The Normative Core Of Paternalism

The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions.     

Normative Explanation And Justification*

Normative explanations of why things are wrong, good, or unfair are ubiquitous in ordinary practice and normative theory. This paper argues that normative explanation is subject to a justification condition: a correct complete explanation of why a normative fact holds must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain actions or attitudes. I first explain and motivate the condition I propose. I then support it by arguing that it fits well with various theories of normative reasons, makes good sense of certain legitimate moves in ordinary normative explanatory discourse, and helps to make sense of our judgments about explanatory priority in certain cases of normative explanation. This last argument also helps to highlight respects in which normative explanation won't be worryingly discontinuous with explanations in other domains even though these other explanations aren't subject to the justification condition. Thus the paper aims not only to do some constructive theorizing about the relatively neglected topic of normative explanation but also to cast light on the broader question of how normative explanation may be similar to and different from explanations in other domains.     

人的所有制与人权概念

人的所有制是被用来从总体上表明一个人类共同体内部各成员之间占有关系的一种社会制度或社会关系;人的所有制是人类社会最基本的经济制度,它是区别和划分人类历史上各种不同经济形态的根本标志,是一个比生产资料所有制更为重要和更为基本的社会所有制的存在形式;人权概念是一个先后为在相关人类共同体中分别建立和维持人的公民所有制、劳动力的公民所有制、公民所有制的劳动者人身所有制、人格的公民平等、人的个人所有制、劳动力的个人所有制、个人所有制的劳动者人身所有制、婚权的个人所有制和使包括所有成年女性在内的所有社会成年成员享有人格的人类平等、劳动力的部分社会所有制等社会制度而被提出来的哲学概念、法律概念和政治概念。     

The History Of Applied Mathematics And The History Of Society

Choosing the history of statistics and operations research as a casestudy, several ways of setting the development of 20th century appliedmathematics into a social context are discussed. It is shown that there isample common ground between these contextualizations and several recent research programs in general contemporary history. It is argued that a closer cooperation between general historians and historians ofmathematics might further the integration of the internalist andexternalist approaches within the historiography of mathematics.     

The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge‐how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge‐how is in fact resilient to being undermined by the very kinds of traditional (propositional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists identify with knowledge‐how. Second, we aim to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge‐how could be modelled within an anti‐intellectualist framework.     

The Units Of Selection And The Causal Structure Of The World

Genic selectionism holds that all selection can be understood as operating on particular genes. Critics (and conventional biological wisdom) insist that this misrepresents the actual causal structure of selective phenomena at higher levels of biological organization, but cannot convincingly defend this intuition. I argue that the real failing of genic selectionism is pragmatic – it prevents us from adopting the most efficient corpus of causal laws for predicting and intervening in the course of affairs – and I offer a Pragmatic account of causation itself which ultimately bears out the claim that genic selectionism misrepresents the causal structure of selective contexts.     

马克思与罗尔斯论资本主义及市场的正义

马克思和罗尔斯似乎有着十分不同的正义观。马克思主张,正义概念的功能,在意识形态上表现为以主导生产模式所要求的操行,作为具有普遍约束性的律令。罗尔斯则主张,正义是社会制度的第一美德,它的法则可能被所有这样的人所认可:他们公正、合理地商讨的问题,是如何公平划分彼此之间在社会合作中的负担和利益。尽管体现在马克思和罗尔斯立场之间的种种重要不同仍然存在,但笔者认为,这两种正义观上显然不同的立场,是能够调和的。尽管受到黑格尔和康德的不同影响,马克思和罗尔斯的观点还是能显示出一致之处。在提出明确的正义政治概念时,罗尔斯认为,可以接受的正义原则,必须是在社会体制中能够实行的。这导致他的“康德式构成主义”,向黑格尔的观点靠近,在这一点上,马克思奠定了他对普遍的、社会先验的正义原则的拒斥。笔者认为,马克思和罗尔斯两人所追问的,都可以被看作是何种社会制度能够实现作为公平的正义原则。不过,其间仍有两点重要不同。首先,马克思憧憬的,似乎是一种超越休谟和罗尔斯所谓“正义环境”的社会,而对罗尔斯(2001,P177)来说,超越正义环境的社会则是乌托邦。其次,马克思认为,作为社会基础的市场关系应该被超越,因为这些市场关系天然地包含着生产者与生产的社会过程以及社会劳动产品的异化。虽然在超越正义环境的社会里,市场的消亡也许可能,罗尔斯却宣称,在要求必须公正解决竞争的任何社会里,市场消亡均不可能。笔者认为,如果将马克思对市场的拒绝,看作是从根本上拒绝“商品拜物教”,那么马克思和罗尔斯的立场就能调和。笔者的结论是,除了马克思关于未来无阶级社会概念中含有理想成分外,在资本主义及市场的正义观上,马克思和罗尔斯的立场相当接近。     

Ecology And The Science Of Psychology

This study explored the feasibility of discriminating among subtypes of mental retardation on the basis of observable behavior. The major focus was on discrimination between Ss whose low I.Q. could be attributed to normal chromosomal or single locus genetic defects. Concurrently the study sought t o distinguish among diagnostic subgroups of the second category. Three groups of institutionalized subjects were used: Undifferentiated (presumed polygenic segregants), PKU, and Down's Syndrome.     

元认知结构在教学背景中的理解

近20年来,元认知(metacognition)成为心理学研究的热点之一,人们提出了一系列的元认知理论,试图对人的认知与学习过程作出更为深入的探讨和解释。在许多认知活动中元认知都起着重要作用,这些活动包括口头信息交流、口语理解、阅读理解、写作、语言习得、知觉、注意、记忆、问题解决、社会认知和各种形式的自我控制、自我指导等等。本文主要谈:在教学背景中,对元认知的含义及其结构的理解。     

The Rational Analysis Of Mind And Behavior

Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning leads to a radicalreinterpretation of empirical results which are typically viewed asdemonstrating human irrationality.     

The Hypothesis Of Ether And Reid's Interpretation Of Newton's First Rule Of Philosophizing

My object is to question a recurrent claim made to the point that Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was hostile to ether theories and that this hostility had its source in his distinctive interpretation of the first of Newton's regulæ philosophandi. Against this view I will argue that Reid did not have any quarrel at all with unobservable or theoretical entities as such, and that his objections against actual theories concerning ether were scientific rather than philosophical, even when based on Newton's first rule. I argue further that Reid's insistence on Newton's rule concerns, not direct observation, but rather the notion of explanation itself.     

The Logic Of Reliable And Efficient Inquiry

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper pursues a thorough-going instrumentalist, or means-ends, approach to the theory of inductive inference. I consider three epistemic aims: convergence to a...     

Armstrong And The Problem Of Converse Relations

In A World of States of Affairs(Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers acomprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consistsof states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and whileArmstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have adirection or definite order among their places, he does explicitlyacknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have adefinite order or direction. I first show that non-symmetricalrelations pose a problem for Armstrong's theory by raising TheProblem of Converse Relations. I then argue that the bestresolution of this problem in the context of Armstrong's theoryinvolves adopting an analysis of the order or direction of a relationthat differs from the analysis that Russell assumes. I conclude bydiscussing a further problem facing Armstrong's ontology: TheProblem of Converse Relational Properties.     

On The Dynamics Of Alper And Bridger

Bridger and Alper (1999) maintain that the nonphysical featuresof the supertasks described by Pérez Laraudogoitia (1996) involving a system containing an infinite number of particles may be avoided by introducing, in a specific way, Hilbert space in classical dynamics. I argue that it is possible to interpret their proposal in two ways, neither of which is acceptable for the purpose for which it was introduced.     

The Relationship Of Gender And Voice To Depression And Eating Disorders

Research often fails to document a gender difference in measures of voice. This is inconsistent with Gilligan's conceptualization of voice as a gendered construct. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate currently available measures of voice, particularly in terms of whether they appear to be assessing the same characteristics in men as in women. Eighty-seven men and 146 women, all college students, completed both the Silencing the Self Scale (STSS; Jack & Dill, 1992) and the Saying What I Think Around Others scale (SWIT; Harter and Waters, 1991). In addition, measures of depression and eating problems as well as the Personal Attributes Questionnaire were completed. Results indicated inconsistent gender differences on voice measures with some showing no differences, others showing men as having lower voice, and others showing lower voice in women. Correlations between the two voice measures for men and for women were small to moderate. As suggested by Harter, Waters, Whitesell, and Kastelic (1998), femininity was often negatively related to voice, though masculinity was more consistently, and positively, related. The link between lack of voice and psychopathology that has been suggested by various researchers was documented more clearly for women than for men. The results, then, show different patterns of relationships involving voice measures for men than for women. This raises the possibility that the measures are tapping different constructs in men and women, rendering mean comparisons questionable.