共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(1):60-77
The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This dissolves the apparent paradox of Frankfurt-type cases as well as the chance objection to incompatibilist free will. 相似文献
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Greenspan PS 《哲学与公共事务》1993,22(1):31-43
...I want to argue that the Human Genome Project itself poses no special problem for human freedom, understood in relation to the philosophical issue of free will versus determinism. It seems to pose a problem only if one muddles the interpretation of the issue or of the project that is supposed to bear on it. There is a need for conceptual clarification to point this out, perhaps, but I see no need for "research" in the sense that implies original investigation. However, I also want to probe a bit deeper to identify a distinct set of philosophical worries about freedom that seem to have been misplaced onto the standard issue, the issue of freedom versus determinism, in this discussion and elsewhere. After arguing that the genome project has no real bearing on free will versus determinism, I shall attempt to identify the threat it poses to freedom partly by detaching it from this standard version of the free will question. I shall argue that the worrisome forms of genetic influence that the project might uncover do not really presuppose determinism. But what they do presuppose -- some form of internal or psychological constraint on behavior -- suggests an alternative version of the free will question as the source of popular fears about scientific explanation of human behavior. What is under threat on this version of the question is the Aristotelian notion of character formation and self-control. 相似文献
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P. Hájı´ček 《Consciousness and cognition》2009,18(1):103-109
The general notion of relative freedom is introduced. It is a kind of freedom that is observed everywhere in nature. In biology, incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by Popper’s trial-and-error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neuron connections. After the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness, free will is defined as a conscious version of relative freedom. The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phenomenon that agrees with our experience. 相似文献
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Taylor W. Cyr Matthew T. Flummer 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2018,83(2):183-199
Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism (or at least semi-Pelagianism), and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live (orthodox) option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers (including Richard Cross, Eleonore Stump, and Kevin Timpe) have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic (and thus avoid Pelagianism) but maintain the resistibility of God’s grace (with the aim of blocking the tracing of sin to God). In this paper, we present a challenge to such accounts of the resistibility of grace, namely that they imply that human beings are praiseworthy for omitting to resist God’s grace. Even if such views escape Pelagianism as it is typically defined, they fail to avoid the worry at the heart of prominent criticisms of Pelagianism concerning the praise for a human being’s salvation. At the end of the paper, we suggest three possible solutions to this problem. 相似文献
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The Free will Revolution (Continued) 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(3):315-345
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji.
In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make
some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas.
I thank Michael McKenna for his thoughtful comments, his generous introduction, and all his hard work in putting this together.
Also, I wish to thank J. Angelo Corlett for his very pleasantly surprising decision to do this volume, and for his outstanding
work in editing this wonderful journal from its inception. 相似文献
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Meynen G 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2010,31(6):429-443
A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile,
it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship
between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will explore the link between mental disorder and free
will. I examine two domains in which a connection between mental disorder and free will is present: the philosophy of free
will and forensic psychiatry. As it turns out, philosophers of free will frequently refer to mental disorders as conditions
that compromise free will and reduce moral responsibility. In addition, in forensic psychiatry, the rationale for the assessment
of criminal responsibility is often explained by referring to the fact that mental disorders can compromise free will. Yet,
in both domains, it remains unclear in what way free will is compromised by mental disorders. Based on the philosophical debate,
I discuss three senses of free will and explore their relevance to mental disorders. I conclude that in order to further clarify
the relationship between free will and mental disorder, the accounts of people who have actually experienced the impact of
a mental disorder should be included in future research. 相似文献