A phase transition model for the speed-accuracy trade-off in response time experiments

Most models of response time (RT) in elementary cognitive tasks implicitly assume that the speed-accuracy trade-off is continuous: When payoffs or instructions gradually increase the level of speed stress, people are assumed to gradually sacrifice response accuracy in exchange for gradual increases in response speed. This trade-off presumably operates over the entire range from accurate but slow responding to fast but chance-level responding (i.e., guessing). In this article, we challenge the assumption of continuity and propose a phase transition model for RTs and accuracy. Analogous to the fast guess model (Ollman, 1966), our model postulates two modes of processing: a guess mode and a stimulus-controlled mode. From catastrophe theory, we derive two important predictions that allow us to test our model against the fast guess model and against the popular class of sequential sampling models. The first prediction--hysteresis in the transitions between guessing and stimulus-controlled behavior--was confirmed in an experiment that gradually changed the reward for speed versus accuracy. The second prediction--bimodal RT distributions--was confirmed in an experiment that required participants to respond in a way that is intermediate between guessing and accurate responding.     

Molar and latent models of cognitive slowing: Implications for aging,dementia, depression,development, and intelligence

The time that it takes a group of participants to respond in simple cognitive tasks varies systematically with the identity of the group. For example, on most tasks, older adults take longer to respond than younger adults. Similarly, on most tasks, younger children take longer to respond than mature children. More generally, response time has been found to vary reliably with a number of other factors that differentiate groups of participants, including the levels of dementia, depression, and intelligence. For each factor, investigators have sought to determine whether the various mental processes are slowed identically as the level of impairment increases. They have based this determination largely on the relation between the overall response times of the relevant groups. Here it is shown how one can base this determination on the relation between the speeds of the individual latent or mental processes governing the performance of the target groups. Such a shift in emphasis has three important advantages: it reduces the possibility of falsely accepting or rejecting the hypothesis that all processes are slowed identically; it pinpoints the actual processes that are lengthened disproportionately when processes are not slowed identically; and it makes possible the rigorous testing of the effects of changes in speed on other dependent variables (e.g., accuracy).     

Inhibitory control during sentence reading in dyslexic children.

The present study focused on the nature of the reading disability of children with the guessing subtype of dyslexia (who read fast and inaccurately). The objective was to separate the excitatory account of their reading disturbance (i.e., in guessers the words' resting levels of activation are oversensitive to semantic context) from the inhibitory account (i.e., guessers tend to react prematurely to (false) candidate words that are activated in the lexicon). To disentangle the above accounts, guessers and normal readers were presented with a sentential priming task (SPT). In the SPT, subjects had to determine whether the final word of a sentence was semantically congruent or incongruent with the sentence, but had to inhibit their 'congruent' or 'incongruent' response in case of an occasionally presented pseudoword. To evoke guessing, each pseudoword closely resembled either a valid congruent or incongruent word. Guessing referred to prematurely accepting a pseudoword as a word that either appropriately or inappropriately completed the sentence. The extent to which subjects guessed at word meaning was evidenced by the false recognition rates (FRR) of the misspelled terminal words. Analyses on the FRRs of the pseudowords showed that guessers had significantly more difficulty in suppressing the 'go tendency' triggered by the pseudowords. It was concluded that the impulsive reading style of guessers should be ascribed to a less efficient suppression mechanism rather than to excessive reliance on contextual information. Specifically, the data were explained by assuming that the availability of the pseudoword's candidate meaning activated the hand to respond with, and that guessers found difficulty in suspending this response until they analyzed all letters in the stimulus and they could be sure of its spelling.     

Parkinson's disease is associated with goal setting deficits during task switching

Ten Parkinson's Disease (PD) patients and 10 control participants were tested using a task-switching paradigm in which there was a random task sequence, and the task was cued in every trial. Five PD patients showed a unique error profile. Their performance approximated guessing when accuracy was dependent on correct task identification, and was nearly perfect when accuracy did not depend on correct task identification or in conditions without task switching. Nonetheless, PD patients showed normal task-rule implementation, evidenced by their preparation-related reduction in the reaction-time task-switching cost. The results indicate that, without redundant task information, some PD patients have a specific goal setting deficit, reflected in a difficulty determining which task is currently relevant.     

Rhyme decisions to spoken words and nonwords

Lexical effects in auditory rhyme-decision performance were examined in three experiments. Experiment 1 showed reliable lexical involvement: rhyme-monitoring responses to words were faster than rhyme-monitoring responses to nonwords; and decisions were faster in response to high-frequency as opposed to low-frequency words. Experiments 2 and 3 tested for lexical influences in the rejection of three types of nonrhyming item: words, nonwords with rhyming lexical neighbors (e.g.,jop after the cuerob), and nonwords with no rhyming lexical neighbor (e.g.,vop afterrob). Words were rejected more rapidly than nonwords, and there were reliable differences in the speed and accuracy of rejection of the two types of nonword. The advantage for words over nonwords was replicated for positive rhyme decisions. However, there were no differences in the speed of acceptance, as rhymes, of the two types of nonword. The implications of these results for interactive and autonomous models of spoken word recognition are discussed. It is concluded that the differences in rejection of nonrhyming nonwords are due to the operation of a guessing strategy.     

Expression of nonconscious knowledge via ideomotor actions

Ideomotor actions are behaviours that are unconsciously initiated and express a thought rather than a response to a sensory stimulus. The question examined here is whether ideomotor actions can also express nonconscious knowledge. We investigated this via the use of implicit long-term semantic memory, which is not available to conscious recall. We compared accuracy of answers to yes/no questions using both volitional report and ideomotor response (Ouija board response). Results show that when participants believed they knew the answer, responses in the two modalities were similar. But when they believed they were guessing, accuracy was at chance for volitional report (50%), but significantly higher for Ouija response (65%). These results indicate that implicit semantic memory can be expressed through ideomotor actions. They also suggest that this approach can provide an interesting new methodology for studying implicit processes in cognition.     

Time perception and word recognition: an elaboration of the time-criterion account

Past research suggests that a time criterion guides responding in speeded word recognition tasks. The time-criterion account has been challenged, however, because it incorrectly predicts equivalent latencies for stimuli of differing difficulty when those stimuli are presented in the same trial block. By requiring participants to perform a lexical decision or naming task but to respond only once they had estimated that 1 sec had elapsed, we investigated the idea that stimulus difficulty effects in response latency might be at least partially due to time perception processes. Consistent with this idea, the participants produced shorter estimates of 1-sec intervals when processing easier stimuli (i.e., time seemed to pass faster when easier stimuli were processed). The implication is that understanding speeded word recognition performance will require looking beyond processes involved in acquiring information about the presented stimulus and examining more general response processes.     

Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: the quad model of implicit task performance

The authors argue that implicit measures of social cognition do not reflect only automatic processes but rather the joint contributions of multiple, qualitatively different processes. The quadruple process model proposed and tested in the present article quantitatively disentangles the influences of 4 distinct processes on implicit task performance: the likelihood that automatic bias is activated by a stimulus; that a correct response can be determined; that automatic bias is overcome; and that, in the absence of other information, a guessing bias drives responses. The stochastic and construct validity of the model is confirmed in 5 studies. The model is shown to provide a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the interplay of multiple processes in implicit task performance, including implicit measures of attitudes, prejudice, and stereotyping.     

On Minimizing Guessing Effects on Multiple‐Choice Items: Superiority of a two solutions and three distractors item format to a one solution and five distractors item format

Multiple‐choice response formats are troublesome, as an item is often scored as solved simply because the examinee may be lucky at guessing the correct option. Instead of pertinent Item Response Theory models, which take guessing effects into account, this paper considers a psycho‐technological approach to re‐conceptualizing multiple‐choice response formats. The free‐response format is compared with two different multiple‐choice formats: a traditional format with a single correct response option and five distractors (‘1 of 6’), and another with five response options, three of them being distractors and two of them being correct (‘2 of 5’). For the latter format, an item is scored as mastered only if both correct response options and none of the distractors are marked. After the exclusion of a few items, the Rasch model analyses revealed appropriate fit for 188 items altogether. The resulting item‐difficulty parameters were used for comparison. The multiple‐choice format ‘1 of 6’ differs significantly from the multiple‐choice format ‘2 of 5’, while the latter does not differ significantly from the free‐response format. The lower difficulty of items ‘1 of 6’ suggests guessing effects.     

Inhibitory Control During Sentence Reading in Dyslexic Children

The present study focused on the nature of the reading disability of children with the guessing subtype of dyslexia (who read fast and inaccurately). The objective was to separate the excitatory account of their reading disturbance (i.e., in guessers the words’ resting levels of activation are oversensitive to semantic context) from the inhibitory account (i.e., guessers tend to react prematurely to (false) candidate words that are activated in the lexicon).

To disentangle the above accounts, guessers and normal readers were presented with a sentential priming task (SPT). In the SPT, subjects had to determine whether the final word of a sentence was semantically congruent or incongruent with the sentence, but had to inhibit their ‘congruent’ or ‘incongruent’ response in case of an occasionally presented pseudoword. To evoke guessing, each pseudoword closely resembled either a valid congruent or incongruent word. Guessing referred to prematurely accepting a pseudoword as a word that either appropriately or inappropriately completed the sentence. The extent to which subjects guessed at word meaning was evidenced by the false recognition rates (FRR) of the misspelled terminal words.

Analyses on the FRRs of the pseudowords showed that guessers had significantly more difficulty in suppressing the ‘go tendency’ triggered by the pseudowords. It was concluded that the impulsive reading style of guessers should be ascribed to a less efficient suppression mechanism rather than to excessive reliance on contextual information. Specifically, the data were explained by assuming that the availability of the pseudoword’s candidate meaning activated the hand to respond with, and that guessers found difficulty in suspending this response until they analyzed all letters in the stimulus and they could be sure of its spelling.     

Unconscious influences on direct-test performance

From intense interest in implicit memory there have evolved various methods for separating the respective influence of implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) processes on performance of various tasks. Two experiments are reported, utilizing a levels-of-processing (LOP) approach to manipulate encoding level and comparable indirect (word-stem completion) and direct (cued-completion) retention tests. Confidence ratings of recollection were taken for each direct test response. The aim of these experiments was to explore the role that guessing plays in direct-test performance (Experiments 1 and 2) and to contrast this with performance in a comparable indirect test (Experiment 2). Analysis of correctly guessed responses showed that direct-test performance was reliably influenced by unconscious processes, but differently as a function of LOP. Guessing stems of nonsemantically processed words was found to enhance performance, whereas guessing stems of semantically processed words had no effect on performance. Results are discussed in terms of the similarity between guessing in a direct test and engaging in an indirect test, and subjects' unwitting resourcefulness at being able to retrieve words they cannot explicitly remember.     

An analysis of performance by pre-school children on the KRISP and on a length discrimination task

The speed and accuracy of judgements made by pre-school children on the Kansas Reflection-Impulsivity Scale for Pre-schoolers (KRISP - Wright 1971, 1973) and on a two-choice length discrimination task were investigated. If subjects were relatively accurate on the KRISP then correct responses tended to be faster than errors while if subjects were relatively inaccurate errors were the faster. It is inferred that accurate subjects respond asymptotically in terms of a speed-accuracy tradeoff while inaccurate subjects set a less demanding criterion. Accurate subjects showed a tendency to increase inspection time as a function of item difficulty. This relation did not hold for inaccurate subjects.However, groups classified by means of the KRISP did not differ in either the speed of correct responses or accuracy of line length discriminations. For all groups judgement times were significantly related to stimulus differences and to stimulus ratios. There was no evidence that so-called impulsive children engage in less efficient and less detailed processing than other children.It is argued, contrary to the view of Kagan and his co-workers (e.g. Kakan 1966), that speed and accuracy of responding may not reflect a stable trait dimension. Rather children appear to be able to change their strategies according to the particular demands, implicit or explicit, of the task.     

Rate of processing and judgment of response speed: comparing the effects of alcohol and practice

Both alcohol and practice affect choice reaction time. The present study was conducted to investigate the possibility that impairment from alcohol and improvement with practice could be attributed to changes in the efficiency of control mechanisms (Rabbitt, 1979a), some of which depend upon the ability to judge response speed accurately. Twenty subjects participated in a four-choice reaction time experiment in which they received no alcohol (NA) in Session 1 and either no alcohol (10 subjects) or 0.8 ml alcohol (A) per kilogram of body weight (10 subjects) in Session 2. The task was to respond as fast and as accurately as possible to each stimulus. In addition, subjects were required to press a fifth key after any response that they considered to be both fast and accurate. Subjects had no difficulty in performing this task: (1) there was a significant difference of 122 msec between the mean response time for correct responses indicated as fast and that for correct responses not indicated as fast, and (2) subjects indicated 1 in 4 correct responses but only 1 in 64 errors. Alcohol increased all response times by approximately 40 msec. In contrast, practice decreased response times less for correct responses not indicated as fast than for correct responses indicated as fast. The ability to distinguish between fast and slow responses was thus unaffected by alcohol, but was improved by practice. Responses indicated as "fast" were significantly faster than errors, and appeared to occur without warning (unlike errors, which tended to end a sequence of increasingly fast correct responses). The results suggest that alcohol and practice influence choice reaction time in qualitatively different ways: Alcohol impairs overall response speed but has no effect on the ability to judge response speed, whereas practice improves both.     

What's Context Got to Do with It? Comparative Difficulty of Test Questions Influences Metacognition and Corrected Scores for Formula‐scored Exams

Summary: On formula‐scored exams students receive points and penalties for correct and incorrect answers, respectively, but they can avoid the penalty by withholding incorrect answers. However, test‐takers have difficulty strategically regulating their accuracy and often set an overly conservative metacognitive response bias (e.g., Higham, 2007). The current experiments extended these findings by exploring whether the comparative difficulty of surrounding test questions (i.e., easy vs. hard)—a factor unrelated to the knowledge being tested—impacts metacognitive response bias for medium‐difficulty test questions. Comparative difficulty had no significant influence on participants' ability to choose correct answers for medium questions, but it did affect willingness to report answers and confidence ratings. This difference carried over to corrected scores (scores after penalties are applied) when comparative difficulty was manipulated within‐subjects: Scores were higher in the hard condition. Results are discussed in terms of implications for interpreting formula‐scored tests and underlying mechanisms of performance.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which route to recovery? Controlled retrieval and accessibility bias in retroactive interference

New learning often interferes with the production of older, previously learned responses. However, the original responses usually appear to spontaneously recover and regain their dominance after a delay. This article takes a new approach to questions of interference and recovery by examining performance on immediate and delayed tests using direct or indirect instructions. Direct instructions asked participants to deliberately retrieve the original responses, and indirect instructions allowed them to respond on a more automatic basis, using whatever response came to mind first. Results suggest that interference and recovery may have their largest effects via relatively automatic influences on memory, such as the accessibility of new versus original information. This finding adds a new perspective to classic theories of interference and recovery, and may also inform current understanding of performance in populations (e.g., older adults) that often rely predominantly on automatic memory processing.     

A hierarchical latent response model for inferences about examinee engagement in terms of guessing and item-level non-response

In low-stakes assessments, test performance has few or no consequences for examinees themselves, so that examinees may not be fully engaged when answering the items. Instead of engaging in solution behaviour, disengaged examinees might randomly guess or generate no response at all. When ignored, examinee disengagement poses a severe threat to the validity of results obtained from low-stakes assessments. Statistical modelling approaches in educational measurement have been proposed that account for non-response or for guessing, but do not consider both types of disengaged behaviour simultaneously. We bring together research on modelling examinee engagement and research on missing values and present a hierarchical latent response model for identifying and modelling the processes associated with examinee disengagement jointly with the processes associated with engaged responses. To that end, we employ a mixture model that identifies disengagement at the item-by-examinee level by assuming different data-generating processes underlying item responses and omissions, respectively, as well as response times associated with engaged and disengaged behaviour. By modelling examinee engagement with a latent response framework, the model allows assessing how examinee engagement relates to ability and speed as well as to identify items that are likely to evoke disengaged test-taking behaviour. An illustration of the model by means of an application to real data is presented.     

Effect of loudness on reaction time and response force in different motor tasks

Van der Molen and Keuss, in 1979 and 1981, showed that paradoxically long reaction times occur with extremely strong auditory stimuli when the task is difficult, e.g., choice-by-location or Simon paradigm. It was argued that this paradoxical behavior of RT is due to active inhibition of an arousal-dependent bypassing mechanism to prevent false responses. As the peak force, i.e., maximal force exerted by participants on a response key, is considered to be related to immediate arousal, we predicted that for extremely loud stimuli and for difficult tasks, lengthening of RT should be associated with reduction of peak force. Moreover, these effects should be enhanced when emphasis is on accuracy rather than speed. Although the relation between RT and intensity depended on task difficulty, no increase in RT was found for the loudest tones. Moreover, peak force increased monotonically with loudness, showing no tendency to be suppressed for loudest tones and difficult tasks.     

The effects of spatial uncertainty and cue predictability on visual orienting in children

Visual orienting was studied using a task that required participants to respond to stimuli at various locations that were either accurately or inaccurately cued. Orienting abilities of children ages 6 to 8 years, and young adults (21 years) were tested under conditions of spatial uncertainty (i.e., multiple possible target locations), and variable cue predictability (i.e., variable proportion of validly cued targets). The results indicate that children orient their attentional resources automatically to abrupt visual onsets, and do so under conditions when it is not beneficial to overall performance. Adults, on the other hand, are able to control their orienting in such a way that it is limited to conditions where it improves their task efficiency. There appears to be developmental change in the ability to assess the utility of a location cue and/or to moderate responses in accordance with the utility of a cue. This finding is discussed in terms of the development of attentional control and inhibitory processes in children.     

Accounting for individual differences in speed in the discretized signed residual time model

With advances in computerized tests, it has become commonplace to register not just the accuracy of the responses provided to the items, but also the response time. The idea that for each response both response accuracy and response time are indicative of ability has explicitly been incorporated in the signed residual time (SRT) model (Maris & van der Maas, 2012, Psychometrika, 77, 615–633), which assumes that fast correct responses are indicative of a higher level of ability than slow correct responses. While the SRT model allows one to gain more information about ability than is possible based on considering only response accuracy, measurement may be confounded if persons show differences in their response speed that cannot be explained by ability, for example due to differences in response caution. In this paper we propose an adapted version of the SRT model that makes it possible to model person differences in overall speed, while maintaining the idea of the SRT model that the speed at which individual responses are given may be indicative of ability. We propose a two-dimensional SRT model that considers dichotomized response time, which allows one to model differences between fast and slow responses. The model includes both an ability and a speed parameter, and allows one to correct the estimates of ability for possible differences in overall speed. The performance of the model is evaluated through simulation, and the relevance of including the speed parameter is studied in the context of an empirical example from formative educational assessment.     

Lack of control enhances accurate and inaccurate identification responses to degraded visual objects

Recent studies have shown that lack of control induces illusory pattern perception. In this study, we demonstrate that lacking control also affected identification responses to degraded pictures of visual objects. As compared with control participants, participants in whom lack of control was experimentally induced produced identification responses to visual objects at a significantly higher level of degradation of the stimulus. Lacking control did not influence accuracy of identification, since the effect was present for both correct and incorrect identification responses, and did not encourage pure random guessing. Our results indicate that lacking control makes individuals more prone to achieve visual closure by attempting earlier identifications of perceptually degraded visual objects. Possible mechanisms involved in this effect are discussed.