Autopoietic Enactivism,Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities.

     

Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology

Pragmatism’s naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition’s anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition’s criticisms of naturalism.     

Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow for the possibility of supernatural entities.

Ambiguity,the Trinity,and Naturalism: From the Methodology of Pannenberg to the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

Through an interpretation of Wolfhart Pannenberg's trinitarian methodology, this article presents the argument that theology and naturalism are ambiguously intertwined and that we once again have to determine how to methodologically address the relationship between theology and science. This study contends that Pannenberg's theology is important for our conception of the dialog between theology and science. However, I wish to offer a fundamentally new interpretation of Pannenberg which locates the ambiguous character of his methodology primarily in the substantive issue with which it deals. This redirects the dialogue between theology and science through Pannenberg's hermeneutic of history towards the contemporary phenomenology of the body and ultimately to the suggestion of a trinitarian-phenomenological approach beyond the methodology of Pannenberg.     

Metaphysics Within Science: Against Radical Naturalism

In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version of naturalistic metaphysics and propose that contemporary analytic metaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether (i) science and metaphysics are separable, (ii) intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and (iii) Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics is that successful scientific research presupposes metaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common to metaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories.     

Science,Religious Naturalism,and Biblical Theology: Ground for the Emergence of Sustainable Living

During this century, humans must learn to live in ways that are sustainable, both ecologically and morally. The global community already consumes more ecological resources than Earth can generate; population growth and increasing development are widening that gap. We suggest that paths to sustainability can be found by mindful reflection on meanings discerned in the convergence of a scientific understanding of nature, religious naturalism, and biblical understandings of creation. The patterns of ecological sustainability observed in natural systems and the wise ways of relating to the land discerned in the Hebrew Bible suggest that sustainability must be grounded in social and ecological justice and that just ways of living can emerge from a deep sense of the ways in which nature and all of humanity are interdependent. We conclude that the twentieth-century emphasis on individual control of our future must make room for the emergence of a new understanding of mutuality. There can be no flourishing apart from mutual flourishing.     

Phenomenology and the Third Generation of Cognitive Science: Towards a Cognitive Phenomenology of the Body

Phenomenology of the body and the third generation of cognitive science, both of which attribute a central role in human cognition to the body rather than to the Cartesian notion of representation, face the criticism that higher-level cognition cannot be fully grasped by those studies. The problem here is how explicit representations, consciousness, and thoughts issue from perception and the body, and how they cooperate in human cognition. In order to address this problem, we propose a research program, a cognitive phenomenology of the body, which is basically motivated by the perspective of Merleau-Ponty. We find a substantial clue in developmental psychological studies on the body and language.

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Naturalism: A Critical Analysis

Book Information Naturalism: A Critical Analysis. Edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Routledge. London. 2000. Pp. xv + 286. £60.00.     

Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach

In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasamvitti as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness.     

历史视野中自然主义与自然化认识论的演化与嬗变

自然主义作为一种有影响的哲学运动的出现是很晚近的事情,文章详细梳理了自然主义与自然化认识论的历史发展与演化的轨迹,指出自然主义与自然化认识论的复兴,是科学哲学研究路线在当代发生转向的重要标志。     

Naturalism and the A Priori

Philosophical Studies -