% reported having felt trapped in the relationship at some point. The data revealed that a considerable majority of youth in the sample had been victims of unperceived abuse. More specifically, they presented evidence of having experienced abuse in their dating relationship even when they described themselves as not being abused.     

Identity, narcissism and the emotional core

This paper describes the course of an analysis which demonstrates how borderline and narcissistic functioning can be understood in terms of a struggle with issues of identity. It shows how such functioning can come to exert a profound hold on the individual and why it seems, at times, a matter of life and death to the patient to avoid states of separation from the analyst. The paper suggests that these complex phenomena can be understood, perhaps surprisingly, in the simple terms of the nature of affect itself. The concept of the emotional core is introduced to embody and highlight that which lies beneath both Jungian and Freudian models (offering a potential bridge between the two models)--namely the psyche's essentially affective nature. It is suggested that the emotional core can serve as an organ of perception giving the individual both their primary relation to reality and an emotional attachment to others. This emotional core is understood to function in a narcissistic manner to preference experiences of sameness and in aversion to experiences of difference--a view consonant with Stern's understanding of infant development where the infant is able to distinguish self from other from the beginning of life (as Fordham also held); taking up Stern's terminology, it gives the individual a 'core' sense of being. There is, however, no stable, on-going sense of 'I' associated with this form of functioning as the individual is immersed in the latest affect to enter consciousness (as in the borderline state of mind) and consequently the individual comes to rely intensely on the other to determine their sense of being (the other becomes a self-regulating other in Stern's terms). The development of ego-functioning gives a more stable and on-going sense of 'I' to the individual, giving contact with the broader personality, allowing the individual to be less reliant on the other and orientating them to reality in a way more fitting to their overall needs. The paper describes how consciousness, which is not seen as identical with the ego, moves between the mode of functioning of the ego and that of the emotional core, i.e., shifting in and out of states where projective identification predominates. It elaborates the range of self-experience encompassing spiritual experience and states of disintegration (which are understood to have a similar structure) on one side, to ego-based experience (which can itself be defensive and rigid at times) on the other. It explores the consequences of such a view for analytic technique and relates it to the Jungian view of the self and the Freudian unconscious.     

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life

The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP approaches is that human organisms first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person’s body is universal. Specifically, we focus on the development of minimal selfhood in utero as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship. We conclude with some implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self and social cognition.     

Structural Imaging Measures of Brain Aging

During the course of normal aging, biological changes occur in the brain that are associated with changes in cognitive ability. This review presents data from neuroimaging studies of primarily “normal” or healthy brain aging. As such, we focus on research in unimpaired or nondemented older adults, but also include findings from lifespan studies that include younger and middle aged individuals as well as from populations with prodromal or clinically symptomatic disease such as cerebrovascular or Alzheimer’s disease. This review predominantly addresses structural MRI biomarkers, such as volumetric or thickness measures from anatomical images, and measures of white matter injury and integrity respectively from FLAIR or DTI, and includes complementary data from PET and cognitive or clinical testing as appropriate. The findings reveal highly consistent age-related differences in brain structure, particularly frontal lobe and medial temporal regions that are also accompanied by age-related differences in frontal and medial temporal lobe mediated cognitive abilities. Newer findings also suggest that degeneration of specific white matter tracts such as those passing through the genu and splenium of the corpus callosum may also be related to age-related differences in cognitive performance. Interpretation of these findings, however, must be tempered by the fact that comorbid diseases such as cerebrovascular and Alzheimer’s disease also increase in prevalence with advancing age. As such, this review discusses challenges related to interpretation of current theories of cognitive aging in light of the common occurrence of these later-life diseases. Understanding the differences between “Normal” and “Healthy” brain aging and identifying potential modifiable risk factors for brain aging is critical to inform potential treatments to stall or reverse the effects of brain aging and possibly extend cognitive health for our aging society.     

The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness

How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many theories have been proposed. Certain theories suggest that consciousness should be explained in terms of brain functions, such as accessing information in a global workspace, applying higher order to lower order representations, or predictive coding. These functions could be realized by a variety of patterns of brain connectivity. Other theories, such as Information Integration Theory (IIT) and Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), identify causal structure with consciousness. For example, according to these theories, feedforward systems are never conscious, and feedback systems always are. Here, using theorems from the theory of computation, we show that causal structure theories are either false or outside the realm of science.