A set-theoretic random utility model of choice behavior

A random utility model of choice was developed by combining the basic ideas of the well-known theories of Thurstone and Restle. The new model has exactly the same number of free parameters as Tversky's Elimination-by-Aspects model. Furthermore, both models were found to fit, with equal accuracy, the data reported by Rumelhart and Greeno, and Tversky. It was concluded that although the two theories are not identical, they may be difficult to discriminate empirically.     

Joint independent random utility models where one of the choice structures satisfies the strict utility model

It is known that one cannot construct an independent joint random utility model for which both the preference and aversion probabilities satisfy the strict utility model. Given this result, it is natural to ask what kind of relations are possible in such contexts. Here, for instance, we demonstrate that if a structure of preference and aversion probabilities are generated by a common independent random utility model, and if the preference probabilities satisfy the strict utility model, then the preference and aversion probabilities are related by what is known as the strong acceptance condition. We also prove an appropriate converse of this result. Finally, an example is given of a process (other than the random utility model) that is compatible with the assumption that a structure of preference and aversion probabilities satisfies a common strict utility model.     

Empirical underidentification in estimating random utility models: The role of choice sets and standardizations

A standard approach to distinguishing people’s risk preferences is to estimate a random utility model using a power utility function to characterize the preferences and a logit function to capture choice consistency. We demonstrate that with often-used choice situations, this model suffers from empirical underidentification, meaning that parameters cannot be estimated precisely. With simulations of estimation accuracy and Kullback–Leibler divergence measures we examined factors that potentially mitigate this problem. First, using a choice set that guarantees a switch in the utility order between two risky gambles in the range of plausible values leads to higher estimation accuracy than randomly created choice sets or the purpose-built choice sets common in the literature. Second, parameter estimates are regularly correlated, which contributes to empirical underidentification. Examining standardizations of the utility scale, we show that they mitigate this correlation and additionally improve the estimation accuracy for choice consistency. Yet, they can have detrimental effects on the estimation accuracy of risk preference. Finally, we also show how repeated versus distinct choice sets and an increase in observations affect estimation accuracy. Together, these results should help researchers make informed design choices to estimate parameters in the random utility model more precisely.     

Rationality,group choice and expected utility

In this paper I propose a view uniformly extending expected utility calculations to both individual and group choice contexts. By way of three related cases I discuss the problems inherent in applying expected utility to group choice cases. I show that the problem with such group cases does not essentially depend upon the fact that more than one agent is involved. A modified strategy is then devised allowing the application of the expected utility formula to these otherwise problematic cases. One case, however, leads to contradiction. But recognizing the falsity of the proposition.(1) If an agent x knows options A and B are both available, and x knows that were he to do A he would be better off (in every respect) than were he to do B, then doing A is more rational for x than doing B,allows the resolution of the contradiction and also allows my modified strategy to resolve otherwise paradoxical cases of group choice such as the Prisoners' Dilemma.This paper is dedicated to my parents, Arleen Eichengreen and Alvin Richter, for their encouragement, understanding, and financial support. Very special thanks also go to Daniel Hunter, Richard Sharvy, and Paul Horwich. In addition I owe a great deal to discussions and correspondence with Michael Ferejohn, John Ferejohn, Kit Fine, Allan Gibbard, Dale Jamieson, Gregory Kavka, David Lewis, J. Karel Lambert, Alice Perrin, Howard Pospesel, Brian Skyrms, J. Howard Sobel, and Michael Tooley.     

Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

We propose a model of vocational choice that can be used for analyzing and guiding the decision processes underlying career and job choices. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (BDM), in particular the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998). The basic model involves two major processes. First, the selection of a decision strategy according to four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive effort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justifiability of the decision. Second, the construction of situation-specific preferences, which can reflect irrelevant task and context factors such as the evaluation mode. This basic model is extended to account for social influences and the long decision time typical of most career and job decisions. We review research on vocational choice in light of this model, discuss normative implications for counseling, and outline a research agenda for studying vocational choice from a behavioral decision making perspective.     

Evolutionary preference/utility functions: A dynamic perspective

The collection of repeated measures in psychological research is one of the most common data collection formats employed in survey and experimental research. The behavioral decision theory literature documents the existence of the dynamic evolution of preferences that occur over time and experience due to learning, exposure to additional information, fatigue, cognitive storage limitations, etc. We introduce a Bayesian dynamic linear methodology employing an empirical Bayes estimation framework that permits the detection and modeling of such potential changes to the underlying preference utility structure of the respondent. An illustration of revealed stated preference analysis (i.e., conjoint analysis) is given involving students’ preferences for apartments and their underlying attributes and features. We also present the results of several simulations demonstrating the ability of the proposed procedure to recover a variety of different sources of dynamics that may surface with preference elicitation over repeated sequential measurement. Finally, directions for future research are discussed.The authors wish to acknowledge and thank the Editor, the Associate Editor, and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments. Duncan K.H. Fong’s work was sponsored in part by a research grant from the Smeal College.This revised article was published online in August 2005 with the PDF paginated correctly.     

A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.     

Binary choice probabilities: on the varieties of stochastic transitivity

Let {P_λ} denote the family of decisiveness relations {$\text{P}{}_{\mathrm{\lambda }}\text{:}\text{1}\text{2}\text{≤ λ < 1}$} with aP_λb if and only if P(a,b) > λ, where P is a binary choice probability function. Families in which all decisiveness relations are of the same type, such as all strict partial orders or all semiorders, are characterized by stochastic transitivity conditions. The conditions used for this purpose differ in various ways from the traditional forms of strong, moderate, and weak stochastic transitivity. The family {P_λ} is then examined from the viewpoint of interval representation models, the most general of which is aP_λb if and only if I(a, λ) > I(b, λ), where the I's are real intervals with I(a, λ) > I(b, λ) if and only if the first interval is completely to the right of the second. With I(a, λ) = [f(a, λ), f(a, λ) + σ(a, λ)], the specializations of the interval model that are discussed include those where the location function f (for left end-points) depends only on the set A of alternatives or stimuli and where the length function σ depends only on A or on λ or neither.     

Random utility models with equality: An apparent,but not actual,generalization of random utility models

A probabilistic model for choice, and preference, is introduced that includes (Tversky's) elimination by aspects model, and the random utility model, as special cases. The model is based on a covert sequential elimination process, the element that is finally chosen in a simple choice experiment being the eventual lone survivor of the elimination process. The model leads us to question the usual form of simple choice experiments, in which a subject must (eventually) choose one of the currently available alternatives, and to suggest that a much more realistic experimental design would allow the subject the no-choice option, i.e., he may refuse to accept any of the currently available alternatives.     

Travel choice and the goal/process utility distinction

The concept of utility emanating from decision theory is employed in applied research aiming to understand and forecast the travel choices the general public make. Related to a distinction between telic and autotelic motivational theories, it is argued that in this area the prevalent definition of utility as goal-related evaluations of outcomes of activities (goal utility) needs to be complemented by the notion that utility is also experienced from performing the activities themselves (process utility). The validity of the distinction thus introduced between goal and process utility was demonstrated empirically in two studies of choices of travel destinations. In Experiment 1, one group of students rated the likelihood of patronizing fictitious grocery stores and another group rated the likelihood of impulse purchases in these stores. In addition to travel time, the rated likelihood of patronizing the stores was independently affected by the number of desirable goods available to purchase (goal utility) and the quality of personal services provided by staff (process utility). In contrast, the rated likelihood of impulse purchases was only affected by the latter. In Experiment 2, similar results were obtained for choices of fictitious grocery stores by a representative sample of car-owning households participating in a travel survey.     

On the wisdom and utility of (under)sociality: A consumer psychology perspective

Kumar and Epley (2023) review robust evidence for an intriguing hypothesis: That people fail to appreciate the benefits of everyday social behaviors and thus hesitate to connect with others in ways that would increase well-being. In this commentary, we discuss how consumer research can enrich theory and application in this emerging line of inquiry. We suggest (a) that the hedonic implications of undersociality can be integrated with reputational signaling insights to generate new questions about the wisdom and utility of social behavior, and (b) that undersociality has interesting implications for a consumption domain of particular interest to maximizing welfare: charitable giving.     

Better together: a unified perspective on appraisal and emotion regulation

ABSTRACT

Advances in our understanding of appraisal processes and emotion regulation have been two of the most important contributions of research on cognition and emotion in recent decades. Interestingly, however, progress in these two areas has been less mutually informative than one might expect or desire. To help remedy this situation, we provide an integration of appraisal theory and the process model of emotion regulation by describing parallel, interacting and iterative systems for emotion generation and emotion regulation. Outputs of the emotion generation system are perceived by the emotion regulation system, and emotion regulation strategies then modulate emotion by intervening at specific stages of the emotion generation system, ultimately changing appraisal dimensions. We hope that our unified perspective will encourage and guide future research at the interface of cognition and emotion.     

A characterization of stochastic independence by association,with an application to random utility theory

A characterization of stochastic independence in terms of association of random variables is given. The result is applied to yield a simple proof of the Sattath-Tversky inequality without continuity assumptions.     

Subjective utility,anticipated utility,and the Allais paradox

One of the most notable counterexamples to expected utility theory is the “Allais paradox” (M. Allais, 1953, Econometrica, 31, 503–546). A number of alternative theories have been proposed in an attempt to resolve this paradox, notably including Karmarkar, 1978, Karmarkar, 1979, 24, 67–72). It is shown that SWU theory necessarily involves violations of dominance, but that the theory can be modified to avoid these violations. The result is a special case of J. Quiggin's anticipated utility theory (1982, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 3, 323–343).     

The importance of choice in therapy: From the perspective of a,hopefully flexible,CBT practitioner

The main purpose of this paper is to present a personal account of my therapeutic journey and to show how my practice of CBT is informed not only by orientation-specific variables (e.g. emphases on 1) attitude; 2) perpetuation of disturbance as opposed to its acquisition; 3) specificity; 4) the development of client self-help skills; and 5) homework), but by more general, trans-theoretical variables (e.g. rooting therapy in the bonds, views, goals and tasks domains of the working alliance and dealing effectively with threats to this alliance). In doing so, I hope to show that when practised well CBT draws upon general principles that span different therapeutic approaches as well as on ideas specific to CBT.     

Rethinking the value of choice: a cultural perspective on intrinsic motivation

Conventional wisdom and decades of psychological research have linked the provision of choice to increased levels of intrinsic motivation, greater persistence, better performance, and higher satisfaction. This investigation examined the relevance and limitations of these findings for cultures in which individuals possess more interdependent models of the self. In 2 studies, personal choice generally enhanced motivation more for American independent selves than for Asian interdependent selves. In addition, Anglo American children showed less intrinsic motivation when choices were made for them by others than when they made their own choices, whether the others were authority figures or peers. In contrast, Asian American children proved most intrinsically motivated when choices were made for them by trusted authority figures or peers. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.