Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm,and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections (Paper 2 of 2)

This second of two papers focuses on the shame which emerged in the first 14 years of analysis of a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed, and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. To explore this intense and pervasive shame I draw on Jung's and Laplanche's emphasis on experiences of unresolvable, non‐pathological ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at the heart of the psyche. Images, metaphors, elements of clinical experience, and working hypotheses from a number of analytic traditions are used to flesh out this exploration. These include Kilborne's use of Pirandello's image of shame as like a ‘hole in the paper sky’ which, I suggest, points to a crack in subjectivity, and reveals our belief in the efficacy of the self to be illusory. Hultberg's observations on shame as having an existential mode (function) are also explored, as is the nature of analytic truth. Using these ideas I describe my patient's process of finding some small but freeing space in relation to her shame and self‐hatred. Through enduring and learning from her shame in analysis she realized that it was part of a desperate unconscious attempt to draw close to her troubled father and so to ‘love him better’.     

Unpacking Competitiveness Within and Between Women: Discussion of “With Friends Like These,Who Needs Enemies?”

F. Diane Barth’s paper (this issue) illustrates how a woman’s competitiveness can set her up for significant psychic conflict and interpersonal strife. Achievement strivings are an arena in which “being for oneself” may undermine—in fantasy, but also in reality—one’s ability to “be for the other,” and vice versa. My discussion contextualizes Barth’s thinking in relation to earlier psychoanalytic explorations of the female gender identity and its development. I elaborate on the special challenges involved in the achievement-oriented and competitive urges of women in particular, and I attempt to parse more fully the diverse nature and motivational wellsprings of such strivings. While recognizing the author’s clear helpfulness to the patient, I raise a few questions about her theoretical position and technical approach in the case study she presents. In particular, I address what seems to me to be a dominant-submissive element that to some extent reenacts the competitive dynamic being analyzed.     

Substantive Equality and Equal Citizenship1

In Part 1, I argue that Watson and Hartley’s relational feminist political liberal approach – grounded in the idea of equal citizenship – produces a rather elusive liberal feminist agenda (because of its reliance on intuitions) and that it may lose track of the importance of goods whose value stems from the role they play in an individual woman’s or girl’s life rather than from the role they play in securing equal citizenship. I suggest that a distributive principle approach – like that of Susan Okin – might do better on both scores. In Part 2, I argue that Watson and Hartley may have overpromised what the state can and may do. Discussion includes focus on policy questions concerning, for example, prostitution and the gendered division of labor.     

Reproductive ectogenesis: The third era of human reproduction and some moral consequences

In a well known story Derek Parfit describes a disconnection between two entities that normally (in real life) travel together through space and time, namely your personal identity consisting of both mind and body. Realising the possibility of separation, even if it might never happen in real life, new questions arise that cast doubt on old solutions. In human reproduction, in real life, at present the fetus spends approximately nine months inside the pregnant woman. But, we might envisage other possibilities.Historically, the first era is the normal conception inside the woman, the growth of the fetus in the womb and then, after nine months, birth and the appearance of a new individual. The second era is In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF). The fetus starts outside the woman as a fertilised egg, moves to the body of the woman and spends nine month there, where the body of the woman and the fetus travel together in space-time to separate at birth. In the third era of reproductive ectogenesis, the two never travel together. The fetus spends its gestational time entirely outside the woman’s body. We have two entities separated in space-time the whole time. The intimate connection consisting in the fetus being a part of the woman’s body is gone.In this paper I will briefly comment on the three eras of human reproduction — and primarily on the relationship between the new individual and the woman — and then spend some time with a fictional story illustrating some moral consequences of the third era. The story is from Pig Pharmaceuticals Limited and how they in the year 2050 report the successful development of pig-related pregnancies with transgenic pigs as surrogate mothers.     

The relationship between space and mutual interaction: Kant contra Newton and Leibniz

Kant claims that we cannot cognize the mutual interaction of substances without their being in space; he also claims that we cannot cognize a ‘spatial community’ among substances without their being in mutual interaction. I situate these theses in their historical context and consider Kant’s reasons for accepting them. I argue that they rest on commitments regarding the metaphysical grounding of, first, the possibility of mutual interaction among substances-as-appearances and, second, the actuality of specific distance-relations among such substances. By illuminating these commitments, I shed light on Kant’s metaphysics of space and its relation to Newton and Leibniz’s views.     

Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find support in the idealism of Hegel. I begin by first explaining what philosophical naturalism amounts to. I then move on to show, using Finn Spicer’s and Alison Stone’s understandings of philosophical naturalism, how there is a stronger form of philosophical naturalism but also how there is a weaker form as well. Having established the distinction between stronger and weaker variants of philosophical naturalism, I discuss Sebastian Gardner’s recent objections to treating absolute idealism as a genuinely naturalist position. I argue that Gardner is incorrect to claim that absolute idealism is not a genuinely naturalist position on both historical and interpretive grounds, where to do so I bring in features of Hegel’s idealism to show that Hegel was committed to liberal naturalism. In the next section of the paper, I address Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for liberal naturalism. To counter this claim, I offer an Hegelian diagnosis of Neta’s charge and argue that Neta’s concern about the possibility of liberal naturalism is illegitimately motivated.     

The aim of Russell’s early logicism: a reinterpretation

I argue that three main interpretations of the aim of Russell’s early logicism in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) are mistaken, and propose a new interpretation. According to this new interpretation, the aim of Russell’s logicism is to show, in opposition to Kant, that mathematical propositions have a certain sort of complete generality which entails that their truth is independent of space and time. I argue that on this interpretation two often-heard objections to Russell’s logicism, deriving from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and from the non-logical character of some of the axioms of Principia Mathematica respectively, can be seen to be inconclusive. I then proceed to identify two challenges that Russell’s logicism, as presently construed, faces, but argue that these challenges do not appear unanswerable.     

Embodied female experience through the lens of imagination

Abstract: In 1971, I made a film entitled Self Portrait of a Nude Model Turned Cinematographer in which I explore the objectifying ‘male’ gaze on my body in contrast to the subjective lived experience of my body. The film was a radical challenge to the gaze that objectifies woman – and thus imprisons her – which had hitherto dominated narrative cinema. Since the objectification of women has largely excluded us from the privileged phallogocentric discourses, in this paper I hope to bring into the psychoanalytic dialogue a woman's lived experience. I will approach this by exploring how remembering this film has become a personally transformative experience as I look back on it through the lens of postmodern and feminist discourses that have emerged since it was made. In addition, I will explore how this process of imaginatively looking back on an artistic creation to generate new discourses in the present is similar to the transformative process of analysis. Lastly, I will present a clinical example, where my embodied countertransference response to a patient's subjection to the objectifying male gaze opens space for a new discourse about her body to emerge.     

Perspectivity,Intersubjectivity, Normativity: On Malpas’s Place and Experience

ABSTRACT

The publication of the revised edition of Jeff Malpas’s Place and Experience in 2018 gives the opportunity to reconsider this book (originally published in 1999) and the debates that it originally sparked. In this article, I focus on Malpas’s characterization of space as subjective, allocentric, and objective and I approach them in conjunction with other notions and considerations that, I suggest, are useful to expand and complement Malpas’s central theses. I approach the concept of subjective space in conjunction with the notion of coenaesthesis and with Heidegger’s notion of mineness (Jemeinigkeit); the concept of allocentric space by addressing Malpas’s critique of Nagel’s notion of detachment; and the concept of objective space through a discussion of the issue of perspective in light of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Leibniz’s notion of ‘géométral’ (geometrized projection). These analyses pave the way for a discussion of some possible normative implications of the conception of place and subjectivity that emerges from Malpas’s Place and Experience against the background of Heidegger’s thought, and particularly in relation to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling (Wohnen).     

Discussion of “Taking the Sting Out: Manifesting Aggression and Containing Difficult States in a Relational Group Psychotherapy”

Ravit Raufman’s paper contributes to the bridging gap between relational approaches and group therapy. It is also important in its recognizing the (group) therapist’s aggression and suggesting how to use it in the service of the group development. In this review I focus on the dynamics of a group of women led by a woman to explain some of the phenomena that Raufman describes in her article, and I add some social unconscious ideas to enrich our understanding of that group.     

UNTOLD STORIES AND THE POWER OF SILENCE IN THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF SOCIAL TRAUMA*

There are intergenerational secrets and unprocessed experiences that very often don’t have a voice or an image associated with them but loom in our minds nonetheless. What haunts are not the dead, but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others. This paper will look at the conflict that occurs when unspoken events and memories of one generation haunt the next one. It is my contention that the second-generation survivors of trauma can be deeply affected by something that did not directly happen to them. Utilizing my own personal narrative I will examine how being the daughter of a woman who escaped the Holocaust, and her silence about those events affected my personal development and later my work with patients. I will also explore the unspoken secret that a patient’s mother kept from her, paralleling the writer’s mother’s secret.     

A Lacanian Ethics of Non-Personal Responsibility

It is widely believed that Jacques Lacan fails to explain adequately how the subject, allegedly no more than an effect of signifiers in the Symbolic order, can take responsibility for her actions. I argue that the subject can find an appropriate measure for her actions in an awareness of the role her desire plays in her self- and world-constitution. I propose a measure derived from Simone Weil’s ethics of decreation: the subject accepts a “non-personal” symbolic understanding of herself that opens up space in her world of signifiers for all that is unknown, threatening, or demanding about the other’s desire. Lacan’s critics must therefore respond to Weil’s contention that ethics requires almost no “self” at all.     

On negativity in Revolution in Poetic Language

Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language offers a challenge to theories of the subject in psychoanalysis, linguistic theory, and in philosophy. Central to that challenge is Kristeva’s conception of negativity. In this article, I trace the development of the concept of negativity in Revolution in Poetic Language from its root in Hegel, to rejection, which Kristeva develops out of Freud. Both are crucial to the development of the material dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic that makes up Kristeva’s subject-in-process/on trial. I argue that a clearer understanding of Kristeva’s conception of negativity helps us to better appreciate the force of Kristeva’s challenge, both philosophically and politically. Finally I argue that Kristevan negativity also helps us to clarify the relation between the delimited space of politics and its conditions, laying the groundwork for constitutive exclusion as political critique and opening a space for the possibility of political re-constitutions.     

Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

The Great Mother and the Terrible Mother: mimesis,alterity and attachment in adolescence

This paper discusses attachment, the longing for familiarity and sameness (mimesis), the search for difference and separateness (alterity) and the problem with the Other¹ seen through the lens ofthe individuation process in adolescence. These are explored with reference to relational aspects and Levinas and Girard's divergent views of the Other. The relational space, which in Phillip Bromberg's (2003) words is ‘uniquely relational, but still uniquely individual’ and in which analyst and patient ‘stand together in the space between realities’, might under exceptional circumstances be transformed into ‘a twilight space where the impossible becomes possible’ (p. 573). I will sketch a developmental trajectory starting from primitive states, in which the presence of the Other,as a separate entity cannot be tolerated and where the patient strives for total mimesis. Should the analyst prematurely shatter this illusion, she becomes an alien ‘Other’; a wolf in sheep's clothing. I trace the current psychoanalytic paradigm shift to an emphasis on the co‐creation of meaning in the interpersonal space and explore what alterity consists of and how much of the other's unknowability can be tolerated and respected without a translation into one's own idiom. The clinical vignettes illustrate aspects of therapy which normally lie outside the analytical remit and are culled from an inpatient setting and private practice.     

Participation by being: Teenage girls' hanging out at the shopping mall as ‘dwelling with’ [the world]

In this paper, I talk about young teenage girls' hanging out at the shopping mall. I approach hanging out as ‘dwelling with’ commercial spaces by thinking of it as 1) a meaningful practical engagement, and as 2) marking and claiming spaces as one's own. Hanging out with friends often goes on without much reflection, but it is deeply affectual. Because hanging out is wonderfully purposeless, space is cleared for the inspiring mood of enchantment. This receptivity can make ‘dwelling with’ possible. Hanging out can be conceptualized as playful being-in-the-world that allows for improvisations with one's surroundings in movement: an event of different rhythm, openness and experiment. By drifting at the mall, ‘actively doing nothing’, girls are open to the new and surprising. Therefore, hanging out can provide a momentary way out from the seriousness of adult life and make space for enchantment. A micro-atmosphere of play is produced when girls engage with the commercial space and artifacts. A kind of counter-politics of affect actuates from the intra-active play between girls and the things that matter to them. While hanging out, girls make temporary ‘hangout homes’ for themselves, and acquire situated rights to spaces by dwelling with them.     

Lawlor Laid Out: Between Space and Emotion

This essay explores two topics in Leonard Lawlor’s work: the role of space and the place of emotion. Lawlor’s early and middle works offer a complex and subtle discussion of time, with occasional adversions to space. I attempt to draw out what he says, or should say, about space and place in an effort for it to be given its due in the face of the temporocentrism that is endemic in continental philosophy since Bergson. From there I explore the role of affect and emotion in Lawlor’s more recent writing, arguing for its centrality in his promising and productive idea of “speaking out.”     

Naturalism and the Space of Reasons in Mind and World

Abstract

This paper aims to show that many criticisms of McDowell’s naturalism of second nature are based on what I call ‘the orthodox interpretation’ of McDowell’s naturalism. The orthodox interpretation is, however, a misinterpretation, which results from the fact that the phrase ‘the space of reasons’ is used equivocally by McDowell in Mind and World. Failing to distinguish two senses of ‘the space of reasons’, I argue that the orthodox interpretation renders McDowell’s naturalism inconsistent with McDowell’s Hegelian thesis that the conceptual is unbounded. My interpretation saves McDowell from being inconsistent. However, the upshot of my interpretation is that what is really at work in McDowell’s diagnosis of the dualism between nature and reason is the Hegelian thesis, not the naturalism of second nature.