Postempiricism and psychological theory

Discusses postempiricism as a view of scientific knowledge and of knowledge in general. It gives a prominent role to theory in relation to experience, experiment, and action and emphasizes the contextual nature of knowledge. The articles by Dishion and Patterson (this issue), Evans (this issue), and Liddle (this issue) are all positioned clearly in this contemporary epistemology. Fonagy's (this issue) analysis of the apparent restriction of psychoanalytic methods of change is discussed.     

Literal meaning and psychological theory

This paper evaluates the psychological status of literal meaning. Most linguistic and philosophical theories assume that sentences have well-specified literal meanings which represent the meaning of a sentence independent of context. Recent debate on this issue has centered on whether literal meaning can be equated with context-free meaning, or whether a sentence's literal meaning is determined only given a set of background assumptions. Neither of these positions meet the demands of a psychological theory of language understanding. Sentences do not have well-defined literal meanings, regardless of whether these are determined in light of a set of background assumptions. Moreover, the putative literal meanings of sentences do not contribute in systematic ways toward the understanding of speakers' utterance meanings. These observations suggest that the distinctions between literal and metaphoric meanings, and between semantics and pragmatics, have little psychological validity.     

Causal Co-personality: In defence of the psychological continuity theory

Abstract

The view that an account of personal identity can be provided in terms of psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e. the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be examples of states that it ascribes wrongly using only the causal connections available to it. In this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks.     

The theory of psychological reversals: A review and critique

The main elements in the new theory of psychological reversals are examined. One application of the theory, in the crisis-counselling field, is explored to illustrate its practical implications. A number of problems associated with the recent development of the theory are identified.     

Decision making, risk taking and psychological time: Review of empirical findings and psychological theory

Three domains of research (1) involvement in past and future events, (2) knowledge of the past and the future, and (3) value as a function of time (discounting) were used to elucidate man's limitations when he makes decisions based on earlier experience with consequences in the close and distant future. Evidence from all three areas illustrate that man is captured in a narrow time-space sphere around "here and now".—One consequence of this limitation is that risk-willingness increases the longer ahead the outcome of a decision is likely to occur. To specify, the less we are involved in, the less we know of and the less the consequences are evaluated the larger is our willingness to make decisions with future risks. Learning from experience seems to play a minor role in improving decision making. Ill-defined problems and non-distinct outcomes make "economic man" fairly useless as a norm for decision making in decisions with longranging effects and of a non-repititive character.—The paper ends with a discussion of strategies that can compensate for the limitations of distal cognition.     

Logical versus psychological necessity: A discussion of the role of common sense in psychological theory

Smedslund's has argued that psychological theory should be concerned with the logical analysis of common sense since (a) empirical data are "arbitrary" and no general and empirical laws can exist when it comes to human action; and (b) theoretical explanation of data is likely to be empirically empty—psychological theory often cannot be falsified. The argument was supported mainly by an analysis of Bandura's self-efficacy conceptions. Bandura's approach is, however, not developed to the point of being an explicit theory, a fact that explains why it can be demonstrated as being non-distinguishable from the naive analysis of action. Many well developed theories of decision making, such as Tversky's EBA theory, transcend common sense and are falsifiable. Common sense is, furthermore, subject to change over time and differs between cultures, and even between individuals. There is no such things as the common sense. It is also inconsistent and ambiguous and uses a loose mode of thinking which can often provide post hoc explanations but no predictions. Therefore, common sense probably offers little in the way of profound insights. Furthermore, the problems of inferrring general laws from unique events have not stifled progress in the natural sciences and should not discourage psychologists. The case for general laws in psychology is still being heard. Besides, even if findings are restricted in time and space they concern important questions of how people act here and now. Finally, Smedslund's attempt at logical analysis of treatment rules is shown to provide little more than semantic explication of the chosen definitions of key terms; in no way can such explication serve as a substitute for empirical research on psychotherapy effects.     

Person-centered theory and the contemporary practice of psychological testing

This paper examines the effects of person-centered theory on contemporary psychological testing. Seven basic ideas or assumptions, which are integral to and guide the testing process, are identified and briefly discussed. Each idea is considered to have been affected either directly or indirectly by person-centered philosophy. Some of the ways in which these ideas are reflected in contemporary testing practice are indicated.     

Parental psychological control dimensions: Connections with Russian preschoolers’ physical and relational aggression

Parental psychological control generally consists of overinvolved/protective and critical/rejecting elements, both being linked to children's psychosocial maladjustment. The critical/rejecting element is multidimensional in nature, and few studies have explored this conceptual fullness. It is possible that some dimensions, if they can be statistically differentiated, are uniquely tied to various child behaviors. This may help resolve some of the inconsistency apparent across studies, such as studies of relational aggression. Accordingly, we examined the association between parental psychological control and childhood physical and relational aggression using a dimensional approach. Participants were 204 Russian preschoolers and their parents. The results revealed that dimensions of psychosocial control (i.e., shaming/disappointment, constraining verbal expressions, invalidating feelings, love withdrawal, and guilt induction) could be statistically differentiated, even though most dimensions tended to be significantly correlated. Furthermore, all dimensions, except for invalidating feelings, were significantly associated with childhood aggression, but predominantly in same-gender parent–child dyads.