Action and Variation in Perception

In her paper, ‘Action and Self‐location in Perception’, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know‐how. That, in turn, requires self‐locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and an agent, viz., someone who has a capacity for actions. She also makes two objections, viz., the unification objection and the sentient statue objection, to Alva Noë's sensorimotor view, a different account of how perceptual experience depends on actions. I will argue that her objections jointly render problematic not only Noë's but also her own view.     

Perception And Action: Alternative Views

A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected.Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and action are seen as instrumentallyinterdependent. It is argued here that a betteralternative is to reject both assumptions, resultingin a two-level interdependence view in whichperception and action co-depend on dynamicallycircular subpersonal relations and as a result may bemore than merely instrumentally interdependent. Thisis illustrated by reference to motor theories ofperception and control theories of action.     

Perception and Action Are Inseparable

In her article, Michaels (2000) defined action as "a temporally bounded, observable, goal-directed movement (or non-movement) that entails intention, the detection of information, and a lawful relation between that information and the movement" (p. 251). She defined perception as "the detection of information" (p. 244). This forces one to conclude that it is impossible to study action separately from perception. We argue that perceptual judgments are communicated by movements and that it is impossible to distinguish movements reporting perceptual judgments from other movements, so we conclude that the reverse also is true: It is impossible to study perception separately from action.     

Practical Perception and Intelligent Action

Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge‐how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding.     

Asymmetries in Coupling Dynamics of Perception and Action

The influence of information-based dynamics on coordination dynamics of rhythmic movement was examined with special reference to the expression of asymmetries. In Experiment 1, right-handed subjects performed unimanual, rhythmical movements in coordination with either a discrete or continuous visual display. The right hand-visual display system defined a more stable perception-action collective than the left, particularly when continuous visual information was available. In Experiment 2, the same subjects performed rhythmic bimanual movements in coordination with a continuous visual display. The action collective was inherently more stable than the perception-action collective, although similar patterns were observed at both levels. Importantly, the dynamics of the perception-action collective impinged upon the dynamics of the action collective in terms of stability. Asymmetries remained evident between limbs in the bimanual preparations, with the left hand exhibiting greater limit-cycle variability and also a tendency to more often effect transitions at the action couple. Features of dynamical models that capture characteristics of manual asymmetries are discussed.     

Seeing by Feeling: Virtues,Skills, and Moral Perception

Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue.     

Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception*

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3‐D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.     

A Systems Approach to Perception and Action

ABSTRACT

On the 50th anniversary of its publication, we look back on some of the intellectual contributions of Gibson's (1966) The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. This work is often seen as contributing a new perspective to our understanding of the 5 senses. In this paper, we explore another intellectual contribution: Gibson's treatment of perception–action as an irreducible, functional system. We review select examples of systems thinking from the physical, animal, and human social domains. Our suggestion is that a systems-level approach to social interactions would have been a natural extension of Gibson's ideas.     

The Social Nature of Perception and Action

ABSTRACT— Humans engage in a wide range of social activities. Previous research has focused on the role of higher cognitive functions, such as mentalizing (the ability to infer others' mental states) and language processing, in social exchange. This article reviews recent studies on action perception and joint action suggesting that basic perception–action links are crucial for many social interactions. Mapping perceived actions to one's own action repertoire enables direct understanding of others' actions and supports action identification. Joint action relies on shared action representations and involves modeling of others' performance in relation to one's own. Taking the social nature of perception and action seriously not only contributes to the understanding of dedicated social processes but has the potential to create a new perspective on the individual mind and brain.     

Embodied Perception and the Economy of Action

ABSTRACT— Perception informs people about the opportunities for action and their associated costs. To this end, explicit awareness of spatial layout varies not only with relevant optical and ocular-motor variables, but also as a function of the costs associated with performing intended actions. Although explicit awareness is mutable in this respect, visually guided actions directed at the immediate environment are not. When the metabolic costs associated with walking an extent increase—perhaps because one is wearing a heavy backpack—hills appear steeper and distances to targets appear greater. When one is standing on a high balcony, the apparent distance to the ground is correlated with one's fear of falling. Perceiving spatial layout combines the geometry of the world with behavioral goals and the costs associated with achieving these goals.     

Developing the Individual: Life Skills and Family Therapy

Two bodies of literature on life skills and on family therapy have developed from different sources but have interesting similarities. Life skills comes from training and educational thinking, and concentrates upon the skills of and strategies for coping. Family therapy focuses upon the disturbance of an individual as symbolic of the dynamics of the family, but has at its roots a more-or-less explicit model of what constitutes an effective family, where the interactions can be readily understood in life-skill terms. The two approaches are compared and contrasted.     

Cultural Differences in Attitudes Toward Smoking: Developing Messages Using the Theory of Reasoned Action1

The theory of reasoned action was used to identify the culturally appropriate beliefs of Hispanic smokers that might be targeted in an anti-smoking campaign. In-depth interviews were conducted with 263 Hispanics and 150 non-Hispanic whites. Intentions to quit smoking were predicted most strongly by the attitudinal rather than the normative component of the model. A pattern of cultural differences between the two ethnic groups was identified. Family-related consequences and concerns about bad smell contributed more to Hispanic attitudes toward quitting than to those of non-Hispanic whites, while the effects of withdrawal from cigarettes contributed more to non-Hispanic whites'attitudes than to Hispanics'. The bad smell of cigarettes, improving relationships with the family, weight gain, breathing more easily, and having a better taste in the mouth were the consequences of smoking and quitting that most strongly discriminated between those Hispanics intending and not intending to quit. These results should be used in the creation of culturally appropriate anti-smoking messages for this group.     

Virtues,Skills, and Right Action

According to Rosalind Hursthouse’s virtue based account of right action, an act is right if it is what a fully virtuous person would do in that situation. Robert Johnson has criticized the account on the grounds that the actions a non-virtuous person should take are often uncharacteristic of the virtuous person, and thus Hursthouse’s account of right action is too narrow. The non-virtuous need to take steps to improve themselves morally, and the fully virtuous person need not take these steps. So Johnson argues that any virtue based account of right action will have to find a way to ground a moral obligation to improve oneself. This paper argues that there is an account of virtue that can offer a partial solution to Johnson’s challenge, an account where virtue is a type of practical skill and in which the virtuous person is seen as having expertise. The paper references the account of skill acquisition developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Their research demonstrates that novices in a skill have to employ different strategies to act well than the strategies used by the experts, and so the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis provides support for Johnson’s claim that the actions of the non-virtuous will differ from the virtuous. On the other hand, their research suggests that there is no separating the commitment to improve yourself from the possession of expertise, and so the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis has the resources for grounding the obligation to improve oneself in an account of virtue.     

Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.     

Predicting the Effects of Actions: Interactions of Perception and Action

Many theories in cognitive psychology assume that perception and action systems are clearly separated from the cognitive system. Other theories suggest that important cognitive functions reside in the interactions between these systems. One consequence of the latter claim is that the action system may contribute to predicting the future consequences of currently perceived actions. In particular, such predictions might be more accurate when one observes one's own actions than when one observes another person's actions, because in the former case the system that plans the action is the same system that contributes to predicting the action's effects. In the present study, participants (N = watched video clips displaying either themselves or somebody else throwing a dart at a target board and predicted the dart's landing position. The predictions were more accurate when participants watched themselves acting. This result provides evidence for the claim that perceptual input can be linked with the action system to predict future outcomes of actions.