God’s silence

Vagueness manifests itself (among other things) in our inability to find boundaries to the extension of vague predicates. A semantic theory of vagueness plans to justify this inability in terms of the vague semantic rules governing language and thought. According to a supporter of semantic theory, the inability to find such a boundary is not dependent on epistemic limits and an omniscient being like God would be equally unable. Williamson (Vagueness, 1994) argued that cooperative omniscient beings adequately instructed would find a precise boundary in a sorites series and that, for this reason, the semantic theory misses its target, while Hawthorne (Philosophical Studies 122:1–25, 2005) stood with the semantic theorists and argued that the linguistic behaviour of a cooperative omniscient being like God would clearly demonstrate that he does not find a precise boundary in the sorites series. I argue that Hawthorne’s definition of God’s cooperative behaviour cannot be accepted and that, contrary to what has been assumed by both Williamson and Hawthorne, an omniscient being like God cannot be a cooperative evaluator of a semantic theory of vagueness.     

Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites

Call an argument a ‘happy sorites’ if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, however, that appears to allow for at least some happy sorites arguments: strict finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. My aim in this paper is to explore to what extent this appearance is accurate. As we shall see, this question is far from trivial. In particular, I will discuss two arguments that threaten to show that strict finitism cannot consistently accept happy sorites arguments, but I will argue that (given reasonable assumptions on strict finitistic logic) these arguments can ultimately be avoided, and the view can indeed allow for happy sorites arguments.     

WHAT WILLIAMSON'S ANTI‐LUMINOSITY ARGUMENT REALLY IS*

Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his argument is not a sorites argument; I explain why he has not given us any reason to accept the claim.     

V—Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought

The problem of vagueness and the sorites paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites.     

JUST WHAT IS VAGUENESS?

We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth‐value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of ‘vagueness’ must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total‐ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of ‘vagueness’, we propose a very general non‐question‐begging definition.     

论Priest对Sorites悖论的模糊解悖方案

G.Priest在1998-2003年之间有一个对sorites悖论的模糊解悖方案,根据该解悖方案,对含混语言的最佳语意论应该是某种的模糊语意论。在这样的模糊语意论中,边界语句是既真且假的语句,而sorites悖论中所涉及的离断律和等同传递律则不是有效的推论步骤。Priest并试图利用这样的语意论去说明：为什么sorites悖论看起来像是有效的论证,以及为什么切割点的存在尽管必然却违反直觉。我在本文中论证：Priest的模糊解悖方案是一个完全失败的方案,因此最好被放弃。我论证,Priest的模糊解悖方案至少有以下几个主要的问题：它与Priest的真理理论以及双面真理论不兼容、它对于sorites悖论的诊断有特设的嫌疑、它对于sorites悖论为何看起来有效的说明不具有可信度、它对于切割点存在何以违反直觉的说明也不具有可信度、它有将高阶含混性崩塌为一阶含混性之虞。     

SCHIFFER ON VAGUENESS

Abstract:  I go through, and criticize, Stephen Schiffer's account of vagueness and the sorites paradox. I discuss his notion of a happy-face solution to a paradox, his appeal to vagueness-related partial belief, his claim that indeterminacy is a psychological notion, and his view that the sorites premise and the inference rule of modus ponens are indeterminate.     

Why Induction Is No Cure For Baldness

The paper aims at establishing that the premises of both the inductive and the multi‐premised versions of the sorites argument are not apparently acceptable and that, therefore, sorites‐type arguments do not constitute logical or conceptual paradoxes. Rather, it is suggested that such arguments are most properly and fruitfully described as skeptical challenges. A secondary goal of the paper is to focus attention to the unduly neglected inductive version of the argument.     

Towards a theory of communicative competence

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ‘performative utterance’, the author elucidates the role of dialogue‐constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a”; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis.     

A Model of Tolerance

According to the naive theory of vagueness, the vagueness of an expression consists in the existence of both positive and negative cases of application of the expression and in the non-existence of a sharp cut-off point between them. The sorites paradox shows the naive theory to be inconsistent in most logics proposed for a vague language. The paper explores the prospects of saving the naive theory by revising the logic in a novel way, placing principled restrictions on the transitivity of the consequence relation. A lattice-theoretical framework for a whole family of (zeroth-order) “tolerant logics” is proposed and developed. Particular care is devoted to the relation between the salient features of the formal apparatus and the informal logical and semantic notions they are supposed to model. A suitable non-transitive counterpart to classical logic is defined. Some of its properties are studied, and it is eventually shown how an appropriate regimentation of the naive theory of vagueness is consistent in such a logic.     

Integrating the stereotype content model (warmth and competence) and the Osgood semantic differential (evaluation,potency, and activity)

We integrate two prominent models of social perception dimensionality. In three studies, we demonstrate how the well‐established semantic differential dimensions of evaluation and potency relate to the stereotype content model dimensions of warmth and competence. Specifically, using a correlational design (Study 1) and experimental designs (Studies 2 and 3), we found that semantic differential dimensions run diagonally across stereotype content model quadrants. Implications of integrating classic and modern approaches of social perception are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analysis of word comprehension in a case of pure word deafness

A case of pure word deafness due to a left temporal infarct is reported. The results of dichotic tests suggest that auditory verbal material may be processed in the right hemisphere. The inability to repeat nonsense words, the frequent semantic paraphasias in real-word repetition tasks, and the capacity to give a partial account of the meaning of a word that the patient cannot repeat show that despite the impairment of the phonological analysis, lexical semantic processing is possible. An attempt is made to demonstrate that the patient resorts to this semantic processing and that this reflects the linguistic competence of the right hemisphere.     

Semantic additivity and semantic inhibition: dissociable processes in the cerebral hemispheres?

We report the results of two visual half-field semantic priming experiments using a high proportion of related trials to examine hemisphere asymmetries for semantic processes beyond those attributable to automatic meaning activation. Contrary to previous investigations, we obtained inhibition for unrelated trials in both visual fields. However, priming was additive (being greater for words related via category membership and association than for either single dimension) only when words were presented to the RVF/left hemisphere. A third experiment, using centrally presented stimuli, implied that semantic additivity should be attributed to post-access meaning comparisons and inhibition to the generation of semantic expectancies. These results suggest (1) that inhibition and additivity are potentially dissociable "controlled" semantic processes and (2) that the left hemisphere predominates for meaning integration across successively presented words. The availability of finely tuned meaning integration processes in the left hemisphere may contribute to its superiority in language processing, despite right hemisphere competence for some semantic operations.     

Slippery Slopes and Collapsing Taboos

A slippery slope argument is an argument to this twofold effect. First, that if a policy or practice P is permitted, then we lack the dialectical resources to demonstrate that a similar policy or practice P* is not permissible. Since P* is indeed not permissible, we should not endorse policy or practice P. At the heart of such arguments is the idea of dialectical impotence, the inability to stop the acceptance of apparently small deviations from a heretofore secure policy or practice from leading to apparently large and unacceptable deviations. Using examples of analogical arguments and sorites arguments I examine this phenomenon in the context of collapsing taboos.     

Higher-Order Sorites Paradox

The naive theory of vagueness holds that the vagueness of an expression consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. The naive theory is contrasted with the nowadays dominant approach to vagueness, holding that the vagueness of an expression consists in its presenting borderline cases of application. The two approaches are briefly compared in their respective explanations of a paramount phenomenon of vagueness: our ignorance of any sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. These explanations clearly do not provide any ground for choosing the dominant approach against the naive theory. The decisive advantage of the former over the latter is rather supposed to consist in its immunity to any form of sorites paradox. But another paramount phenomenon of vagueness is higher-order vagueness: the expressions (such as ‘borderline’ and ‘definitely’) introduced in order to express in the object language the vagueness of the object language are themselves vague. Two highly plausible claims about higher-order vagueness are articulated and defended: the existence of “definitely ^ω ” positive and negative cases and the “radical” character of higher-order vagueness itself. Using very weak logical principles concerning vague expressions and the ‘definitely’-operator, it is then shown that, in the presence of higher-order vagueness as just described, the dominant approach is subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes analogous to the original ones besetting the naive theory, and therefore that, against the communis opinio, it does not fare substantially better with respect to immunity to any form of sorites paradox.     

Indiscriminability as Indiscernibility by Default

Most solutions to the sorites reject its major premise, i.e. the quantified conditional . This rejection appears to imply a discrimination between two elements that are supposed to be indiscriminable. Thus, the puzzle of the sorites involves in a fundamental way the notion of indiscriminability. This paper analyzes this relation and formalizes it, in a way that makes the rejection of the major premise more palatable. The intuitive idea is that we consider two elements indiscriminable by default, i.e. unless we know some information that discriminates between them. Specifically, following Rough Set Theory, two elements are defined to be indiscernible if they agree on the vague property in question. Then, a is defined to be indiscriminable from b if a is indiscernible by default from b. That is to say, a is indiscriminable from b if it is consistent to assume that a and b agree on the relevant vague property. Indiscernibility by default is formalized with the use of Default Logic, and is shown to have intuitively desirable properties: it is entailed by equality, is reflexive and symmetric. And while the relation is neither transitive nor substitutive, it is “almost” substitutive. This definition of indiscriminability is incorporated into three major theories of vagueness, namely the supervaluationist, epistemic, and contextualist views. Each one of these theories is reduced to a different strategy dealing with multiple extensions in Default Logic, and the rejection of the major premise is shown to follow naturally. Thus, while the proposed notion of indiscriminability does not solve the sorites by itself, it does make the unintuitive conclusion of many of its proposed solutions—the rejection of the major premise—a bit easier to accept.     

The Role of Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Pragmatic Computations

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Some and possibly all dogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not all dogs are mammals,” known as a scalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.     

On the Epistemology of Language

Epistemology of language, a branch of both epistemology and the philosophy of language, asks what knowledge of language consists in. In this paper, I argue that such an inquiry is a pointless enterprise due to its being based upon the incorrect assumption that linguistic competence requires knowledge of language. However, I do not think the phenomenon of knowledge of language is trivial. I propose a virtue‐theoretic account of linguistic competence, and then explain the phenomenon from a virtue‐semantic point of view.     

Vagueness and Naturalness

I attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness with classical logic and bivalence. I hold that for any vague predicate there is a sharp cut-off between the things that satisfy it and the things that do not; I claim that this is due to the greater naturalness of one of the candidate meanings of that predicate. I extend the thought to the problem of the many and Benacerraf cases. I go on to explore the idea that it is ontically indeterminate what the most natural meanings are, and hence ontically indeterminate where the sharp cut-off in a sorites series is.     

Competence and Trust in Choice Architecture

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s Nudge advances a theory of how designers can improve decision-making in various situations where people have to make choices. We claim that the moral acceptability of nudges hinges in part on whether they can provide an account of the competence required to offer nudges, an account that would serve to warrant our general trust in choice architects. What needs to be considered, on a methodological level, is whether they have clarified the competence required for choice architects to prompt subtly our behaviour toward making choices that are in our best interest from our own perspectives. We argue that, among other features, an account of the competence required to offer nudges would have to clarify why it is reasonable to expect that choice architects can understand the constraints imposed by semantic variance. Semantic variance refers to the diverse perceptions of meaning, tied to differences in identity and context, that influence how users interpret nudges. We conclude by suggesting that choice architects can grasp semantic variance if Thaler and Sunstein’s approach to design is compatible with insights about meaning expressed in science and technology studies and the philosophy of technology.