Historical Contingency and the Impact of Scientific Imperialism

In a recent article in this journal, Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh propose a normative basis for John Dupré's criticisms of scientific imperialism, namely that scientific imperialism can cause a discipline to fail to progress in ways that it otherwise would have. This proposal is based on two presuppositions: one, that scientific disciplines have developmental teleologies, and two, that these teleologies are optimal. I argue that we should reject both of these presuppositions and so conclude that Clarke and Walsh's proposal is insufficiently warranted for it to provide a normative basis for criticisms of scientific imperialism.     

Scientific Imperialism and the Proper Relations between the Sciences

John Dupré argues that ‘scientific imperialism’ can result in ‘misguided’ science being considered acceptable. ‘Misguided’ is an explicitly normative term and the use of the pejorative ‘imperialistic’ is implicitly normative. However, Dupré has not justified the normative dimension of his critique. We identify two ways in which it might be justified. It might be justified if colonisation prevents a discipline from progressing in ways that it might otherwise progress. It might also be justified if colonisation prevents the expression of important values in the colonised discipline. This second concern seems most pressing in the human sciences.     

Scientific Imperialism: Difficulties in Definition,Identification, and Assessment

This article identifies and analyses issues related to defining and evaluating the so-called scientific imperialism. It discusses John Dupré's account, suggesting that it is overly conservative and does not offer a definition of scientific imperialism in not presenting it as a phenomenon of interdisciplinarity. It then discusses the recent account by Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh, taking issue with ideas such as illegitimate occupation, counterfactual progress, and culturally significant values. A more comprehensive and refined framework of my own is then summarized. It suggests types and aspects of scientific imperialism as a dynamic interdisciplinary relationship, distinguishing between imperialism of scope, style and standing, for example. It also suggests normative (ontological, epistemological, axiological and institutional) constraints on scientific imperialism. This enables us to distinguish, in principle, recommendable from non-recommendable kinds of it, while recognizing the difficulties involved in trying to do this in practice.     

如何看待科学主义

奇特的美国人,即为人类登月而崇拜科学,又有近一半的人不相信“进化论”,而相信各种各样的超自然现象。     

Economics Imperialism and Epistemic Cosmopolitanism

The standard view on economics imperialism is that it should be resisted when it is epistemically or morally harmful. I argue that the moral dimension of economics imperialism is in need of further analysis. In my view, economics imperialism is wrong when imperialists violate the epistemic responsibility they have towards scientists working in the discipline that is the target for imperialist explorations. By epistemic responsibility, I refer to a moral duty to justify one’s knowledge claims to a particular audience so that the justification appeals to at least some of the standards of argumentation recognized by that audience.     

全球帝国主义与重构的后现代主义

现代文化和政治已经导致了全球帝国主义,即一种通过一个国家来创建一个无所不包的帝国的尝试。为了战胜这种全球帝国主义,需要从现代世界秩序转向一种后现代世界秩序,其中,以主权为基础的民族国家的无政府秩序将被全球民主所取代。怀特海式的重构的后现代主义为后现代政治的双重任务(抵抗全球帝国主义和建立全球民主)提供了各种文化资源。     

Scientism, deconstruction, and nihilism

I show how scientism leads to deconstruction and both, in turn, lead to nihilism. Nihilism constitutes a denial both of the existence of fallacious moral reasoning and the existence of a moral dimension to fallacious reasoning. I argue against all of these positions by maintaining that (1) there is a pre-theoretical framework of norms within which technical thinking function, (2) the pre-theoretical framework cannot itself be technically conceptualized, and (3) the explication of this framework permits us to identify both fallacies of moral reasoning and the immorality of fallacious reasoning.     

How Not to Criticise Scientism

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self-referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.     

Identity,Recovery, and Religious Imperialism

Cultural disintegration and the resulting loss of self-esteem have acted as precursors for rampant substance abuse in indigenous American communities. Especially at risk are Native women, who have little recognition in the dominant culture, but whose traditional roles of respect have also dwindled with forced acculturation. Just when a wave of reconversion (going "back to the blanket") is taking hold among Native women substance users/abusers, the even more prevalent commercialization of Indian religion and pseudo-religion are denigrating these recaptured sources of dignity and pride. This "religious imperialism" doesn't just parody true Native faiths; it robs Native women in recovery of the self-esteem building tool which has proven most effective. It also continues the appropriation of indigenous culture which further serves to undermine coming generations of Native American women.     

对科学主义新版本的质疑

一、科学主义的旧版本关于科学主义的旧版本,说法也很多,选择几种有代表性的。1.“科学主义”一词最早出现于1877年。它的原意是指“作为科学家特征的方法、精神态度等等。”2.随后我们便发现了一本专门讲科学主义的书,英国学者汤姆·索雷尔的《科学主义》,书中指出:“科学主义就是这样的信念:科学特别是自然科学是人类知识中最有价值的部分——因为它最有权威,最严肃和最有益。”     

Science and Scientism in Huston Smith's Why Religion Matters

Huston Smith is justifiably critical of scientism, the belief that science is the only reliable path to truth. He holds that scientism and the materialism that accompanies it have led to a widespread denial of the transcendence expressed in traditional religious world-views. He argues that evolutionary theory should be seen as a product of scientism rather than of scientific evidence, citing authors who claim that the fossil record does not support the idea of continuous descent with modification from earlier life forms. I suggest that he has underestimated the cumulative weight of evidence from many independent fields of science supporting neo-Darwinism. I argue that methodological (but not philosophical) naturalism is a basic assumption of scientific inquiry. Proponents of intelligent design assume a fixed plan or blueprint, which is compatible with Smith's understanding of God's timeless vision. By contrast, almost all biologists and many theologians today envisage a dynamic and open-ended process rather than the realization of the unchanging forms in a preexisting plan.     

科学主义的尴尬与中医学的多向度发展

近５０年的中医现代化研究暴露了科学主义试图消解其他向度存在的独尊倾向,而经络实质研究、证客观化研究等方面的失败,宣告了科学主义并不是解决中医学所有问题的灵丹妙药。科学主义所遇到的这种尴尬局面表明,中医学应该有多种向度的发展,除了现代化研究这一模式之外,至少还应当有两种向度的存在,即原有形态的传统中医学体系应继续存在下去,传统中医学在技术上与西医学的结合应当受到鼓励。     

守住医学的疆界——关于医学中的科学主义与金钱至上主义

医学的疆界是增进人的健康。当今,有两个因素在诱惑医学超越固有的疆界。医学不仅应当求真,而且应当求善。强化医学人文教育是医学教育改革的当务之急。向医学生注入热爱病人、热爱生命、尊重人的尊严,是医学人文教育的根本目的。     

Imperialism,Progress, Developmental Teleology,and Interdisciplinary Unification

In a previous article in this journal, we examined John Dupré's claim that ‘scientific imperialism’ can lead to ‘misguided’ science being considered acceptable. Here, we address criticisms raised by Ian J. Kidd and Uskali Mäki against that article. While both commentators take us to be offering our own account of scientific imperialism that goes beyond that developed by Dupré, and go on to criticise what they take to be our account, our actual ambitions were modest. We intended to ‘explicate the sense in which the term is used by Dupré’ and to ‘identify the normative content of his critique of scientific imperialism’. We made no claim to have developed our own account of scientific imperialism that went further than what was implicit in Dupré's work already. However, that said, the discussions presented by both Kidd and Mäki raise important general issues about how the idea of scientific imperialism should be understood and framed. Here, we offer our considered responses to Kidd's and Maki's discussions of scientific imperialism.