决策中的建议接受和判断

通过对近十余年建议接受（advicetaking）文献的回顾,阐述了建议接受的典型实验范式——判断-建议人系统（judge-advisor system）及其通常采用的决策任务类型。其中,重点讨论了建议接受中常出现的现象以及影响建议接受的因素,如自信、建议人数、情绪和决策精确度等。最后,探讨了建议接受未来的研究方向。     

判断与决策研究纵观:基于模糊痕迹理论的视角(英文)

模糊痕迹理论是用于解释记忆、判断与决策的综合性理论,该理论的提出和发展主要基于对信息存储、表征、提取和加工过程的研究。本文首先介绍了模糊痕迹理论的基本原则,在此基础上重点讨论了其要义(gist)如何发挥核心作用,使得模糊痕迹理论有别于其他传统的决策模型。该理论将高级直觉与原始冲动性进行了区分,并且预测决策误差来源于判断与决策的各种不同成分,如背景知识、信息表征、提取和加工过程等。模糊痕迹理论不仅可以解释诸如框架效应、合取谬误等传统决策与判断文献中常讨论的误差现象,同时基于该理论的研究还得到了一些与传统决策理论相悖的新发现。此外,对脑与行为如何发育性变化的研究为我们了解成人的认知过程提供了至关重要的新视角,这些对脑与行为的发育性研究和对特殊人群的研究结果也都支持了模糊痕迹理论对要义加工依赖的预测。     

判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

判断与决策中的情感启发式

情感启发式是指在判断与决策的过程中,个体会有意识或无意识的利用自己对任务选项的主观情感反应来做出决策。具体来说,个体头脑中物体和事件的表征会激起不同水平的情感体验,这种不同的体验会对所有的表征做出积极或消极的标记,人们根据这些被标记的体验来做出判断和决策。情感启发式是个体在决策中常用的策略。目前,关于情感启发式心理机制的解释主要有情感启发式模型和双加工理论。此外,情感启发式的影响因素主要包括经验、时间压力、可评估性和计数能力等。未来的研究应主要集中在探究情感启发式的产生根源和进一步扩展情感启发式应用领域的研究。     

Decision Neuroscience: New Directions in Studies of Judgment and Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Investigations of decision making have historically been undertaken by different disciplines, each using different techniques and assumptions, and few unifying efforts have been made. Economists have focused on precise mathematical models of normative decision making, psychologists have examined how decisions are actually made based on cognitive constraints, and neuroscientists have concentrated on the detailed operation of neural systems in simple choices. In recent years, however, researchers in these separate fields have joined forces in an attempt to better specify the foundations of decision making. This interdisciplinary effort has begun to use decision theory to guide the search for the neural bases of reward value and predictability. Concurrently, these formal models are beginning to incorporate processes such as social reward and emotion. The combination of these diverse theoretical approaches and methodologies is already yielding significant progress in the construction of more comprehensive decision-making models.     

知觉流畅性对判断和决策的影响

流畅性是个体对加工信息难易程度的一种主观体验, 它分为知觉流畅性、概念流畅性、提取流畅性等。研究者通过操纵刺激与背景的颜色对比度、刺激的字体类型、清晰程度等因素来控制知觉流畅性, 发现知觉流畅性会影响一系列判断和决策任务, 如命题真实性、类别判断、偏好、熟悉性等。知觉流畅性既可以作为判断的直接线索也可以通过选择不同线索和认知策略来间接影响判断和决策。     

判断与决策中的证实性偏差

证实性偏差是指个体在决策时, 倾向于有意或无意地寻找支持已有信念、预期或假设的信息和解释, 忽视可能与之不一致的信息和解释。目前, 研究者主要从肯定检验策略、认知失调理论以及错误规避三个方面解释证实性偏差的心理机制。证实性偏差还受到条件性参考框架、任务的抽象性、个体经验以及认知闭合的需要等因素的影响。虽然证实性偏差不能完全消除, 但是可以通过竞争性假设分析法和考虑对立面的方法降低其程度。未来的研究可以从证实性偏差的产生根源、研究范式、群体决策中的证实性偏差以及拓展应用研究这四个方面进行探讨。     

Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making

Human reasoning is accompanied by metacognitive experiences, most notably the ease or difficulty of recall and thought generation and the fluency with which new information can be processed. These experiences are informative in their own right. They can serve as a basis of judgment in addition to, or at the expense of, declarative information and can qualify the conclusions drawn from recalled content. What exactly people conclude from a given metacognitive experience depends on the naive theory of mental processes they bring to bear, rendering the outcomes highly variable. The obtained judgments cannot be predicted on the basis of accessible declarative information alone; we cannot understand human judgment without taking into account the interplay of declarative and experiential information.     

决策与判断研究中的个体分析(英文)

决策与判断研究中(甚至是实验心理学研究中)的许多问题关注某效应是否真实存在,及其背后的解释是什么。这些问题不关注该效应在某一特殊群体中是否显著。因此,可以通过分析单个被试来检验效应的显著性。如果有一个被试表现出了该效应,那么,这个效应就是存在的。根据这一观点,有时也可通过跨案例或者轮次(across cases or rounds)分析来验证效应的显著性,而不需要进行跨被试分析(across subjects)。这一观点也暗示在一些实验中可能存在反方向的效应。本文建议通过进行基于被试个体的统计分析来检验这样的效应,并介绍了一些不同形式的方法:PP概率图(probability probability plots);P值分布检验(tests of the distribution of p-values);分层取样多重检验的矫正(correction for multiple testing with step-down resampling)。这些方法都可以用于处理在对同样假设进行多重检验时无法避免的问题。另外,本文也列举了一些例子,其中有一部分例子存在反方向的效应,另一部分例子不存在。     

The Development of Judgment and Decision Making During Childhood and Adolescence

Research on adult judgment and decision making has focused on deviations from normative models, demonstrating biases and reliance on heuristic shortcuts, thus presenting a very different picture than developmental theories that describe a unidirectional progression toward greater logic and efficiency. Recent research related to this apparent contradiction indicates that children develop competencies to reason effectively and make normative decisions, but also develop biased judgment strategies that are used inappropriately in some situations. We suggest potential explanations for the findings, highlighting the need to consider models that incorporate development in both experiential and analytic information processing systems.     

Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

How Information Availability Interacts with Visual Attention during Judgment and Decision Tasks

Decisions in front of a supermarket shelf probably involve a mix of visually available information and associated memories—and interactions between those two. Several cognitive processes, such as decision making, search, and various judgments, are therefore likely to co‐occur, and each process will influence visual attention. We conducted two eye‐tracking experiments capturing parts of these features by having participants make either judgments or decisions concerning products that had been previously encoded. Half the time, participants made their choices with full information about the available products and half the time with crucial task‐relevant information removed. By comparing participants' use of visual attention during decisions and search‐based and memory‐based judgments, we can better understand how visual attention is differently employed between tasks and how it depends on the visual environment. We found that participants' visual attention during decisions is sensitive to evaluations already made during encoding and strongly characterized by preferential looking to the options later to be chosen. When the task environment is rich enough, participants engage in advanced integrative visual behavior and improve their decision quality. In contrast, visual attention during judgments made on the same products reflects a search‐like behavior when all information is available and a more focused type of visual behavior when information is removed. Our findings contribute not only to the literature on how visual attention is used during decision making but also to methodological questions concerning how to measure and identify task‐specific features of visual attention in ecologically valid ways. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

决策行为和道德判断过程的外语效应:现状与展望

最近研究者发现,人们对决策任务的加工随表述的语言形式(母语/外语)的不同而发生改变,即出现外语效应,并基于双加工模型提出了直觉(即情绪)加工被弱化和审慎(即认知)加工被增强两种理论解释,且均获得部分研究结果的支持。本文概述了外语效应及其心理机制的主要研究文献,并指出由于既往研究范式无法分离情绪与认知加工两个子过程的效力,未来研究应利用加工分离程序以及负性情绪与认知加工阻断技术,深入考察外语对直觉加工和审慎加工的影响,以阐明外语效应的形成机制。     

直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。