How Nonsectarian is ‘Nonsectarian’?: Jorge Ferrer's Pluralist Alternative to Tibetan Buddhist Inclusivism

This paper queries the logic of the structure of hierarchical philosophical systems. Following the Indian tradition of siddhānta, Tibetan Buddhist traditions articulate a hierarchy of philosophical views. The ‘Middle Way’ philosophy or Madhyamaka—the view that holds that the ultimate truth is emptiness—is, in general, held to be the highest view in the systematic depictions of philosophies in Tibet, and is contrasted with realist schools of thought, Buddhist and non-Buddhist. But why should an antirealist or nominalist position be said to be ‘better’ than a realist position? What is the criterion for this claim and is it, or can it, be more than a criterion that is tradition-specific for only Tibetan Buddhists? In this paper, I will look at the criteria to evaluate Buddhist philosophical traditions, particularly as articulated in what came to be referred as the ‘nonsectarian’ (ris med) tradition. I draw from the recent work of Jorge Ferrer to query the assumptions of the hierarchical structures of ‘nonsectarian’ traditions and attempt to articulate an evaluative criteria for a nonsectarian stance that are not based solely on metaphysical or tradition-specific claims.     

Dynamic and Syncretic Dimensions to Śāntarakṣita's Presentation of the Two Truths

It is common for philosophers from the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhist thought to offer a presentation of the two truths, ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and conventional truth (sa?v?tisatya), as a vehicle for presenting their views on the ontological status of entities. Though there is some degree of variance, generally ultimate truths are described as objects known by an awareness of knowing things as they are. Conventional truths are objects as conceived by a mistaken awareness, one that superimposes a mode of existence onto objects that is not actually there. These two truths are contrasted (one is accurate; one is not) and used as a vehicle for understanding the ontological status of phenomena and the means by which they are known. ?āntarak?ita (725–788 CE) was among the most important Madhyamaka thinkers in Indian Buddhist history, yet his presentation of the two truths has several features that signal its uniqueness. This paper will discuss two particular unique dimensions to ?āntarak?ita's views on the two truths: his integration of aspects of Cittamatra/Yogācāra thinking, including the rejection of external objects, into his presentation of conventional truths, and the dynamic way in which conventional truths are not merely presented as objects of a mistaken awareness, but rather as an important soteriological step in the process of realizing the ultimate. This syncretic and dynamic integration of Yogācāra thought, where its ideas are fully engaged and incorporated into an over-arching Madhyamaka philosophical system is a key component to the thought of one of the most important, influential, and innovative figures in the late period of Indian Madhyamaka, and one which has yet to be fully acknowledged in secondary literature.     

Apophasis and the turn of philosophy to religion: From Neoplatonic negative theology to postmodern negation of theology

This essay represents part of an effort to rewrite the history metaphysics in terms of what philosophy never said, nor could say. It works from the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Plato’s Parmenides as the matrix for a distinctively apophatic thinking that takes the truth of metaphysical doctrines as something other than anything that can be logically articulated. It focuses on Damascius in the 5–6th century AD as the culmination of this tradition in the ancient world and emphasizes that Neoplatonism represents the crisis of Greek metaphysics on account of the inability to give a rational account of foundations for knowing and of the ultimate principle of beings. Neoplatonism discovered how all such ultimate principles were necessarily beyond the reach of reason and speech. This apophatic insight is drawn out with the help of contemporary criticism of Neoplatonic philosophy, defining also some points of divergence. The essay then discusses the motives for thinking the unsayable in postmodern times on the basis of this parallel with Neoplatonic thought. Discourse’s becoming critical of itself to the point of self-subversion animates them both. However, the tendency in postmodern thought to totally reject theology, including negative theology, is a betrayal of its own deepest motivations. This tendency is debated through an examination of the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. While any traditional discourse can be negated, the negating and self-negating capacity of discourse itself is infinite, and this is where a perennial negative theological philosophy of the unsayable is to be located. Language, eminently the language of philosophy, as infinitely open, points in a direction which becomes equally and ineluctably theological.     

Jñānagarbha and the “God's‐eye view”

In trying to define the difference between conventional and ultimate truth, the Mādhyamika Buddhist author Jñānagarbha ends up in paradoxical formulations. Putnam's discussion of Nietzsche's remark that “as the circle of science grows larger it touches paradox at more places” is presented as an illustration for Jñānagarbha's case. No comparison of Putnam and Jñānagarbha is intended as regards the contents of their presentations, the focus being only on the logical form of their argumentation. The paradoxical nature of Jñānagarbha's doctrinal system is explained to derive from the logical incompleteness of formal systems. The paradox is also explained to work as a direction arrow pointing to what can only be realised in a mystical experience.     

佛教逻辑学的论辩解释与认知解释——陈那、法称与因明

佛教逻辑有别于西方形式逻辑的一项重要特征,在于对论证前提为真的强调,并在此基础上提出了著名的"因三相"理论。论证前提的真,在陈那著作中又被理解为辩论主体将该前提确定为真。这种"确定"体现为文献中对"极成"(prasiddha)、"成"(siddha)、"决定"(ni?cita)、"见"(d???a)、"已知"(vidita)的强调。这些表达辩论者认知状态的词汇,皆可概括为佛教逻辑中的"认知算子"(epistemic operator)。本文通过研究东亚因明与法称两个传统对陈那《正理门论》中"决定同许"的理论设定的不同解释,说明因明传统在陈那奠定的方向上,进一步采取了"论辩解释"(dialectic interpretation),将"确定为真"解释为在辩论的情境中为辩论的双方承认为真(共许、同许)。法称《释量论自注》对陈那"决定同许"的解释,则表明由他开启的传统在陈那的基础上,进一步采取了"认知解释"(epistemic interpretation),将"确定为真"解释为在认识论的意义上得到确定(ni?cita/ni?caya,决定),即为有效认知的手段(量)所证成。这是因明传统与法称传统的一项根本差异。因明传统对辩论术的关注,极有可能反映了法称以前印度学界对陈那思想的诠释路径。     

Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and Yogācāra Buddhism's theory of the three natures

IntroductionNa¯ga¯rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ that ‘The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma¯dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that all phenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The former, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth; while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. This paper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the Tibetan Pra¯sangika Ma¯dhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them. It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge's (hereafter Go rampa 1429-1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the two truths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate in a way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or identity.     

Paleo-Compatibilism and Buddhist Reductionism

Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.

Buddhist Impact on Chinese Culture

The Chinese traditional culture includes three systems of thought: Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. The first two are Chinese culture, and Buddhism is a foreign religion introduced from India. Although there had been conflicts among the three systems of thoughts, but integration is the mainstream in the development of Chinese cultural thought. Thus, Chinese culture has developed into a system by uniting the three religions into one with Confucianism at the centre supported by Daoism and Buddhism. For over 2,000 years, Buddhism has interacted with all levels of Chinese culture such as literature, philosophy, morality, arts, architecture and religions. As a result, Buddhism has successfully integrated into the traditional Chinese culture and has become one of the three pillars. In this paper, I will discuss the Buddhist impact on Chinese culture from the following four points: (1) philosophy and moral teaching; (2) religions and popular beliefs; (3) language and literature; and (4) art and architecture.     

“动态的空”与历程哲学——宗教间创造性的相互转化的一个案例分析

本文首先分析了在耶佛对话的背景下,阿部正雄是如何向西方对话伙伴阐释佛教"空"的思想,并指出阿部诠释"空"的最大特色在于其"动态性"。接着,针对一些学者认为阿部的"空"观沿袭了中国传统佛教对"空"的阐释,本文提出了不同看法,认为阿部对"空"的诠释有其独创性。最后,通过分析怀特海的历程思想与阿部"空"的联系,指出阿部对"空"的创造性阐释受到了其宗教对话的启发,实践了"促进宗教间创造性的相互转化"的理念。     

Why did Bodhidharma go to the east? Buddhism’s struggle with the mind in the world

This question—why did Bodhidharma come from the West?— is ubiquitous in Chinese Ch’an Buddhist literature. Though some see it as an arbitrary question intended merely as an opener to obscure puzzles, I think it represents a genuine intellectual puzzle: Why did Bodhidharma come from theWest—that is, fromIndia? Why couldn’tChina with its rich literary and philosophical tradition have given rise to Buddhism? We will approach that question, but I prefer to do so backwards. I want to ask instead, “why was it so fortuitous for the development of Buddhist philosophy that Bodhidharma wentEast? I will argue that by doing so he gave a trajectory to Buddhist thought about the mind and knowledge that allows certain issues that are obscure in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, despite their centrality to the Buddhist critique of Indian orthodoxy, to come into sharper relief, and hence to complete a project begun, but not completable, in that Indo-European context.     

论雅斯贝尔斯“轴心时代”观念的中国思想来源

雅斯贝尔斯对“轴心时代”文明之梳理,在很大程度上是考察在人类历史上中国、印度和希腊三种文明是以何种方式达到“统摄”（das Umgreifende）的。而孔子和老子的思想在达至终极真理的方式方面,给予了雅斯贝尔斯以极大的启发。本文考察了中国资源在雅斯贝尔斯“轴心时代”观念形成过程中所起的作用,并进而指出,如果没有中国思想参与的话,“轴心时代”这一概念会不会出现,都是值得考虑的。反过来,正是借助于作为存在哲学大师的雅斯贝尔斯的复述,孔子和老子的思想变得鲜活起来,从而更符合时代的要求。实际上,中国只是雅斯贝尔斯寻求世界文明历史发展进程的一个重要组成部分,他希望通过对世界不同文明发展进程的探寻,来思考和揭示人性存在的现状,进一步发现共同的起源和未来,从而为他的世界哲学理念提供一个更加广泛的基础。     

Learning from experience: Bion's concept of reverie and Buddhist meditation: A comparative study

The author argues for a common denominator between Bion's view and the Buddhist view of mental development. In both thought systems, mental growth is synonymous to learning from experience. The author closely examines Bion's concept of attention and compares it to mindfulness, a major factor in Buddhist meditation. In both doctrines, attention must be isolated from other mental processes in order to attain learning from experience. The author compares reverie to the state of mind of equanimity. She argues that enhancement of the ability of reverie, or improving the inner container such that it can hold any content while unmoved by desire, is the purpose of Buddhist practice. Both view the mind as capable of transcending its own restrictions and 'the capacity to know anything' as attainable through disciplined practice.     

TWO STRAINS IN BUDDHIST CAUSALITY

This essay will focus on the Buddhist metaphysics of experience which is generally glossed over due to the excessive concern for the ultimate goal in Buddhism, nirvīna , and in consequence of which the emphasis has been on the practice of; meditative discipline in aspiration for that goal. Yet neither nirvana nor meditative discipline can be understood properly without examining the full dimension of our ordinary experience. Such an examination should reveal to us the unique ways in which the Buddhist refers to the bounded and unbounded conditions of existence. All this is novel insofar as metaphysics goes and indeed it would have to be a unique form of metaphysics in order to accommodate the dual aspect of existence. The key to this metaphysics lodges in the Buddhist concept of experiential process,¹ technically known as pratītyasamutpāda which is variously translated as relational origination, interrelational origination or dependent origination. It refers to the Buddhist concept of causality but, as we shall see, it is a unique concept with more than the usual Western connotation.     

Questions in the Making: A Review Essay on Zen and Buddhist Ethics in the Context of Buddhist and Comparative Ethics

In reviewing four works from the 1990s—monographs by Christopher Ives and Phillip Olson on Zen Buddhist ethics, Damien Keown's treatment of Indian Buddhist ethics, and an edited collection on Buddhism and human rights—this article examines recent scholarship on Zen Buddhist ethics in light of issues of Buddhist and comparative ethics. Its highlights selected themes in the notional and real encounter of Zen Buddhism with Western thought and culture as presented in the reviewed works and identifies issues and problems for further consideration, in particular, problems of comparative and cross-cultural understanding and the articulation and redefinition of Zen Buddhist tradition.     

The Varied Trajectories of Engaged Buddhism: New Works on Buddhist Environmental Ethics,Interdependence, and Racial Karma

This book discussion reads three works in contemporary Buddhist social ethics alongside one another: Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s Interconnected, David Loy’s Ecodharma, and Larry Ward’s America’s Racial Karma. Each of these works contributes to the subfield of engaged Buddhism, which aims to bring Buddhist value theory to contemporary social and political issues in order to effect social change. The rapid development of engaged Buddhism constitutes a particularly rich moment in the history of Buddhist thought, as Buddhist ethics is showing itself to be actively in process—a tradition in the midst of rapid transformation, revision, and cross-cultural application. This book discussion interrogates these three works with that metaphilosophical and historiographical issue in mind, analyzing the particular ways in which they contribute to challenging and reshaping the traditional contours of Buddhist ethics into a contemporary social and political register. In exemplifying the approaches of translation, extending, and applying, these works demonstrate the creative and experimental moment in which Buddhist social ethics finds itself today. Such adaptations of the Buddhist tradition are historiographically significant as innovations, while also of a piece with Buddhism’s history of intercultural transmission.     

《庄子》中的孔子形象

本文从《庄子》的有关记载中,发现《庄子》一书中的孔子既“具有道家思想的儒者形象”,又有“道家的反面形象”。进而又从书中“以重言为真”的写作方法等方面探讨了儒道两家之间既互相矛盾又互相渗透的关系。     

Radical Intersubjectivity: Reflections on the “Different” Foundation of Education

This article addresses the question how educational theory can overcome the assumptions of the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness, a tradition which can be seen as the foundation of the modern project of education. While twentieth century philosophy has seen several attempts to make a shift from consciousness to intersubjectivity (Dewey, Wittgenstein, Habermas) it is argued that this shift still remains within the humanistic tradition of modern thought in that it still tries to define, still tries to develop a theory about the human subject. Foucault's thesis of the end of man is interpreted as an attempt to move beyond humanism, an attempt motivated by a sincere concern for the humanity of the subject. Starting from the question as to who comes after the subject, several answers to this question, which all share an interest in the question as to where the subject comes into presence, are discussed (referring to the writings of Tschumi, Arendt and Levinas). In the concluding section it is argued that one way to move beyond the humanistic tradition of modern thought is to conceive of the subject in terms of responsibility and ethics (Levinas) and to conceive of the very task of theory in terms of justice, and not in terms of truth. This, so it is argued, should be the final concern for educational theory and curriculum theory.     

CORNELIUS ERNST. SERMON PREACHED BY FERGUS KERR O.P.

"Ultimately, I cannot accept the framework of experience demanded and presupposed by the orthodox ecclesiastical tradition. I think I must face this, with consequences I can't foretell. I have another tradition to which I am almost equally respectful–in some ways more so–the tradition of the human heart: novels, art, music, tragedy. I cannot allow that God can only be adored in spirit and in truth by the individual introverted upon himself and detached from all that might disturb and solicit his heart. It must be possible to find and adore God in the complexity of human experience. (Patrick White). On my deathbed, what in memory will I be grateful for? Where will my life have been most fully lived? And memory is a sort of history. The eschatological moment must be a fulfilment and consummation of human history and not its negation merely. Let. me grasp this as true; then perhaps the pain may be more bearable. For of course there must be a negation and a separation at the heart of this affirmation and consent; and this remains the importance of the ecclesiastical tradition".     

Trauma and Truth: Representations of Madness in Chinese Literature

With only a few exceptions, the literary theme of madness has long been a domain of Western cultural studies. Much of Western writing represents madness as an inquiry into the deepest recesses of the mind, while the comparatively scarce Chinese tradition is generally defined by madness as a voice of social truth. This paper looks at five works of twentieth-century Chinese fiction that draw on socio-somatic aspects of madness to reflect upon social truths, suggesting that the inner voice of subjectivity is perhaps not the only true voice of the self.     

Common Core Thesis and Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Mysticism in Chinese Buddhist Monks and Nuns

This study explores the phenomenological structure of mystical experience among 139 Chinese Pure Land and Chan Buddhist monks and nuns. Semi‐structured interviews, thematic coding, and statistical analyses demonstrated that Stace's common facets of mysticism as measured by Hood's Mysticism Scale (M Scale) successfully described Buddhist experience as modified by Buddhist doctrines. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) revealed that these facets could be formed into Stace's three‐factor structure. A mystical introvertive unity hypothesized to be separate from an extrovertive unity instead converged in the Chinese Buddhist context. These results lend strong support to the thesis that the phenomenology of mystical experience reveals a common experiential core that can be discerned across religious and spiritual traditions. These data also demonstrated that this common core can and should be explored using mixed methods.